Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ARISH RUSTAMI, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25-3160-JWL
)
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, )
Department of Homeland Security; )
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, )
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; )
SAM OLSON, Field Office Director, )
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; )
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, )
)
Respondents. )
)
____________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, by which he challenges his detention by immigration officials. For the reasons set
forth below, the petition is granted in part and denied in part. The petition is granted
with respect to petitioner’s claim that he was improperly denied an interview, and
respondents are hereby ordered to ensure that such an interview of petitioner takes place
on or before January 16, 2026. The petition is otherwise denied.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Iran who was admitted to the United States in
2004. In 2010, petitioner was convicted in Missouri state court of possession of child
pornography, and immigration officials initiated removal proceedings. On March 3, 2011,
petitioner’s removal was ordered, but petitioner was granted withholding of removal to
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Iran, meaning that he could only be removed to an alternative third country. On June 30,
2011, petitioner was released from custody subject to an order of supervision (OSUP). On
June 23, 2025, petitioner was again taken into custody by immigration officials, and his
supervised release was revoked.
Petitioner claims that his continued detention by immigration authorities is
improper. To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28
U.S. C. § 2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory
and constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003).
Generally, when an alien is ordered removed, the removal is to occur within a period
of 90 days, referred to as the “removal period.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Petitioner
claims that because six months have now elapsed since the beginning of the removal
period, his detention has become unreasonably indefinite, and that his release is therefore
required under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court noted that an alien must be detained during the 90-
day removal period and that the Government may continue to detain an alien after that
period or release the alien under supervision. See id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2),
(6)). The Court held, however, that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,
continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute.” See id. at 699. The Court
elaborated on that standard as follows:
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In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether
the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure
removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s
basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of
removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.
In that case, of course, the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on
any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the
circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a
violation of those conditions. . . .
We recognize, as the Government points out, that review must take
appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the
Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent
in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and
the Nation’s need to “speak with one voice” in immigration matters. But we
believe that courts can take appropriate account of such matters without
abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an alien’s
continued detention.
See id. at 699-700 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then established a presumptively
reasonable detention period of six months in which to accomplish removal, after which the
reasonableness of an alien’s detention should be determined as follows:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior
postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable
future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of
course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after
six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has
been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
See id. at 701; see also, e.g., Anyimu v. Department of Homeland Security, 2017 WL
193180, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2017) (Lungstrum, J.) (applying this framework); Kaliku
v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024 WL 4854523, at *2-3 (D.
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Kan. Nov. 21, 2024) (Lungstrum, J.) (same); Vargas v. Noem, 2025 WL 2770679, at *2-3
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (same).
Applying this framework, the Court concludes that petitioner has not met his burden
to show that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future. The mere fact that the requisite six months have now elapsed is not sufficient to
meet that burden. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (“This 6-month presumption, of course,
does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months.”).
Moreover, petitioner does not contend that officials have made no efforts to remove him to
a third country, and respondents have provided evidence that they have attempted to obtain
a travel document for petitioner from at least one alternative third country (albeit
unsuccessfully). In light of those efforts and the fact that petitioner’s detention has lasted
only slightly longer than six months since the beginning of the removal period, the Court
cannot find that petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably indefinite under the
applicable framework, and the Court therefore denies that claim.1
1 Petitioner argues that Zadvydas requires release if removal is not reasonably
foreseeable, but in that case the Supreme Court also held that a period of six months in
which to accomplish removal is presumptively reasonable, and it adopted the framework
that the Court has applied here. Petitioner also argues that any such six-month period
elapsed long ago, as his initial removal period ended in 2011. The Court has consistently
held, however, that the six-month period for the purpose of applying the Zadvydas
framework restarts when an alien is taken into custody after previously having been
released. See Abedi v. Carter, 2025 WL 3209009, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 6, 2025) (Lungstrum,
J.) (citing Liu v. Carter, 2025 WL 1207089, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2025)), appeal filed
(10th Cir. Oct. 6, 2025). Petitioner argues that the Court has erred in so ruling, but he cites
no authority for the contrary position, and the Court therefore declines to reconsider that
ruling. Petitioner suggests that government officials could manipulate that ruling by
repeatedly detaining and releasing an alien, but any such manipulation may be addressed
if it occurs (it has not occurred in this case).
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Petitioner also claims that his due process rights have been violated because he has
not been given notice of any intent to remove him to a particular third country and has not
had the opportunity to assert a claim of fear of persecution or torture to immigration
officials and then to an immigration judge. Petitioner asks the Court to enjoin his removal
to a third country without such notice and an opportunity to assert a credible-fear claim to
officials and to an immigration judge and an opportunity to seek an order of withholding
to that country.2
The Court rejects this claim and denies the relief requested. First, the Court agrees
with respondents that any such claim of a due process violation is premature. Petitioner
has not shown that officials have declared any intent to remove him to a particular third
country, and thus officials have not denied any process due him with respect to any
opportunity to object to such a removal. Petitioner notes that officials have explored
removal to Afghanistan or Pakistan, but, again, officials have not indicated that they intend
to remove petitioner to either country. Thus, petitioner has not shown that any due process
violation has yet occurred. Nor has petitioner shown any likelihood that officials will not
give him the opportunity to object once he receives notice of an intent to remove him to a
particular country.
Moreover, as the Court has concluded in a similar case, petitioner’s apparent
membership in a class certified in another case makes the requested relief inappropriate.
See Manago v. Carter, 2025 WL 2576755, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Sept. 5, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.)
2 In his subsequent filings, petitioner abandoned his initial request for an order
enjoining removal to Iran based on the withholding order.
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(citing D.V.D. v. United States Dept. of Homeland Sec., 778 F. Supp. 3d 355 (D. Mass.),
appeal filed (1st Cir. Apr. 22, 2025), stay granted, 145 S. Ct. 2153 (June 23, 2025)).
