COLLINS v. MCCELLAN et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
AUSTIN COLLINS Mr., 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:24-cv-00528-JPH-MJD
)
DESIREE Ms., et al., 	)
)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND
SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT
Austin Collins alleges that he was provided insufficient medical care while
he was held at the Marion County Adult Detention Center ("MCADC"). Defendant
Wellpath LLC seeks judgment on the pleadings, arguing that all claims against
it have been discharged in bankruptcy. Mr. Collins has filed a motion for leave
to amend his complaint. For the reasons below, Wellpath's motion is granted,
dkt. [75], and the Court proceeds to screen Mr. Collins's amended complaint.
I. 	Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
A. Background
On November 12, 2024, Wellpath filed a Voluntary Petition for Relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of Texas, in In Re: Wellpath Holdings, Case No. 24-90563
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("Bankruptcy Case").1 Under the Bankruptcy Code, the proceedings in this case
were stayed pending resolution of the Bankruptcy Case. Dkt. 59.
On April 30, 2025, Wellpath filed its "First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization of Wellpath Holdings, Inc. and Certain of Its Debtor Affiliates
(with Technical Modifications)" in the bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy Case Dkt.
2376-1 (the "Plan"); dkt. 64-1. Under the Plan, all claims against Wellpath were
discharged and holders of claims that were discharged were enjoined from
pursuing those claims. Dkt. 64-1 at 132–34. In addition, claims against "related
parties," which included Wellpath's employees were released. Id. at 81.
The Bankruptcy Court confirmed this plan on May 1, 2025, and the plan
became effective on May 9. Bankruptcy Case Dkt. 2596, 2680.
In June 2025, Mr. Collins filed a notice that he wanted "to opt out of the
Bankruptcy Claim" and proceed with his claim against Wellpath. Dkt. 81.
Wellpath notified Mr. Collins that the deadline to make a claim in the Bankruptcy
Case had passed, but Mr. Collins could opt out from third-party releases
regarding his claim in this case against former Wellpath employee Desiree Davis.
Dkt. 82. The Court directed Mr. Collins to these procedures in its August 11,
2025, order, explaining that the opt out paperwork would have to be filed with
the Bankruptcy Court. See dkt. 89.
1 The Court may take judicial notice of the Bankruptcy Court’s orders, as well as filings
in the bankruptcy action, without converting the motion for judgment on the pleadings
into one for summary judgment. Parungao v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 858 F.3d 452, 457
(7th Cir. 2017) ("Courts may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of
public 	record 	when 	the 	accuracy 	of 	those 	documents 	reasonably 	cannot 	be
questioned.").
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Wellpath moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that all claims
against it have been discharged in bankruptcy. Dkt. 75.
B. Applicable Law
After the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial, a
defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings if a complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for
judgment on the pleadings is governed by the same standard as a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Adams v. City of
Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2014). To survive a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A
claim has factual plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Claims that
have been discharged in bankruptcy can be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Jack Cooper Transp. Co., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-503, 2020 WL
3841270, 	at 	*1 	(N.D. 	Ind. 	July 	8, 	2020) 	("Clearly, 	Plaintiff's 	claims 	were
discharged in the bankruptcy, as further explained below, such that he fails to
state a claim upon which any relief may be granted.").
C. Discussion
Wellpath argues that the claims against it in this case must be dismissed
because they were discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings. Dkt. 75; dkt. 76.
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Mr. Collins responded that he does not understand the bankruptcy process and
wanted his claims against Wellpath to proceed. Dkt. 83.
Wellpath's bankruptcy plan included the release of "all claims," "causes of
action," and "suits" existing against it. Dkt. 64-1 at 129, 132–34. When the
Bankruptcy Court confirmed the plan, that created an injunction that prevents
Mr. Collins from seeking to hold Wellpath liable for actions that occurred before
the bankruptcy discharge. See In re Taylor, 793 F.3d 814, 819–21 (7th Cir. 2015)
(explaining 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)). Wellpath's motion for judgment on the pleadings
therefore must be granted. See Griffin v. Jensen, No. 24-cv-53-JPS, 2025 WL
3771477 at *2 (E.D. Wisc. Dec. 31, 2025) (granting judgment on the pleadings
based on Wellpath's bankruptcy discharge); Abercrombie., 2020 WL 3841270 at
*1.
