Langford Sosa v. Howes

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JASON ROBERT LANGFORD SOSA,
Petitioner,
v. 	CASE NO. 25-3245-JWL
JESSE HOWES,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
This matter is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by
Petitioner and Kansas state prisoner Jason Robert Langford Sosa, who has now paid the filing fee
in this matter. The Court has conducted an initial review of the petition as required by Rule 4 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. For the reasons
explained below, the Court will direct Petitioner to show cause in writing why this matter should
not be dismissed with prejudice because it was not timely filed.
Background
In May 2023, Petitioner pled guilty in Wyandotte County District Court to distribution of
fentanyl or possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. (Doc. 1,
p. 1.) In August 2023, the state district judge sentenced Petitioner to 100 months in prison. Id.
Petitioner did not appeal, nor has he made other attempts in state court to challenge his conviction.
Id. at 3-4. On November 12, 2025, Petitioner filed the pro se petition for federal writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that began this case. (Doc. 1.)
Standard of Review
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
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requires the Court to review a habeas petition upon filing and to dismiss it “[i]f it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254. Because Petitioner is
proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes his filings. See Hall v. Bellman, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But the Court does not assume the role of Petitioner’s advocate and it will
not construct arguments for him. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840
(10th Cir. 2005).
Analysis
This action is subject to the one-year limitation period established by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Section 2244(d)(1)
provides:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of –
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to case on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
The one-year limitation period generally runs from the date the judgment becomes “final,”
as provided by § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).
Nothing in the current petition suggests that another subsection of the statute applies to control the
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date on which the one-year limitation period began. The United States Supreme Court has held
that direct review concludes—making a judgment “final”—when an individual has exhausted his
or her opportunity for direct appeal to the state courts and his or her opportunity to request review
by the United States Supreme Court. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009).
In this matter, Petitioner’s conviction came after he pled guilty to the charge. Under K.S.A.
22-3602(a), “[n]o appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction before a
district judge upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, except that jurisdictional or other grounds
going to the legality of the proceedings may be raised by the defendant as provided in K.S.A. 60-
1507, and amendments thereto.” Thus, because Petitioner pled guilty to the charge, he could not
pursue a direct appeal of his conviction. His conviction—the “judgment” being challenged in this
federal habeas case—became final on August 18, 2023, when the district judge sentenced him.
The next day, which was August 19, 2023, the one-year AEDPA limitation period began
to run. Under the “anniversary method” used in the Tenth Circuit, the final day for Petitioner to
timely file his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in this Court was August 19, 2024. See United States v.
Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2003). But Petitioner did not file his § 2254 petition until
November 2025. (Doc. 1.)
The federal habeas statute of limitations includes a tolling provision: “The time during
which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). But the petition filed in this case reflects that
Petitioner did not file a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion or other motion seeking collateral review, so there
is no reason to toll, or pause, the statute of limitations under this provision. Therefore, it appears
from the information now before this Court that the last day on which Petitioner could timely file
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his federal habeas petition seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was August 19, 2024. Because
he did not file the petition until November 2025, the petition is untimely and is subject to dismissal.
Equitable Tolling
The federal habeas one-year limitation period is subject to equitable tolling “in rare and
exceptional circumstances.” Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10 th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted). Equitable tolling is available only “when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and
demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his
control.” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 127, 1220 (10 th Cir. 2000). Circumstances that warrant
equitable tolling include, “for example, when a prisoner is actually innocent, when an adversary’s
conduct—or other uncontrollable circumstances—prevents a prisoner from timely filing, or when
a prisoner actively pursues judicial remedies but files a deficient pleading during the statutory
period.” Gibson, 232 F.3d at 808 (internal citations omitted).
Nothing in the petition now before the Court alleges circumstances that justify equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations in this matter. Petitioner will be granted time, however, to show
that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control prevented him from timely filing this federal
habeas petition. He must also show that he was diligently pursuing his claims during the time he
wishes this Court to equitably toll the federal habeas statute of limitations.
Actual Innocence
Additionally, an exception to the one-year time limitation exists where a petitioner
adequately asserts his or her actual innocence. “[A]ctual innocence ‘serves as a gateway through
which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . or . . . expiration of
the statute of limitations.’” Fontenot v. Crow, 4 F.4th 982, 1030 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013)). In order to pass through the actual innocence
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gateway, Petitioner must provide this Court with “new reliable evidence—whether it be
exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—
that was not presented at trial.” See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). “An actual innocence
claim must be based on more than the petitioner’s speculations and conjectures.” Taylor v. Powell,
7 F.4th 920, 927 (10th Cir. 2021).
To be clear, Petitioner is not required to conclusively exonerate himself in order to pass
through the actual innocence gateway. But he must present the Court with new, reliable evidence—
meaning reliable evidence that was not presented at his trial—and he must “demonstrate ‘that more
likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt’” about Petitioner’s guilt in light
of the new, reliable evidence. See Fontenot, 4 F.4th at 1030 (quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518,
538, 553 (2006)). “Actual innocence means ‘factual innocence not mere legal insufficiency.’”
O’Bryant v. Oklahoma, 568 Fed. Appx. 632, 637 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bousley v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)). Thus, arguments regarding legal insufficiencies will not open
the actual innocence gateway.
The actual innocence gateway will open only if Petitioner presents to this Court reliable
evidence that was not presented at trial and which, when considered with all of the other relevant
evidence makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found Petitioner guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. This is a high bar, in
recognition of the Tenth Circuit’s explanation that
tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare, arising only in an extraordinary
case. The gateway should open only when a petition presents evidence of innocence
so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the
court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.
Fontenot, 4 F.4th at 1031 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Conclusion
In summary, this matter does not appear to have been timely filed and is therefore subject
to dismissal with prejudice. Therefore, the Court will direct Petitioner to show cause in writing
why this matter should not be dismissed as time-barred. Petitioner may choose to argue that he is
entitled to statutory tolling or equitable tolling and/or that he should be allowed to pass through
the actual innocence gateway and avoid the federal habeas statute of limitations. If Petitioner
successfully does so, the Court will resume the Rule 4 review and issue further orders as necessary.
If Petitioner fails to timely submit a response to this order or if his response does not show
entitlement to statutory tolling, equitable tolling, or the actual innocence gateway, this matter will
be dismissed with prejudice as untimely without further prior notice to Petitioner.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Petitioner is granted until and including
January 5, 2026, in which to show cause, in a written response to this order, why this matter
should not be dismissed due to his failure to commence it within the one-year time limitation. The
failure to timely respond to this order will result in this matter being dismissed as untimely without
further prior notice to Petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	This 1st day of December, 2025, at Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
United States District Judge
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