Worley v. Little, et al.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
MAJOR DAVID T. WORLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRAD LITTLE, in his official capacity
as Governor of the State of Idaho and
Commander-in-Chief of the Idaho
National Guard; MAJOR GENERAL
TIMOTHY J. DONNELLAN, in his
official capacity as Adjutant General of
the Idaho National Guard; and
BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES C.
PACKWOOD, in his official capacity as
Assistant Adjutant General of the Idaho
Army National Guard,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00025-DCN
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Governor Brad Little
(Dkt. 13), and three motions filed by Plaintiff David Worley: a Motion for Default Against
Defendants 	Donnellan 	and 	Packwood 	(Dkt. 	17), 	and 	two 	Motions 	for 	Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 2; Dkt. 17).
Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay,
and because the Court finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by
oral argument, the Court will decide the Motions on the record and without oral argument.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). For the reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS
Governor Little’s Motion to Dismiss and DENIES Worley’s Motion for Default and
Motions for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
II. BACKGROUND
In this case, Worley alleges Defendants Little, Donnellan, and Packwood violated
his First Amendment Rights by stripping him of his command with the Idaho National
Guard due to their disagreement with religious and political views Worley posted online
prior to his tenure in command. Worley explains he was reported to his superior officers,
Defendants Donnellan and Packwood, by a subordinate for the aforementioned political
and religious internet posts. Worley was then asked to resign by Donnellan and Packwood
lest more formal disciplinary proceedings begin, which Worley did. After discussion with
counsel, and due to his own beliefs, Worley decided to rescind the resignation and a formal
inquiry into the original complaint was launched by Donnellan and Packwood. This inquiry
resulted in the ultimate loss of Worley’s command.
Worley initially filed a Complaint (Dkt. 1) and Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 2). Worley served summons directly on Defendants
Little, Packwood, and Donnellan. Dkts. 9-11. Little then filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing
he is immune from suit and that Worley failed to state a claim against him. Dkt. 13. Worley
then filed a Motion to Enter Preliminary Injunction against All Defendants and for Entry
of Default Against Defendants Donnellan and Packwood because each failed to respond to
his initial Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Dkt. 17.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, the United States of America filed two statements of
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
interest setting forth its position on certain matters—specifically service. Dkts. 19, 23.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
1. 	Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move to dismiss claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The objection that a federal
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own
initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment. Arbaugh
v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). “Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not
warranted to the extent that the complaint pleads facts from which federal jurisdiction
clearly may be inferred.” Demarest v. United States, 718 F.2d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 1983). A
Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214,
1242 (9th Cir. 2000). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained
in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for
Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a claim if the
plaintiff has “failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “A Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of
sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare
Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation modified). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “This is not an onerous burden.” Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1122.
A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” but it must set forth “more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. In other words, the claim for relief must be “plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A
plausible complaint is one that allows the reviewing court to draw a “reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
2. 	Motion for Default
“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must
enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). “A default judgment may be entered against
the United States, its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes a claim or right
to relief by evidence that satisfies the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d).
3. 	Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. In
each case, courts must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect
on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief. In exercising their sound
discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in
employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 24, (2008) (citation modified).
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 13)
The Eleventh Amendment generally bars the federal courts from entertaining suits
brought by a private party against a state or its instrumentality in the absence of state
consent. Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 714 F.2d 946,
950 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209 (1984). An exception to this rule exists
under Ex Parte Young wherein a private citizen can sue a state officer for upholding an
unconstitutional law, so long as there is “some connection” between the named state officer
and enforcement of the challenged state law. See Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979
F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir.1992). “This connection must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to
enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing
the challenged provision will not subject an official to suit.” Id.
Here, taking all averments in Worley’s complaint as true,1 there is no indication that
Governor Little’s role as commander-in-chief of the Idaho National Guard provides the
“fairly 	direct” 	connection 	to 	the 	disciplinary 	policy 	purportedly 	implemented 	by
Defendants Packwood and Donnellan. As Ex Parte Young does not strip Little of his
immunity as governor of Idaho in this case, the Court does not have jurisdiction over the
claims against him. Therefore, Little is dismissed from this case.
