Daniel Jack, Jr

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
IN RE:
DANIEL JACK, JR.,
Debtor.
CASE NO. 25-56449-JWC
CHAPTER 13
DANIEL JACK, JR.,
Movant,
v.
SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING,
INC.; TOWD POINT MORTGAGE
TRUST 2020-02, U.S. BANK
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS
INDENTURE TRUSTEE; AND
MCCALLA, RAYMER, LEIBERT,
PIERCE, LLP,
Respondents.
CONTESTED MATTER
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Debtor Daniel Jack, Jr.’s Emergency Motion for Order to
IT IS ORDERED as set forth below:
________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
Jeffery W. Cavender
U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge
Date: September 25, 2026
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Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt for Willful Violation of
the Automatic Stay (11 U.S.C. § 362) (the “Stay Violation Motion”). The Court
construed the Stay Violation Motion as a request for sanctions for violations of the
automatic stay by respondents Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2020-2, U.S. Bank National
Association, 	as 	Indenture 	Trustee 	(the 	“Trust”), 	Select 	Portfolio 	Servicing, 	Inc.
(“Select”), and McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLP (“McCalla,” and together with the
Trust and Select, the “Respondents”). After several initial hearings, the Court held a
trial on the Stay Violation Motion April 22, 2026, at which Daniel Jack, Jr. (“Mr. Jack”)
and counsel for Respondents appeared, put on evidence, and made arguments. The
Court took the matter under advisement.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052, the Court makes the following findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
I. 	FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	Mr. Jack and his parents, Daniel Jack, Sr. and Rosa Jack, were the owners
of Mr. Jack’s residence located at 1185 To Lani Dr., Stone Mountain, Ga. 30083 (the
“Property”). Mr. Jack’s parents, but not Mr. Jack, borrowed money from Wachovia
Bank in 2006 pursuant to a promissory note. To secure the debt, Wachovia recorded a
Deed to Secure Debt with the Clerk of Superior Court for DeKalb County, GA (the
“Security Deed”). The face of the Security Deed shows the signatures of Mr. Jack and
his parents.
2. 	The Trust conducted a foreclosure sale of the Property at an auction held
May 6, 2025, pursuant to the Security Deed (the “Foreclosure Sale”). The Trust was
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the winning bidder at the Foreclosure Sale.
3. 	Mr. Jack filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy case June 10, 2025.
4. 	The Trust received notice of the bankruptcy soon after it was filed, and
counsel entered a notice of appearance for the Trust on August 14, 2025, and again on
October 3, 2025.
5. 	On August 1, 2025, Mr. Jack filed Adversary Proceeding No. 25-05140 (the
“Adversary Proceeding”) against the Respondents challenging the validity of the
Security Deed and the Foreclosure Sale. McCalla filed a motion to extend time to
answer in the Adversary Proceeding, and Select filed a motion to dismiss the Adversary
Proceeding.
6. 	When Mr. Jack filed his bankruptcy case, he was employed by Amedisys,
but he lost that job on or around September 4, 2025. According to a Separation Notice
from Amedisys, the reason for the separation was “Unsatisfactory Performance.”
7. 	Soon after losing his job with Amedisys, Mr. Jack received a job offer on
or around September 9, 2025, but he turned it down because he did not believe he could
accept it in good faith because of anxiety, insomnia, fatigue, stress, the time involved
in litigating pro se, and the time spent looking for an attorney in connection with his
bankruptcy case and dealings with the Respondents.
8. 	At a hearing in the bankruptcy case held September 30, 2025, Mr. Jack
stated that extreme stress resulted in sleeplessness, exhaustion, and deficiency in his
work capacity, resulting in job loss.
9. 	On October 22, 2025, the Trust recorded a Deed Under Power of Sale
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memorializing the Foreclosure Sale (the “Deed Under Power”) with the Clerk of
Superior Court for DeKalb County, GA.
10. 	On November 13, 2025, McCalla, on behalf of the Trust, sent a demand
for possession of the Property addressed to “Rosa Jack; Daniel Jack and/or All Other
Occupants and/or Tenants, Known or Unknown” (the “Demand for Possession”).
11. 	On November 18, 2025, a private process service posted a copy of the
Demand for Possession on a door at the Property.
12. 	On December 2, 2025, the Court held a hearing in Mr. Jack’s bankruptcy
case at which he discussed the Demand for Possession and asserted Respondents
violated the automatic stay.
13. 	On December 3, 2025, McCalla, on behalf of the Trust, initiated an
eviction proceeding in the Magistrate Court of DeKalb County, naming Daniel Jack,
Rosa L. Jack, “And All Others” occupying the Property (the “Dispossessory”).
14. 	On December 8, 2025, the Dispossessory affidavit and summons were
served by hand at the Property and by mail to the Property.
