JANE DOES 1-4 v. BUTLER UNIVERSITY et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JANE DOE 1, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:23-cv-01302-JRS-MKK
)
BUTLER UNIVERSITY, 	)
MICHAEL HOWELL individually and as
an agent of Butler University,
)
)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
)
BUTLER UNIVERSITY, 	)
MICHAEL HOWELL individually and as
an agent of Butler University,
)
)
)
Cross Claimants, 	)
)
v. 	)
)
MICHAEL HOWELL individually and as
an agent of Butler University,
)
)
BUTLER UNIVERSITY, 	)
)
Cross Defendants. 	)
)
)
JANE DOE 2 1:23-cv-1303, 	)
JANE DOE 3 1:23-cv-1306, 	)
JANE DOE 4 1:23-cv-1457, 	)
)
Consol Plaintiffs. 	)
Order on Defendant Butler University's Objection to Magistrate Judge's
Order Granting Continuation of Pseudonymity
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Butler University's ("Butler")
Objection to Magistrate Judge M. Kendra Klump's Order Granting Continuation of
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Pseudonymity to Plaintiff Jane Doe 4. 	(ECF No. 192.) 	For the following reasons,
Butler's objection is overruled, and Judge Klump's Order is affirmed.
I. 	Background
Plaintiffs Jane Does 1–4, former Butler women's soccer players, each filed a
Complaint against Defendants Butler and Michael Howell, Does' athletic trainer,
alleging various tort claims arising out of Howell's grooming, sexual abuse, sexual
assault, and sexual harassment of Does 1–4.1 (See, e.g., Doe 1 Compl., ECF No. 1.)
Does moved to litigate this case using pseudonyms. (See, e.g., Pls.' Joint Mot. Proceed
Under Pseudonym, ECF No. 3.) Magistrate Judge M. Kendra Klump granted Does'
motions over Howell's objections. 	(ECF Nos. 45, 51.) 	Butler did not object to
pseudonymity for Does 1–2, took no position on pseudonymity for Doe 3, (ECF No.
31), and incorporated its responses to Does 1–3 in response to Doe 4's motion for
pseudonymity, (ECF No. 22, cause no. 1:23-cv-01457-JRS-MKK).
After Judge Klump granted Does' motions to proceed using pseudonyms, the
United 	States 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Seventh 	Circuit 	issued 	two 	opinions
addressing the standards for permitting pseudonymous litigation. See Doe v. Trs. of
Ind. Univ., 101 F.4th 485, 491–93 (7th Cir. 2024); Doe v. Loyola Univ. Chi., 100 F.4th
910, 912–14 (7th Cir. 2024). Consequently, Judge Klump sua sponte set a hearing to
determine whether Does may continue to use pseudonyms given the Seventh Circuit's
recent guidance. (ECF No. 110.) The Parties briefed the pseudonymity issue before
1 Does 1–4 also asserted claims against Ralph Reiff, Butler's athletic director. 	The
Court dismissed the claims against Reiff on summary judgment. (Order Mot. Summ.
J., ECF No. 183.)
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the hearing. 	(See ECF Nos. 117, 122, 137.) 	Does argued, in part, that public
identification would "place them at risk of further emotional and psychological
suffering and injury." (Pls.' Br. 5, ECF No. 117.) At the hearing, Does 1–4 testified,
as did Dr. Shana Markle, a licensed psychologist who had treated Does 1–3 but not
Doe 4. 	(Order 5, ECF No. 188.) 	Judge Klump also admitted documentary exhibits
offered by both Parties. 	(Id.) The Court briefly summarizes the relevant testimony
below.
Doe 4 testified that she experienced "crippling anxiety" and depression, "inability
to gain weight or keep weight on," hair loss, and inability to sleep because of the abuse
she endured. (Pseudonymity Hr'g Tr. 7:16–8:5, ECF No. 202.) Doe 4 explained that
the publicity of this case has had a negative effect on her mental health. (Id. 15:11–
19.) Doe 4 further testified that she fears the "worsen[ing]" of the above physical and
mental symptoms should she be publicly identified as a plaintiff in this case. (Id. 9:6–
14.) 	She worries that she "will hit a point where [she's] not able to get up to go to
work . . . [or] do anything . . . because of the depression . . . and the anxiety." 	(Id.
