Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
PATRICIA D., 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-00886-MJD-JMS
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Parties' Amended Joint Motion for an Award of
Attorney Fees under the EAJA. [Dkt. 23.] For the reasons set forth below, the motion is
GRANTED. In light of this ruling, the parties' original fee motion, [Dkt. 21], is DENIED AS
MOOT.
I. Background
On May 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Complaint seeking judicial review of the ALJ's
unfavorable finding denying Plaintiff's application for disability benefits. [Dkt. 1.] Following a
joint motion to remand, the Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff and entered judgment on September
30, 2025, reversing the decision of the Commissioner and remanding for further proceedings.
[Dkt. 20.] The Parties timely filed the instant joint motion with supporting documentation on
December 12, 2025, requesting an EAJA attorney fee award in the amount of $6,659.53. [Dkt.
23.]
II. Discussion
Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), a "court shall award to a prevailing
party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil
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action . . . brought by or against the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In order to
succeed on a Petition for EAJA fees, the movant must, within thirty days of final judgment in the
action, file an application (1) showing that she is a "prevailing party," (2) providing the Court
with an itemized statement that represents the computation of the fees requested, and (3) alleging
that the position taken by the United States was "not substantially justified." 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(B). Additionally, the Court may, in its discretion, reduce or deny the award of fees
and expenses if the prevailing party "engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably
protracted the final resolution of the matter in controversy" during the course of the proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(C).
There is no question that Plaintiff is a prevailing party in this case. See Shalala v.
Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993) (holding that Plaintiff whose complaint is remanded to an
administrative law judge for further consideration qualifies as a "prevailing party" under Section
2412(d)(1)(B) of the EAJA). The Commissioner bears the burden of proving that his
prelitigation conduct, including the ALJ's decision itself, and his litigation position were
substantially justified. See Stewart v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2009). The
Commissioner has not done so here; indeed, the Commissioner has joined the motion asking the
Court to award attorney fees to the Plaintiff. [Dkt. 23.] The Court also is not aware of any
"conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the matter in
controversy" by Plaintiff or her counsel. Therefore, the Court will not reduce or deny an award
of fees or expenses on such grounds.
Finally, the Court must determine whether the amount of the fee award sought by
Plaintiff is reasonable pursuant to the terms of the EAJA. As a threshold requirement, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(B) of the EAJA requires Plaintiff to submit "an itemized statement from any
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attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in [sic] behalf of the party stating the actual
time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed." The parties have
done so. See [Dkt. 23-1]. Plaintiff's counsel spent 26.8 hours on this case, which the Court finds
to be reasonable.
A reasonable EAJA fee is calculated under the lodestar method by multiplying a
reasonable number of hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S.
586, 602 (2010). Although the hourly rate is statutorily capped at $125.00 per hour, the language
of the statute permits the Court to allow for "an increase in the cost of living" to arrive at a higher
hourly rate. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). In order to prove that such an increase is justified, the
Seventh Circuit has held that "an EAJA claimant may rely on a general and readily available
measure of inflation such as the Consumer Price Index, as well as proof that the requested rate
does not exceed the prevailing market rate in the community for similar services by lawyers of
comparable skill and experience." Sprinkle v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2015).
Reliance solely on a readily available measure of inflation is not sufficient, as an inflation-
adjusted rate might result in a rate higher than the prevailing market rate in the community for
comparable legal services, creating a windfall, which is to be avoided. Id. at 428-29.
The parties set out the appropriate calculation of the applicable hourly rates permitted by
the EAJA, taking into account the increase in the cost of living, as set forth in the Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers in the Midwest Region, since the statutory hourly rate was
set at $125 per hour in March 1996. See [Dkt. 23-3]. That calculation arrives at a maximum
statutory hourly rate of greater than the $248.49 rate agreed upon by counsel. The Court finds
that this rate does not exceed the prevailing market rate in the community by lawyers of
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comparable skill and experience and is consistent with the rate approved in other similar cases in
this district.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the Parties' Amended Joint Motion
for an Award of Attorney Fees under the EAJA, [Dkt. 23], and awards fees in the amount of
$6,659.53. An award under the EAJA belongs to Plaintiff and not her attorney and can be offset
to satisfy any pre-existing debt that Plaintiff owes the United States. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S.
586 (2010). However, if Defendant verifies that Plaintiff does not owe a pre-existing debt to the
government subject to the offset, Defendant shall direct that the award be made payable to
Plaintiff's attorney pursuant to the EAJA assignment duly signed by Plaintiff and counsel, [Dkt.
23-2]. If payment is mailed, as compared to electronically deposited, it shall be mailed to
counsel's address of record: 2300 NW Corporate Boulevard, Suite 244, Boca Raton, FL 33431.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 29 DEC 2025
Distribution:
Service will be made electronically
on all ECF-registered counsel of record via
email generated by the Court's ECF system.
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