Young v. USA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DEANDRE YOUNG,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
RESPONDENT.
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Case No. 3:23-cv-00494-DWD
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
In this proceeding, Petitioner Deandre Young (“Young”) requests that the Court
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1). The Government
opposes that request. (Doc. 5). For the reasons explained below, Petitioner’s request is
DENIED.
On April 6, 2021, Young was indicted in this District in United States v Deandre
Young, case number 3:21-cr-30043-DWD, for aiding and abetting his co-defendant,
Lamondra Beckley (“Beckley”), who knowing and intentionally possessed with the intent
to distribute a mixture containing methamphetamine. (Count I). In Count III, Young was
charged with possession of firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. (R. 42). On
October 7, 2021, Young entered an open plea of guilty to Counts I and III of the
indictment. (R. 83). Young’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated his
guideline sentence on Count I as 70-87 months and 60 months as a mandatory minimum
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on Count III to run consecutive to Count I. At sentencing, this Court varied downward
to 36 months on Count I and imposed the mandatory minimum of 60 months for Count
III, for a total of 96 months. Judgment was entered accordingly. Young did not appeal.
Young now raises multiple grounds in support of his Habeas motion. First, he
claims that his attorney was ineffective when he failed to investigate and utilize
mitigating evidence to “show that movant was working his job at Door Dash delivering
food and groceries when he was contacted by his friend who happened to be a
confidential informant.” (Doc. 1, pg. 4). Young claims such information would provide a
basis for challenging the nexus between the gun and the drugs. (Doc. 1, pg. 4). Second,
Young claims that he was prejudiced when his attorney failed to “correct errors in [the]
pre-sentence report” that suggested co-defendant Beckley was Young’s partner. (Doc. 1,
pg. 5). Third, Young argues that he entered into an open plea unaware of the effect of
pleading to the gun charge would have on his “ability to earn FSA good time credit.”
(Doc 1, pg. 7). And fourth, he asserts that he came to believe that his only choice was to
plead guilty because his attorney told him that he would not get a “jury of his peers if he
went to trial.” (Doc. 1, pg. 8).
I. 	Background
On March 11, 2021, a confidential source (CS) participated in monitored phone
calls with Young to arrange a four-ounce methamphetamine purchase in Fairview
Heights, Illinois. The CS agreed to pay Young $2,100. Young agreed to meet the CS after
Young picked up the methamphetamine from “his guy,” the supplier. (R. 115, pg. 4).
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Young arrived at the agreed-upon meet location then proceeded to a nearby gas station
where agents approached Young’s vehicle occupied by Young, his wife and Beckley, a
passenger. All vehicle occupants were searched, and agents located a handgun in
Young’s pant pocket, as well as 1.724 grams of actual methamphetamine. Beckley was
found in possession of a handgun and two bags containing approximately 110 grams of
actual methamphetamine. Id.
In a post-arrest interview, Beckley admitted to possessing ice, which he intended
to sell based upon a “deal” that Young, who Beckley described as his “partner”, arranged
with the confidential source. Young declined to make a post-arrest statement. (R. 115, pg.
4-5).
Young made an open guilty plea to Counts I and III of the indictment. At the plea
hearing, the Court confirmed that Young was familiar with the charges he faced and
explained to him the essential elements to be proven by the government at trial. (Doc. 5-
1, pg. 7). More specifically, the Court outlined the three elements of Count III, possession
of firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, including that one of the
government’s burdens was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. (Doc. 5-1, pg. 7).
During the plea hearing, Young confirmed that he signed and agreed to the
Stipulation of Facts. That Stipulation of Facts provides in part that “[a]s charged in Count
3 of the indictment, on or about March 11, 2021, Defendant Young knowingly and
intentionally possessed a firearm […] in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.” (Doc. 5-
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2, pg. 1). He confirmed that the statements in the Stipulation of Facts are “substantially
true.” (Doc. 5-1, pg. 12).