9:11–14.)
Dr. Markle, in relevant part, testified that she is a licensed psychologist that has
counseled hundreds of sexual assault survivors during her career. (Id. 22:3–4, 23:24–
24:4, 27:21–28:5.) 	She began treating Does 1–3 approximately one year after they
reported Howell's abuse to Butler. 	(Id. 33:7–11.) 	Does 1–3 initially presented with
symptoms including "significant anxiety," "a lot of difficulty functioning," "a lot of
interference with . . . appetite [and] sleep," "a lot of social isolation, not going to public
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events, difficulty even just going to class." 	(Id. 27:1–9.) 	Dr. Markle explained that
sometimes, Does 1–3 were not able to "take care of their basic tasks around the home
or bath[e]." 	(Id. 27:11–14.) 	These symptoms, according to Dr. Markle, are "very
common" in survivors of sexual assaults. (Id. 27:15–20.) Dr. Markle further testified
that Does 1–3 each expressed suicidal ideations at the thought of being publicly
identified as a plaintiff in this case. 	(Id. 29:10–30:13.) 	Moreover, Dr. Markle
explained that "[i]t would be devastating" to Does 1–3 to be publicly identified as
plaintiffs in this case. (Id. 30:15–18.) Specifically, Dr. Markle warned: "I don't think
I could state strongly enough how concerned I would be about their health and their
ability to remain safe if they were in a position where their names were made public."
(Id. 30:19–23.) 	Additionally, Dr. Markle noted that proceedings in this case have
"reactivated all of the primary symptoms [Does 1–3] experienced when [Dr. Markle]
first started meeting them," (id. 38:5–12), or in other words, caused a "secondary
trauma," (id. 43:4–16). 	Dr. Markle views the publicity of this case as having a
negative impact on Does' mental health. (Id. 39:22–25.)
Judge Klump granted Does' requests to continue using pseudonyms. (Order, ECF
No. 188.) She concluded that the testimony and evidence established that Does each
face a "significant risk of physical harm, as well as damage to their mental health, if
the pseudonymity protection were lifted. 	(Id. 9.) 	Judge Klump further concluded
that 	Does 	"do 	not 	rely 	only 	on 	a 	generalized 	fear 	of 	embarrassment 	or
unsubstantiated 	risk 	of 	harm, 	but 	rather 	point 	to 	specific, 	credible 	evidence"
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supporting their asserted risk of physical harm resulting from public identification.
(Id. 7.)
Butler objects to Judge Klump's order to the extent it permits Doe 4 to continue
using a pseudonym and apparently concedes that Does 1–3 may continue using
pseudonyms. (See Butler Obj., ECF No. 192.)
II. 	Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 72(a) authorizes this Court to "modify or set
aside any part of" a magistrate judge's order on a non-dispositive motion if it "is
clearly erroneous or is contrary to law." 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). 	"Clear error is an
extremely deferential standard of review, and will only be found to exist where the
'reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.'" Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 888 (7th Cir.
2006) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). "An order is
contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or
rules of procedure." 	Wells v. Freeman Co., No. 3:21-cv-00047-JRS-MPB, 2022 WL
22672903, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 9, 2022) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Roncalli High Sch.,
Inc., No. 1:19-cv-04291-RLY-TAB, 2021 WL 4539199, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Sep. 30, 2021)).
III. 	Discussion2
"Judicial proceedings . . . are to be conducted in public." Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, "[t]he norm in federal
2 Butler objects to Judge Klump's Order without citation to the pseudonymity hearing
transcript. 	To facilitate review in this Court and in the appellate court, the Court
ordered a partial transcript of testimony given by Jane Doe 4 and Dr. Shana Markle
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litigation is that all parties' names are public." 	Trs. of Ind. Univ., 101 F.4th at 491
(collecting cases); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); cf. Blue Cross, 112 F.3d at 872 ("The use of
fictitious names is disfavored."). 	Yet, pseudonymity can be justified in "exceptional
circumstances." Blue Cross, 112 F.3d at 872; see also Loyola Univ. Chi., 100 F.4th at
913 (citing E.A. v. Gardner, 929 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2019)) ("[O]nly 'exceptional
circumstances' justify the use of a fictitious name for an adult."). "The [Court] has an
independent duty to determine whether exceptional circumstances justify such a
departure from the normal method of proceeding in federal courts." Roe v. Dettelbach,
59 F.4th 255, 260 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Blue Cross, 112 F.3d at 872). 	These
exceptional circumstances must "outweigh both the public policy in favor of identified
parties and the prejudice to the opposing party that would result from anonymity."