15. 	On December 9, 2025, Mr. Jack filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy and
Notice of Automatic Stay in the Dispossessory. He also filed the Stay Violation Motion
the same day requesting emergency relief.
16. 	On December 11, 2025, McCalla, on behalf of the Trust, filed a dismissal
of the Dispossessory without prejudice.
17. 	On December 16, 2025, the Court held an initial hearing on the Stay
Violation Motion. At the hearing Mr. Jack confirmed that the Trust dismissed the
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Dispossessory, and the Court determined the matter was not emergent and required
an evidentiary hearing.
18. 	On January 9, 2026, the Court dismissed Mr. Jack’s bankruptcy case and
the Adversary Proceeding. Mr. Jack appealed the orders and filed motions to stay
pending the appeal, which the Court denied.1
19. 	Mr. Jack resided at the Property during the entirety of his bankruptcy
case and through the day of the trial.
20. 	Select sent a Form 1099-A to Daniel Jack at the Property2 for tax year
2025. The face of the Form 1099-A indicates that the “lender,” defined as Select,
acquired the Property November 5, 2025.
21. 	On March 24, 2026, Select sent an Annual Escrow Account Disclosure
Statement (the “Escrow Statement”) addressed to “Daniel L Jack” and Rosa Jack at
the Property.
22. 	At the hearing, Mr. Jack offered testimony related to his damages. He
testified that he has spent over 800 hours in a state of “hypervigilance” since the
Dispossessory, including time spent drafting the Stay Violation Motion and time
1 Since the trial the District Court upheld the orders dismissing the bankruptcy case and
Adversary. See Jack v. Whaley, 26-CV-00427-VMC, Doc. Nos. 11 and 12 (N.D. Ga. June 23,
2026); Jack v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., 26-CV-00422-VMC, Doc. Nos. 14 and 15 (N.D. Ga.,
June 23, 2026). Mr. Jack further appealed those orders to the Eleventh Circuit. Mr. Jack also
had a separate lawsuit and appeal pending during the bankruptcy case. See Jack v. Select Serv.
Portfolio, Inc., et al, USCA11 Case No. 25-12233 (11th Cir.), appealing Jack v. Select Servicing
Portfolio, Inc., Case No. 25-CV-02477-VMC (N.D. Ga.). The appellate case was dismissed
January 15, 2026, soon after the Court dismissed the bankruptcy case.
2 Select mailed the Form 1099-A to the Property, but the Form does not specify between Daniel
Jack, Jr. (the Debtor) and Daniel Jack, Sr. (Debtor’s father). Both Jr. and Sr. held ownership
interests in the Property, but only Sr. was personally obligated on the underlying debt.
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diverted from work. Mr. Jack did not provide any testimony or evidence specifying how
many hours he devoted specifically to Respondents’ alleged stay violations. Mr. Jack
further 	offered 	testimony 	about 	emotional 	distress, 	including 	stress, 	anxiety,
sleeplessness, and fatigue. Although Mr. Jack offered some testimony about specific
distress resulting from the Demands for Possession and Dispossessory, the evidence
made clear that he experienced similar emotional distress related to his bankruptcy
case generally, the Adversary Proceeding, and his ongoing disputes and litigation with
Respondents that have no direct connection to any alleged stay violations.
23. 	Mr. Jack attempted to offer his own expert testimony about his emotional
distress, but the Court did not admit him as an expert after objection by Respondents.
Mr. Jack testified that he and his wife received relentless phone calls, texts, and other
solicitations after the Dispossessory was filed.
24. 	At the hearing, Mr. Jack offered the testimony of Ralph John in support
of damages. Mr. John is a close friend of Mr. Jack and has known him since 2008. Mr.
John testified about his interactions with Mr. Jack prior to the ongoing dispute with
Respondents and at various points during the bankruptcy case. He testified that he
visited Mr. Jack’s house or otherwise spent time with Mr. Jack often during October
and November of 2025. He testified that he was at Mr. Jack’s house the day that Mr.
Jack learned that the Deed Under Power was recorded, and he described Mr. Jack’s
reaction. He also testified to changes he perceived in Mr. Jack’s behavior and his
concern for his friend during the bankruptcy case. Mr. John was not with Mr. Jack
when Mr. Jack learned of the Dispossessory, but after the Dispossessory he observed
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that Mr. Jack was nervous about having visitors to his house for fear of being served
with dispossessory papers and instructed Mr. John not to come to his house without
advance warning. He also provided testimony about the changes he observed in Mr.
Jack following the Dispossessory, stating that things got worse, that it affected his
relationship with his children, it became difficult for Mr. Jack to function on a day-to-
day basis, and his energy level has been down. On cross-examination, Mr. John stated
that he was not aware that the Dispossessory was dismissed on December 11, 2025, or
that it was not pending as of the day of the trial.
