BOYKIN v. HOLLYWOOD CASINO LAWRENCEBURG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JAWUAN CRYSTAL BOYKIN 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:25-cv-00120-TWP-MJD
)
HOLLYWOOD CASINO LAWRENCEBURG 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS AND FINAL ADMONISHMENT
This matter is before the Court on several Motions filed by pro se Plaintiff Jawuan Crystal
Boykin ("Ms. Boykin"). Before the Court is a Motion for Clarification (Dkt. 46), Motion for
Reconsideration of Summary Judgment (Dkt. 53), two Motions to Add Jurisdiction (Dkts. 66, 71),
Motion to Address the Court (Dkt. 72), and Motion for Injunctive Relief (Dkt. 77). Ms. Boykin
has also filed several documents docketed as "Submission of Proposed Order of Recusal," in which
she requests "recusal of judge" (Dkts. 51, 52, 75). For the reasons explained below, the motions
are granted in part and denied in part, the requests for recusal are denied, and Ms. Boykin is
given a final admonishment to refrain from making premature, frivolous, and duplicative filings.
I. 	DISCUSSION
Upon screening of Ms. Boykin's Complaint, the Court determined that her claim against
her former employer, Defendant Hollywood Casio Lawrenceburg ("the Casino") for race
discrimination shall proceed (Dkt. 7 at 4). Specifically, Ms. Boykin alleges that the Casino
wrongfully terminated her employment "after requiring [her] to work in an unsafe environment
and [giving her white] attacker more favorable consideration," and that the Casino terminated her
in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. Id. Because Ms. Boykin is a frequent litigator in
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this Court, who continues to make duplicate, repetitive, and frivolous filings in both her open and
closed cases despite warnings from the Court to refrain, a limited filing ban was imposed because
of Ms. Boykin's failure to follow court orders (Dkt. 74).
The Court will first address the recusal requests before turning to the pending motions.
A. 	Recusal Submissions
Ms. Boykin has filed duplicative Proposed Orders for Recusal (Dkts. 51, 52), in which she
cites 28 U.S. Code § 144, alleging "[y]our honor is a personal stakeholder under the State of
Indiana" and "Plaintiff has requested your honor to recognize the criminal complaints against
several state of Indiana government representatives who were acting under color of law, and
prominent business of the state."1 (Dkts. 51, 52). In her Addendum to Entry 51 and 52 Requesting
Recusal (Dkt. 75), Ms. Boykin "requests the recusal of Judge Tanya Walton Pratt for reasons stated
in entry 51 and 52 of case no 4:25-cv-00120-TWP-KMB" and declares under penalty of perjury
that the foregoing is true and correct. Id.
Section 144 requires the recusal of a district judge if "a party to any proceeding in a district
court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party." 28
U.S.C. § 144. "The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice
exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the
proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time," and
also be "accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that [the affidavit] is made in
good faith." Id.
1 It appears that Ms. Boykin is referring to allegations made in unrelated cases (Boykin v. FBI, 4:25-cv-121-TWP-
KMB; Boykin v. EEOC, 4:25-cv-125-TWP-KMB and Boykin v. FBI, 4:25-cv-152-TWP-KMB), which have been
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
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As an initial matter, the filings are deficient as they are not in the form of a motion. In the
Notice to Pro Se Litigants, Ms. Boykin was informed that a "motion is the means by which a
litigant seeks to have the Court take some form of official action" and "[i]f a litigant seeks such
official action by the Court, the filing must include the word 'motion' in the title." (Dkt. 6).
Although the filings are deficient, the Court will address the instant "submissions," but Ms. Boykin
is forewarned that further submissions will not receive a ruling.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that § 144 is "a powerful tool that could
easily be abused," so a motion for recusal under § 144 can be denied "if the moving party fails to
satisfy the statute's strict procedural demands." United States v. Barr, 960 F.3d 906, 919 (7th Cir.
2020). Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 requires recusal when the judge has a "personal bias or prejudice"
against a party in the proceeding. In determining whether a judge must recuse under this actual
bias standard, "the question is whether a reasonable person would be convinced the judge was
biased." Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation modified).
First, Ms. Boykin's requests are procedurally denied because no affidavits are attached to
the filings, and the addendum which contains an affirmation does not independently allege a
personal bias or prejudice. Second, Ms. Boykin's ground for recusal—that the undersigned "is a
personal stakeholder under the State of Indiana" (Dkt. 51 at 2)—has no foundation in law or fact
and is not the kind of specific fact that might warrant recusal. See Hook, 89 F.3d at 356.
Instead, Ms. Boykin expresses dissatisfaction with prior rulings in unrelated closed cases.
