Manning v. State of Illinois et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTWON MANNING,
Plaintiff,
v.
J.B. PRITZKER, LATOYA HUGHES,
and DARREN GALLOWAY,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-1654-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Antwon Manning, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
who is currently incarcerated at Shawnee Correctional Center, brings this action for
deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Manning’s original
Complaint (Doc. 1), which alleged that high-ranking officials retaliated against him by
denying his grievances, was dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim
(Doc. 10). He was granted leave to file an amended pleading. In his Amended Complaint
(Doc. 16), Manning once again alleges that high-ranking officials retaliated against him.
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Amended
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to
screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law
is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
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The Amended Complaint
On March 21, 2024, three staff members at Shawnee raided Manning’s cell; drugs
were found, and he was sent to segregation (Doc. 16, p. 8). Manning believes the cell
search was targeted because he wrote grievances and filed lawsuits against the Illinois
Department of Corrections’ “higher ups” (Id.). He asked to be placed on suicide watch
and spent five days on watch before being returned to segregation (Id.). On March 27,
2024, he spoke with intelligence officer Calvin Pind about the drugs, but he remained
silent and made no comment (Id. at pp. 8-9). As a result of his refusal to cooperate,
Manning received a disciplinary ticket for the drugs and interfering with an investigation
(Id. at p. 9). On March 29, 2024, he had a disciplinary hearing led by Robert Johnson (Id.).
Manning believes that the committee lacked impartiality, and they found him guilty of
the charges (Id.). Manning received two months on C-Grade, two months on B-Grade,
and 21 days in segregation (Id.).
On April 3, 2024, Manning submitted a grievance about his disciplinary report.
On April 9, 2024, grievance officer Quinton Smothers denied the grievance, and Warden
Darren Galloway concurred with the decision (Doc. 16, p. 9). Manning alleges that
Galloway acted in retaliation for the numerous grievances Manning previously wrote
and because he had a pending lawsuit against Galloway (Id.). Manning also alleges that
the denial of his grievance made Galloway liable for any underlying constitutional
violation 	caused 	by 	the 	disciplinary 	report 	because 	Galloway’s 	concurrence
demonstrated his agreement with his subordinates’ actions (Id. at pp. 9-10). He appealed
the grievance to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) where it was denied by Ryan
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Kilduff and Latoya Hughes. Similar to the claims against Galloway, Manning alleges that
Hughes’s denial of his grievance was an act of retaliation and makes her liable for all
underlying violations caused by her subordinates (Id. at p. 10).
On April 16, 2024, Manning submitted another grievance because he learned that
a change in grade was not an eligible punishment for his violations (Doc. 16, p. 10). The
counselor noted that his C-Grade was set to end on May 29, 2024, but did not otherwise
address Manning’s allegations (Id.). The grievance officer denied his grievance noting
that the prior grievance raised issues with his discipline (Id.). Warden Galloway again
concurred in the decision. Manning again argues that Galloway’s actions were a form of
retaliation (Id. at p. 11). Manning submitted this grievance to the ARB, but Kilduff
returned the grievance indicating that the issue was addressed by Manning’s previous
grievance (Id.).
Manning alleges that his placement on C-Grade and then B-Grade prevented him
from making phone calls and limited his access to a television for a month (Doc. 16, p. 11).
The restrictions impacted his “peace of mind.” (Id.). Manning alleges that he was later
physically assaulted by an inmate and both individuals were sent to segregation.
Manning does not indicate when this assault occurred (Id. at p. 12). Manning was placed
in segregation despite not swinging back at the inmate (Id.). He also received a
disciplinary ticket for the incident. Manning believes that the ticket was an act of
retaliation for his numerous grievances. He wrote two grievances about the assault. The
first grievance disappeared despite Manning placing it properly in the grievance box (Id.
at p. 13). He alleges that on two separate occasions, staff members tried to discourage him
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from filing a grievance (Id.). He submitted another grievance, but the counselor took over
three months to respond despite Manning normally receiving responses within two to
three weeks (Id.). After submitting the grievance to the grievance officer, Quinton
Smothers denied the grievance, and Galloway concurred (Id.). Manning alleges that
Galloway’s actions were an act of retaliation (Id. at pp. 13-14). Manning submitted the
grievance to the ARB where Latoya Hughes concurred in the denial (Id. at p. 14). Manning
alleges Hughes’s denial was an act of retaliation. Manning submitted a second grievance
regarding the ticket, arguing that it was an act of retaliation, but this grievance was also
denied. Galloway concurred in the denial (Id. at p. 15). The ARB returned the grievance
because it lacked a response from the counselor (Id.). Manning alleges that the return was
Latoya Hughes’s way of discouraging him from filing grievances, although he alleges the
signature on the return was from Ryan Kilduff (Id.). Manning believes that Hughes runs
a corrupt grievance process to prevent lawsuits from inmates (Id.).