25. 	At the hearing, the attorney who filed the Dispossessory, Andru Powers,
testified about the events leading to the filing of the Dispossessory. She described the
procedure employed by McCalla to check for bankruptcy filings to determine whether
the automatic stay is in place before filing a dispossessory. She testified, among other
things, that an automated system checks for PACER hits during the intake process.
Mr. Jack’s name and social security number generated positive PACER hits during the
process, and she testified that three human errors occurred. First, the positive PACER
hit should have caused an “eviction specialist” assigned to the case to place the positive
results in an attorney review queue, which would have created a “soft hold.” For
unknown reasons that did not occur. Second, the positive hit was not included in the
complaint package. Again, it is unclear why this happened. Third, Ms. Powers failed to
manually review the matter because, although she printed the complaint package and
intended to review it manually, she got distracted, put it aside, and forgot to review it.
26. 	She testified the firm has implemented two changes to its process to
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address the errors. First, when the automated PACER search generates a positive
result, the matter is automatically put into the attorney review queue. Second,
complaint packages cannot be generated unless a PACER search has been run within
24 hours.
27. 	She testified that she did not intend to violate the automatic stay by filing
the Dispossessory. She testified that the client, SPS or the Trust, generated the referral
to her firm but that clients do not expect the firm to file dispossessory cases if they are
not allowed to file them, and clients expect the firm to run PACER searches and
investigate other matters, such as military status, to determine whether dispossessory
cases are allowed to proceed. She testified that she had no direct communication with
the client regarding Mr. Jack’s bankruptcy case. She further testified that she filed the
dismissal of the Dispossessory immediately after personally receiving Mr. Jack’s
indication of bankruptcy filed in the Dispossessory.
II. 	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Venue is
proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1409. This matter is a core proceeding under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
When Mr. Jack filed his bankruptcy case, the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.
§362(a) went into effect. “[A]n individual injured by any willful violation of a stay
provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’
fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. §
362(k). “A party seeking damages for a stay violation must establish that: (1) a violation
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occurred; (2) the violation was committed willfully; and (3) the violation caused actual
damages.” Gordon v. Hill (In re Wilson), 454 B.R. 546, 550 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011)
(citing Hampton v. Yam's Choice Plus Autos, Inc., (In re Hampton), 319 B.R. 163, 170–
71 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005). The party seeking damages bears the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. Spinner v. Cash In a Hurry, LLC (In re Spinner), 398
B.R. 84, 94-95 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2008); Roche v. Pep Boys, Inc. (In re Roche), 361 B.R.
615, 624 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005). A stay violation is “willful” if the party (1) knew the
automatic stay was invoked and (2) intended the actions which violated the stay. In re
Allied Holdings, Inc., 355 B.R. 372, 378 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) (citing Jove Eng’g, Inc.
v. IRS, 92 F.3d 1539, 1554 (11th Cir. 1996)). “The defendant must have actual notice
of the stay for the violation to be willful. . . . However, proof of the defendant’s intent
to violate the stay is not required, only the defendant’s intent to act must be shown.”
In re Roche, 361 B.R. at 622 (citations omitted).
A. Did Respondents Violate the Automatic Stay?
The 	Court 	first 	addresses 	whether 	the 	Respondents 	committed 	any 	stay
violations. Mr. Jack asserted several potential stay violations: (1) notarizing and
recording the Deed Under Power; (2) sending the Demand for Possession; (3) filing the
Dispossessory; and (4) actions related to insurance on the Property.
1. 	Recording the Deed Under Power Did Not Violate the Stay
The Court finds that notarizing and recording the Deed Under Power did not
violate the automatic stay. As the Court has ruled in other orders in this case, Georgia
law is clear that a debtor’s right of redemption under a deed to secure debt terminates
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when the lender accepts a winning bid at a foreclosure sale, property sold at a
foreclosure sale does not become property of the bankruptcy estate in any subsequently
filed case even if the deed under power has not yet been recorded when the case is filed,
and any subsequent delivery and/or recording of the deed under power post-petition
does not violate the automatic stay.3
Mr. Jack has never disputed, and did not dispute at trial, that the Trust
conducted a foreclosure auction of the Property on May 6, 2025, at which the Trust was
selected as the winning bidder. Mr. Jack’s arguments are that 1) his interest in the
Property did not terminate until the Trust recorded the Deed Under Power, and 2) the
Security Deed was invalid due to notary fraud, rendering the Foreclosure Sale invalid.
As discussed, the Court has already rejected the first argument and does so again. Mr.
