Taylor v. SSA

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LONDON
TARA A. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK J. BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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No. 6:26-CV-43-HAI
MEMORANDUM OPINION
& ORDER
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In January 2023, Plaintiff Tara Anita Taylor filed a protective Title II application for
disability insurance benefits. See D.E. 9 at 125.1 She alleged disability beginning April 30, 2018,
although the alleged onset date was later amended to April 1, 2022. Id. The Social Security
Administration denied Taylor’s application initially and upon reconsideration. Id. Then, on
September 17, 2024, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Sandra Morales Price conducted a
telephonic administrative hearing. The ALJ heard testimony from Taylor (represented by
attorneys Tomas C. Newlin III and Charles Haynes with only Haynes appearing at the hearing)
and impartial vocational expert (“VE”) Edith Edward. Id. Taylor was found to not be disabled
during the relevant period. Id. at 135. The Appeals Council denied review on July 16, 2025. Id.
at 5.
On September 19, 2025, Taylor (proceeding on her own without a lawyer) brought this
action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c) to obtain judicial review of the ALJ’s October 25,
1 Page-number citations to the administrative record are to the large black page numbers at the bottom of each page.
Page-number citations to the parties’ briefs refer to the blue page numbers generated by ECF.
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2024 decision denying her application. Taylor filed her brief on January 20, 2026, and the
Commissioner filed his brief on May 6, 2026. D.E. 11, 18. Taylor filed her pro se reply on May
19, 2026. D.E. 19. In August 2026, the matter was referred to the undersigned to conduct all
proceedings and order the entry of a final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. D.E. 21, 22. The Court, having reviewed the record and for
the reasons stated herein, DENIES Taylor’s request to remand these proceedings.
I. The ALJ’s Decision
Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920, an ALJ conducts a five-step analysis to evaluate a
disability claim.2 The ALJ followed these procedures in this case.
At the first step, if a claimant is working at a substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). In this case, the ALJ found that Taylor “has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since April 1, 2022, the amended alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).”
D.E. 9 at 127.
At the second step, if a claimant does not have any impairment or combination of
impairments which significantly limit her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,
then she does not have a severe impairment and is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). In this
case, the ALJ found Taylor had the severe impairments of “lumbar disc disease, thoracic disc
2 The Sixth Circuit summarized this process in Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2003):
To determine if a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act, the ALJ employs a five-step
inquiry defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of
proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is
precluded from performing her past relevant work, but at step five of the inquiry . . . the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that
accommodate the claimant’s residual functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational
profile.
Id. at 474 (internal citations omitted).
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disease, cervical disc disease, and obesity (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).” D.E. 9 at 128. Taylor does not
argue the ALJ should have identified additional severe impairments.
At the third step, if a claimant’s impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, then she is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The ALJ
found Taylor failed to meet this standard. D.E. 9 at 128. Relevant to this appeal, the ALJ
considered musculoskeletal impairments under Listing 1.15. Id. Taylor does not argue that her
impairments meet or equal a listing.
If, as here, a claimant is found non-disabled at step three, the ALJ must determine the
claimant’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), which is her maximum ability to do physical
and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from her impairments. The ALJ
found:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) except she can never crawl or climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds; and
occasionally crouch, kneel, stoop, and climb ramps/stairs. She can occasionally
reach overhead and frequently in any other direction. The claimant can have no
exposure to vibrations or hazards such as unprotected heights and operation of
heavy machinery with hand/foot controls. She can have occasional exposure to
extreme cold.
D.E. 9 at 129. Taylor takes issue with this RFC. D.E. 11.
At the fourth step, if a claimant’s impairments do not prevent her from doing past relevant
work (given the ALJ’s assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity), she is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). The ALJ found that Taylor had no past relevant work. D.E. 9
at 134.
At the fifth step, if a claimant’s impairments (considering her RFC, age, education, and
past work) do not prevent her from doing other work that exists in the national economy, she is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). The ALJ found Taylor was not disabled at this step. D.E.
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9 at 134-135. The ALJ asked the vocational expert “whether jobs exist in the national economy
for an individual with the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity.” Id. at 134. The expert provided a list of jobs including checker I, routing clerk, and
paper pattern inspector. Id. at 135. Because sufficient work existed in the national economy that
Taylor could perform, the ALJ found her “not disabled” as defined by the regulations. Id.
II. Framework for Judicial Review
Under the Social Security Act, a “disability” is defined as “the inability to engage in
‘substantial gainful activity’ because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment
of at least one year’s expected duration.” Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th
Cir. 2007). Judicial review of the denial of a claim for Social Security benefits is limited to
determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the
correct legal standards were applied. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir.
2007). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance;
it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). The substantial
evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which decision makers can
go either way, without interference from the court.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir.
1986) (en banc) (quotes and citations omitted).
In determining the existence of substantial evidence, courts must examine the record as a
whole. Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545 (citing Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524,
535 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983)). However, courts are not to conduct a de
novo review, resolve conflicts in evidence, or make credibility determinations. Id. (citations
omitted); see also Bradley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6th Cir.