1 Governor Little is mentioned just twice in Worley’s 45-page complaint. Both instances are perfunctory at
best. First, in the opening paragraph of his Complaint, Worley states he is suing Governor Little “in his
official capacity as Governor of the State of Idaho and Commander-in-Chief of the Idaho National Guard.”
Dkt. 1, at 2. Second, in his section outlining the parties in the case, Worley lists “Defendant, BRAD
LITTLE, is the Governor of the State of Idaho and Commander-in-Chief of the Idaho National Guard.
Governor Little is sued in his official capacity.” Id. at 11. There are no other allegations, facts, or information
as to Governor Little and his involvement, oversight, or connection to the conduct Worley complains of in
his Complaint.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
B. Motion for Default (Dkt. 17)
A defendant can only fail to plead or defend a case against them if they have been
properly served. Worley sued Defendants Packwood and Donnellan in their official
capacities as officials of the Idaho National Guard. Dkt. 1. Therefore, service must be
affected in the manner described in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i), which establishes
the procedure for serving the United States, its agencies, corporations, officers, and
employees. See 10 U.S.C. § 10508(b)(3)(C) (explaining that “in any civil action arising out
of personnel actions or conditions of employment in the Idaho National Guard, the United
States shall be the sole defendant or respondent”). As the United States pointed out in its
two notices, it (the United States) is the only proper defendant in this case. Worley,
however, has neither named the United States as a defendant nor attempted service on them.
Worley has not provided any evidence to suggest the service requirements of Rule
4(i) have been completed. Moreover, there is no way to serve Packwood or Donnellan
properly because they cannot be proper defendants in this type of action, per 10 U.S.C. §
10508(b)(3)(C).Therefore 	the 	Motion 	for 	Default 	as 	to 	Defendants 	Packwood 	and
Donnellan is denied. And, because Defendants Packwood and Donnellan cannot be made
proper parties to this case, they are dismissed.
C. Motions for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
(Dkts. 2, 17)
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20,
(2008) (citation modified). The elements for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction are “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Bursh &
Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).
Worley has filed two motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. Dkt. 2; Dkt. 17. The first motion bases its argument on the Winter factors and
the second argues the motion should be granted based simply on the fact that Defendants
Little, Packwood, and Donnellan did not respond to the first motion. Id.
With what is available in the record for this case, it is not obvious that Worley is
likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. Worley’s claims center around an alleged policy
created and promulgated by the commanders of the Idaho National Guard called “No
Christians in Command.” See generally Dkt. 1. It is not clear to the Court that this policy
exists. Worley has not offered any documents that show that this policy is written down
formally the way other Idaho National Guard policies would be. Worley also did not
provide or allege any examples of this purported policy being used widely or systematically
against other members of the Idaho National Guard. This is not to say Worley is unlikely
to succeed on the merits of his claims, just that there is not enough here for the Court to
grant a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction based on the Winter elements
at this time. As explained, a temporary restraining order is an extreme remedy. Worley has
not carried his burden of persuasion at this stage to obtain such relief.
Moreover, the argument that the temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction should be granted because it was not responded to is unavailing. As explained
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8
above, Defendants Little, Packwood, and Donnellan are not proper defendants, thus, are
not required to respond. Therefore, the aforementioned motions will be denied.
V. ORDER
1. Defendant Governor Little’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 13) is GRANTED. Little
is dismissed as a Defendant in this case.
2. Worley’s Motion for Entry of Default Against Defendants Donnellan and
Packwood (Dkt. 17) is DENIED.
3. Worley’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
(Dkt. 2) is DENIED.
4. Worley’s Motion to Enter Preliminary Injunction against All Defendants (Dkt.
17) is DENIED.
5. James C. Packwood is dismissed as a Defendant in this case.
6. Timothy J. Donnellan is dismissed as a Defendant in this case.
7. Worley is granted leave to amend the Complaint within twenty-one (21) days
from the date of this Order to name and serve the proper Defendant(s) in this case.
DATED: February 12, 2026
_________________________
David C. Nye
U.S. District Court Judge
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