Doe v. Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Dettelbach, 59
F.4th at 259 (quoting Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004)) ("A
party seeking to proceed by pseudonym must 'show[] that the harm to the [party] . . .
exceeds the likely harm from concealment.'").
Exceptional circumstances exist where the plaintiff "is a minor, is at risk of
physical harm, or faces improper retaliation." 	Trs. of Ind. Univ., 101 F.4th at 493.
"Retaliation" in this context is rather narrow and limited to "retaliation . . . that is
unjustified by the facts—such as animus toward people with unpopular religious
beliefs." Loyola Univ. Chi., 100 F.4th at 913; see, e.g., Doe 3 v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist.,
given at the pseudonymity hearing. 	(See Order, ECF No. 201; Partial Tr., ECF No.
202.)
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658 F.3d 710, 723–24 (7th Cir. 2011), adopted on this issue by Doe v. Elmbrook Sch.
Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 	The "reaction legitimately
attached to the truth of events as determined in court" is insufficient to justify
pseudonymity, as is the desire to avoid embarrassment. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 101 F.4th
at 491. The risk of harm necessary to justify anonymity must be "substantial." See
id.; see also Doe v. Young, No. 24-2871, 2025 WL 927320, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 27,
2025) (affirming denial of pseudonymity where plaintiff presented "overly broad
assumptions" instead of "evidence of a substantial risk of harm directed towards
him").
The Seventh Circuit recently observed that "[c]ourts often extend the protection
of anonymity to victims of sex crimes." Loyola Univ. Chi., 100 F.4th at 914; see Blue
Cross, 112 F.3d at 872 ("[F]ictitious names are allowed when necessary to protect the
privacy of children, rape victims, and other particularly vulnerable parties or
witnesses."). Courts have cited this guidance when granting pseudonymity to sexual
assault victims. 	See, e.g., Doe I v. Ind. Univ. Bloomington, No. 1:24-cv-01982-MPB-
MG, 2025 WL 754523, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2025); Kane v. Loyola Univ. Chi., No.
22 CV 6476, 2024 WL 4907100, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 3, 2024).3
3 Federal courts are split on whether allegations of sexual assault victimization alone
are sufficient to justify anonymity. See Ind. Univ. Bloomington, 2025 WL 754523, at
*3 n.2 (collecting cases); Kane, 2024 WL 4907100, at *2 n.1 (same). 	Judge Klump
"d[id] not conclude that allegations of unwanted sexual contact, sexual misconduct,
or sex crimes automatically entitle a party to pseudonym protection," (Order 6, ECF
No. 188); thus, the Court need not take a position on that issue here.
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Butler argues that, with respect to Doe 4, Judge Klump's order is clearly erroneous
and/or contrary to law for three reasons. 	First, Butler asserts that Doe 4 failed to
show an exceptional circumstance sufficient to justify pseudonymity. (Butler Obj. 8,
ECF No. 192.) 	Second, Butler argues that Judge Klump erred by failing to explain
how Doe 4 proved an exceptional circumstance "without the benefit of [Dr.] Markle['s]
testimony." 	(Id.) 	Third, Butler argues that Judge Klump failed to weigh Doe 4's
alleged exceptional circumstances against the public interest. (Id.) Below, the Court
addresses each of Butler's arguments4 and concludes that Judge Klump's order was
neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.
A. 	Exceptional Circumstance & Sufficiency of Evidence
Judge Klump found that Doe 4 would "face a significant risk of physical harm, as
well as damage to [her] mental health, if the pseudonymity protection were lifted."