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1988). Rather, if the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even
if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently, and even if substantial evidence also
supports the opposite conclusion. Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir.
1999); see also Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993);
Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545; Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983).
Under the current rules, all medical opinions are weighed in light of several factors:
supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and any other relevant
factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c). Supportability and consistency “are the most important factors”
in weighing medical opinions. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2).
Disability determinations often hinge on the claimant’s credibility. The ALJ must consider
statements or reports from the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). To determine whether
statements of a claimant are credible, the following two-part test is used:
First, the ALJ will ask whether there is an underlying medically determinable
physical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s
symptoms. Second, if the ALJ finds that such an impairment exists, then he must
evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms on the
individual’s ability to do basic work activities.
Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a)).3
It is within the province of the ALJ, rather than the reviewing court, to evaluate the claimant’s
3 In 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, the Social Security Administration informs claimants that, in certain credibility
determinations, the following factors should guide the analysis of the agency decision makers:
(i) Your daily activities; (ii) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of your pain or other
symptoms; (iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors; (iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side
effects of any medication you take or have taken to alleviate your pain or other symptoms; (v)
Treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other
symptoms; (vi) Any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or other symptoms (e.g.,
lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and
(vii) Other factors concerning your functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other
symptoms.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); see also Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1037-38 (6th Cir. 1994).
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credibility. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (citing Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531
(6th Cir. 1997); Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1990); Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 1981)). Even so, the credibility determinations of the ALJ must
be reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 249.
Issues that are adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at
developed argumentation, are deemed waived. United States v. Kerns, 9 F.4th 342, 351 (6th Cir.
2021); Strickland v. City of Detroit, 995 F.3d 495, 511 (6th Cir. 2021).
Finally, arguments raised for the first time in reply briefs are also deemed waived.
Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 598 F.3d 257, 275 (6th Cir. 2010);
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Raising the issue for the first
time in a reply brief does not suffice; reply briefs reply to arguments made in the response brief—
they do not provide the moving party with a new opportunity to present yet another issue for the
court’s consideration.”).
Courts liberally construe the pleadings of pro se claimants and hold their petitions to a less
stringent standard than similar pleadings drafted by attorneys. Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708,
715 (6th Cir. 1999).
III. Analysis
Taylor’s first argument concerns the VE’s testimony that a claimant’s excessive need for
breaks or missing two or more workdays per month would preclude competitive employment.
D.E. 11 at 4-6. At the hearing, Taylor’s lawyer asked the VE about such scenarios. D.E. 9 at 162-
66. Taylor argues the ALJ “failed to incorporate or properly address these limitations.” D.E. 11
at 4. Although claimant’s counsel asked about these scenarios, the ALJ never found that Taylor
would need excessive breaks or days off per month. The VE was speaking in general terms, not
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opining on Taylor’s own capabilities. See D.E. 9 at 162-66. In the Court’s experience, vocational
experts commonly testify that the need for excessive breaks or multiple days off per month would
preclude competitive work. Yet this testimony only becomes relevant for the RFC when the ALJ
finds (or the record shows) the claimant’s limitations support such a scenario. The ALJ could not
be expected to include these limitations in the RFC if she did not find they applied to Taylor. Nor
has Taylor identified any medical opinion in the record stating she would need to be off task fifteen
minutes per hour or would miss two or more days of work per month.
The VE testified that if Taylor had to be off-task fifteen minutes per hour or would miss
two or days of work per month, then she could not obtain competitive employment. But the ALJ
did not find these needs applicable. The VE’s generalized testimony on this subject is no grounds
for reversal.
Taylor faults the ALJ for finding her testimony not fully credible. She says, “The ALJ
relied on boilerplate credibility language stating that Plaintiff’s symptoms were ‘not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence,’ without identifying which allegations were rejected or
explaining how the cited evidence undermined Plaintiff's testimony.” D.E. 11 at 5.
Here, the ALJ opined, “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” D.E. 9 at 130. This statement
follows the ALJ’s summary of Taylor’s hearing testimony, where Taylor said, among other things,
she was
unable to work due to pain, limited range of motion in her back, high blood
pressure, shortness of breath, fatigue, and brain fog. She said she has attended
physical therapy, but nothing has helped. She testified she can lift/carry 5-10
pounds, sit 10-15 minutes, and walk 20-30 steps. . . . She said she needs [an
assistive device for walking] but does not use or have one. She stated she has
arthritis in both hands. She testified when she walks, she is leaned over a bit due
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to spondylosis. She said she is up every hour at night. . . . She testified she has had
no surgery, but she needs to have a CT scan to see if she needs surgery. She said
she has lost two inches in her height due to the curvature of her spine, and she said
she has lost 62 pounds over the past year. She stated she uses heat/ice for pain.
D.E. 9 at 129.