At the sentencing hearing, the Court conducted an inquiry regarding Young’s
review of the PSR. Young confirmed that he did have the opportunity to review the PSR
with his attorney and that he had no objections to it. Further, Young confirmed that
“everything in the presentence investigation report that we’ve been discussing is true and
accurate.” (Doc. 5-7, pg. 4-5). As noted, the Court sentenced Young to a below-guideline
sentence of 36 months on Count I and the mandatory minimum of 60 months on Count
III. Young did not appeal.
II. 	Discussion
Young now claims that his attorney was ineffective when he (1) failed to
investigate surveillance tapes and Beckley’s statements in an effort to challenge the
existence of a “nexus” between the drugs and the gun; (2) failed to correct errors in the
presentence investigation report in that it mischaracterized Young as a “known meth
dealer;” (3) failed to advise him of the consequences of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A) as it pertains to his inability to secure First Step Act credits; and (4) advised
Young that he would not get a jury of his peers in the Southern District of Illinois.
Under § 2255(a), the Court will grant the “extraordinary remedy” of vacating,
setting aside, or correcting Petitioner’s sentence only if he shows it “was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
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authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a);
Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007). Notably, a hearing on such
matters is not necessary when “the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” United States v. Taylor, 605 F.Supp.3d 1079, 1081 (N.D.
Ill. Jun. 1, 2022). The undersigned, as the District Judge who presided over Petitioner’s
underlying criminal case, “is uniquely suited to determine if a hearing is necessary.” See
Taylor, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 1081 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 987 (7th
Cir. 2002)), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (7th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).
As a substantive matter, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
grants criminal defendants the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Wyatt v. United
States, 574 F.3d 455, 457 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Watson v. Anglin, 560 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir.
2009)). Under Strickland, the petitioner must prove: (1) that his attorney’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that the attorney’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant such that “there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” McDowell v. Kingston, 497 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2007). “Both components of
the test must be satisfied; ‘the lack of either is fatal.’” Clay v. United States, 311 F.Supp.3d
911, 918 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2018) (quoting Edmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1313 (7th Cir.
1996)).
During this inquiry, it is presumed that a petitioner’s counsel was “reasonably
proficient.” Galbraith v. United States, 313 F.3d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Wyatt v
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United States, 574 F.3d 455, 458 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] movant must overcome the ‘strong
presumption 	that 	counsel’s 	conduct 	falls 	within 	the 	wide 	range 	of 	reasonable
professional assistance.’”); Clay, 311 F.Supp.3d at 919 (“The central question in this
analysis is not whether counsel’s conduct deviated from best practices or most common
custom, but instead, whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence
under prevailing professional norms.”) (cleaned up). “The benchmark for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Put another way,
in order to establish counsel’s performance was deficient, the defendant must show errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. 	Hartjes 	v. 	Endicott, 	456 	F.3d 	786, 	790 	(7th 	Cir. 	2006). 	“Counsel’s
representation need not be perfect, indeed not even good, to be constitutionally
adequate.” Anderson v. United States, 94 F.4th 564, 581 (7th Cir. 2024). Moreover, on the
question of prejudice, Petitioner must prove there was a reasonable probability that,
absent counsel’s objectively unreasonable or deficient performance, he would have
insisted on proceeding to trial rather than plead guilty. See Wyatt, 574 F.3d at 458 (quoting
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)); Galbraith, 313 F.3d at 1008 (citing Tezak v. United
States, 256 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1318 (7th Cir.
1989)); Rastafari v. Anderson, 278 F.3d 673, 688 (7th Cir. 2002).
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A. Counsel’s failure to investigate surveillance tapes and Beckley’s statement to law
enforcement to challenge any “nexus” between the drugs and the gun.
Young claims that his counsel was ineffective because he did not investigate
“mitigating evidence to challenge the nexus of the gun found on petitioner to the drugs.”