II. Motions for Leave to Amend Complaint
and Screening of Amended Complaint
On June 4, 2025, Mr. Collins filed his first motion for leave to file amended
complaint. Dkt. 67. On June 9, 2025, Mr. Collins filed his second motion for
leave to file amended complaint. Dkt. 70. Mr. Collins subsequently notified the
Court that his second motion had been filed in error. Dkt. 102. Accordingly, Mr.
Collins's motion for court assistance, dkt. 102, is granted to the extent that
the Court denies without prejudice his second motion to amend, dkt. 70, and
grants his motion to amend. Dkt. 67. The Court now proceeds to screen the
amended complaint attached to Mr. Collins's first motion. Dkt. 67-1.
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A. Screening Standard
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).
Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720
(7th Cir. 2017).
B. The Amended Complaint
Mr. Collins names six defendants in his amended complaint: (1) Officer
McClellan; (2) Officer Akanbi; (3) Marion County Sheriff's Office; (4) Wellpath
Holdings, L.L.C./Wellpath Healthcare Services; (5) Dr. Cumbee, and (6) Desiree
Davis. He seeks money damages and injunctive relief. Mr. Collins bases his
amended complaint on the following allegations, which are accepted as true at
the pleading stage. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2023).
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Mr. Collins was booked into the MCADC on November 20, 2023. He was
going through withdrawals from opioids and had an active prescription for
suboxone. Dkt. 67-1 at 3. Based on this information, Mr. Collins was placed in
1-E, a housing unit for inmates going through withdrawals. Id. Each of the next
two days, Officers McCellan and Akanbi took Mr. Collins to the Medically
Assisted Treatment (MAT) unit, where Nurse Davis gave him suboxone. Id. at 4.
On the third day, he was moved into the MAT unit, where he continued to receive
suboxone. Id. On the fourth day Officer McCellan removed Mr. Collins from the
MAT after realizing that a different inmate named Collins was supposed to be
placed there and the plaintiff was not. Id. at 5.
Mr. Collins was moved back to 1-E and then to a different unit, 2-R. He
was not provided medication for his withdrawal symptoms. Id. at 5–7. On
November 25, a nurse gave him medications prescribed to a third inmate named
Collins. Id. at 7. After Mr. Collins submitted a grievance, a nurse told him that
she was told not to give him further medication, and Officer McClellan subjected
him to disciplinary action. Id. at 7–8. Nurse Davis falsely reported to Dr. Cumbee
that Mr. Collins did not indicate any pre-existing substance abuse problems
upon intake and later issued instructions to not provide Mr. Collins with
medication or medical attention of any kind, resulting in Mr. Collins's failing to
receive treatment for his opioid withdrawal. Id. at 8.
C. Discussion of Claims
Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the complaint
certain claims are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as submitted.
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First, 	all 	claims 	against 	Wellpath 	must 	be 	dismissed 	because, 	as
discussed above, Mr. Collins's claims against Wellpath have been discharged by
the Bankruptcy Court.
Second, all claims against defendants Akanbi, Marion County Sheriff's
Department, and Officer McClellan must be dismissed because, after Mr. Collins
filed his motion for leave to amend his complaint, he entered into a settlement
agreement with these defendants and filed a stipulation of dismissal, which the
Court acknowledged on September 29, 2025. See dkts. 91, 94, and 95.
Next, Fourteenth Amendment medical care, "class of one" equal protection
claims, and state law medical malpractice and negligence claims against Nurse
Davis and Dr. Cumbee will proceed.
III. Motion to Appoint Counsel
Litigants in federal civil cases do not have a constitutional or statutory
right to court-appointed counsel. Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir.