Jack’s presentation of the 1099-A Form at trial, the face of which indicates that Select
acquired an interest in the Property in November of 2025, does not change the Court’s
conclusion 	that 	Georgia 	law 	dictates 	that 	Mr. 	Jack’s 	interest 	in 	the 	Property
terminated at the Foreclosure Sale.4
3 See, e.g., Meadows v. Patel (In re Meadows), Case No. 25-64063-PMB, 2026 WL 1507733, *3
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 28, 2026) (“As this Court has previously explained, once a foreclosure
sale is concluded and the successful bid accepted, the debtor no longer retains a legal or
equitable interest in the property sufficient to bring it into the bankruptcy estate under 11
U.S.C. § 541.”); Lariscey v. MEB Loan Trust II (In re Lariscey), 2022 WL 789449 (Bankr. S.D.
Ga. 2022) (discussing issue and citing cases); Taylor v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Taylor),
Case No. 16–69706–PMB, AP No. 17–5253, 2018 WL 1267998 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. March 8, 2018)
(concluding that accepting winning bid at foreclosure sale terminates debtor’s right of
redemption and recording deed under power post-petition does not violate automatic stay).
4 Neither party developed any significant argument relative to the Form 1099-A or submitted
any authority related to the Form 1099-A, and the Court has found no authority addressing the
relevance of a Form 1099-A to the question of when a borrower’s interest in property is
terminated during the foreclosure process or whether such property becomes property of a
bankruptcy estate. The IRS instructions to Form 1099-A provide, “File Form 1099-A,
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As to the second argument, assuming Mr. Jack could prove his claims related to
a fraudulent notary signature on the Security Deed, an invalid notary signature does
not void the Security Deed or render it unenforceable; rather, attestation defects affect
the recordability of the Security Deed. See Burgos v. Sand Canyon Corp., 813 Fed.Appx.
363, 367 (11th Cir. 2020) (unpublished). “Georgia law is clear that an allegation that a
deed was improperly witnessed ‘is insufficient to void the deed to secure debt, since a
deed without attestation conveys the title as against the grantor and his heirs.’” Id.
(citing Budget Charge Accounts, Inc. v. Peters, 213 Ga. 17, 96 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1957)).
Mr. Jack provided no evidence to establish that the Foreclosure Sale was invalid or
that the Property became property of the bankruptcy estate after the Foreclosure Sale.
To the extent any Respondent notarized, delivered, or recorded the Deed Under Power
post-petition, such actions did not violate the automatic stay.
Acquisition or Abandonment of Secured Property, for each borrower if you lend money in
connection with your trade or business and, in full or partial satisfaction of the debt, you acquire
an interest in property that is security for the debt, or you have reason to know that the property
has been abandoned.” Instructions for Forms 1099-A and 1099-C, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. (Apr. 2025) https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1099a. For the date of acquisition, the
instructions provide, “If you purchase the property at a sale held to satisfy the debt, such as at
a foreclosure or execution sale, use the later of the date of sale or the date the borrower's right
of redemption, if any, expires.” Id. (emphasis added). Form 1099-A is “wholly informational”
and creates no tax liability in and of itself. See Carr v. Ocwen Loan Serv., LLC, 16-CV-04036-
AT, 2017 WL 11495239, *5 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2017), and this wholly informational document
sent pursuant to IRS instructions does not change Georgia law as to when Mr. Jack’s right of
redemption terminated or what constitutes property of the estate under § 541. The Court does
not find the fact that the Form 1099-A presented by Mr. Jack shows an acquisition date in
November (post-petition) to be inherently in conflict with the conclusion that Mr. Jack’s right
of redemption terminated prepetition. Under Georgia law, the right of redemption expires at
the foreclosure auction, but the transaction between the lender and the purchaser is not
completed “[u]ntil a deed under power is transferred and consideration is passed.” In re Lariscey
at *3 (citing Tampa Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., Inc., 723 S.E.2d 674, 677 (Ga.
2012)).
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2. 	The Demand for Possession and Dispossessory Violated the Stay
The Court concludes the Demand for Possession and the Dispossessory filing
each violated the automatic stay. Although Mr. Jack’s ownership rights in the Property
terminated prepetition, he continued to reside in the Property and held a possessory
interest as of the petition date and at the time of the Demand for Possession and the
Dispossessory. The Court agrees with cases finding that the automatic stay protects a
debtor’s possessory interest in property even if the property is not property of the
estate, and that efforts to dispossess the debtor of such property violate the automatic
stay.5 Thus, the Court finds that sending the Demand for Possession and filing the
Dispossessory constituted violations of the automatic stay. The evidence, however,
establishes only that the Trust and McCalla were involved in the Demands for
Possession 	and 	Dispossessory, 	and 	there 	is 	no 	evidence 	that 	Select 	had 	any
involvement in those actions. The Court therefore finds that the Trust and McCalla,
but not Select, violated the automatic stay by sending the Demands for Possession and
filing the Dispossessory.