(Doc. 1, pg. 13). More specifically, he asserts that “surveillance tapes” would show
Petitioner working his job at Door Dash delivering food and groceries when he was
contacted by the confidential source. (Doc. 1, pg. 13). He goes on to claim that he was
carrying a firearm while working for Door Dash and before he was contacted by the
confidential source, which proves that he carried the firearm for protection while
working in dangerous areas. (Doc. 1, pg. 13). 1 Young concludes that he was “prejudiced
by counsel’s failure to bring this mitigation evidence to light.” (Doc. 1, pg. 14).
The statute under which Young was charged in Count III, 18 U.S.C. § 924, only
requires that the firearm be used or carried during and “in furtherance of” a drug
trafficking crime. It provides in part:
. . . any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime . 	. 	. 	for which the person may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance
of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime--
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
1 Young attaches to his Reply (Doc. 7) numerous documents evidencing his position as an independent contractor
with Door Dash in 2021, as well maps apparently purporting to show his deliveries on March 11, 2021 and various
publications containing references to violence against persons involved in home deliveries. He also attaches
information regarding crime rates in Glasgow Village, Missouri. (Doc. 7, pg. 16-52). The Court assumes that a
person engaged in home deliveries in high-crime areas may legitimately desire to carry a firearm for protection.
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But as the government observes, Young does not identify the source of any
particular surveillance video or that he ever shared with his counsel the existence of any
such video. (Doc. 5, pgs. 9-10). He only suggests that there are surveillance videos that
confirm he carried a firearm for personal protection while working for Door Dash. Even
if there are videos that show Young carrying a firearm while working his Door Dash job,
such evidence would not exclude the “in furtherance” possession of the same firearm in
when he engaged in his drug trafficking activities later on the day of his arrest. Firearms
can be possessed for more than one purpose. And they may be carried for both legitimate
and illegitimate reasons and done so at the same time. Possessing a firearm for legitimate
reasons does not necessarily exclude the possession of the firearm for other reasons that
are not legitimate. So, it is of no help to Young’s argument that he carried the firearm in
question for self-protection during his work for Door Dash when the record demonstrates
that he later possessed it for the illegitimate purpose of furthering his drug trafficking.
So, any failure to secure surveillance videos of Young carrying his firearm while working
would be of no consequence in the face of the evidence that he carried the same firearm
later that day in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
The Government also points out that Young does not allege that he even told
Attorney Margulis to investigate the existence of surveillance tapes. (Doc. 5, pg. 9).
2 “[W]hen determining the reasonableness of trial counsel's investigation,” we “consider
2 Although Young apparently did not allege in his Petition that he told Attorney Margulis to investigate the
existence of surveillance videos, he argues in his Reply that he did so. (Doc. 7, pg. 3)
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what [the defendant] told trial counsel.” Koons v. United States, 639 F.3d 348, 354 (7th Cir.
2011). Certainly, “an attorney need not investigate every possible factual scenario.
Instead, the Constitution requires an attorney to make a ‘reasonable’ investigation.” Long
v. United States, 847 F.3d 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). But
here, even if it is assumed that Young told Attorney Margulis about the a surveillance
tapes that would, as Young argues, demonstrate he carried a firearm while working, it
would not be unreasonable to forego an investigation to locate such a video given that it
would not necessarily contradict the evidence in the record that he also carried that
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Attorney Margulis failed in his
representation of Young to function as “counsel” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
or that he undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process. More to the
point, it is not unreasonable for Attorney Margulis to forego an expansive search for
“surveillance videos” among presumably many homes and places of business Young had
visited while working for Door Dash. Even if he did secure surveillance videos of Young
carrying a firearm while carrying out his employment duties, it would not unsettle the
fact that he was also carrying it during, and, as Young admitted, in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime. It cannot be said that under such circumstances Young was prejudiced
by his attorney’s representation of him.
B. The Failure of Attorney Margulis to advise Young regarding nexus between drug
trafficking and the Gun.