Bias against a litigant must arise from extrajudicial sources. United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 820,
831 (7th Cir. 1996). Insofar as Ms. Boykin challenges the substance of the Court's rulings in this
or her closed cases, no bias has been shown. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, (1994)
("[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality recusal motion"
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as "they cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest
circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial
source is involved."); see also Barnett v. City of Chi., 952 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
Adverse orders and other judicial rulings are not sufficient to establish bias for disqualification.
See Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000).
Ms. Boykin's arguments for recusal consist of either "unsupported, irrational or highly
tenuous speculation," United States v. Cerceda, 188 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting In
re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981)), or assertions about the validity of the Court's
rulings. She offers no meritorious grounds for recusal. No reasonable person would be convinced
the judge was biased based on these allegations. Accordingly, the Court denies the submissions
and requests for recusal of judge.
B. 	Motion for Clarification (Dkt. 46)
The Motion for Clarification is difficult to discern. It appears that Ms. Boykin challenges
arguments made by opposing counsel in their Motion for More Definite Statement (Dkt. 25). She
cites the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 4.1 and 8.4, and
asks the Court "Can an attorney make arguments that aren't true?" (Dkt. 46). The motion is denied
because while a party can ask a judge for clarification on a ruling, she cannot ask the judge for
legal advice or clarification of arguments made by opposing counsel.
C. 	Reconsideration of Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 53)
Motions to reconsider "serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or
to present newly discovered evidence." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nokes, 263 F.R.D. 518, 526
(N.D. Ind. 2009). The motion "will be successful only where the movant clearly establishes:
(1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence
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precluded entry of judgment." Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Relief pursuant to a motion to reconsider is an
"extraordinary remed[y] reserved for the exceptional case." Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584
(7th Cir. 2008).
Ms. Boykin initiated this action on June 25, 2025 (Dkt. 1), and on July 30, 2025, filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 16). The Court denied the motion for summary judgment
because it was filed before the Casino had answered the Complaint and before the Court has held
an initial status conference, issued a case management plan, or set any case management deadlines
(Dkt. 17 at 3). The Court explained that that "parties did not have an opportunity to exchange any
information before Boykin requested a decision on the merits of her claims. It is premature and
inefficient to file a motion for summary judgment knowing that the opposing party will identify
discovery it needs to respond to it." Id.2
In her motion for reconsideration, Ms. Boykins states, "[t]he case law defense counsel used
to display an absolute privilege, which doesn't, gives your honor ability to grant summary
judgement [sic] for the deceptive action." (Dkt. 53). Ms. Boykin has not shown that the Court
committed a manifest error of law or fact in denying her motion for summary judgment as
premature, or that newly discovered evidence precluded the ruling. Accordingly, the motion to
reconsider is denied.
D. 	Motions to Add Jurisdiction (Dkts. 66, 71)
These motions are denied as moot, as jurisdiction to bring the instant claim in federal court
is not challenged.
2 The Court also stated the motion was denied without prejudice to refile after the parties have met with the Magistrate
Judge and engaged in discovery. Id.
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E. 	Motion to Address the Court (Dkt. 72)
In this motion, Ms. Boykin states:
Plaintiff is subject to domestic violence in the home. Attached is a complaint of
domestic violence that is related to this case. The local law enforcement is biased
in handling plaintiff's reports of violence. Previously reported acts of domestic
violence, the officers sided with plaintiff's live in boyfriend.
Plaintiff has called the police and officers now refuse to come to her home.
Plaintiff reports that her live in boyfriend is taking advantage of the deprivation of
rights the police are exercising against plaintiff in retaliation to be violent in the
home. This creates a situation of duress. . . .
It is necessary for the court to grant plaintiff's crime victim's rights under 18 USC
3771.
(Dkt. 72 at 1).
The Motion is granted in that Ms. Boykin may address the Court, and the Court informs
that this issue is best addressed in a state court proceeding. It is denied as to any relief in this
action. While the Court is sympathetic to Ms. Boykin's situation with her live-in boyfriend, this
unfortunate situation has nothing to do with the claims against the Casino.
F. 	Motion for Injunctive Relief (Dkt. 77)
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff first must show that: "(1) without this relief,
[she] will suffer irreparable harm; (2) traditional legal remedies would be inadequate; and (3) [she]
has some likelihood of prevailing on the merits of [her] claims." Speech First, Inc. v. Killen, 968
F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). In her Motion for Injunctive Relief, Ms. Boykin
argues there is a conspiracy between the Indiana Gaming Company, the Seafarer's Entertainment
Allied 	Trust 	Union, 	the 	Lawrenceburg 	Police, 	and 	the 	Equal 	Employment 	Opportunity
Commission (Dkt. 77). She argues:
Without an injunction from the court, it is probable the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission will conceal or alter the record of the Seafarer's
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Entertainment Allied Trust Union investigation and available documents, because
this was the action the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission took on behalf
of the Indiana Gaming Company. The documents of both companies are relevant
because they detail the event that led to plaintiff's wrongful termination and the
retaliation that plaintiff reported from the community that works and lives locally
in connection to the racial discrimination reported at South Dearborn School
Corporation.
