Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
DANIEL KHUNGBIK, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 26-3016-JWL
)
C. CARTER, Warden, FCI-Leavenworth; )
AARON J. WENDLER, Deportation Officer; )
TODD LYONS, ICE Acting Director; )
PAM BONDI, Attorney General; and )
KRISTI NOEM, DHS Secretary, )
)
Respondents. )
)
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
by which he challenges his detention by immigration officials. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court denies the petition.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of the country presently known as Myanmar.
Petitioner was admitted to the United States in 2007 and became a lawful permanent
resident two years later. In 2021, after state-court convictions for domestic assault,
petitioner was taken into custody by immigration officials. On September 1, 2021, an
immigration judge denied petitioner’s application for relief and ordered petitioner’s
removal to Myanmar. Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed, and in February 2022, petitioner
was released from custody subject to supervision after officials were unable to obtain a
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travel document for him. On June 23, 2025, petitioner was again taken into custody, and
his prior supervision order was revoked. Petitioner remains in custody within this judicial
district. Petitioner filed the instant action on January 26, 2026; respondents filed an answer
to the petition, and petitioner filed a traverse, and the matter is therefore ripe for ruling.
Petitioner claims that his continued detention by immigration authorities is
improper. To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory
and constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003).
Generally, when an alien is ordered removed, the removal is to occur within a period
of 90 days, referred to as the “removal period.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Petitioner
claims that his present detention for more than six months has now become unreasonably
indefinite, and that his release is therefore required under the framework set forth by the
Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court noted that an alien must be detained during the 90-
day removal period and that the Government may continue to detain an alien after that
period or release the alien under supervision. See id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2),
(6)). The Court held, however, that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,
continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute.” See id. at 699. The Court
elaborated on that standard as follows:
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In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether
the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure
removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s
basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of
removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.
In that case, of course, the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on
any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the
circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a
violation of those conditions. . . .
We recognize, as the Government points out, that review must take
appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the
Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent
in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and
the Nation’s need to “speak with one voice” in immigration matters. But we
believe that courts can take appropriate account of such matters without
abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an alien’s
continued detention.
See id. at 699-700 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then established a
presumptively-reasonable detention period of six months in which to accomplish removal,
after which the reasonableness of an alien’s detention should be determined as follows:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior
postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable
future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of
course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after
six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has
been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
See id. at 701; see also, e.g., Anyimu v. Department of Homeland Security, 2017 WL
193180, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2017) (Lungstrum, J.) (applying this framework); Kaliku
v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024 WL 4854523, at *2-3 (D.
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Kan. Nov. 21, 2024) (Lungstrum, J.) (same); Vargas v. Noem, 2025 WL 2770679, at *2-3
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (same).
Based on the present record, the Court finds that petitioner has not met his burden
to provide “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of [his] removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future.” It is true that petitioner has now been in custody for
more than eight months. In their answer, however, respondents submitted evidence that
during that time, petitioner assisted in completing a travel document application (after
initially refusing); the application was submitted to Myanmar authorities; those authorities
requested and conducted an interview of petitioner in January 2026; and that the Myanmar
authorities indicated to local officials that a travel document would likely be issued in
approximately 30 days. On February 20, 2026, respondents supplemented that evidence
with a declaration stating that a travel document for petitioner has now been received by
local officials and that his removal would be arranged in the coming weeks. In his traverse,
petitioner does not address the fact that a travel document has now been issued.
Accordingly, there is no good reason to believe that petitioner’s removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future is not likely, and the Court therefore denies petitioner’s claim under
Zadvydas.
Although petitioner purports to assert multiple claims in his petition, he has not
shown any violation of due process from his continued detention in order to remove him
pursuant to governing statutes, nor has he established any other federal violation.
Accordingly, the Court denies the petition in its entirety.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 9th day of March, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
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