The Court further concludes that the stay violations were willful. The Trust had
knowledge of the bankruptcy case no later than August 14, 2025, when its counsel
entered a notice of appearance in the bankruptcy case; McCalla had knowledge of the
bankruptcy case no later than August 29, 2025, when it entered a notice of appearance
in the Adversary Proceeding. The stay violations occurred in November and December,
5 See, e.g., In re Meadows, 2026 WL 1507733 at *5 (“Even where a debtor no longer holds legal
title to real property, a debtor's continued possessory interest is protected by the automatic
stay.” (citing In re Coates, 108 B.R. 823, 825-26 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989))).
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well after the Trust and McCalla had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case.
Therefore, the stay violations were willful.
Both parties, however, cured the violations by causing the Dispossessory to be
dismissed on December 11, 2025. At one point during the trial, it appeared that Mr.
Jack argued that because the Dispossessory was dismissed without prejudice, the stay
violation somehow continued after the dismissal. To the extent that was Mr. Jack’s
argument, the Court disagrees. The Dispossessory was dismissed on December 11,
2025, and a dismissal without prejudice merely preserves the right to bring a new
dispossessory action in the future. The Court sees no continuing stay violation there.
3. 	There Is Insufficient Evidence to Show a Stay Violation in Relation to
Insurance
The Court finds that Mr. Jack has not satisfied his burden of establishing a stay
violation related to insurance on the Property. Mr. Jack made arguments about the
Trust interfering or causing the termination of insurance on the Property post-petition,
and he asserts that the Trust caused excessive force-placed insurance to be placed on
the Property, but Mr. Jack provided minimal evidence related to the insurance issues.
Mr. Jack testified about conversations with his insurance agent and offered emails
between him and his insurance agent, but the substance of the insurance agent’s
statements are hearsay, and it is not clear to the Court what happened with the
insurance or when. It appears that the insurance was canceled by the insurance
company at some point during the bankruptcy case, but it is unclear why or that it was
canceled because of any actions by Respondents. Further, the Court has ruled that Mr.
Jack had no interest in the Property other than possession when he filed the
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bankruptcy case, and it is not clear to the Court how interference with insurance
policies on a Property that was not property of the estate constitutes a stay violation.
If the Trust or Select attempted to collect force-placed insurance premiums against Mr.
Jack personally on a post-petition basis, then such actions 	could, theoretically,
constitute a stay violation, but the Court has no evidence that such collection attempts
occurred while the bankruptcy case was pending. Mr. Jack may have valid state law
claims related to the insurance issues (the Court expresses no opinion on those
matters), but the Court does not find sufficient evidence to establish that Respondents
violated the automatic stay as it relates to any insurance on the Property.
4. 	There Is No Evidence of Other Stay Violations
Finally, the Court concludes that there is no evidence of any other stay
violations. Mr. Jack testified and argued that the Respondents have persistently acted
in bad faith during his case by refusing to accept mortgage payments, shifting their
positions, and “falsely” asserting a foreclosure took place. Mr. Jack testified that he
had discussions with representatives of the Trust or Select during the bankruptcy case
in which they stated the mortgage account remained active and could be paid, but the
Trust and/or Select later changed positions and would not accept payments because of
the Foreclosure Sale. The Court is further aware from the record in the bankruptcy
case that the Trust and/or Select indeed shifted positions during the bankruptcy case.
Initially the Trust filed a proof of claim and a plan objection indicating the mortgage
account was still active. The Trust later changed its position, asserting that the
Foreclosure Sale occurred prepetition and the Property never became property of the
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bankruptcy estate. The Trust attempted to withdraw its proof of claim6 and withdrew
its initial plan objection. It then filed an objection asserting the Property was not
property of the bankruptcy estate. Thus, the Court has no reason to doubt that the
Trust and/or Select may have initially discussed payment options with Mr. Jack before
refusing to accept any payment, and the Court understands Mr. Jack’s consternation
with this change in position during the case. But the Court does not see how such
changes in position violated the automatic stay. What was evident to the Court during
the bankruptcy case was that the Trust, Select, and its multiple counsel7 failed to
properly communicate and coordinate in connection with Mr. Jack’s bankruptcy case,
but the Court does not equate a change in factual and legal position with a stay
violation.
Nor does the Court find any evidentiary support for Mr. Jack’s assertions that
the Trust “falsely” alleged the Foreclosure Sale occurred. Mr. Jack has never presented
anything to contradict the evidence that the Foreclosure Sale occurred in May. He has
challenged the legal effect of the Foreclosure Sale, arguing that he still had an interest
in the Property until the Deed Under Power was recorded, offering the Form 1099-A
as evidence. But as discussed multiple times in this opinion, other orders in the
bankruptcy case, and on the record at multiple hearings, the Court disagreed with Mr.
6 Because Mr. Jack filed an adversary proceeding against the Trust, he has argued that the
Trust could not withdraw its proof of claim without an order from the Court after notice and a
hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3006. Although Mr. Jack is correct that the Trust could
not withdraw its claim without an order from the Court, filing a withdrawal of the proof of claim
does not violate the stay.
