Cardenas v. Commissioner of Social Security

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
RIANE CARDENAS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LELAND DUDEK, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-00141-DKW-KJM
ORDER REMANDING DECISION
OF ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Plaintiff 	Riane 	Cardenas 	appeals 	the 	Acting 	Commissioner 	of 	Social
Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits, arguing that an
Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	(ALJ) 	erred 	in 	(1) 	rejecting 	Cardenas’ 	symptom
testimony; and (2) discounting several physicians’ opinion evidence. After carefully
reviewing the record below and the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that
sufficient deficiencies in the ALJ’s discussion of Cardenas’ symptom testimony
require remand. 	Therefore, as more fully explained below, the Court REMANDS
this proceeding for further evaluation of Cardenas’ symptom testimony and the
medical evidence.
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Leland Dudek was automatically substituted
as the party-defendant in this action upon his appointment as the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security.
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BACKGROUND
I. 	Review of Disability Claims
A five-step process exists for evaluating whether a person is disabled under
the Social Security Act (SSA). 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 	First, the claimant must
demonstrate that she is not currently involved in any substantial, gainful activity. Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). 	Second, the claimant must show a medically severe
impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limit her physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities. 	Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). 	Third, if
the impairment matches or is equivalent to a listing in the governing regulations, the
claimant is judged conclusively disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d).
If the claimant’s impairment does not match or is not equivalent to an
established listing, the Commissioner makes a finding about the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (RFC) to perform work. Id. § 404.1520(e). The evaluation then
proceeds to a fourth step, which requires the claimant to show her impairment, in
light of the RFC, prevents her from performing work she performed in the past. Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f). If the claimant is able to perform her previous work,
she is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant cannot perform her past work,
though, the evaluation proceeds to a fifth step. 	Id. § 404.1520(a)(v), (g). 	At this
final step, the Commissioner must demonstrate that (1) based upon the claimant’s
RFC, age, education, and work experience, the claimant can perform other work,
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and (2) such work is available in significant numbers in the national economy. 	Id.
§ 404.1560(c); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining
that, at step five, the burden moves to the Commissioner). If the Commissioner fails
to meet this burden, the claimant is deemed disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).
II. 	The ALJ’s Decision
On May 1, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding Cardenas not disabled for
the purposes of the SSA from the alleged onset date of October 26, 2020 through the
date of the decision. 	Administrative Record (“AR”) at 50. 	At Step One of the
evaluation process, the ALJ determined that Cardenas had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since October 26, 2020. Id. at 33. At Step Two, the ALJ determined
that Cardenas had the following severe impairments: juvenile idiopathic arthritis;
left 	hip 	osteoarthritis; 	obesity; 	asthma; 	postural 	tachycardia 	syndrome; 	and
migraines. 	Id. at 33–34. At Step Three, the ALJ determined that Cardenas did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled
the severity of one of the impairments listed in the governing regulations. Id. at 37–
38.
Before reaching Step Four, the ALJ determined that Cardenas had the RFC
to perform “sedentary work” that included:
the ability to lift up to 10 pounds occasionally and lift 5 pounds
frequently, stand and/or walk up to 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, and
sit 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, except: ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
frequent reaching, handling, fingering, feeling with the bilateral upper
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extremities; can do work that is performed in no more than moderate
noise level intensity environment; can do work that does not involve
exposure to vibration, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation,
extreme hot or cold temperatures, and hazardous moving machinery or
unprotected heights; no work at production pace, such as assembly line;
will require option to change positions for 5 minutes after every hour
of standing or walking while remaining on task; and will require option
to change positions for 5 minutes after every hour of sitting while
remaining on task.
Id. at 38–39.
At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Cardenas was capable of
performing relevant past work as a medical clerk. 	Id. at 46-47. Because of
this, the ALJ determined that Cardenas was not disabled. Id. at 49–50.23
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court must uphold an ALJ’s decision “unless it is based on legal error or is
not supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194,
1198 (9th Cir. 2008). 	“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less
than a preponderance.” 	Id. (quotation omitted). 	Stated differently, “[s]ubstantial
evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” 	Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.
2005) (quotation omitted). “Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
2 The ALJ also determined that Cardenas was not disabled following a Step Five analysis. AR at
48.
3 The Appeals Council denied Cardenas’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision, meaning that
the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Acting Commissioner. AR at 1.
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interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” 	Id. at 679; see also
Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“[Courts] leave it to the ALJ to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the
testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.”).
In addition, a court may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error
that is harmless. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he
burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking
the agency’s determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quotation and citation omitted). In making this assessment, a court “look[s] at the
record as a whole to determine whether the error alters the outcome of the case.” Id.
at 1115.
DISCUSSION
In her Opening Brief, Dkt. No. 21, Cardenas challenges the ALJ’s decision in
two areas: (1) the ALJ’s finding that Cardenas’ complaints were not credible; and
(2) the ALJ’s evaluation of opinion evidence. For the reasons set forth more fully
below, because the ALJ’s evaluation of Cardenas’ symptom testimony requires
further development, the Court addresses only that issue. 	See Hiler v. Astrue, 687
F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (remanding to the ALJ while declining to reach an
alternative ground for remand).
