Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ROGER LEE SHARP,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 25-4014-EFM
FRANK BISIGNANO, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Roger Lee Sharp seeks review of a final decision by Defendant, the Commissioner
of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying his application for disability benefits under Title II
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. Plaintiff argues that the administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) erred by failing to comply with SSR 96-8p’s requirement that the ALJ explain and
resolve any material inconsistencies or ambiguities between Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) and the medical opinion the ALJ relied upon. For the reasons stated below, the Court
reverses and remands the Commissioner’s judgment.
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is a 59-year-old man who suffers from depression, anxiety, and occasional panic
attacks. On March 12, 2021, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the
Social Security Act. Plaintiff’s application was denied twice, so he appealed those denials to an
ALJ. The ALJ ultimately issued an unfavorable decision to Plaintiff, finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The ALJ based his findings on evidence
presented at a telephone hearing and Plaintiff’s medical records.
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At the telephone hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert
(“VE”). The ALJ posed two hypotheticals to the VE during the VE’s testimony. The first
hypothetical reads:
For hypothetical number one, I’d like you to assume an individual of [Plaintiff’s]
age, education, and work experience, and this individual could do work at all
exertional levels without any exertional limitations. The individual could apply
common sense understanding, and carry out detailed and uninvolved instructions
in the performance of simple, routine, or repetitive tasks, in a work environment
free of fast paced production requirements, involving only simple work-related
decisions with few, if any, workplace changes. The individual would not be able to
have contact with the public as part of the job, and could have occasional interaction
with coworkers and supervisors.
In response, the VE testified that an individual matching the description in the first hypothetical
could perform work in the national economy. The ALJ then posed a second hypothetical:
For hypothetical number two, assume all the restrictions and limitations from
hypothetical number one. Assume further that this individual would not be able to
maintain attention, concentration, persistence and pace for two-hour segments of
time, such that they’d be off task 20 percent of the day. The individual would also
miss work approximately three times per month.
When asked if the second hypothetical individual could perform any work in the national economy,
the VE testified they could not.
The second hypothetical encompasses the medical opinions from Plaintiff’s consultative
examination with Kristy Cramer, M.A., LCPC. Based on the examination and cognitive testing,
Ms. Cramer opined that Plaintiff had average intelligence, fair attention and concentration, and
normal immediate recall and long-term memory such that he could perform simple, repetitive tasks
and multi-step commands. She also opined that Plaintiff had deficits in short-term memory and
may experience difficulties with maintaining a regular work schedule due to problems with sleep.
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Further, she opined that Plaintiff was able to interact appropriately with coworkers and supervisors
in a moderate contact environment.
The ALJ reviewed Ms. Cramer’s medical report, amongst others, to determine Plaintiff’s
RFC. The ALJ found most of Ms. Cramer’s opinions supported and consistent, including her
opinion that Plaintiff may struggle maintaining a regular work schedule due to problems with
sleep. The ALJ, however, found that Ms. Cramer’s opinion on Plaintiff’s ability to interact with
coworkers and supervisors insufficiently accounted for Plaintiff’s ongoing anxiety and occasional
panic attacks. As such, the ALJ designated Ms. Cramer’s report as partially persuasive.
After reviewing the medical records and testimony from the telephone hearing, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff had the RFC:
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-
exertional limitations. The claimant is able to apply common sense understanding
to carry out detailed but uninvolved instructions in the performance of simple,
routine, and repetitive tasks, in a work environment free of fast-paced production
requirements, involving only simple, work-related decisions, with few, if any,
workplace changes. The claimant can have no interaction with the general public.
The claimant can have occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors.
The RFC determination did not adopt Ms. Cramer’s finding that Plaintiff may occasionally
struggle to maintain a regular work schedule. The ALJ did not explain why this opinion was
omitted from the RFC in his narrative.
Based on the RFC, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act and that Plaintiff could perform unskilled work. Plaintiff now appeals the decision
for judicial review.
