Monk v. Lowe's Home Improvement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KEVIN MONK,
Plaintiff,
v.
LOWE’S HOME CENTERS, LLC,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:25-CV-1257-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint filed by
Defendant Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC (hereinafter “Lowe’s”).1 (Doc. 11). After pro se
Plaintiff Kevin Monk’s response deadline passed, Lowe’s filed a Notice of Non-
Opposition. (Doc. 12). Monk filed a “Motion to Reinstate.” 2 (Doc. 13). For the following
reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.
B ACKGROUND
According to Monk’s complaint—the allegations in which are taken as true for the
purposes of the motion to dismiss—he was called an extremely racist epithet by his
supervisor at Lowe’s three times. (Doc. 3, at 6). He brought his objections to a manager
1 Defendant is incorrectly named “Lowe’s Home Improvement” in the original complaint. (Doc. 11, at
1 n.1). The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to correct Defendant’s name to Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC, as
reflected in the above caption.
2 It appears that, at the time he filed his motion, Monk believed this Court had already dismissed his
complaint. (See Doc. 13). In keeping with the rule that courts are to construe pro se claims generously, Buechel
v. United States, 746 F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 2014), the Court treats Monk’s motion to reinstate as a response
to the motion to dismiss.
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but was fired in retaliation. Id.
Monk filed a complaint alleging the above on June 18, 2025. In response to the
complaint, Lowe’s filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, arguing that Monk had failed to allege that he had exhausted his
administrative remedies and thus had failed to state a claim under either Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act or the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). (Doc. 11). 3 When Monk did
not respond within the deadline, Lowe’s filed a “notice of non-opposition,” urging this
Court to dismiss Monk’s complaint on the basis of his failure to respond. (Doc. 12).
Monk then filed a motion asking this Court to “reinstate” his complaint under
Rules 59 or 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 13). In this motion, Monk
alleges that he filed a case related to this incident with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the time limit. Id. at 1. However, the motion still
does not address whether the administrative proceedings at the EEOC were exhausted.
DISCUSSION
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests whether
the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d
635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff only needs to allege
3 Lowe’s also makes the factual allegation that Monk could not now cure any failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies, as the statutory time limits for beginning the process have now expired. (Doc. 11,
at 5). To support this claim, Lowe’s provides a declaration by one of its employees “who is familiar with
when charges are filed against Lowe’s.” Id. In the declaration, the employee avers that Lowe’s never
received notice of any action by Monk aside from the instant suit. (Doc. 11-1, at 2–3). However, as explained
below, Monk fails to even allege exhaustion, which warrants dismissal of his claims. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court has therefore considered neither the factual allegations made by Lowe’s nor its
employee’s declaration. See also Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2013) (“In
general, a court may only consider the plaintiff’s complaint when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”).
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enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff need not plead detailed factual allegations,
but must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements.” Id. at 555.
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts as true all well-
pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2013). Taken together, the
factual allegations contained within a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up).
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The IHRA
prohibits employers from engaging in unlawful discrimination, as well. 775 ILCS 5/1-101
et seq. Before a plaintiff may file a Title VII or IHRA claim, he must first exhaust his
administrative remedies by filing a Charge of Discrimination and receiving a “right-to-
suee” letter. 4 Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019). “After doing so,
a plaintiff filing suit in federal court ‘may bring only those claims that were included in
her EEOC charge, or that are like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge
and growing out of such allegations.’” Id. (quoting Geldon v. S. Milwaukee Sch. Dist.,
414 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp., 914 F.3d 560, 564 (7th
4 “The EEOC and the IDHR ‘have a work sharing arrangement providing that a charge filed with one is
deemed cross-filed with the other.’” Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp., 914 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting
McQueen v. City of Chicago, 803 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902–03 (N.D. Ill. 2011)).
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Cir. 2019) (“In general, a plaintiff can only bring claims under Title VII or the IHRA that
he has included in the original charge filed with the [EEOC] or the IDHR.”). This
requirement allows the agency and the employer to settle the matter and ensures the
employer has adequate notice of the alleged conduct. Id. (citing Teal v. Potter, 559 F.3d
687, 691 (7th Cir. 2009)).
In his complaint, Monk does not allege that he received a right-to-sue letter from
either the EEOC or the IDHR. (See Docs. 3, 13). This mandates dismissal, as the right-to-
sue letter is a “prerequisite” for bringing claims under either statute. See, e.g., Chaidez, 937
F.3d at 1004; Anderson v. United Airlines, 140 F.4th 385, 390 (7th Cir. 2025); Worth v. Tyler,
276 F.3d 249, 259 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[A] complaint may be deficient and subject to dismissal
if the plaintiff lacks a right-to-sue letter.”).
That being said, the Court is mindful of Monk’s pro se status. If Monk indeed filed
a charge with the EEOC within the required time period, as he claims in his motion
(Doc. 13, at 1), it is possible that he has received or will receive a right-to-sue letter and
thereby cure his deficient complaint, see Worth, 276 F.3d at 259 (explaining that receipt of
such a letter after initiating suit can cure the deficiency). As such, the dismissal is without
prejudice.
Furthermore, the Court grants Monk leave to amend his complaint within thirty
days. He should attach any right-to-sue letter he has received from the EEOC, and the
Court encourages Monk to review the Court’s resources for pro se litigants, which can be
found at: https://www.ilsd.uscourts.gov/representing-yourself-pro-se-litigant. If Monk
does not amend his complaint within thirty days, the Court may dismiss this case with
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prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint filed by Defendant
Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC (Doc. 11) is GRANTED. Plaintiff Kevin Monk’s Complaint
(Doc. 3) is DISMISSED without prejudice. Monk is GRANTED leave to amend his
Complaint on or before December 1, 2025. If Monk fails to file an Amended Complaint
by December 1, 2025, this entire case may be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	October 28, 2025
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
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