7 McCalla was not the only counsel that represented the Trust during the bankruptcy case.
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Jack’s repeated arguments that his ownership interest in the Property continued until
the Deed Under Power was recorded, and the Court does not agree that Respondents
“falsely” alleged that a Foreclosure Sale occurred in May.
Finally, to the extent Select sent the Escrow Analysis in March of 2026, the
Court finds it baffling that Select would send such a document nearly a year after the
Foreclosure Sale and given the history of this bankruptcy case, but the bankruptcy case
was closed when it was mailed and there was no automatic stay in place to violate.
Further, the Escrow Analysis is addressed to Daniel Jack, and it is not clear if that is
intended to be addressed to Mr. Jack, who was not an obligor on the underlying debt,
or his father, who has never been in bankruptcy as far as the Court is aware. The
Escrow Analysis did not violate the automatic stay.
In sum, the Court finds that the Trust and McCalla willfully violated the
automatic stay by sending the Demand for Possession in November, 2025, and by filing
the Dispossessory in December, 2025. The Trust and McCalla both cured the Stay
Violations by dismissing the Dispossessory on December 11, 2025. The Court finds no
other stay violations.
B. Damages
Mr. Jack is entitled to actual damages, including costs and attorneys fees,
resulting from the Demands for Possession and Dispossessory. Actual damages are
defined as “real, substantial and just damages or the amount awarded to a complainant
in compensation for [his] actual and real loss or injury, as opposed to nominal damages
and punitive damages.” In re Roche, 361 B.R. at 624. (citing McMillian v. FDIC, 81 F.3d
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1041, 1054 (11th Cir. 1996)). “Actual damages must be prove[n] with reasonable
certainty, and mere speculation, guess or conjecture will not suffice.” Castillo v. Three
Aces Auto Sales, (In re Castillo), 456 B.R. 719, 725 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011). 	Further,
“the debtor must demonstrate that actual damages were ‘proximately caused by and
reasonably incurred as a result of the violation of the automatic stay.’” Dawson v. RAM
Motors, LLC (In re Dawson), 665 B.R. 796, 804-05 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2025).
1. 	There Is Insufficient Evidence to Establish Out-of-Pocket Expenses
Mr. Jack offered limited evidence of out-of-pocket costs he incurred in connection
with the stay violations. He is not represented by counsel, and he offered no evidence of
any attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with the stay violations. He attempted to
testify that he incurred “thousands” in expenses for filing costs, transcripts, printing,
and transportation, but the Court sustained an objection to that testimony for lack of
foundation. He also attempted to submit bank statements and receipts showing
expenses for court transcripts, mailing expenses, and filing fees, but the Court did not
admit those documents on Respondents’ relevance objection because they related to
costs incurred in connection with other matters in his bankruptcy case and other
litigation, such as the cost of appealing the Court’s order dismissing the bankruptcy
case. 	Mr. 	Jack 	failed 	to 	tie 	the 	expenses 	with 	the 	Demands 	for 	Possession,
Dispossessory, or litigating the Stay Violation Motion. The Court finds Mr. Jack did not
satisfy his burden of establishing any out-of-pocket expenses related to the stay
violations.
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2. 	There Is No Causal Connection Between Stay Violations and Lost Wages
Mr. Jack asserted damages for lost employment or wages beginning September
2025 to March 2026. He lost his job at Amedisys in early September—over two months
before the first stay violation occurred in mid-November. The stay violations could not
have caused Mr. Jack’s loss of employment at Amedisys.
Mr. Jack further argued that he has devoted so much time to this case, and it
has caused him so much emotional distress, that he has not been able to work since
losing his job at Amedisys. But he testified that the stress and time spent litigating
caused him to turn down a job offer on or around September 9—over two months before
the stay violations. The Court cannot conclude that Mr. Jack’s inability to work was
caused by the stay violations; instead, they appear to be the result of the overall stress
and time related to Mr. Jack’s bankruptcy case and other litigation and claims he
alleges against the Respondents.
Mr. Jack asserted at trial that his job loss was not the result of the bankruptcy
process but, “as I testified on the record on September 30[, 2025], my extreme stress,
sleeplessness, and job loss were the direct result of the Respondents’ relentless bad
faith. Specifically, they refused to accept my mortgage payments, constantly shifted
their legal positions, and falsely claimed a foreclosure sale occurred in May of 2025.” As
discussed above, the Court does not accept that these acts constitute stay violations,
and Mr. Jack has not established that his inability to work beginning in September was
caused by any stay violation.