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II. 	Legal Standard
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision is guided by the Social Security Act, which
provides that the Commissioner’s findings as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.1 The Court must therefore determine whether the Commissioner’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standard.2 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; in short, it
is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support the conclusion.”3 The Court may
“neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].”4
An individual is disabled under the Act only if she can “establish that she has a physical or
mental impairment which prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity and is
expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months.”5 This
impairment “must be severe enough that she is unable to perform her past relevant work, and
further cannot engage in other substantial gainful work existing in the national economy,
considering her age, education, and work experience.”6 The Social Security Administration has
established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is
1 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2 Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007).
3 Barkley v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3001753, at *1 (D. Kan. July 28, 2010) (citing Castellano v. Sec’y of Health
& Hum. Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994)).
4 Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991)).
5 Brennan v. Astrue, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1306–07 (D. Kan. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)).
6 Barkley, 2010 WL 3001753, at *2 (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217–22 (2002);
20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (2005)).
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disabled.7 The steps are designed to be followed in order. If it is determined, at any step of the
evaluation process, that the claimant is or is not disabled, further evaluation under a subsequent
step is unnecessary.8
The first three steps of the sequential evaluation require the ALJ to assess: (1) whether the
claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset of the alleged disability;
(2) whether the claimant has a severe, or combination of severe, impairments; and (3) whether the
severity of those impairments meets or equals a designated list of impairments.9 If the impairment
does not meet or equal one of these designated impairments, the ALJ must then determine the
claimant’s RFC, which is the claimant’s ability “to do physical and mental work activities on a
sustained basis despite limitations from her impairments.”10
After assessing the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ continues to step four and five. Step four
requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work.11 Step five
requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant can generally perform other work that exists
in the national economy.12 The claimant bears the burden in steps one through four to prove a
disability that prevents the performance of her past relevant work.13 The burden then shifts to the
7 Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a).
8 Barkley, 2010 WL 3001753, at *2.
9 Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084; see also Barkley, 2010 WL 3001753, at *2 (citing Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748,
751 (10th Cir. 1988)).
10 Barkley, 2010 WL 3001753, at *2; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545.
11 Barkley, 2010 WL 3001753, at *2 (citing Williams, 844 F.2d at 751).
12 Id.
13 Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084.
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Commissioner at step five to show that, despite her alleged impairments, the claimant can perform
other work in the national economy.14
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff’s appeal primarily lies in step five of the ALJ’s evaluation process. Specifically,
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s RFC when he omitted a portion of
Ms. Cramer’s medical opinion and failed to explain why, violating Social Security regulations.
Plaintiff argues the lack of an explanation harmed him because it resulted in an overestimation of
his RFC and ability to perform other work in the national economy.
SSR 96-8p regulates an ALJ’s determination of a claimant’s RFC. 15 When determining a
claimant’s RFC, SSR 96-8p requires an ALJ to “include a narrative discussion describing how the
evidence supports each conclusion.”16 In the narrative discussion, the ALJ must “explain how any
material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record were considered and
resolved.”17 “If the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the ALJ must
explain why the opinion was not adopted.”18 “An RFC conflicts with a medical opinion when it
expressly adopts specific restrictions within that opinion while leaving out others without
comment.”19
14 Id.
15 SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996).
16 Id. at *7.
17 Id.
18 M.H. v. Saul, 2020 WL 916856, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 26, 2020).
19 Karla M. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 4597849, at *6 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2022) (citing Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d
1205, 1207–08 (10th Cir. 2007)).
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Here, the RFC assessment conflicts with Ms. Cramer’s opinion. The ALJ found Ms.
Cramer’s opinion was supported and consistent with Plaintiff’s medical record. While the ALJ
designated Ms. Cramer’s opinion only partially persuasive, the ALJ did so because he found that
Plaintiff’s anxiety and panic attacks imposed greater limitations on his ability to interact with
coworkers and supervisors than Ms. Cramer’s report indicated. As such, the ALJ expressly adopted
most of Ms. Cramer’s report alongside these additional limitations. The ALJ, however, did not
adopt Ms. Cramer’s finding that Plaintiff may experience occasional difficulties with maintaining
a regular work schedule due to problems with sleep nor did he provide any comment on it, creating
a conflict between the RFC and Ms. Cramer’s opinion. Under SSR 96-8p, the ALJ was required
to explain why he did not adopt this portion of Ms. Cramer’s opinion. He did not do so, thus failing
to fulfill this requirement.