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Next, Young contends “Counsel failed to advise petitioner of the requirement of a
nexus between the gun and drug” and that had he “known there needed to be a provable
nexus, he would not have [pled] guilty to the gun charge and taken that element to trial.”
(Doc. 1, pg. 14). In his Reply, Young argues “[i]t was only later, when Petitioner entered
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, that Petitioner learned of the elements needed to
convict on the 924(c) charge and begin (sic) to question his counsel’s effectiveness.” (Doc.
7, pg. 3) In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel that led to the entering
of a guilty plea, Young “must establish through objective evidence a reasonable
probability that” but for Counsel’s failure to properly advise him he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on a trial. McCleese v. United States, 75 F.3d 1174,
1179 (7th Cir. 1996). This argument fails for at least two reasons.
First, the government argues that Young offers up no objective evidence. He does
not point to specifically what he learned after the plea and sentencing that causes him
now to question his decision to plead guilty. The Court agrees. His bare-thread allegation
that he would have decided otherwise had he known about the requirement of a “nexus”
is simply self-serving and does not constitute the objective evidence necessary to support
his claim.
Second, apart from the lack of objective evidence in his favor is the abundance of
evidence of record that demonstrates he was aware of the “in furtherance element”
contained in Count III. During the plea hearing, Young was read the essential elements
of § 924(c) that must be proven by the government. (Doc. 5-1, pg. 7). He was informed by
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the Court at that hearing that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
that the firearm was possessed in furtherance of the drug trafficking crime. Young
confirmed during the colloquy that he was aware of this element of Count III. (Doc. 5-1,
pg. 7).
THE COURT: Count 3, which is for the Possession of a Firearm in
Furtherance of Drug Trafficking Crim, also has three elements. The first
one is that you committed the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime
prosecutable in Federal Court; and, two, that you knowingly possessed a
firearm; and three, that the possession of the firearm was in furtherance of
the Defendant’s –that’s you—drug trafficking crime. Were you aware of
those elements?
Deft. Young: Yes, sir.
(Doc. 5-1, pg. 7).
Young also provided to the Court an executed stipulation of facts that confirmed
he possessed the firearm in furtherance of the drug trafficking crime. (Doc. 5-2, pgs. 1-2).
Finally, and before accepting his change of plea, the Court confirmed with Young that he
understood everything discussed during the change of plea hearing. Further, the Court
gave Young the opportunity to speak again with his attorney with any questions before
entering a plea of guilty. (Doc. 5-1, pg. 12). He declined the opportunity.
If he did not understand the meaning of the phrase “in furtherance of he made no
mention of it during the change of plea hearing despite there being opportunities to
question its meaning. See United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 814 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
natural meaning of ‘in furtherance of’ is ‘furthering, advancing or helping forward.’”).
As the government observes, the Court was entitled to rely on the truth of Young’s
statements that he was aware of the elements under Count III and that he understood
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everything discussed at the Rule 11 hearing. He cannot not now claim successfully that
he would have declined to plea guilty to Count III had he been made aware of the
requirement of proof of “nexus” or “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime. 3
Young also alleges that Attorney Margulis informed him that “merely because
petitioner had the gun at the scene of the crime the prosecutor did not need to make a
connection between the gun and drugs.” (Doc. 1, pg. 6). This advice, Young suggests,
made Attorney Margulis’ representation of him ineffective. Young seemingly ignores the
indictment which alleges that possession of the firearm was “in furtherance of” a drug
trafficking crime. He disregards the Stipulation of Facts which he signed before changing
his plea and which the Court reviewed with him at the plea hearing, and which indicates
that he had possession of the firearm “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime. Apart
from the clear wording of the Indictment and Stipulation of Facts, there is the information
contained in discovery illuminating the circumstances of Young’s possession of the
firearm and drugs. It is apparent that Attorney Margulis, during the course of discovery,
was made aware of law enforcement’s report of Young’s arrest which indicates that the
3 Because it appears that Young may be conflating the word “nexus” with the statutory phrase “in
furtherance of,” it is appropriate to reiterate that “in furtherance of” by its natural meaning, requires a
showing that the firearm was used to advance or move forward his drug trafficking. A “nexus” means only
a link or connection. See Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary/nexus (last visited Jan. 23, 2026) Case law often
uses the term “nexus” to describe “in furtherance of.” See United States v. Duran, 407 F.3d 828, 840 (7th Cir.