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3. 	There Is Insufficient Evidence to Establish Damages for Time Spent
Resolving Stay Violations
Mr. Jack testified that he has spent over 800 hours “in a state of hypervigilance”
from the Dispossessory through March of 2026, including time spent drafting the Stay
Violation Motion and time diverted from work. Mr. Jack requested $80,000 for this time
based on an estimated $100 per hour for the value of his labor. The Court finds these
requested damages to be speculative and unreasonable. Mr. Jack filed the Stay
Violation Motion December 9, the day after he learned of the Dispossessory, and the
Court held a short hearing on December 16 at which everyone agreed the Dispossessory
was dismissed, causing the Court to conclude the matter was not emergent. Although
Mr. Jack likely devoted significant time preparing for the trial, 800 hours is not a
reasonable or plausible amount of time for such preparation, and Mr. Jack offered no
testimony or evidence to establish how much time he spent preparing the Stay Violation
Motion, attending the initial hearings, or preparing for the trial. He testified that he
was in a state of hypervigilance, in part because the dismissal was without prejudice.
As discussed, however, the non-prejudicial nature of the dismissal did not constitute an
ongoing stay violation, and the Court finds damages for “hypervigilance” after the stay
violation ended to be speculative or conjectural in nature.8 As for time diverted from
work, as discussed above, the evidence showed that Mr. Jack turned down a job at least
two months prior to the first stay violation because of the time he was already devoting
to his bankruptcy and related litigation, and the Court cannot conclude that the
8 Mr. Jack’s testimony about hypervigilance sounds more like emotional distress, which the
Court discusses below.
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Demand for Possession or Dispossessory was the cause of Mr. Jack’s loss of work.
Assuming Mr. Jack’s time is compensable for resolving the stay violations, the Court
simply has no evidence from which it could determine how much time Mr. Jack actually
spent on the stay violation matters, and the Court concludes there is insufficient
evidence to establish any damages for the value of Mr. Jack’s time.
4. 	There Is Evidence of Emotional Distress Damages
Mr. Jack requests emotional distress damages. The Eleventh Circuit has made
clear that emotional distress damages are included within the broad term of “actual
damages” in § 362(k). See Lodge v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 750 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th
Cir. 2014). The Eleventh Circuit cautioned, though, that not every willful violation of
the stay merits compensation for emotional distress. At a minimum, to recover actual
damages for emotional distress under § 362(k), a plaintiff must
(1) suffer significant emotional distress,
(2) clearly establish the significant emotional distress, and
(3) demonstrate a causal connection between that significant emotional distress
and the violation of the automatic stay.
Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1271 (citing Dawson v. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. (In re
Dawson), 390 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2004)). Normally, the testimony of the plaintiff
alone is not sufficient to establish significant emotional distress, and a plaintiff must
provide corroborating evidence. In re Steed, 2021 WL 1186482, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
Mar. 26, 2021), aff’d sub nom. Steed v. GSRAN-Z, LLC, 2022 WL 1907593 (N.D. Ga.
Apr. 	22, 	2022). 	A 	debtor 	may 	establish 	emotional 	distress 	damages 	through
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corroborating medical evidence or non-expert testimony of family, friends, or co-
workers. Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1271 (citing In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149). “’In some
cases significant emotional distress may be readily apparent even without corroborative
evidence,’ such as where ‘the violator may have engaged in egregious conduct.”” Id.
After considering the evidence at trial and the testimony of Mr. Jack and
corroborating testimony of Mr. John, which the Court found to be sincere and credible,
the Court concludes that Mr. Jack established significant emotional distress resulting
from the Demand for Possession and Dispossessory, but not to the extent Mr. Jack
asserts. The testimony and other evidence made clear that Mr. Jack has experienced
significant 	distress 	throughout 	his 	bankruptcy 	case 	and 	related 	litigation 	with
Respondents, but Mr. Jack is not entitled to damages for distress caused by the
bankruptcy case and other litigation. He is entitled only to significant emotional
distress caused by the stay violations. The testimony and evidence provided make it
difficult to distinguish between the distress caused by the bankruptcy case and related
litigation, and the distress caused specifically by the stay violations.
Mr. John, for example, gave clear and convincing testimony about his first-hand
account of Mr. Jack’s distress on the day he learned that the Deed Under Power was
recorded. He also gave sincere testimony about the overall effect that the foreclosure,
bankruptcy, and related litigation have had on Mr. Jack. That testimony, however, does
not support an award of damages for emotional distress caused by the stay violations.
His 	testimony 	about 	Mr. 	Jack’s 	distress 	specifically 	related 	to 	the 	Demand 	for
Possession and Dispossessory was more general in nature and not grounded in any
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specific first-hand account like his testimony about the Deed Under Power. Further,
Mr. John was not aware that the Dispossessory was dismissed just a few days after it
was filed, and it is difficult to know if his testimony about the Dispossessory-specific
distress related to the time period during which the stay violation was ongoing, or if it
was more generalized to the entire time period beginning on the date the Dispossessory
was filed and extending all the way to the trial. That said, he offered some testimony
that could be pinpointed to the Dispossessory itself, such as Mr. Jack asking Mr. John
not to come to Mr. Jack’s house without advanced notice for fear that someone arriving
at his house without warning might be a sheriff or other person coming to evict him.