Petitioner has not addressed that conclusion by the Court in Manago, and thus he has not
shown that a different outcome is appropriate in this case.
Petitioner also claims that officials violated applicable regulations, specifically 8
C.F.R. §§ 241.4, 241.13, by failing to give him notice of the reasons for the revocation of
this supervised release and by failing to grant him an interview as required.3 First, those
regulations provide that an alien shall be notified “upon revocation” of the reasons for the
revocation of release. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i)(3). On June 23, 2025,
petitioner was detained, and immigration officials issued a Notice of Revocation of
Release, which stated that his release was being revoked because of changed circumstances
and a determination that he could be expeditiously removed; and respondents have
submitted evidence that that notice was served on petitioner four days later, on June 27,
2025. Petitioner does not dispute that he received the notice on June 27. Nor does he argue
expressly that this notice was not sufficient to meet the regulations’ notice requirement.4
Petitioner instead appears to argue that he was entitled to receive this notice prior to the
revocation. The Court rejects this argument, for which petitioner has cited no authority, as
3 Petitioner also claims in his petition that his release could only be revoked because
of a violation of the terms of his release, but he has abandoned any such claim in his
subsequent briefs. Such a claim lacks merit at any rate, as the regulations plainly provide
for revocation for other reasons. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(2), 241.13(i)(2); see also Abedi,
2025 WL 3209009, at *1 (rejecting similar argument).
4 The regulations do not require a hearing prior to or after revocation, see 8 C.F.R.
§§ 241.4(l)(2), 241.13(i)(2), and petitioner has abandoned his initial argument that officials
also violated the regulations by failing to provide a hearing.
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the regulations require notice only “upon revocation,” and thus not prior to revocation. In
addition, petitioner has not identified any prejudice that he suffered because he received
the notice four days after he was detained based on the revocation. Petitioner argues that
an alien must have notice of the reasons for revocation so that he may object when given
the opportunity to do so; but petitioner has not identified any such opportunity (such as an
interview) that occurred in those first four days. Accordingly, the Court denies petitioner’s
claim based on the regulations’ notice requirement.
The regulations also state that an alien will be afforded an informal interview
promptly upon his return to custody “to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the
reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” See id. Respondents do not dispute
petitioner’s claim that no such interview took place; accordingly, the Court finds that
officials did violate the applicable regulations in that regard. Moreover, respondents do
not argue that petitioner cannot show prejudice from that violation.5 Cf. Qui v. Carter,
2025 WL 2770502, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (rejecting claim based
on the lack of an interview, as the petitioner had not shown any particular prejudice and
had had ample opportunity to make arguments in the habeas litigation).6
5 Respondents argued in their supplemental response brief that petitioner had
suffered no prejudice because he had received an interview on September 12, 2025. After
petitioner disputed that an interview had taken place on that date, respondents filed a notice
in which they conceded that petitioner was not given the opportunity to contest his
detention on that date, and in which they therefore withdrew their argument that petitioner
could not show prejudice from any violation of the interview requirement.
6 In Qui, the Court concluded that officials had violated the regulations by revoking
the petitioner’s release without a proper determination of changed circumstances. See Qui,
2025 WL 2770502, at *3-4. Petitioner has not asserted that particular claim in this case.
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The Court further concludes, however, that this violation does not warrant
petitioner’s release; rather, the appropriate remedy is substitute process. See Olmedo v.
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2025 WL 2821860, at *3 (D. Kan.
Oct. 3, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (citing cases in concluding that substitute process was the
appropriate remedy for a violation of the regulations that was not necessarily harmless).
Petitioner relies on Cifuentes Rivera v. Arnott, No. 25-570 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 7, 2025), in
which the court ordered the petitioner’s release because of violations of the regulations’
notice and interview requirements. See id. In that case, however, the Government limited
its arguments to the issue of jurisdiction, and thus the court did not discuss the issue of an
appropriate remedy (and so granted the petition in which release was requested). See id.
In this case, the Court concludes, as it did in Olmedo, that the violation is most
appropriately remedied by ensuring that petitioner does receive the process that he was
denied. Accordingly, the Court grants the petition to that extent, and respondents are
hereby ordered to ensure that petitioner is granted his informal interview mandated by the
regulations on or before January 16, 2026.
Finally, the Court rejects petitioner’s discovery requests. A habeas petitioner is not
entitled to discovery as a matter of course, although a court may in its discretion grant leave
to conduct discovery for good cause shown. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904
(1997) (citing Rule Governing § 2254 cases, Rule 6(a)). Good cause may be shown if
specific allegations provide a reason to believe that if facts are fully developed, the
petitioner may be able to demonstrate an entitlement to relief. See id. at 908-09 (citing
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)).
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The Court in its discretion concludes that discovery is not warranted here. Petitioner
requests records relating to the alleged interview of petitioner on September 12, 2025,
arguing that such records are needed in light of a factual dispute concerning whether an
interview occurred on that date. There is no longer such a factual dispute, however, as
respondents have withdrawn their argument based on an interview on that date. Petitioner
also requests documents relating to officials’ efforts to obtain travel documents from third
countries. The Court assumes, however, that officials have not made additional efforts to
remove petitioner that are not documented in the declarations submitted by respondents;
and petitioner has not adequately shown that the actual language of the communications
concerning an unsuccessful request to one country could alter the Court’s conclusion that
petitioner has not met his burden under Zadvydas at this time, after only six months in
custody.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby granted in part and denied in part. The
petition is granted with respect to petitioner’s claim that he was improperly denied an
interview, and respondents are hereby ordered to ensure that such an interview takes place
on or before January 16, 2026. The petition is otherwise denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 30th day of December, 2025, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
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