Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
SARI ABOU AMRA, )
)
Petitioner, )
v. ) Case No. 25-3222-JWL
)
SAM OLSON, Field Director, )
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and )
JACOB WELSH, Sheriff, Chase County, )
)
Respondents. )
)
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner filed, through counsel, a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, by which he challenges his detention by immigration officials. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court denies the petition.
Petitioner, who was born in Libya, later lived in Qatar, and is of Palestinian descent,
is presently stateless. He entered the United States in 2000, but he was placed in
immigration proceedings after he overstayed his authorization to be in this country. In
November 2002, an immigration judge denied a request for relief for petitioner and his
family, granted petitioner voluntary departure, and issued an order of removal to take effect
if petitioner did not depart by the imposed deadline. Petitioner did not depart, however.
By 2004, petitioner’s appeals had been denied, and in 2005 petitioner was placed under an
order of supervision. On June 4, 2025, petitioner was taken into custody by immigration
officials, and his supervised release was revoked. Petitioner is presently in custody within
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this judicial district.1 On October 14, 2025, petitioner filed the instant petition.
Respondents have filed an answer, petitioner has filed a traverse (though counsel), and the
matter is therefore ripe for ruling.2
Petitioner claims that his continued detention by immigration authorities is
improper. To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28
U.S. C. § 2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory
and constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003).
In his petition filed by counsel, petitioner claims that his continued detention
violates due process and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), although he does so
in a fairly conclusory manner without citing specific bases for the claims or even applicable
authority. In his reply, petitioner appears to assert a claim solely under the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). In Zadvydas, the Supreme
Court noted that an alien must be detained during the initial 90-day removal period and
that the Government may continue to detain an alien after that period or release the alien
under supervision. See id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), (6)). The Court held,
1 Although petitioner’ counsel has decried a lack of access to documents concerning
petitioner’s removal proceedings and detention, counsel has not disputed these facts, and
the Court finds respondents’ evidence of these facts to be credible.
2 Respondents have also submitted evidence that in August 2025 petitioner filed a
motion with the Bureau of Immigration Appeals to reopen his case, which motion remained
pending as of November 10, 2025. Respondents have not argued, however, that that
motion provides a basis for denying the petition.
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however, that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is
no longer authorized by the statute.” See id. at 699. The Court elaborated on that standard
as follows:
In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether
the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure
removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s
basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of
removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.
In that case, of course, the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on
any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the
circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a
violation of those conditions. . . .
We recognize, as the Government points out, that review must take
appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the
Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent
in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and
the Nation’s need to “speak with one voice” in immigration matters. But we
believe that courts can take appropriate account of such matters without
abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an alien’s
continued detention.
See id. at 699-700 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then established a presumptively
reasonable detention period of six months in which to accomplish removal, after which the
reasonableness of an alien’s detention should be determined as follows:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior
postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable
future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of
course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after
six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has
been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
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See id. at 701; see also, e.g., Anyimu v. Department of Homeland Security, 2017 WL
193180, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2017) (Lungstrum, J.) (applying this framework); Kaliku
v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024 WL 4854523, at *2-3 (D.
Kan. Nov. 21, 2024) (Lungstrum, J.) (same); Vargas v. Noem, 2025 WL 2770679, at *2-3
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (same).
Petitioner does not dispute that his removal period for these purposes began on June
4, 2025, when petitioner was taken into custody. See Abedi v. Carter, 2025 WL 3209009,
at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 6, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (rejecting argument that the applicable
removal period expired years before the petitioner’s re-detention). Thus, petitioner has
been detained only slightly longer than the six-month period deemed presumptively
reasonable in Zadvydas. In addition, respondents have submitted evidence that petitioner
failed to cooperate with immigration officials by refusing to answer questions and to
complete travel document applications to facilitate his possible removal to particular
countries. Thus, the statutory removal period during which petitioner may be detained has
been extended, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C), which in turn means that petitioner’s
detention has not exceeded the presumptively reasonable period granted under the
Zadvydas framework. See Amom v. Carter, 2025 WL 3267755, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 24,
2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (petitioner was not entitled to release despite having been detained
more than six months since the removal period started because he had failed to cooperate
with removal efforts). Moreover, these acts of refusal by petitioner undermine any
argument that petitioner has been detained longer than needed to effectuate his removal.
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Petitioner argues in his traverse that he should not be deemed to have refused to
cooperate because he was merely attempting to consult with counsel first. Petitioner does
not dispute respondents’ evidence, however, that in September 2025 petitioner refused to
sign application documents after consulting with counsel. Petitioner, through his traverse
filed by counsel, has complained of a lack of access to legal counsel; but he has not
provided any evidence or authority to support the argument that an alien should not be
deemed to have refused to cooperate for the purpose of extending the removal period if the
alien’s refusal was based on the advice of counsel.3
Finally, even if the Court did not deem petitioner’s statutory removal period to have
been extended, it would nonetheless conclude that petitioner has not shown an entitlement
to relief under the Zadvydas framework. Again, petitioner has been detained only slightly
longer than the presumptively-reasonable period of six months, and respondents have
documented numerous and ongoing attempts to obtain a travel document for petitioner
(despite petitioner’s refusal to cooperate with respect to any such applications).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that petitioner has not met his burden to provide good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, and the Court therefore denies the petition.4
3 As noted above, petitioner has also complained in his briefs about an inability to
obtain records from immigration officials concerning his case, but he has not requested any
specific relief in that regard, nor has he shown that the lack of any particular records has
hindered his ability to argue his claim under the Zadvydas standard.
4 Of course, if petitioner’s detention continues and becomes unreasonably definite
under the applicable standard, petitioner is free to file a new petition seeking relief.
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IT IS THEREFFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 19th day of December, 2025, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
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