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Cardenas argues that, with respect to her symptom testimony, the ALJ erred
in rejecting Cardenas’ testimony concerning her activities of daily living and
improperly analyzed the medical evidence. Dkt. No. 21 at 7–23. In response, the
Acting Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly discounted Cardenas’ testimony
and reasonably evaluated the medical opinions and findings in the record. Dkt. No.
25 at 13–17.
In the Ninth Circuit, when considering a claimant’s symptom testimony, an
ALJ must, first, determine whether (1) objective medical evidence has been provided
of an underlying impairment that may reasonably produce the symptom(s) alleged,
and (2) the claimant is malingering. 	Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492–
493 (9th Cir. 2015). 	Here, the ALJ found that Cardenas’ medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms. 	AR at
40. In addition, the ALJ made no finding that Cardenas was malingering.
As a result, in order for the ALJ to reject Cardenas’ testimony about the
severity of her symptoms, the ALJ was required to provide “specific, clear and
convincing reasons for doing so.” 	Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493. 	“General
findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible
and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” 	Id. 	The reason for
specificity is so a reviewing court can “conclude the adjudicator rejected the
claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a
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claimant’s testimony regarding pain.” Id. This clear and convincing standard is “the
most demanding required in Social Security cases.” 	Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d
995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014). In general, the Ninth Circuit “ha[s] repeatedly warned
that ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily activities are
inconsistent 	with 	testimony 	about 	pain, 	because 	impairments 	that 	would
unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a workplace environment will
often be consistent with doing more than resting in bed all day.” Garrison, 759 F.3d
at 1016; accord Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[O]nly if
[her] level of activity were inconsistent with [her] claimed limitations would these
activities have any bearing on [her] credibility.”).
Here, the Court agrees that the ALJ failed to support the conclusion reached
about Cardenas’ symptom testimony by clear and convincing evidence. 	First, the
ALJ determined that Cardenas was able to “prepare simple meals,” “perform light
cleaning and organizing,” complete an MBA degree, and “spend[] time with others
by talking” or “going to the beach.” 	AR at 44. 	No specific explanation is given,
however, as to why the ability to perform these activities “suggests fewer limitations
than alleged,” as the ALJ put it. Id. Courts have previously found that merely listing
possible activities is insufficient where “no attempt is made to explain how the
limited number of activities mentioned by the ALJ rendered [the claimant] able to
do the work” the ALJ identified. 	Platt v. Saul, 2020 WL 435354, at *5 (D. Haw.
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Jan. 28, 2020). 	The ALJ here further stated that “the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of the claimant’s pain and symptoms” were “not consistent with the
other evidence of the record,” but this statement amounts to mere boilerplate. AR at
44; see Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014)
(noting that “ALJs routinely include this statement in their written findings as an
introduction to the ALJ's credibility determination” and it constitutes “boilerplate”).
In addition, the ALJ’s characterization of Cardenas’ daily activities overlooks
or omits contrary evidence in the record. 	For example, the ALJ noted that
Cardenas’s most recent function report reflected that she was able to prepare her
own meals “daily.” AR at 44. In that function report, however, Cardenas states that
“preparing” meals amounted merely to “heating up leftovers,” and that, since the
onset of her symptoms, she required help to do even that. 	Id. at 292. Notably, the
ALJ found that Cardenas’ ability to complete her MBA degree within two years
indicated that her symptoms were less severe than she testified. 	Id. at 44. 	As the
ALJ acknowledges, however, this was only possible because Cardenas made
repeated extension requests from her professors. 	Id. 	This finding also ignores
Cardenas’ testimony that she was only able to do her schoolwork online, while
“lying down” in her home, and while “literally medicated” on prescribed medical
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marijuana. 	Id. at 92. 	The ALJ does not address this testimony nor provide any
reason to discount it.4
In short, the ALJ’s summary of daily activities does not provide a convincing
reason to reject Cardenas’ symptom testimony, absent additional explanation.
Remand is therefore warranted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Acting Commissioner’s decision denying
Cardenas’ application for disability insurance benefits is REMANDED for further
administrative proceedings consistent with this Order. The Clerk is directed to close
this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 27, 2026 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
4 The ALJ repeatedly cited to Cardenas’ ability to complete her MBA throughout the decision. For
example, when rejecting the opinions of medical experts Drs. Karen Morgenshtern Yacoby,
Abigail Harada, Mari Shiraishi, and Angeline Dickson as non-persuasive, the ALJ relied heavily
on Cardenas having “returned to school and received an MBA” within two years—in fact, at
various times in the decision, it was the only example the ALJ gave as to why those opinions were
“inconsistent with the overall medical evidence.” AR at 36, 45–46. As noted above, without more,
the Court does not find Cardenas’ completion of her graduate program to be in clear conflict with
these physicians’ opinions, nor, more generally, with a finding of disability. See Sayler v. Colvin,
2015 WL 5567749, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015) (“It is well-settled that an ALJ may not render
his or her own medical opinion or substitute her own diagnosis for that of a physician” and must
“articulate legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting [a physician’s]
opinion”).
___________________________
Derrick K. Watson
Chief United States District Judge
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