Jackson-Lewis v. U.S. Department of Defense et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
CHIEF CARMELA LYNN JACKSON-
LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, et
al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-00539-DKW-RT
ORDER (1) DISMISSING
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND; AND (2) DENYING AS
MOOT APPLICATION TO
PROCEED WITHOUT
PREPAYMENT OF FEES OR
COSTS1
On December 29, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Carmela Lynn Jackson-Lewis filed
this action against the United States Department of Defense, a variety of county-
level police departments, and several unspecified individuals. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff
concurrently filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”).2
Dkt. No. 3.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is impossible to understand and is frivolous. 	As best
can be discerned,3 Plaintiff claims to be “Chief Clean Vagina” of the “Elkhart
1 Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c), the Court finds these matters suitable for disposition without a
hearing.
2 The Court subjects each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory
screening and can order the dismissal of any claims it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
3 The Court liberally construes a pro se Complaint. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th
Cir. 1987). However, the Court cannot act as counsel for a pro se litigant, such as by supplying
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Indiana Chapter of the Blackfoot Native American Tribe,” and a member of a “secret
society” of “Mother Earth’s Cleanest Women.” Dkt. No. 1 at 8–9. Plaintiff alleges
that “terrorist cells of the United States military,” the United Nations, and King
Charles III of the United Kingdom arranged for the murder of “all members” of this
secret society (including Princess Diana) in order to steal “funds” belonging to
Plaintiff’s great-grandmother and “recycle their body parts.” Id. at 8.
Plaintiff states that the events giving rise to her Complaint occurred on
November 20, 2025 at Fort Lauderdale International Airport, Florida. Id. at 10. On
that date, Plaintiff alleges the “military used my family members to murder me” to
“silence my secrete [sic] society.” 	Id. 	For her relief, Plaintiff requests, with no
elaboration, that the Court “stop James Lee Boxely . . . from being the nastiest
homosexual, incestuous, drug addicted, child trafficking, byte switching terrorist
group.”4 Id. at 11 (pdf pagination).5
For a variety of reasons, the Complaint must be dismissed. The Complaint’s
allegations are not merely implausible but nonsensical and unable to survive scrutiny
the essential elements of a claim. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
4 “James Lee Boxely” is not among the named Defendants, and Plaintiff provides no information
as to his identity, save for describing him as “USA Navy” and a “sick African[] [that] has stolen
Native American identity to controll [sic] drug trade.” Dkt. No. 1 at 11 (pdf pagination).
5 Plaintiff also filed a series of documents purporting to be exhibits in support of the Complaint.
See Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 5–10. These documents—a mix of handwritten notes, random websites, and
receipts from various businesses—were filed without any explanation as to their relevance, and so
fail to cure the deficiencies of the Complaint.
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even when read in the most generous possible light. 	See Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“Courts of Appeals have recognized § 1915(d)’s term
‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal
conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegations not supported by any facts.”);
Patel v. United States, 2023 WL 9045535, at *3 (D. Haw. Dec. 29, 2023) (dismissing
pro se complaint as frivolous because allegations of being secretly controlled by
“stress technology” were “implausible and fanciful”).
Even if Plaintiff’s Complaint could be understood, dismissal would still be
warranted on other grounds. 	First, Plaintiff states that her claims arise under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 3888 (1971). Dkt. No. 1 at 7 (pdf pagination). However, several
of the Defendants are federal or state agencies,6 neither of which may be sued
pursuant to either Section 1983 or Bivens. 	See Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d
898, 908 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Section] 1983 . . . impose[s] liability upon a “person,”
and a federal agency is not a “person” within the meaning of [Section 1983].”); see
Johnson v. Dhaliwal, 2021 WL 8742192, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2021) (“Bivens
claims are available only against individual officers, not departments or other
6 Plaintiff’s Complaint lists the “County Sheriff” of various locations as Defendants but does not
clarify if she intends to sue the county sheriff’s departments or the sheriffs themselves as
individuals. Dkt. No. 1 at 3–6 (pdf pagination). Plaintiff’s claims fail regardless, and so the Court
will not guess at her intentions.
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entities.”). 	Second, for the individual Defendants, Plaintiff fails to provide any
specific allegations as to their personal involvement in any purported violation of
rights.7 See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Liability
under 	[Section] 1983 must 	be 	based 	on 	the personal involvement of 	the
defendant.”); 	West 	v. 	City 	of 	Mesa, 	708 	F. 	App’x 	288, 	292 	(9th 	Cir.
2017) (concluding that district court properly dismissed Bivens claim where plaintiff
failed 	to 	allege 	defendants’ personal involvement in 	alleged 	unconstitutional
conduct). Finally, although Plaintiff purports to be a resident of Hawai‘i, see Dkt.
No. 1 at 3 (pdf pagination), all but one of the Defendants is listed as a resident of
other states, and the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims apparently occurred in
Florida, id. at 3–6, 10. It is therefore unclear what, if any, connection this action has
with Hawai‘i, or whether this Court serves as an appropriate forum.
Accordingly, the Complaint does not state a claim and must be dismissed. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1). 	Typically,
“[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se
litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to
amend prior to dismissal of the action.” 	Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248
(9th Cir. 1995); see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977–978 (9th Cir.
7 Plaintiff also fails to specify if the individual Defendants were state or federal government
officials.
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2013). 	Although the Court has serious doubts that amendment would cure any of
the above defects, it is obliged to DISMISS the Complaint without prejudice and
with leave to amend. Plaintiff may have until February 3, 2026 to file an amended
complaint consistent with a litigant’s ethical obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b).
The Court cautions Plaintiff that failure to file a timely amended complaint will
result in the dismissal of this action without further notice.
The IFP Application, Dkt. No. 3, is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 20, 2026 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
___________________________
Derrick K. Watson
Chief United States District Judge
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