2018). Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) gives courts the authority to "request"
counsel. Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989). "'When
confronted with a request under § 1915(e)(1) for pro bono counsel, the district
court is to make the following inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff made a
reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing
so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear
competent to litigate it himself?'" Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007)).
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The question of competence "requires consideration of both the factual and
legal complexity of the plaintiff's claims and the competence of the plaintiff to
litigate those claims himself." Eagan, 987 F.3d at 682 (citing Pruitt, 503 F.3d at
655). "Specifically, courts should consider 'whether the difficulty of the case—
factually and legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff's capacity as a layperson to
coherently present it to the judge or jury himself.'" Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d
at 655). "This assessment of the plaintiff's apparent competence extends beyond
the trial stage of proceedings; it must include 'the tasks that normally attend
litigation: evidence gathering, preparing and responding to motions and other
court filings, and trial.'" Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655).
The Seventh Circuit has found that "until the defendants respond to the
complaint, the plaintiff's need for assistance of that counsel . . . cannot be
gauged." Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013); see also
Mapes v. Indiana, 	932 F.3d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 2019) (acknowledging "the
difficulty in accurately evaluating the need for counsel in the early stages of pro
se litigation"). That statement from Kadamovas is not a "bright-line rule," but in
this case, Mr. Collins has not shown he needed counsel to assist him to
"investigate and flesh out any claim that may exist." Mapes, 932 F.3d at 971-72.
His amended complaint is well-written and indicates that Mr. Collins does not
have difficulty reading and writing English or conveying information to the Court.
At this time, however, before the remaining defendants have had an opportunity
to answer or otherwise respond to the amended complaint, the Court cannot
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gauge his need for counsel. Accordingly, Mr. Collins's motion to appoint counsel
is denied without prejudice.
IV. Other Motions
Mr. Collins's motion to proceed to seek judgment, dkt. [83], is denied. As
the Court has explained, his claims against Wellpath have been discharged by
the Bankruptcy Court and may not continue. His claims against Nurse Davis
and Dr. Cumbee shall proceed according to the Court's Screening Order in Part
IV.
Nurse Davis' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [103], is denied as moot
because Mr. Collins has been granted leave to amend his complaint. Nurse Davis
will now have an opportunity to answer or otherwise respond to the additional
claims against her in the amended complaint and refile any dispositive motions
when appropriate.
Mr. Collins's motion for extension of time to complete discovery, dkt. 96,
is denied without prejudice. After defendants answer or otherwise respond to
the amended complaint, the Court will issue a scheduling order setting forth
various deadlines, including the deadline to complete discovery.
V. Conclusion
The motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Wellpath, dkt. [75] is
granted. The clerk is directed to terminate Wellpath as a defendant.
Mr. Collins's motion for leave to file amended complaint, dkt. [67], is
granted. The clerk is directed to add Dr. Cumbee as a defendant, and to change
defendant Desiree's name to "Desiree Davis" on the docket. The clerk is also
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directed to docket Mr. Collins's amended complaint, dkt. [67-1], as a new docket
entry. The clerk is further directed to enclose the Court's Counsel Form with
Mr. Collins's copy of this order.
Mr. Collins's second motion for leave to amend complaint, dkt. [70], is
denied without prejudice. His motion to proceed to seek judgment, dkt. [83], is
denied. Mr. Collins's motion for extension of time, dkt. [96], and motion to
appoint counsel, dkt. [98], are denied without prejudice. His motion for court
assistance, dkt. [102], is granted.
Defendant Davis' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [103], is denied as
moot.
VIII. Service of Process
The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process
to defendant Dr. Cumbee in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall
consist of the amended complaint filed on June 4, 2025, dkt. [67-1], applicable
forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and
Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Order.
Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 3/13/2026
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Distribution:
AUSTIN COLLINS
215193
Hancock County Jail
398 Malcolm Grass Way
Greenfield, IN 46140
Dr. Cumbee
Marion County Adult Detention Center
675 Justice Way
Indianapolis, IN 46203
All electronically registered counsel
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