Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JAIME SOLAYA CLAVERO, )
)
Petitioner, )
v. ) Case No. 25-3278-JWL
)
JACOB WELSH, Sheriff, Chase County; )
SAMUEL OLSON, ICE Field Office Director; )
TODD LYONS, ICE Acting Director; )
KRISTI NOEM, DHS Secretary; )
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General; and )
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION )
REVIEW, )
)
Respondents. )
)
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, by which he challenges his detention by immigration officials without a bond
hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the petition in part.
Respondents are ordered either to release petitioner or to ensure that petitioner receives a
bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on or before March 27, 2026, and they are
further ordered to provide notice to this Court when such relief has been given. The Court
denies petitioner’s requests for other relief.
Petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, entered the United States illegally in 2022, without
inspection or admission. Petitioner was detained by border authorities at that time, but he
was released on his own recognizance. In August 2025, petitioner was again detained by
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immigration officials, and he remains in custody in this judicial district. On December 30,
2025, petitioner filed the instant habeas action; respondents have filed an answer, and
petitioner has filed a reply brief, and the matter is therefore ripe for ruling.1
To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory and
constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003). Respondents have not argued
that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s claim.
Petitioner was not recently detained as an alien newly arriving in the United States;
rather, he had been present in the United States for three years when he was detained.
Petitioner argues that, for that reason, his detention does not fall within the scope of 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention pending removal proceedings, and
under which the Government purports to detain petitioner; but instead is governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary release on bond. Petitioner thus claims
that his detention without any consideration of his release on bond violates these statutes.2
1 On February 6, 2026, an immigration judge ordered petitioner’s removal to Cuba,
but petitioner has appealed that order, causing the removal order to be stayed. Thus,
because petitioner’s removal order is not yet administratively final, his detention still must
be governed by either Section 1225(b)(2)(A) or Section 1226, and as the parties have
jointly confirmed, the present claim has not been rendered moot.
2 Petitioner also claims that his detention without consideration of release on bond
violates due process. In light of the Court’s conclusion that petitioner is entitled to bond
consideration under the statues, it need not reach that issue.
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In a similar case decided days ago, this Court rejected the Government’s
interpretation of these statutes in favor of the interpretation adopted by the overwhelming
majority of courts that have addressed the issue, and the Court ordered relief in the form of
a bond hearing under Section 1226(a). See Galdamez Orellana v. Welsh, 2026 WL 710121
(D. Kan. Mar. 13, 2026) (Lungstrum, J.). For the same reasons set forth in that opinion,
see id. at *1-3, the Court concludes in this case that the Government may not detain
petitioner under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), and that it may therefore detain petitioner pending
a final removal decision only under Section 1226(a), which allows for release on bond; and
that the Government has therefore violated these statutes by refusing to allow for
consideration of petitioner’s release on bond under Section 1226(a)
In addition, for the reasons stated in Galdamez Orellana, see id. at *3-4, the Court
concludes that the most appropriate remedy for that violation is to require that petitioner
be granted a bond hearing as if detained under Section 1226(a). Accordingly, the Court
orders respondents either to release petitioner or to ensure that petitioner receives a bond
hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), at which petitioner’s suitability for release on bond
is considered on its merits, on or before March 27, 2026.3
3 Respondents have not argued or provided evidence that a hearing could not be
conducted within a short timeframe as requested by petitioner. Nor have respondents
argued that an immigration judge could not conduct a bond hearing for petitioner on the
merits. Although this Court lacks jurisdiction to review an immigration judge’s denial of
release on bond, see Chen v. Dorneker, 2021 WL 5769354, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 6, 2021)
(Lungstrum, J.) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)), it would not be precluded from reviewing an
immigration judge’s refusal to conduct a hearing based the Yajure Hurtado decision by the
Board of Immigration Appeals (just as it has done in the present case).
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Finally, the Court notes that petitioner has requested an award of attorney fees under
the Equal Access to Justice Act. Any such request should be made by future motion, after
consultation with Government counsel, in accordance with applicable rules.4
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby granted in part. Respondents are ordered
either to release petitioner or to ensure that petitioner receives a bond hearing pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on or before March 27, 2026, and they are further ordered to provide
notice to this Court when such relief has been given. The Court denies petitioner’s requests
for other relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 16th day of March, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
4 Although petitioner has not addressed the issue in a separate count in his petition,
he nevertheless seeks as relief an order declaring that petitioner was in fact paroled into the
United States, effectively to reverse a contrary finding by the immigration judge. Petitioner
has seemingly abandoned any such claim for relief in his traverse. At any rate, petitioner
has not shown that this Court would have jurisdiction to review such a finding, and the
Court denies the claim to the extent that petitioner does seek such relief.
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