Progressive Casualty Insurance Company v. Estate of Randy Franklin Hammonds, Deceased et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE ESTATE OF RANDY FRANKLIN
HAMMONDS, DECEASED,
CATHERINE NEWELL, AUSTIN
MICHAEL MEYER, MEYER AAA
HAULING, LLC, MEYER
CONTRACTING AND HAULING LLC,
and EZ PORTABLE BUILDINGS, INC.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:24-CV-02091-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This case grows out of a multi-vehicle highway accident in Alexander County,
Illinois, on June 20, 2022. Defendant Austin Michael Meyer was operating a 2007 Peterbilt
truck on Illinois Route 3. (Doc. 64-4, pp. 3-5). As Meyer attempted to pass a car in front of
him, he allegedly set in motion a series of events that resulted in a head-on collision
between Catherine Newell and Randy Hammonds, the occupants of two other vehicles.
Hammonds died from his injuries.
Subsequently, 	Hammonds’ 	estate 	sued 	Meyer, 	Newell, 	and 	several 	other
defendants — Meyer AAA Hauling, LLC, Meyer Contracting & Hauling LLC, and
EZ Portable Buildings, Inc. — in Alexander County, Illinois Circuit Court. (Doc. 66, ¶ 4;
Doc. 68, ¶ 4; Case No. 2022LA3). Newell filed a counterclaim against all of the defendants
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except the estate. (Id.).
On August 30, 2024, Progressive filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in
this district court against all of the parties to the state court lawsuit, seeking a declaration
that it does not owe a duty to defend or indemnify any party with respect to insurance
policy 02004736. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a). Plaintiff Progressive is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business
in Ohio; Defendant Meyer is a citizen of Missouri; Defendants Meyer AAA Hauling, LLC
and Meyer Contracting and Hauling, LLC are a single-member LLCs owned by a citizen
of Missouri; EZ Portable Buildings, Inc. is a Kentucky corporation with its principal place
of business in Kentucky; Newell is an Illinois citizen; and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. (Doc. 1).
The Insurance Policy
This case concerns a commercial auto insurance policy (Policy No. 02004736)
issued by Progressive to Meyer Contracting and Hauling LLC. (Doc. 64-1). The policy
was effective from April 16, 2022, to April 16, 2023. Several provisions are relevant here.
First, the policy states:
Subject to the General Definitions, to all the terms, conditions, and
limitations of the Duties In The Event of an Accident or Loss section, to all
the terms, conditions, and limitations of the General Provisions, and to all
the terms, conditions, exclusions, limitations, and applicable reductions
described in this Part I, if you pay the premium for this coverage and
coverage under this Part I applies, we will pay damages for bodily injury,
property damage, and covered pollution cost or expense for which an
insured becomes legally responsible because of an accident.
We will settle or defend, at our option, any claim or lawsuit for damages
covered by this Part I. We have no duty to settle or defend any lawsuit, or
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make any additional payments, after the Limit of Liability for this coverage
has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.
(Doc. 64-1, p. 19).
The policy goes on to define “insured” as follows:
A. When used in Part I-Liability to Others, insured means:
1. You with respect to an insured auto.
2. Any person while using, with your permission, and within the
scope of that permission, an insured auto you own, hire, or borrow
except:
[ . . .]
3. Any other person or organization, but only with respect to the
legal liability of that person or organization for acts or omissions of
any person otherwise covered under this Part I-Liability to Others.
(Id. at pp. 19-20).
The policy contains two definitions of “insured auto.” The first provides:
6. “Insured auto” or “your insured auto” means:
a. Any auto specifically described on the declarations page; or
b. An additional auto for Part I - Liability To Others and/or Part II -
Damage To Your Auto on the date you become the owner if:
(i) you acquire the auto during the policy period shown on
the declarations page;
(ii) we insure all autos owned by you that are used in your
business;
(iii) no other insurance policy provides coverage for that auto;
and
(iv) you tell us within 30 days after you acquire it that you
want us to cover it for that coverage.