2005). That use of the word “nexus” does not create a heightened standard of relationship between the
firearm and the drug trafficking beyond the statutory language. Accordingly, any failure on the part of
Attorney Margulis to employ the term “nexus” instead of the phrase “in furtherance of” in his
conversations with Young is not consequential. See United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“In fact, carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime like [defendant] did will always seem to
constitute possession in furtherance because carrying a firearm always serves to protect the holder.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
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gun and the methamphetamine were found in the same pocket. (Doc. 5-8, pgs. 3-4).
Discovery also disclosed the contents of co-defendant Beckley’s post-arrest interview,
which reported that when Beckley showed the drugs to Young, Beckley and Young
confirmed with one another that each was “strapped.” (Doc. 5-9). With such evidence, a
jury could quite easily find that Young carried his firearm “in furtherance of” a drug
trafficking crime.
The contemplation and weighing of the potential success of arguments that may
be placed before the jury for its consideration is not only proper but is the duty of any
attorney representing a person charged with crimes like those involved here. In the
record before the Court, there is no indication that Attorney Margulis’ advice to Young
to plead guilty was objectively unreasonable. As such, under these circumstances there
is no room for a meaningful argument that advice to plead guilty amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel.
C. The alleged failure of Attorney Margulis to correct errors in the presentence
investigation report in that it mischaracterized Young as a Beckley’s “partner” and
Young was a “known meth dealer.”
Young next contends that Attorney Margulis failed to correct errors in the PSR
which resulted in the “mischaracterization of petitioner that prejudiced petitioner in the
eyes of the court.” (Doc. 1, pg. 14). More specifically, he argues that he was prejudiced by
the PSR’s reference to Young as co-defendant Beckley’s “partner” and as a “known
distributor of methamphetamine in Southern Illinois.” Young argues that there is no
evidence that he was co-defendant Beckley’s partner or that he engaged in drug
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trafficking beyond the episode that is charged in Count I. He posits that he is a father to
two children and worked hard to provide for and raise them in difficult circumstances;
that the only reason he was in Southern Illinois is that he was asked to by Beckley; and
his involvement was limited to “putting the two parties together.” (Doc. 1, pg. 14-15).
The PSR was disclosed on January 5, 2022, and on January 18, 2022, Young filed
an Acceptance of Presentence Investigation Report which indicates that he “accepts and
has not objections to the Presentence Investigation Report.” (Doc. 5-3). At the sentencing,
Young was placed under oath. The Court, notwithstanding the Young’s Acceptance, then
inquired of Young to ensure that he had adequate opportunity to review the PSR with
Attorney Margulis for truth and accuracy. (Doc. 5-7, pgs. 4-5). He confirmed that he had.
(Doc. 5-7, pgs. 4-5). Thus, his claim that the PSR was inaccurate or untruthful fails because
he has already confirmed under oath that he had no objection to its content.
The government goes on to point out that Young clearly was not prejudiced
because his attorney raised during the sentencing the same positive attributes that Young
now asserts in his Petition. The government points to the letters of support and the
“mountains of mitigating evidence” that Attorney Margulis put forth at sentencing that
resulted in the Court varying downward from a guideline sentence of 130-147 months to
96 months of imprisonment. The government then concludes that the Court’s downward
variance cannot support the idea that he had been “prejudiced in the eyes of the Court.”