(Order 9, ECF No. 188.) Judge Klump further concluded that Doe 4 did not "rely only
on a generalized fear of embarrassment or unsubstantiated risk of harm," but instead
supported her asserted risk of harm with "specific, credible evidence." 	(Id. 7.)
Specifically, Judge Klump considered Doe 4's testimony that she feared her "physical
and mental symptoms," including "anxiety, depression, weight and hair loss, and
sleep disruption" would "worsen again" should she be publicly identified. 	(Id. 8
4 Does observe that Judge Klump applied the same legal principles to Does 1–4. (Pls.'
Resp. 5, ECF No. 193.) Accordingly, Does argue that Butler "defies logic" by arguing
that Judge Klump misapplied the law to only Doe 4's request for pseudonymity. (Id.)
Butler does not explain why Judge Klump's application of the law is erroneous with
respect 	to 	only 	Doe 	4's 	request. 	Nevertheless, 	the 	Court 	addresses 	Butler's
arguments as to only Doe 4's pseudonymity.
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(quoting Doe 4's testimony)). 	Judge Klump also considered the testimony of Dr.
Markle, a licensed psychologist who counseled Does 1–3 but not Doe 4. (See id. 7–8.)
Judge Klump found both Doe 4 and Dr. Markle credible and concluded that Doe 4's
fears "go beyond mere speculation and are corroborated by [her] past experiences as
well as the testimony of Dr. Markle." (Id. 8–9.)
The Court discerns no error in these factual findings and legal conclusions.
1. 	Exceptional Circumstance
Butler argues that Judge Klump's order was clearly erroneous and contrary to law
because Doe 4 failed to demonstrate an "exceptional circumstance" sufficient to justify
pseudonymity. 	(Butler Obj. 8–13, ECF No. 192.) 	The Court disagrees. 	Butler's
arguments are, in large part, premised on mischaracterizations of Doe 4's exceptional
circumstance. 	First, Butler characterizes Doe 4's alleged exceptional circumstance
as "[p]ublicity-related stress" related to "recounting and proving" her tort claims. (Id.
9.) Accordingly, Butler argues that Judge Klump "neglect[ed], misread[][,] and
misappl[ied]" the law by "lead[ing] with the rationale" that Doe 4 has "been 'required
to disclose information of the utmost intimacy'" to pursue her claims. 	(Id. 10–11
(quoting Order 5–6, ECF No. 188)). 	Not so. 	Judge Klump did not rely on this
rationale when she found that Doe 4 faced a substantial risk of physical harm and
granted pseudonymity. Instead, she observed, "[a]s a preliminary matter," that "the
continued litigation has confirmed many of the findings from [the court's]" previous
pseudonymity orders, including that Doe 4 has been required to disclose intimate
information. 	(Order 5–6, ECF No. 188.) 	Though Judge Klump noted that the
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"disclosure of this type of information—i.e., allegations of unwanted sexual contact—
weighs in favor of permitting pseudonyms," Judge Klump explicitly rejected the
premise that Doe 4's "allegations of unwanted sexual contact . . . automatically"
justify pseudonymity. (Id. 6.)
Next, Butler characterizes Doe 4's alleged exceptional circumstance as "[s]tress
from 	litigating 	pseudonymity," 	"stress 	from 	motion 	practice," 	and "generalized
participation in the proceedings." 	(Butler Obj. 12–13, ECF No. 192.) Butler argues
that Judge Klump "reason[ed] that 'secondary trauma' from Butler's 'challenge of
their pseudonyms'" is an exceptional circumstance. 	(Id. 12.) 	Again, not so. 	Judge
Klump's only mention of a "secondary trauma" is in a recitation of Dr. Markle's
testimony. (See Order 7–8, ECF No. 188.) Judge Klump concludes the recitation of
Dr. Markle's testimony by finding Dr. Markle credible. (Id. 7.) Nowhere does Judge
Klump 	find 	that 	"stress 	from 	motion 	practice" 	or 	"stress 	from 	litigating
pseudonymity" or "generalized participation in the proceedings" is an exceptional
circumstance. 	Rather, Judge Klump concluded that Doe 4 would face a significant
risk of physical harm and damage to her mental health resulting from Doe 4's public
identification in this case. (Id. 7, 9.) This conclusion was based on "specific, credible
evidence," namely, Doe 4's testimony that was corroborated by her past experiences
and Dr. Markle's testimony—not a generalized fear of embarrassment. (Id. 7.)