. . .
c. Any replacement auto on the date you become the owner if:
(i) you acquire the auto during the policy period shown on
the declarations page;
(ii) 	the 	auto 	that 	you 	acquire 	replaces 	one 	specifically
described on the declarations page due to termination of your
ownership 	of 	the 	replaced 	auto 	or 	due 	to 	mechanical
breakdown of, deterioration of, or loss to the replaced auto
that renders it permanently inoperable; and
(iii) no other insurance policy provides coverage for that auto.
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(Id. at pp. 15-16).
The second definition provides:
B. When used in Part I-Liability to Others, insured auto also includes:
1. Trailers designed primarily for travel on public roads, while
connected to your insured auto that is a power unit;
2. Mobile equipment while being carried or towed by an insured
auto;
3. Any temporary substitute auto
4. [further defining covered mobile equipment]
(Id. at p. 20).
“Temporary substitute auto” is defined as:
[A]ny auto you do not own while used with the permission of its owner as
a temporary substitute for an insured auto that has been withdrawn from
normal use due to breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.
However, temporary substitute auto does not include any auto available
for the regular or frequent use of you, a relative, or your employees unless
that auto is insured under a separate policy of insurance that provides at
least the minimum required limits of financial responsibility under the
applicable state and federal laws.
(Id. at p. 19).
Procedural History
After Progressive filed its complaint for declaratory judgment in this Court and
served all of the defendants, only two — Hammonds’ estate and Newell — appeared and
answered. (Docs. 4, 8). At Progressive’s request, the Clerk of Court entered default
against the other defendants on February 20, 2025. (Doc. 46). Progressive then moved for
a default judgment against those defendants. (Doc. 47). On June 23, 2025, the Court
granted the motion in part, finding that Progressive does not have duty to defend those
defendants in the underlying state court lawsuit under the policy. (Doc. 55). However,
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the Court declined to decide whether Progressive had a duty to indemnify under the
policy while discovery in this case and in the state action proceeded. (Id.).
On October 23, 2025, Progressive moved for summary judgment on its claim that
it has no duty to defend or indemnify any defendant under the policy. (Doc. 63). Newell
and Hammonds’ estate indicate that they take no position on Progressive’s motion.
(Docs. 67, 69).
Undisputed Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Meyer AAA Hauling, LLC, is a single member
Limited Liability Company owned by Zach Meyer. (Docs. 66, 68). Meyer Contracting and
Hauling LLC is a single-member Limited Liability Company owned by Zach Meyer. (Id.).
Meyer Contracting and Hauling LLC is the named insured on Progressive Policy at issue
here (No. 02004736), which was effective from April 16, 2022 to April 16, 2023. (Id.).
At the time of the collision giving rise to the underlying lawsuit in state court,
Austin Michael Meyer was driving a 2007 Peterbilt 379 with VIN 1XP5AU7X17D744284.
(Id.). Austin Michael Meyer was pulling a trailer that belonged to Meyer Contracting and
Hauling LLC. (Id.). The 2007 Peterbilt was insured under a separate Progressive insurance
policy, Policy No. 953156774. (Id.). That truck was purchased by Meyer Contracting and
Hauling LLC on April 12, 2022, but was leased to Meyer AAA Hauling, LLC two days
prior. (Id.). Meyer Contracting and Hauling LLC purchased the trailer in July 2021. (Id.).
The Auto Coverage Schedule for the Progressive Policy at issue here (No. 02004736) lists
a 2009 International 440, a 2015 Ford F550 and a 2022 Ford F150 but does not list the 2007
Peterbilt nor any trailer. (Id.; see also Doc. 64-1, pp. 3-4). On the date of the collision, none
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of the listed vehicles were out of service. (Docs. 66, 68).
LEGAL STANDARDS
A court should grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Assertions that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed
must be supported by materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Once the moving party
sets forth the basis for summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party
who must go beyond mere allegations and offer specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue of fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-24 (1986).