The Court agrees and finds no evidence that it was “prejudiced” by reason of Beckley’s
statements. In fact, the Court did not address during sentencing the statements that
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Young now claims caused it to be prejudiced toward him. There is no evidence that the
Court was influenced at all by the PSR’s reference to Young as a “partner” of Beckley or
that Young was a distributor of methamphetamine in Southern Illinois. The PSR’s
reference to “partner” is a description by Beckley of his relationship with Young, and that
was simply reported in the PSR. (R. 115, ¶ 16). Likewise, it was the confidential source
that provided the information about Young being a distributor of methamphetamine in
Southern Illinois. (R. 115, ¶ 13). Young has not, and, under the circumstance of this
matter, cannot present any objective evidence that Attorney Margulis was ineffective as
counsel for failing to correct his PSR or that he was prejudiced by the inclusion of either
statement in the PSR.
D. Attorney Margulis’ suggestion to Young that he would not get a jury of his peers.
Young claims that Attorney Margulis’ representation was ineffective because he
advised Young that “he would not get a jury of his peers” in the jurisdiction of the Court.
(Doc. 1, pg. 8). Young does not describe how this advice amounts to his being deprived
of effective representation. But a defendant is not entitled to have a jury of his peers
decide his case. Rather, all that such a defendant is entitled to is a panel of impartial and
indifferent jurors. United States v. Raszkiewicz, 169 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1999). In fact,
there is no requirement that a venire or jury mirror the demographics of the general
population of the district. See United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 842 (7th Cir. 2001). So,
whether Young was motivated to plead guilty because of any such advice from Attorney
Margulis is of no consequence as Young is not necessarily entitled to a jury of his peers.
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E. Young’s contention that he would not have entered a plea of guilty had he known
that his 924(c) conviction would disqualify him for First Step “good time credits.”
Young asserts that had he known a 924(c) conviction would make him ineligible
for good time credits under the First Step Act, he would not have entered a plea of guilty
and instead taken the charge to trial. (Doc. 1, pg. 18). Under the first prong of Strickland’s
two prong test, the Court must analyze the evidence to determine whether counsel’s
representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). “The first prong—constitutional deficiency—is necessarily linked
to the practice and expectations of the legal community: ‘The proper measure of attorney
performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” Id.
Here, the Court will assume for the purposes of expediency that the weight of prevailing
norms supports the view that counsel must advise his client regarding ineligibility for
good time credits for those convicted under 924(c).
The second prong under Strickland requires a litigant to also demonstrate
prejudice, that is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 119
(2017) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). It is here that Young’s argument fails.
Young’s mere allegation that he would have decided to go to trial instead of
pleading guilty to Count III had he known he would not be eligible for good time credits
is self-serving. He does not allege that he told Margulis that a condition to his pleading
guilty is that he would receive good time credits. 	Likewise, he does not make any
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showing or point to anything in the record that he suffered prejudice by Attorney
Margulis’ representation of him or that the outcome would have been different had he
known of his possible ineligibility for good time credits. Accordingly, Young’s failure to
make the required showing of sufficient prejudice defeats his ineffectiveness claim. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that Young is entitled to no relief
on his Petition. (Doc. 1). Accordingly, Young’s request to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence under § 2255 is DENIED without a hearing. See United States v. Taylor, 605
F.Supp.3d at 1081. The case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is
DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Cases in the U.S. District Courts requires
the issuance or denial of a certificate of appealability when a final order is entered against
an applicant. Such a certificate of appealability may be issued “only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Petitioner “must have a constitutional claim (or an underlying procedural argument on
which a constitutional claim depends), and he must ‘demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.’” United States v. Fleming, 676 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 281 (2004); citing Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1165 (7th Cir.
2008)); accord Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, the Court FINDS the
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alleged grounds for relief lack merit, and reasonable jurists would not find that
conclusion debatable or wrong. Since Petitioner has not made a “substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right,” the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of
appealability.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 23, 2026 	/s/ David W. Dugan
______________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge
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