Smith v. Amazon.com Services LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
ATO SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant.
Civil No. 26‐00089 MWJS‐WRP
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND GRANTING
FURTHER LIMITED LEAVE TO AMEND
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Ato Smith filed this action against his former employer, Amazon.com
Services, LLC (“Amazon”), alleging that it discriminated against him on account of his
race and disabilities, failed to accommodate those disabilities, and retaliated against
him for engaging in protected activity. On March 13, 2026, the court screened Smith’s
original complaint, granted his application to proceed in forma pauperis based on his
inability to afford the costs associated with maintaining this action, and dismissed the
complaint with leave to amend. Dkt. No. 5. The court identified specific deficiencies in
Smith’s claims of disability‐based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) and race‐based discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”) and explained what additional facts he would need to allege to state a
plausible claim. Id. at PageID.17‐21.
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On March 31, 2026, Smith timely filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Dkt.
No. 7. The FAC proceeds solely under the ADA, dropping the Title VII claims. Id. at
PageID.25. Having again screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court
concludes that Smith’s ADA disability discrimination and failure‐to‐accommodate
claims remain insufficient. And while the FAC adds new allegations in support of an
ADA retaliation theory, these allegations, too, are not sufficient to state a plausible
claim. For these reasons, the FAC is DISMISSED. Nonetheless, to ensure that Smith
had had a full opportunity to address the identified deficiencies, the court DISMISSES
these claims but GRANTS Smith further leave to amend to correct his claims of ADA
disability discrimination and failure‐to‐accommodate, and leave to amend his ADA
retaliation theory.
As explained more fully below, if Smith chooses to file a new complaint, he must
address the identified deficiencies in the claims advanced in the FAC. Smith is not
authorized to add any new defendants or any new claims.
DISCUSSION
The court is no less obligated to screen the FAC than it was the initial complaint.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). And as the court explained in its prior order, the screening
standard mirrors Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt No. 5, at PageID.14; See
Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Smith’s FAC must
therefore include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
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that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. Recognizing that Smith is proceeding without
representation, the court continues to liberally construe his pleadings and to resolve all
doubts in his favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010).
A. 	The FAC
Smith’s FAC provides additional factual context for his allegations. He states
that his ADHD and dyslexia “substantially limit” his ability to concentrate, read,
process information, and learn new tasks. Dkt. No. 7, at PageID.26. Starting in June
2025, when he began orientation for his role as a Flex Associate at Amazon’s Honolulu
delivery warehouse, he disclosed his disabilities and requested assistance. But after he
experienced issues using the company’s scanner system, Amazon separated him from
the training class, instructed him to sit in the break room, and placed him into an
assignment without adequate training or support. Id. at PageID.25. He had “previously
been recognized within Amazon’s system as having ADHD and had received approval
from an Amazon healthcare provider at another location,” but at the new facility, the
accommodation he had previously received was not honored. Id.
The FAC also provides more background about the complaint Smith filed with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on July 22, regarding
Amazon’s failure to honor his accommodation and changes it made to his employment
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conditions and benefits. Id. On August 5, he states he again applied for a reasonable
accommodation. Id. Shortly after that, around August 16, while working with a
scanner, Smith informed his manager, Levi, that he was experiencing distress related to
his ADHD and requested to be removed from that assignment. But that request was
denied. Levi informed Smith that his accommodation was not reflected in the system,
which led Smith to “feel uncomfortable and pressured to continue working despite [his]
condition.” Id. at PageID.26. Before leaving his shift, Smith reported Levi’s conduct to
Human Resources and to a regional manager. Id. Within approximately two weeks of
that interaction, Smith was suspended for allegedly violating a policy, but was not told
what policy he had violated and received no prior written warning. Id.
The FAC asserts three claims under the ADA: disability discrimination (which
the FAC refers to as “Count 1”), failure to accommodate (“Count 2”), and retaliation
(“Count 3”). Id. For the reasons that follow, the FAC does not adequately allege any of
these claims.
1. 	ADA Disability Discrimination (Count 1)
As the court explained in its prior order, to establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: “(1) he is a disabled
person within the meaning of the statute; (2) he is a qualified individual with a
disability; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.”
Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2001); Dkt. No. 5, at
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PageID16. And as the court previously explained, a “qualified individual with a
disability is defined as an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position.”
Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013); Dkt. No. 5, at PageID.17.
The FAC addresses one of the deficiencies the court previously identified. See
Dkt. No. 5 at PageID.19. Where the original complaint did not explain how Smith’s
conditions substantially limit any major life activity, Smith now alleges that his ADHD
and dyslexia substantially limit major life activities including concentrating, reading,
processing information, and learning new tasks. Dkt. No. 7, at PageID.26. The
remaining two elements of his disability discrimination claim, however, remain
inadequately pled.