In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Bennington v.
Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001). The Court may not “assess the credibility
of witnesses or balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence.” Palmer v. Franz,
928 F.3d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 2019) (alteration omitted) (quoting Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the
City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 2010)). “The court has one task and one task
only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of
fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920.
Because the summary judgment motion here is brought against all defendants,
several of whom remain in default, the Court will treat it as a renewed motion for default
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judgment as to those defendants. Rule 55(a) requires the clerk to enter default when a
party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or
otherwise defend and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
The clerk’s entry of a default “is merely a formal matter and does not constitute entry of
a judgment.” 10A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2682 (4th ed.). “Once the default is established, and thus liability, the plaintiff still must
establish his entitlement to the relief he seeks.” VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Illinois
Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Catt, 368 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir.
2004)). “When ruling on a motion for default judgment, the Court “must accept as true
all factual allegations in the complaint, except those regarding the amount of damages.”
Arwa Chiropractic, P.C. v. Med-Care Diabetic & Med. Supplies, Inc., 961 F.3d 942, 948 (7th
Cir. 2020). “Even after default, however, it remains for the court to consider whether the
unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does
not admit conclusions of law.” See 10A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2688.1 (4th ed.).
DISCUSSION
Progressive argues that the undisputed facts make clear that it has no duty to any
defendant under Policy Number 02004736. The Court agrees.
Start with some first principles. Insurance policies are contracts and therefore are
construed using ordinary principles of contract interpretation. Hobbs v. Hartford Ins. Co.
of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17, 823 N.E.2d 561, 564 (2005); see also Old Guard Ins. Co. v.
Riverway Prop. Mgmt., LLC, No. 23-01098, 2024 WL 4112781, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2024).
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A court’s “primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties,
as expressed in the policy language.” Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 17, 823 N.E.2d at 564 (citing
American States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479, 687 N.E.2d 72 (1997)).
Illinois law provides that “the insurer’s duty to defend arises when ‘the facts
alleged in the underlying complaint fall within, or potentially within, the policy’s
provisions.’” Berkley Ins. Co. v. Caraway, No. 24-256, 2025 WL 3280220, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Nov.
25, 2025) (quoting Mkt. St. Bancshares, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 962 F.3d 947, 951–52 (7th Cir.
2020)). An insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify. See Bartkowiak
v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2015 IL App (1st) 133549, ¶ 20, 39 N.E.3d 176, 181 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015). For that reason, the duty “arises not just when the allegations of the
underlying complaint “‘fall within . . . the policy’s coverage,’ but also when those
allegations ‘potentially’ fall within that coverage.” Great Am. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 104 F.4th 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 154 Ill.2d 90, 108, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (1992)). In assessing whether an insurer
has a duty to defend in a particular case, courts may assess matters outside of the
allegations in the underlying complaint and the insurance policy provided that doing so
would not trench upon key issues in the other litigation, such as a plaintiff’s theory of
liability. See Pekin Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Lutheran Church, 2016 IL App (4th) 150966, ¶ 64,
78 N.E.3d 941, 951 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). Provisions in insurance policies that limit coverage
are to be “interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer.” Koloms,
177 Ill. 2d at 479, 687 N.E.2d at 75.
Progressive argues that no defendant is entitled to coverage because none of the
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defendants are an “insured” within the meaning of the policy. (Doc. 64-1, p. 19). The
policy defines “insured” as:
1. You with respect to an insured auto.
2. Any person while using, with your permission, and within the scope of
that permission, an insured auto you own, hire, or borrow except:
[ . . .]
3. Any other person or organization, but only with respect to the legal
liability of that person or organization for acts or omissions of any person
otherwise covered under this Part I-Liability to Others.