Finally, Butler argues that Judge Klump "erroneous[ly] characterize[ed]" Doe 4's
"'damage to mental health' as an exceptional circumstance." 	(Butler Obj. 11, ECF
No. 192.) 	Butler does not dispute that Doe 4 fears damage to her mental health
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should her pseudonymity request be denied. (Butler Reply 4, ECF No. 194.) Rather,
Butler criticizes the Order for rejecting Butler's argument that a risk of physical
harm must be posed by a third-party to justify pseudonymity and for "not identify[ing]
any 	authority 	recognizing 	'damage 	to 	mental 	health' 	as 	an 	'exceptional
circumstance.'" 	(Id. 11–12.) 	In other words, Butler argues that the absence of
authority on pseudonymity justified by first-party risks and "damage to mental
health" requires the Court to reject those justifications for pseudonymity until further
instruction from the Seventh Circuit.
The Court, however, agrees with Judge Klump that Seventh Circuit precedent
does not require physical harm to be inflicted by a third party. (Order 7 n.3, ECF No.
188 (observing that Butler offers no authority for its position)). Moreover, the Court
notes that some courts have permitted mental harm to justify pseudonymity. 	See,
e.g., Doe v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., No. 1:12-cv-1593-JMS-DKL, 2013 WL 3353944, at *3
(S.D. Ind. July 3, 2013) (permitting plaintiff to use pseudonym where plaintiff's
treating psychiatrist opined that public identification of plaintiff would present a
"substantial risk of causing mental and physical harm"); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed
Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (instructing district courts to consider in
their pseudonymity analyses "whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory
physical or mental harm" to the plaintiff). Thus, Judge Klump's conclusion that Doe
4 "face[s] a significant risk of physical harm, as well as damage to [her] mental health,
if the pseudonymity protection were lifted" was not contrary to law. 	(Order 9, ECF
No. 188.)
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2. 	Sufficiency of the Evidence
Butler argues that Judge Klump's order errs by failing to explain "how Doe 4
proved the same 'exceptional circumstance' without the benefit of the Markle
testimony or any similar testimony from a different provider." 	(Butler Obj. 14–15,
ECF No. 192.) 	Specifically, Butler asserts that Dr. Markle's testimony must be
weighed "as a positive factor" for Does 1–3, but as "a deficiency" for Doe 4. (Id. 15.)
The Court disagrees.
To the extent Judge Klump found that Doe 4's fears were corroborated by Dr.
Markle's testimony, this was not clear error. Butler briefly argues that Dr. Markle's
testimony is "treating physician" testimony and therefore lacks foundation as to Doe
4. 	(Butler Reply 8, ECF No. 194.) 	Yet, Does expected Dr. Markle to, in part, more
generally "testify as to the risk of harm sexual abuse victims face in revealing their
abuse." (Pls.' Witness List Pseudonymity Hr'g 2, ECF No. 136.) Thus, although Dr.
Markle did not treat Doe 4, this does not render Dr. Markle's testimony irrelevant
with respect to Doe 4. Rather, as expected, Dr. Markle testified that her professional
experience as a licensed psychologist involved treating hundreds of sexual assault
survivors, in addition to Does 1–3. (Pseudonymity Hr'g Tr. 22:3–4, 23:24–24:4, 27:21–
28:5, ECF No. 202.) Thus, Dr. Markle's testimony was certainly relevant to the extent
Dr. Markle testified about "very common" symptoms experienced by sexual assault
survivors. 	(See id. 27:15–20.) 	Those "very common" symptoms that Dr. Markle
identified include several symptoms that Doe 4 experienced and fears the return of
should she be publicly identified. (Id. 27:15–20, 9:6–14.) Accordingly, Judge Klump
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did not err to the extent she considered Doe 4's testimony corroborated by Dr.
Markle's.
