USA v. Moss

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAKOTA R. MOSS,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:14-CR-30208-NJR-1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Compassionate Release and a Motion to
Appoint Counsel 1 filed pro se by Defendant Dakota Moss. (Docs. 90, 92). In response, the
government asks this Court to stay these proceedings pending the results of an upcoming
decision of the Supreme Court. (Docs. 95, 96). In the alternative, the government argues
Moss’s motion must be denied for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as
required under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Id. Moss did not file a reply.
On September 11, 2015, Moss was sentenced to 248 months in prison for
(1) stealing firearms from a federal firearms licensee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u);
(2) conspiracy to interfere with commerce by violence against person or property in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“Hobbs Act Conspiracy”); (3) carry and use of a firearm
during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and (4) felon in possession of
1 The motion to appoint counsel, while docketed separately, was filed as part of the motion for
compassionate release. (Doc. 90, at 2). For the reasons explained herein, the motion for compassionate
release is denied. Because the motion to appoint counsel was not separate from the motion for
compassionate release, it is denied as well.
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a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Docs. 25, 50).
Moss 	argues 	that 	he 	should 	be 	granted 	compassionate 	under 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) 	because 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	circumstances 	warrant 	it;
specifically, he contends that “a change in the law . . . would produce a gross disparity
between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed on the date” he
filed this motion. (Doc. 90, at 5–6). The animating force behind this argument is that,
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019),
and United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), his Hobbs Act Conspiracy conviction is
not a “crime of violence,” thus depriving his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (carrying
and use of a firearm during a crime of violence) of its necessary predicate. (Doc. 90, at 6). 2
In response, the government first argues (Doc. 95, ¶¶ 4–14) that this Court should
stay these proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s disposition of Fernandez v. United
States, No. 24-556 (U.S. argued Nov. 12, 2025). The government believes that the Supreme
Court’s decision may preclude this Court from considering claims like Moss’s under 18
U.S.C. 	§ 3582(c)(1). 	The 	government 	further 	argues 	that 	Moss 	is 	not 	entitled 	to
compassionate release on the merits of his claim. (Doc. 96). The Court does not reach
these arguments, however, because it concludes that Moss has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
As the government argues in the alternative, prisoners like Moss who seek
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) are required first to file a request with
the prison warden asking the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to move for compassionate release
2 This argument was raised by Moss in a previous habeas petition under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. See Moss v. United
States, No. 20-CV-358, 2024 WL 551889 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2024).
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on his behalf. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). If the prison warden denies that request, the
prisoner must appeal the denial through the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Procedure.
See id. Alternatively, the defendant can show that he submitted a request to the warden
and that 30 days have lapsed since the request was submitted without action by the BOP.
Id. If a prisoner fails to show that he has exhausted his remedies, the Court must dismiss
the motion for compassionate release. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, No. 03-CR-40019,
2020 WL 3077316, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 10, 2020).
Here, Moss has not merely failed to prove exhaustion but instead affirmatively
concedes that he “did not submit a request for compassionate release to the warden,”
explaining that he believes a law had been passed removing the exhaustion requirement.
(Doc. 90, at 3). Moss is mistaken. Exhaustion of his administrative remedies through the
warden is required under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
For these reasons, Defendant Dakota Moss’s Motions for Compassionate Release
(Doc. 90) and to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 92) are DENIED without prejudice. The
government’s Motion to Stay Proceedings (Doc. 95) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 16, 2025
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
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