Aich v. Campbell

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JESSE JOSEPH AICH,
Petitioner,
v. 	CASE NO. 26-3062-JWL
STATE OF KANSAS, et al.1 ,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
This is a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed 	pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by
Petitioner Jesse Joseph Aich, a pretrial detainee being held at the Reno County Correctional
Facility in Hutchinson, Kansas. Petitioner has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(Doc. 2), which will be granted. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner will be required to show
good cause, in writing, why this action should not be dismissed under the abstention doctrines set
out in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Rule 4 Screening
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
requires the Court to review a habeas petition upon filing and to dismiss it “[i]f it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
1 Petitioner has named the State of Kansas and the Reno County Correctional Facility as Respondents in this action,
but the proper respondent in a federal habeas action by a state prisoner is the person who has custody over the
petitioner. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004) (“[I]n habeas challenges to present physical confinement
. . . the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held.”); 28
U.S.C. §§ 2242 (stating that the petition “shall allege . . . the name of the person who has custody over” the petitioner)
and 2243 (“The writ . . . shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.”). Thus, Darrian
Campbell, the current Sheriff of Reno County, Kansas, where Petitioner is confined in the Reno County Correctional
Facility, is hereby substituted as Respondent pursuant to Rules 1(b) and 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 81(a)(4).
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court.” 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254. Rule 1(b) authorizes district courts to apply the Rules to habeas
petitions not brought under § 2254, such as those brought under § 2241. Because Petitioner is
proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes the petition, but it may not act as Petitioner’s
advocate. See James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). “[T]he court cannot take on
the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments.” Garrett v. Selby
Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). It “‘may not rewrite a petition to
include claims that were never presented.’” Childers v. Crow, 1 F.4th 792, 798 (10th Cir. 2021)
(citation omitted).
The Petition (Doc. 1)
As noted above, Petitioner is a pretrial detainee. (Doc. 1, p. 1.) He is currently detained on
two criminal cases and he was arrested in June 2025. Id. at 2. In the petition now before this Court,
he asserts four grounds for relief. In Ground One, he asserts that Kansas statutes “are presumption-
of-law not acctual [sic] law.” Id. at 6. As supporting facts for Ground One, Petitioner states that
“[t]he presumption-of-law can be found (not easily) in your revised statute.” Id. In Ground Two,
Petitioner asserts that he contested his arraignment under the Uniform Commercial Code
(“U.C.C.”), section 1-201(26) and, as supporting facts for Ground Two, Petitioner cites 27 C.F.R.
72.11, he states “[a]ll crimes are commercial,” and he asserts that county courts are no longer
constitutional courts. Id.
In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that he “challenged jurisdiction at arraignment.” Id. As
supporting facts for Ground Three, Petitioner argues: 	“You can’t just presume subject matter
jurisdiction as you’re not charging my flesh and blood but a fictitious artificial entity.” Id. In
Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that he filed three affidavits, presumably in the state district court,
based on provisions of the U.C.C. Id. at 7. As supporting facts for Ground Four, Petitioner states
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that he did not have to discharge the debt since he “did not contract.” Id. As relief, Petitioner seeks
an order dismissing the criminal cases against him “with extreme prejudice.” Id.
Analysis
The Court first notes that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “is the proper avenue by which to challenge
pretrial detention.” See Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2007). “[T]he
traditional function of the writ [of habeas corpus] is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). However, requests for pretrial habeas corpus relief are not
favored. Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 391-92 (1918). The United States Supreme Court has long held
that federal courts generally should not exercise their power to discharge a person being detained
by a state for trial on a state crime, even where the person alleges that the detention is
unconstitutional.
In 1886, the United States Supreme Court described some very limited circumstances in
which such intervention might be proper: when a person is in custody for an allegedly criminal act
that was required by federal law or federal court order, when a person is a citizen of a foreign
country and is in state custody for an allegedly criminal act done under the authority of that foreign
country, when the matter is urgent and involves the United States’ relations with foreign nations,
or when there is some reason why the state court may not resolve the constitutional question in the
first instance. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 251-52. Otherwise, federal courts must abstain from
interfering with the process of state courts. Id. at 252 (stating that federal courts’ non-interference
with state courts “is a principle of right and law, and therefore of necessity”).
Nearly a century later, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that principles of
comity dictate that a federal court generally should not intervene in ongoing state criminal
proceedings unless “irreparable injury” is “both great and immediate.” See Younger v. Harris, 401
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U.S. 37, 46 (1971). Under Younger, federal courts must abstain when “(1) the state proceedings
are ongoing; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state
proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to present the federal constitutional challenges.”
Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997).
If 	these 	three 	circumstances 	are 	present, 	federal 	abstention 	is 	mandatory 	unless
extraordinary circumstances require otherwise. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 888
(10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Amanatullah v. Co. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th
Cir. 1999)). Extraordinary circumstances that warrant federal intervention in ongoing state
criminal proceedings include cases “‘of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state
officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction.’” Amanatullah, 187 F.3d at
1165. However, a petitioner asserting such circumstances must make “‘more than mere allegations
of bad faith or harassment.’” Id.
More recently, the Tenth Circuit explained that “Younger and Ex parte Royall are related
doctrines.” Both “are based upon ‘comity, that is, a proper respect for state functions’” and
stand for “the requirement that special circumstances must exist before the federal
courts exercise their habeas corpus, injunctive, or declaratory judgment powers to
stop state criminal proceedings.” Younger addressed a federal court’s equitable
power to issue an injunction enjoining state proceedings, while Ex parte Royall . .
. involved a request for habeas relief.
Smith v. Crow, 2022 WL 12165390, *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 2022) (unpublished order denying
certificate of appealability) (quoting Dolack v. Allenbrand, 548 F.2d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 1977)).
Liberally construing the petition now before this Court, Petitioner requests relief that implicates
both Younger and Ex parte Royall: 	he asks the Court to order his immediate release, which is
habeas relief, and/or to end the prosecutions against him, which is injunctive relief.
Even liberally construing the pro se petition, however, Petitioner does not allege that he
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has been criminally charged for acts done under the authority of a federal law or foreign
government or that his case involves foreign relations, as would remove the case from the
circumstances that require abstention under Ex parte Royall. Moreover, the three conditions in
Younger appear to be satisfied with respect to Petitioner’s current criminal cases in state court. The
criminal cases against Petitioner are ongoing; the State of Kansas has an important interest in
prosecuting crimes charging the violation of Kansas laws, see In re Troff, 488 F.3d 1237, 1240
(10th Cir. 2007); and the state courts provide Petitioner the opportunity to present his challenges,
including any federal constitutional claims, whether in the district court or, if necessary, on appeal
or in further proceedings, see Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993).
Regarding his ability to present his claims in state court, Petitioner states that he has
previously sought habeas relief from the state district court but his request was denied or dismissed.
(Doc. 1, p. 2.) Petitioner also refers to his efforts to contest his arraignment. Id. Even considering
this information, it appears that Ex parte Royall and Younger require this Court to decline to
interfere in the ongoing state court proceedings in Reno County. Petitioner is granted time in which
to submit a written response to this order that shows why this matter should not be dismissed
without prejudice under Ex parte Royall and Younger. The failure to file a timely response to this
order will result in this matter being dismissed without prejudice and without further prior notice
to Petitioner.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Darrian Campbell, Sheriff of Reno County, where
Petitioner is confined, is substituted as Respondent in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(Doc. 2) is granted.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner is granted to and including April 24, 2026
to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed without prejudice for the reasons set forth
in this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	This 24th day of March, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
United States District Judge
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