The Commissioner presents three unavailing arguments that the ALJ’s narrative is proper
and does not violate SSR 96-8p. First, the Commissioner explains that Ms. Cramer’s opinion, read
in context, is speculative and does not support a finding that Plaintiff is unable to maintain a
reliable work schedule. This explanation, however plausible it may be, should have been included
by the ALJ in the RFC narrative. It was not. Accordingly, the Court cannot consider the
Commissioner’s explanation here.20
Second, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s narrative is proper because the ALJ was
not required to adopt Ms. Cramer’s opinion word for word since he only found it partially
persuasive. True, “the ALJ, not a physician is charged with determining a claimant’s RFC from
20 See Haga, 482 F.3d at 1207–08 (stating that a court “may not create or adopt post-hoc rationalizations”
when the government, rather than the ALJ, provides reasons for rejecting part of a medical opinion).
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the medical record” and “exact correspondence between a medical opinion and the mental RFC is
not required.”21 But when a RFC conflicts with a medical opinion, as the Court concludes is the
case here, the ALJ must explain why the ALJ omitted medical opinions to facilitate judicial
review.22 This is required even when an ALJ designates a medical opinion as partially persuasive
by finding a portion of the medical opinion unpersuasive, but the remaining portions, including a
portion omitted from the RFC, persuasive.23
Lastly, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s narrative is proper because the RFC
sufficiently accounts for Plaintiff’s potential difficulty in maintaining a regular work schedule. The
RFC limits Plaintiff to unskilled work, the simplest type of work that “needs little or no judgment
to do simple duties.”24 Regardless of what appears in the RFC, what does not appear is an
explanation for why the ALJ omitted Ms. Cramer’s opinion on Plaintiff’s potential difficulties
with maintaining a routine schedule. Accordingly, the Court does not further consider whether the
RFC sufficiently accounts for Plaintiff’s potential difficulties, except to note that one must be
present at work to do the job, however simple it may be.
21 Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1071 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1288
(10th Cir. 2012)).
22 Indeed, the ALJ in Wells v. Colvin—a case the Commissioner cites to for support—seemingly explained
why he omitted three medical opinions from the record, facilitating the court’s review. Id. (“The ALJ rejected all three
of them on the issue of severity because he concluded that they were inconsistent with the other evidence in the file.”).
Here, the ALJ provided no explanation for the Court’s review.
23 See J.K. v. Bisignano, 2025 WL 2770493, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2025) (rejecting the Commissioner’s
argument that the ALJ did not violate SSR 96-8p by finding a medical opinion only partially persuasive because the
ALJ did not reject the portion omitted without explanation from the RFC).
24 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(a); see also SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *9 (July 2, 1996).
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None of the Commissioner’s arguments save the ALJ’s error. But even when an ALJ errs
in his decision, courts will not reverse the decision if the error was harmless.25 “Failure to resolve
conflicts between a medical opinion relied on by the ALJ and a claimant’s RFC typically results
in reversible error.”26 As Plaintiff points out, the ALJ’s error is not harmless because the VE
testified that an individual with Plaintiff’s limitations, in addition to missing three days of work a
month, could not do any work in the national economy. The ALJ’s failure to resolve the conflict
posed by Ms. Cramer’s opinion and the RFC undermines the ALJ’s finding that suitable jobs for
Plaintiff exist in the national economy, implicating the Commissioner’s burden at step five.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision must be reversed and remanded.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s judgment is reversed and
remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with
this Memorandum and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 27th day of October, 2025.
This case is closed.
ERIC F. MELGREN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
25 Trujillo v. Comm’r, SSA, 818 F. App’x 835, 842 (10th Cir. 2020) (“We agree with the Commissioner that
a remand is not necessary here because Trujillo fails to show that any error was harmful.”).
26 Karla M., 2022 WL 4597849, at *7.
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