Id. at 2.
The Casino responds that the motion should be denied because "it seeks injunctive relief,
that is not fully identified and is not supported by any legal authority, apparently targeting several
non-parties including The Seafarer's Entertainment Allied Trust Union, the Lawrenceburg Police
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission." (Dkt. 80). The Casino is correct; the motion
does not address any of the elements required for injunctive relief. Therefore, the Court need not
address the three threshold elements. As a preliminary matter, a request for injunctive relief must
necessarily be tied to the specific claims on which a plaintiff is proceeding. See DeBeers Consol.
Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) (denying injunctive relief for a matter "lying
wholly outside the issues in the suit" because injunctive relief is only appropriate "to grant
intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally"); Grupo Mexicano
de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 326 (1999) (explaining that where the
requested injunction relates to matters "'lying wholly outside the issues in the suit,'" an injunction
is beyond the power of the Court (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines, 325 at 220)); see also Benisek
v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 161 (2018) (The "purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to
preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held" (internal
quotations omitted)).
As noted by the Casino, the motion fails to provide any support for the imposition of
injunctive 	relief 	against 	the 	only 	named 	Defendant 	in 	this 	case—Hollywood 	Casino
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Lawrenceburg—based on the alleged conduct of non-parties. This lawsuit is against the Casino
only, and not the Seafarer's Entertainment Allied Trust Union, the Lawrenceburg Police, or the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The motion for injunctive relief is frivolous and
therefore is denied.
G. 	Admonishment
The Court issues this final admonishment to Ms. Boykin in this case. On September 15,
2025, the Court admonished and warned Ms. Boykin to refrain from filing premature or repetitious
motions (Dkt. 45 at 5). Since the first admonishment, Ms. Boykin has filed at least 16
"submissions" or "addendums," not counting the motions addressed in this order (See Dkts. 47, 48,
49, 50, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70). Thereafter, on October 27, 2025, the Court
issued an order imposing a limited filing ban,3 explaining that Ms. Boykin has continued to flood
the Court with duplicative and frivolous filings (Dkt. 74). Ms. Boykin was WARNED that her
currently pending cases may be dismissed, and the filing ban may be extended, if she continues to
make frivolous filings in them. Id. at 5. Since that order, Ms. Boykin has filed two frivolous
submissions in opposition to the filing ban (Dkts. 76, 78), which address parties in the closed cases,
and the frivolous motion for injunctive relief (Dkt. 77). The Casino argues that this case should be
dismissed as a sanction for Ms. Boykin's "contravention of Court orders and this latest costly, time-
consuming, and frivolous motion." (Dkt. 80 at 2).
The Court declines to impose the sanction of dismissal at this time. Instead, the Court issues
a final admonishment. Ms. Boykin is given a final admonishment and warning to refrain from
filing premature or repetitious motions. The filing of additional addendums and submissions is
prohibited. In this action, Ms. Boykin alleges race discrimination and retaliation against
3 The filing ban excepted a Notice of Appeal, habeas case, or any criminal case in which Ms. Boykin is a defendant.
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Hollywood Casino only, so any filing in this case must relate to these claims only. Ms. Boykin
should only file motions, one response to any motion filed by the Defendant, and a reply. Presently,
the only motion pending in this case is Defendant's Motion for More Definite Statement (Dkt. 34),
to which Ms. Boykin has filed five responses (Dkts. 36, 39, 41, 42, 43). The Court will issue a
ruling on the pending motion in due course. In the meantime, Ms. Boykin must be patient and
respectful of the Court's and opposing counsel's time, follow the Court's orders, and await a ruling
on the pending motion.
II. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff Jawuan Crystal Boykin's Motion for Clarification
Dkt. [46], Motion for Reconsideration Summary Judgment, Dkt. [53], two Motions to Add
Jurisdiction, Dkts. [66], [71], and Motion for Injunctive Relief, Dkt. [77], are DENIED. Ms.
Boykin's documents titled "Submission of Proposed Order of Recusal," in which she requests
"recusal of judge", Dkts. [51], [52], [75], are DENIED. Ms. Boykin's Motion to Address the Court,
Dkt. [72], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Ms. Boykin is given a FINAL ADMONISHMENT AND WARNING to refrain from
filing premature, frivolous, or repetitious motions in this case. The filing of addendums or
submissions is PROHIBITED. This case may be dismissed as a sanction if Ms. Boykin continues
to ignore the Court's orders.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 11/24/2025
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DISTRIBUTION:
Distribution:
JAWUAN CRYSTAL BOYKIN
708 Buena Vista Ave
Aurora, IN 47001
Craig M. Borowski
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. (Indianapolis)
cborowski@littler.com
Michelle R. Maslowski
LITTLER MENDELSON, PC
mmaslowski@littler.co
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