That testimony corroborated Mr. Jack’s testimony that after the Dispossessory he was
in a state of “hypervigilance” and that any person arriving at his house caused him
stress. The Court therefore concludes that Mr. John’s testimony established a causal
connection 	between some 	of 	Mr. 	Jack’s 	emotional distress 	and the 	Demand for
Possession and Dispossessory.
Mr. Jack’s testimony about his emotional distress, indeed his damages in
general, appeared to span a broad range of time beginning with the loss of his job in
September and continuing long past the date the Dispossessory was dismissed. Mr.
Jack’s 	overall 	presentation 	of 	damages 	and 	distress 	often 	made 	little 	effort 	to
distinguish between distress that he experienced before the stay violations, during the
stay violations, and after the stay violations were cured. He argued that all such
distress was relevant because of the cumulative effect when the Dispossessory was filed.
The Court can appreciate that argument to some degree, but it is not appropriate to
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award damages for emotional distress that was not caused by the stay violations, and
Mr. Jack’s arguments strike the Court as an attempt to leverage the generalized
distress 	of 	bankruptcy 	and 	related 	litigation 	into 	a 	larger 	damage 	award 	for
circumscribed stay violations.
The Demand for Possession was sent November 13, 2025, and the Dispossessory
was filed December 3. Mr. Jack learned of the Dispossessory December 9, and the
Dispossessory was dismissed December 11. Although the Court can appreciate a
lingering effect of the Dispossessory, and that his distress related specifically to the
Dispossessory might have been exacerbated by previous stress, the Court must focus
its inquiry into damages caused by the stay violation itself, and not conflate the
generalized, albeit significant, distress attendant to nearly every bankruptcy case and
litigation.
The Court is satisfied that Mr. Jack established that the Demand for Possession
and the Dispossessory caused him significant emotional distress in addition to the other
distress he was experiencing. Placing a dollar figure on such distress, however, is
difficult. Mr. Jack requested total emotional distress damages in the amount of
$100,000, but he offered no explanation of how he derived that number, and the Court
believes that number was calculated in reference to all the distress Mr. Jack has
experienced in connection with his bankruptcy case and related litigation, and the
specific distress caused by the Demand for Possession and Dispossessory is much
smaller. The Court concludes that $10,000 is an appropriate amount of damages for the
emotional distress caused specifically by the Demand for Possession and Dispossessory.
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5. 	The Evidence Does Not Support a Finding of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages may be awarded under appropriate circumstances under 11
U.S.C 362(k). Such appropriate circumstances arise where the creditor has acted with
maliciousness or in bad faith. In re Castillo, 456 B.R. at 725. For an award of punitive
damages, courts consider the following factors:
(1) the nature of the defendant's conduct;
(2) the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff;
(3) the defendant's ability to pay;
(4) the motives of the defendant; and
(5) any provocation by the debtor.
In re Roche, 361 B.R. at 624. The Court does not find this case to merit an award of
punitive damages. Ms. Powers’ testimony established, without any countervailing
evidence, that the filing of the Dispossessory was the result of several mistakes made
by individuals at McCalla, not any bad faith, maliciousness, or other circumstances
meriting a finding of punitive damages. To be sure, Ms. Powers’ testimony did not fully
explain why the referral for the Dispossessory was made in the first place by the Trust,
or why the Demand for Possession was sent in mid-November, but there is no evidence
to suggest that either McCalla or the Trust made a conscious decision to ignore the
automatic stay or that the Demand for Possession and Dispossessory were done in bad
faith 	or 	with 	any 	malicious 	intent 	towards 	Mr. 	Jack. 	Ms. 	Powers 	caused 	the
Dispossessory to be dismissed as soon as she learned of Mr. Jack’s bankruptcy, and no
further stay violations occurred. Further, Ms. Powers testified that McCalla has
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implemented changes to its processes and procedures in an effort to address the
mistakes made in this case. The evidence established that mistakes were made, and
steps were taken to address the mistakes; the evidence did not establish any bad faith
or maliciousness by the Respondents. The Court declines to award punitive damages.
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Stay Violation Motion is GRANTED as follows:
Daniel Jack, Jr. is awarded $10,000 in actual damages against the Trust and McCalla
for willfully violating the automatic stay. All other relief requested in the Stay
Violation Motion is DENIED.
The Clerk’s Office is directed to serve a copy of this Order upon the Debtor, the
Chapter 13 Trustee, and counsel of record for the Trust, Select, and McCalla.
END OF DOCUMENT
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