Kirk v. Shoffner et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
TOMMY-LEE KIRK,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 25-1291-JWB
FRANK SHOFFNER, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Magistrate Judge Brooks Severson’s Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the court dismiss this action for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff has timely objected. (Doc. 10.) Additionally, Plaintiff has
filed a motion for de novo review of magistrate judge’s R&R (Doc. 11) and motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 9). 	Despite Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. 10), the court ADOPTS the magistrate
judge’s R&R (Doc. 5) and DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s remaining motions (Docs. 9, 11) are DENIED AS MOOT.
I. 	Facts
On December 19, 2025, Tommy-Lee Kirk (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Credit
Union of America (“CUA”); Frank Shoffner, CEO of CUA; and Sam Grove, CFO of CUA
(collectively “Defendants”). 	(Doc. 1.) 	Plaintiff cites various federal and state constitutional
provisions and statutes, and alleges his civil, property, and contractual rights were violated.
After a review of Kansas state court records, in December of 2024, CUA filed a petition in
the Eighteenth Judicial District Court of Sedgwick County to foreclose a mortgage on real property
as to which Plaintiff and Chantel Kirk had defaulted. See Credit Union of America v. Tom L. Kirk,
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et al., Case No. SG-2024-CV-002339. 	According to the state court docket, CUA obtained a
judgment against Plaintiff in April of 2025, and a sheriff’s sale was scheduled shortly thereafter.
Following entry of judgment, Plaintiff began filing a plethora of motions and notices in the state
court. The last filing was docketed on January 16, 2026.
While not a model of clarity, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to answer what he
characterizes as a “conditional acceptance of a bill.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) Due to their failure to respond,
Plaintiff continues, Defendants impliedly accepted Plaintiff’s “bill,” and subsequently breached.
As a result, Plaintiff alleges that his civil rights were violated because Defendants deprived him of
property without due process.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Magistrate Judge Severson screened
Plaintiff’s complaint and entered an R&R recommending dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 	Magistrate Judge Severson held that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the relief requested requires this court to set aside the
state court judgment or otherwise alter rulings in that action. 	The court agrees and adopts the
R&R.
II. 	Standard
Review of an R&R. Plaintiff has timely objected, in part, to the R&R. When reviewing a
magistrate judge’s ruling on a dispositive matter, the district judge “must determine de novo any
part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3). 	A failure to properly object, however, leaves a party with no entitlement to appellate
review, and allows the district court to review the R&R under any standard it deems appropriate.
See Williams v. United States, No. 19-2476-JAR-JPO, 2019 WL 6167514, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 20,
2019) (citing United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996))
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(“The Tenth Circuit requires that objections to a magistrate judge’s recommended disposition ‘be
both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court...’ ”). “In the
absence of timely objection, the district court may review a magistrate’s report under any standard
it deems appropriate.” Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (stating that “[i]t does not appear that Congress intended to require
district court review of a magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other
standard, when neither party objects to those findings.”)).
Subject-Matter 	Jurisdiction. 	“[F]ederal 	courts 	are 	courts 	of 	limited 	subject-matter
jurisdiction,” and they “may only hear cases when empowered to do so by the Constitution and by
act of Congress.” 	Gad v. Kan. State Univ., 787 F.3d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotation
omitted). Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, a presumption exists against
jurisdiction, and “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, the
court must dismiss an action if at any point in time it determines that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Pro Se Standard. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court is to liberally construe
his filings. 	Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). 	However, liberally
construing filings does not mean supplying additional factual allegations or constructing a legal
theory on his behalf. Id.
III. 	Analysis
Magistrate Judge Severson found that this matter should be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction on the basis that this action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc.
5.) That doctrine “prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought
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by state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced.” 	Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (per curiam) (internal
quotations omitted). “The essential point is that barred claims are those complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments. In other words, an element of the claim must be that the state
court wrongfully entered its judgment.” Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th
Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is difficult to follow, includes several conclusory allegations,
and fails to identify who did what to whom. Nevertheless, this court agrees with Magistrate Judge
Severson’s overall assessment that Plaintiff is claiming injury from state court proceedings and
state court rulings in the ongoing mortgage foreclosure action in the District Court of Sedgwick
County. (Doc. 1.) The requested relief effectively asks the court to review and reject state court
judgments, by merely listing general grievances with the foreclosure process. The court cannot do
so. 	See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007). 	Moreover, under Rooker-
Feldman, this court has no jurisdiction to grant such relief. See MacIntyre v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., 827 F. App’x 812, 818 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding that former homeowner’s complaint,
claiming that note holder committed fraud in foreclosure proceedings in state court, was barred,
under Rooker-Feldman); Williams v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 681 F. App’x 693, 696 (10th Cir.
2017) (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal lawsuit seeking review and rejection
of state court’s foreclosure judgment). 	In sum, Plaintiff’s claims are “inextricably intertwined”
with claims decided by the state court before these federal proceedings commenced. See PJ ex
rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes lower federal courts from effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction over claims
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actually decided by a state court and claims inextricably intertwined with a prior state-court
judgment.”). Therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
IV. 	Conclusion
THEREFORE, the court finds that Plaintiff's complaint fails to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. 10) are OVERRULED, Magistrate Judge
Severson’s R&R (Doc. 5) is ADOPTED, and Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. Because Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, his remaining motions (Docs. 9, 11) are
DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 9th day of February, 2026.
__s/ John W. Broomes________________
JOHN W. BROOMES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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