As to the second element, Smith does not allege facts establishing that he was a
“qualified individual”—that is, that he was able to perform the essential functions of his
position with or without reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Smith v.
Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013). The FAC describes his duties as
“sorting packages, staging deliveries, loading and unloading items, and assisting with
general warehouse operations,” and states that during orientation he disclosed his
ADHD and dyslexia and that he “learn[s] differently and may require additional
support during training.” Dkt. No. 7, at PageID.25. But Smith does not identify what
specific accommodation would have enabled him to perform those duties, or how any
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such accommodation would have addressed his particular limitations. A general
request for more support during training does not answer that question.
As to the third element, Smith must allege facts demonstrating that Amazon took
an adverse employment action because of his disability. See Hutton, 273 F.3d at 891. As
the court noted in its prior order, “Smith pleads no facts connecting those actions to his
alleged disabilities.” Dkt. No. 5 at PageID.20. And the FAC does not cure that
deficiency. Smith’s allegation that “[b]efore leaving, [he] reported Levi’s behavior to
Human Resources and a regional manager, explaining that his conduct made [him] feel
uncomfortable and pressured to work despite [his] medical condition,” and that within
approximately two weeks he “was suspended for allegedly violating a policy,” Dkt. No.
7, at PageID.25–26, does not link the suspension to his disability. Those allegations
describe conduct that bears on whether he was penalized for complaining about his
manager’s conduct—a retaliation theory the court addresses separately below—not
whether any adverse action was taken because of his disability itself.
For these reasons, the court DISMISSES Smith’s claim of disability
discrimination.
2. 	Failure to Accommodate (Count 2)
Smith’s failure‐to‐accommodate claim is premised on the theory that Amazon
was aware of his disabilities but failed to provide the modifications necessary to enable
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him to perform his job. Dkt. No. 7, at PageID.26. The claim fails because Smith has not
pled sufficient facts to support it.
The ADA “defines discrimination to include an employer’s failure to make [a]
reasonable accommodation,” Mendoza v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles,
824 F.3d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016). But it treats a failure‐to‐accommodate claim under
the ADA as “analytically distinct from a claim of disparate treatment or impact.”
Johnson v. Bd. of Trustees of Boundary Cty. Sch. Dist., 666 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2011).
Where a discrimination claim asks whether an employer acted against an employee
because of their disability, a failure‐to‐accommodate claim asks whether the employer
failed to provide the modifications or adjustments that would have enabled the
employee to perform her essential job functions. See Dunlap v. Liberty Nat. Prods., Inc.,
878 F.3d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 2017).
A reasonable accommodation may include modifications to equipment,
adjustments to procedures, or other individualized changes suited to an employee’s
particular limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). Whether a particular accommodation is
reasonable requires a fact‐specific, individualized analysis of the disabled employee’s
circumstances. Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010). Once an
employer becomes aware of the need for accommodation, it has an obligation under the
ADA to engage in an interactive process with the employee to identify and implement
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an appropriate accommodation. See Dunlap, 878 at 799; Zivkovic v. S. California Edison
Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002).
Smith identifies his duties as “sorting packages, staging deliveries, loading and
unloading items, and assisting with general warehouse operations” and states that he
disclosed his ADHD and dyslexia during orientation and that he “learn[s] differently
and may require additional support during training.” Dkt. No. 7, at PageID.25. He
further alleges that “[i]nstead of providing proper assistance or accommodation, [he]
was removed from the training class and directed to sit in the break room,” and that he
“was told to rely on another employee for help, but that employee was performing his
own duties and was unable to properly train or guide [him].” Id. These allegations,
however, do not establish that Smith could perform the essential functions of a
warehouse associate with a reasonable accommodation. Whether the failure to support
Smith during orientation was attributable to his disability or to scanner access problems
and inadequate training is unclear from the FAC. And Smith does not identify what
specific accommodation would have enabled him to perform duties his position
required—sorting, staging, loading, and unloading—or how such an accommodation
would have addressed his particular limitations. A general request for “additional
support during training” does not answer that question. Instead, what Smith describes
in the FAC is a failure to provide adequate training, not a failure to accommodate his
disability. He alleges that he was placed back into a scanner‐dependent position
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without having been trained on the scanner, and that he was told to rely on a coworker
who “was performing his own duties and was unable to properly train or guide” him,
which left him without “the same level of training as other employees.” Id. That
describes a shortcoming in onboarding, not the failure to provide a disability‐specific
modification or adjustment directed at his ADHD or dyslexia.
To be sure, the FAC’s narrative section provides more detail than the original
complaint: it describes Smith disclosing his disabilities during orientation, being told to
rely on another employee for training, and having a prior accommodation approval go
unrecognized at his new facility. Dkt. No. 7, at PageID.25. But the claim itself, as stated
in the counts section, is conclusory: “Defendant failed to engage in an interactive
process and denied reasonable accommodation.” Id. at PageID.26. Even crediting the
facts in Smith’s narrative, he does not plausibly allege what specific accommodation he
formally requested, or how the employer failed to engage in a good faith interactive
process. Without these factual allegations, the claim does not rise above the
“threadbare recital” of elements that Iqbal deems insufficient. 556 U.S. at 678.
Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Smith’s failure‐to‐accommodate claim.
3. 	Retaliation (Count 3)
The ADA prohibits retaliation against any individual who has “opposed any act
or practice made unlawful by” the ADA or who has “made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under” the
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ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Courts in the Ninth Circuit analyze ADA retaliation claims
under the same framework applicable to Title VII retaliation claims. Brown v. City of
Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 2003). To state a prima facie case of retaliation, a
plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) his employer
subjected him to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the
protected activity and the adverse action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir.
2000); See also Jarvis v. Corteva Agriscience, Inc., Civ. No. 23‐00396, 2025 WL 1312119, at *7
(D. Haw. May 6, 2025).
The FAC’s retaliation allegations represent meaningful progress over the original
complaint, which offered no factual support for such a theory. Smith now alleges that
he reported his manager Levi’s conduct to Human Resources and to a regional
manager—explaining that Levi pressured him to work despite his medical condition—
and that within approximately two weeks of that report, he was suspended for an
unspecified policy violation, without a prior written warning or explanation of what
policy he had violated. Dkt. No. 7, at PageID.25–26. These allegations gesture toward a
plausible retaliation claim. Reporting a manager’s conduct that interferes with a
disability accommodation could plausibly constitute “opposing” a practice made
unlawful by the ADA, and a suspension could plausibly qualify as an adverse
employment action.
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Nevertheless, these allegations are not yet sufficient to state a plausible claim,
primarily because they lack the factual detail necessary to plausibly allege causation.
As the court observed in its prior order, “[e]ssential to a causal link is evidence that the
employer was aware that the plaintiff had engaged in the protected activity.” Jarvis,
2025 WL 1312119, at *7 (quoting Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir.
1982)). And while temporal proximity between protected activity and an adverse
employment action can sometimes support an inference of retaliation, see Jarvis, 2025
WL 1312119, at *7–10, it cannot carry that weight here. Smith alleges that he reported
Levi’s conduct to HR and a regional manager on August 16 and was suspended
approximately two weeks later. But he does not identify who made the decision to
suspend him, and he does not allege that the decisionmaker was aware of his HR report
at the time of the suspension. Without those allegations, temporal proximity alone
cannot establish the causal link that a retaliation claim requires. And so Count 3 is
DISMISSED.
B. 	The Court Grants Further Limited Leave to Amend
The court has dismissed each of the FAC’s counts because each suffers from
factual shortcomings. But Smith could “conceivably cure these deficiencies.” Jones v.
Rising Phoenix Holdings Corp., Civ. No. 25‐00178, 2025 WL 2802180, at *9 (D. Haw. Oct. 1,
2025). That is most obvious for the retaliation theory, which is being advanced with
meaningful factual context here for the first time. Here there is the strongest possibility
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that, having now received this court’s legal guidance, Smith will be able to flesh out the
factual particularities that will suffice to state this retaliation claim.
It is a closer call for Smith’s discrimination and accommodation claims, which
have been twice pled without sufficient factual support, and which Smith already
received the court’s guidance in the prior order. Nonetheless, the court recognizes that
Smith’s alleged disabilities may well impede his ability to adequately respond to the
court’s orders. For that reason, and out of an abundance of caution, the court will also
grant Smith further leave to amend the discrimination and accommodation claims.
Accordingly, the court grants FURTHER LIMITED LEAVE TO AMEND. Smith
may add factual allegations to Count 1, Count 2, and Count 3 to address the deficiencies
identified in this order. But he is not authorized to add any additional defendants or
additional claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court DISMISSES Smith’s FAC, Dkt. No. 7, and
grants further limited leave to amend.
If Smith elects to file a second amended complaint, he must comply with the
following requirements:
(1) Smith’s deadline to file a second amended complaint is June 4, 2026;
(2) Smith’s amended complaint should be titled “Second Amended Complaint;”
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(3) Smith may assert only the same Count 1, Count 2, and Count 3 as appeared in
the FAC, and only against the same Defendant named in the FAC; he may not
add any new claims or any new defendants; and
(4) Smith’s amended complaint must cure the deficiencies identified above.
Smith is cautioned that failure to timely file a second amended complaint that complies
with this order will result in automatic dismissal of this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	May 4, 2026, at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Civil No. 26‐00089 MWJS‐WRP; Smith v. Amazon.com Services, LLC; ORDER
DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND GRANTING FURTHER LIMITED
LEAVE TO AMEND
/s/ Micah W.J. Smith
Micah W.J. Smith
United States District Judge
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