(Id. at pp. 19-20). 1
To satisfy any of the definitions, the vehicle involved in the incident must be an
“insured auto.” The first and second subsections mention “insured auto” directly. The
third subsection is less obvious; it adds to the definition of “insured” other persons but
“only with respect to” the liability of that person “for acts or omissions” of someone who
is “otherwise covered under” the policy — i.e., those who are vicariously liable for
someone who is an insured under the first or second definitions. Consequently, the
question becomes whether the truck and trailer at issue in the underlying state case
qualify as an “insured auto” under the policy.
Consolidating all of the policy’s definitions, an “insured auto” is defined in five
ways: (1) vehicles listed on the policy’s declarations page (Id. at p. 15); (2) certain
additional vehicles provided the insured acquires the vehicle during the policy period,
Progressive insures all vehicles used in the insured’s business, no other policy provides
coverage, and the insured requests coverage within 30 days (Id. at pp. 15-16); (3) vehicles
1 “You” and “your” are defined by reference to the individual named on the policy’s declarations page.
(Doc. 64-1, p. 19). In this case, that is Meyer Contracting and Hauling, LLC. (Id. at p. 2).
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acquired during the policy period to replace one of the vehicles listed on the declarations
page; (4) trailers while connected to insured autos (Id. at p. 20); (5) and “temporary
substitute autos” (Id.). A temporary substitute auto is defined to include only vehicles the
insured “do[es] not own while used with the permission of its owner as a temporary
substitute for an insured auto that has been withdrawn from normal use due to
breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.” (Id. at p. 19).
The undisputed facts regarding the vehicle and trailer involved in the collision
make clear that neither is an “insured auto.” The collision involved a 2007 Peterbilt truck.
That vehicle is not listed on the declarations page. Accordingly, it is not covered under
the first definition. Next, the Peterbilt truck is not an additional auto under the second
definition because it was purchased on April 12, 2022, outside the policy period and was
covered by another insurance policy. For similar reasons, neither the truck nor the trailer,
which was purchased in 2021, qualify as replacement autos. Neither the truck nor the
trailer 	was 	a 	“temporary 	substitute 	auto” 	because 	both 	were 	owned 	by 	Meyer
Contracting and Hauling LLC, which is the name of the insured on the policy, and none
of the vehicles listed on the declarations page were out of service on the date of the crash.
Finally, the trailer was not attached to an insured auto, as defined by any of the provisions
discussed above.
Because neither the truck nor the attached trailer qualifies as an “insured auto”
under the policy, it follows that no entity potentially seeking coverage qualifies as an
“insured” under the policy’s liability coverage provisions. (Doc. 64-1, pp. 19-2). Thus, the
policy at issue here (No. 02004736) does not extend coverage to any of the defendants.
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The only parties to appear in this case — Hammonds’ estate and Newell — offer no
argument to the contrary and indeed, do not oppose summary judgment. 2
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Progressive’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 63) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment as follows:
Progressive Casualty Insurance Company owes no duty to defend or
indemnify the Estate of Randy Frankin Hammonds, Catherine Newell,
Austin Michael Meyer, Meyer AAA Hauling, LLC, Meyer Contracting and
Hauling LLC, or EZ Portable Buildings, Inc., under Policy No. 02004736
with respect to the underlying litigation, styled Hammonds, Jr. v. Michael
Austin Meyer, et al, Case No. 2022-LA-3, pending in the First Judicial Circuit
Court in Alexander County, Illinois.
It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case upon entry
of the judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	March 23, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
2 It is true that the underlying litigation remains pending in state court, and the Seventh Circuit regularly
has held that “decisions about indemnity should be postponed until the underlying liability has been
established.” Lear Corp. v. Johnson Elec. Holdings Ltd., 353 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). But
because in Illinois, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, the Court’s finding that there
is no duty to defend necessarily precludes a finding of a duty to indemnify, and summary judgment on
that issue therefore is appropriate. See Health Care Indus. Liab. Ins. Program v. Momence Meadows Nursing
Ctr., Inc., 566 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2009); IMEG Corp. v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., No. 20-03316, 2025 WL 962961,
at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2025).
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