B. 	Balance of Harms
Judge Klump concluded that the risk of harm to Doe 4 from public identification
"exceeds the likely harm from concealment." 	(Order 9–10, ECF No. 188) (quoting
Dettelbach, 59 F.4th at 259). Judge Klump's analysis of the balance of harms focuses
on prejudice to Butler. 	At the hearing, Butler confirmed that it has not been
prejudiced by Does' pseudonymity thus far. (Id. 9.) Moreover, Judge Klump observed
that neither Defendant reported that Does' pseudonymity has hindered liability
discovery, 	third-party 	discovery, 	or 	summary 	judgment. 	(Id.) 	Judge 	Klump
acknowledged that Butler asserts that it would be prejudiced by using pseudonyms
at trial but concluded that this "argument was left largely undeveloped." (Id.)
Butler argues that Judge Klump's Order is clearly erroneous and contrary to law
because it weighed Doe 4's exceptional circumstance against only prejudice to Butler.
(Butler 	Obj. 	13–14, 	ECF 	No. 	192.) 	Butler 	acknowledges 	that 	Judge 	Klump
articulated 	the 	correct 	standard: 	Doe 	4 	must 	"demonstrate 	'exceptional
circumstances' that outweigh both the public policy in favor of identified parties and
the prejudice to the opposing party that would result from [concealing the party's
identity]." (Id. 13 (quoting Order 3, ECF No. 188)). Yet, Butler asserts that the Order
"is silent on 'the public policy in favor of identified parties,'" and, consequently, Judge
Klump "fail[ed] to implement the 'outweigh' rule." 	(Id. 14.) 	"An evaluation that is
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missing the core required evidentiary finding on relative weight is clearly incomplete
and therefore clearly erroneous." (Butler Reply 7, ECF No. 194.)
Judge 	Klump 	identified 	the 	correct 	legal 	standard 	and 	determined 	"[t]hat
standard is satisfied here." (Order 9–10, ECF No. 188.) Accordingly, the exclusion of
a specific reference to "public policy" does not mean that Judge Klump failed to weigh
Doe 4's exceptional circumstances against the public's right to know. Rather, Judge
Klump's 	analysis 	addressed 	Butler's 	undeveloped 	argument 	that 	it 	would 	be
prejudiced by Does' pseudonymity at trial and noted the lack of prejudice against
Butler thus far. 	Moreover, Butler's brief in support of its objection fails to identify
any compelling public interest in Does' identities that Judge Klump should have
explicitly addressed. 	Butler has been unable to do so since the outset of this case.
(See Order 12, ECF No. 45 ("[N]one of the Defendants responded to Plaintiff's
argument that there is no compelling public interest in identifying her.")). 	There is
no evidence to suggest that Judge Klump neglected to consider the public interest in
her analysis—especially where she addressed the public interest in her previous
pseudonymity orders and considering Butler's inability to articulate a public policy
effect that weighs in its favor. (Id.; Order 10–11, ECF No. 51.)
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Judge Klump's conclusion that the risk of
harm to Doe 4 from public identification "exceeds the likely harm from concealment"
is not contrary to law.
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IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Butler's Objection to Order Granting Continuation of
Pseudonymity for Plaintiff Doe 4, (ECF No. 192), is overruled, and Judge Klump's
Order, (ECF No. 188), is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Date: ______________
Distribution:
Bailor Bell
The Fierberg National Law Group
bbell@tfnlgroup.com
Anne L. Cowgur
Paganelli Law Group
acowgur@paganelligroup.com
Rachael J. Denhollander
The Fierberg National Law Group, PLLC
rdenhollander@tfnlgroup.com
Douglas E Fierberg
The Fierberg National Law Group, PLLC
dfierberg@tfnlgroup.com
Jacob Ryan Goodman
The Fierberg National Law Group, PLLC
jgoodman@tfnlgroup.com
William P. Kealey
Stuart & Branigin LLP
wpk@stuartlaw.com
Gregory L. Laker
COHEN & MALAD LLP
glaker@cohenandmalad.com
12/29/2025
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Fred Anthony Paganelli
PAGANELLI LAW GROUP
tony@tonypaganelli.com
Andrea Rose Simmons
Cohen & Malad LLP
asimmons@cohenandmalad.com
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