Manning wrote letters to Governor J.B. Pritzker complaining about numerous
issues at IDOC. Although Manning received notice that the letters were received by the
governor’s office, he never received a response or acknowledgement of his complaints.
Preliminary Dismissals
Manning mentions a number of individuals throughout his statement of claim
who are not identified as defendants in the case caption. Specifically, Manning mentions
Calvin Pind, disciplinary hearing committee member Robert Johnson, various grievance
officials, and unknown correctional officers. In order to be considered a defendant, an
individual must be named in the case caption. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); Myles v. United
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States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005). Because Manning fails to identify these
individuals as defendants in his case caption, any potential claim against them is
DISMISSED.
Manning also fails to state a claim against Governor Pritzker. Manning alleges that
the governor failed to protect him from the actions of Pritzker’s subordinates. But the
governor cannot be liable simply as supervisor over the state’s agencies because there is
no respondeat superior (or supervisory) liability under Section 1983. Sanville v. McCaughtry,
266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001); Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008); Brown
v. Randle, 847 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Public officials are accountable for their own
conduct, but they are not vicariously liable for the acts of their subordinates.”). Even if
the governor received Manning’s letters, he is allowed to delegate the care of inmates to
prison authorities. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus, any
potential claim against the governor is also DISMISSED.
Discussion
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court designates the
following count:
Count 1: 	First Amendment retaliation claim against Latoya Hughes
and 	Garren 	Galloway 	for 	concurring 	in 	the 	denial 	of
Manning’s grievances regarding his disciplinary tickets.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is
mentioned in the Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be
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considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly
pleading standard. 1
Once again, Manning fails to state a viable claim against any defendant. His
Amended Complaint is substantially similar to his original pleading. He alleges that both
Warden Galloway and Director Hughes denied his grievances in retaliation for his
numerous lawsuits and grievances. He further alleges the denials make them liable for
all of the underlying constitutional violations, including the handling of his disciplinary
tickets.
To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he engaged in protected
activity, “suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity,” and the “First Amendment
activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the deprivation.”
Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014). “The ‘motivating factor’ amounts to
a causal link between the activity and the unlawful retaliation.” Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d
678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020). Once again, Manning merely alleges in conclusory fashion that
his previous grievances and lawsuits were a motivating factor for the denial of the
grievances at issue in this case. He fails to allege when he submitted these earlier
grievances and lawsuits, the nature of those filings, and the defendants’ knowledge of
those filings. He merely alleges that their concurrence in the grievances was retaliatory.
Without more, Manning once again fails to state a claim.
1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face”).
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Although Manning alleges that the officials’ participation in the grievance process
makes them liable for the underlying constitutional violations, the simple denial of a
grievance by officials not involved in the underlying constitutional violation fails to state
a claim. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Antonelli v. Sheahan,
81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A] state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give
rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”). There are no allegations
to suggest that Galloway or Hughes participated in the issuance of the disciplinary tickets
or the disciplinary hearings. Nor are there any allegations to suggest they violated
Manning’s rights in any other way.
Even if the officials had participated in the disciplinary proceedings, Manning still
fails to state a claim. As the Court previously stated in dismissing Manning’s original
pleading, his placement on C-Grade does not implicate a liberty interest that would
trigger due process protections. Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 762 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1997).
And his short stay in segregation would also not trigger protections. Manning fails to
include any allegations regarding the discipline he received as a result of the assault.
There are simply no allegations suggesting he was deprived of a protected liberty
interest. 2
2 Even if a protected liberty interest was implicated by his stays in segregation, Manning would
only be entitled to informal due process which requires only that an inmate is provided (1) notice
of the reasons for his placement in segregation, and (2) an opportunity to present his views in
either a written statement or hearing. Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 966 (7th Cir. 2024). Manning
acknowledges receiving notice and was present at the disciplinary hearing. There are simply no
allegations to suggest that his due process rights were violated by the disciplinary proceedings.
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Thus, Manning once again fails to state a claim. This is Manning’s second attempt
to state a viable claim, and he has been unable to do so. The Court finds that further
amendment would be futile. His claims are now DISMISSED with prejudice.
Motion for Counsel
With his Amended Complaint, Manning filed a motion requesting the assignment
of counsel (Doc. 15). He indicated that he had trouble representing himself because he
filed civil cases in the past that were dismissed for failing to do something correctly. But
Manning’s filings in this case were straightforward and easy to understand. The Court
does not find that counsel would benefit Manning or enable him to state a viable claim
on these facts. Thus, his request for counsel (Doc. 15) is DENIED.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, Manning’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED
with prejudice. The Court counts the dismissal of this action as one of Manning’s three
“strikes” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
close the case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 8, 2026
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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