The ALJ subsequently highlighted medical records that in some respects differed from
Taylor’s account of her limitations. For example, an August 11, 2023 consultive examination
found Taylor walked with an abnormal gait pitched slightly forward, but she was not unsteady and
did not require an assistive device. D.E. 9 at 131. The same exam found Taylor could stand stably
and sit comfortably, though she could not lay flat on her back due to pain. Id. The ALJ also noted
that state agency medical consultant Dr. Christine Booth found Taylor could lift or carry “20
pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently; stand/walk 6 hours; and sit 6 hours in an 8-hour
workday.” Id. at 132. This was less restrictive than Taylor’s self-report. The ALJ ultimately
imposed a greater level of work restrictions than what was recommended by the state agency
medical consultants. Id. After further summary of the medical evidence, the ALJ concluded:
Regarding her musculoskeletal impairments, she does have some limitations
stemming from these; however, physical examinations did not show any significant
findings aside from some abnormal gait, reduced range of motion, and reported
pain when lying flat during testing. X-rays and MRI’s do confirm some
degenerative changes at multi-levels in the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine;
however, she has only attended physical therapy, and has not had pain management,
injections, or been recommended for surgery. She does not need an assistive device
to ambulate, and none has been recommended for her.
D.E. 9 at 133.
The record shows the ALJ took account of Taylor’s testimony. But the ALJ, pointing to
evidence in the record, concluded that her back and arthritis pain—and related limitations—were
not as severe as Taylor portrayed. The ALJ adopted an RFC between what Taylor described and
what the state agency consultants suggested. The ALJ’s determination regarding Taylor’s
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credibility, weighed against the administrative record, was properly within the ALJ’s zone of
choice. This Court cannot legitimately override this credibility finding on appeal.
Taylor argues the ALJ cherry-picked “isolated normal findings” at the expense of records
that suggest a finding of disability. D.E. 11 at 5. But the record does not support this
characterization. The opinion’s thorough discussion of the medical record mentions numerous
findings regarding Taylor’s musculoskeletal limitations. D.E. 9 at 130-34. And again, the ALJ
chose an RFC with musculoskeletal limitations more stringent than what the state agency
consultants suggested, yet less stringent that what Taylor described. Given the ALJ included both
positive and negative findings within her global evaluation of the record, it cannot be said the ALJ
committed a legal error here or rendered an RFC unsupported by substantial evidence.
Taylor argues the ALJ placed too much weight on the fact Taylor did not use an assistive
walking device, e.g., a cane or walker. D.E. 11 at 6. Taylor herself agrees that she has used no
assistive devices and none has been prescribed. Id. Yet the ALJ did not place undue weight on
this fact. The ALJ considered diagnoses, medical imaging, examination and treatment notes, and
the opinions of the state agency consultants. The opinion amasses a variety of data related to
Taylor’s musculoskeletal limitations, including her ability to walk and the pain in her back. This
includes Taylor’s own testimony that “She said she needs [an assistive device] but does not use or
have one.” D.E. 9 at 129. This is not a case where the ALJ hung her hat on the mere fact the
claimant has never used a cane or walker. The lack of an assistive device is but one data point in
the ALJ’s discussion. The Court here discerns no legal error. And, that the ALJ gave some weight
to the fact that Taylor walks unassisted does not render the ALJ’s opinion unsupported by
substantial evidence.
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Taylor argues the ALJ failed to develop the record regarding her “documented prior spine
surgery.” D.E. 11 at 7. In describing Taylor’s hearing testimony, the ALJ’s opinion states, “She
testified she has had no surgery, but she needs to have a CT scan to see if she needs surgery.” D.E.
9 at 130. As memorialized in the hearing transcript, the ALJ had asked Taylor, “And you have not
required surgery? They haven’t talked to you about any type of surgery, right?” Id. at 155. Taylor
responded, “I have to have a CT scan done because they want more or maybe better imaging of an
area to see if surgery is even an option.” Id.
But Taylor is arguing the ALJ failed to take into account a prior surgery. D.E. 11 at 7.
Taylor says she “disclosed a history of prior laser spine surgery in response to an MRI
questionnaire contained within the medical evidence.” Id. Taylor faults the ALJ for not asking
her about this past surgery or addressing it in the written opinion. Id. The ALJ’s opinion does
note that Taylor has a “history of spine surgery ‘unknown level.’” This is consistent with the
record, where providers note a self-reported history of “spine surgery” with an “unknown level.”
See, e.g., id. at 450, 452. The record also contains a pre-MRI questionnaire that asks the patient
to list any past surgeries. D.E. 9 at 495. Taylor responded, “lumbar spur removal,” with no
additional information. Id. In her reply brief, Taylor explains that the surgery to remove spinal
bone spurs occurred in 2010. D.E. 19 at 8. She also says this was done at Laser Spine Institute in
Tampa, Florida, and “temporarily improved some symptoms.” Id. at 17. These details were not
in the record before the ALJ. It is not the case that the ALJ found “the absence of surgery . . .
negate[d] disability.” Id. at 18. Here, the ALJ’s opinion noted, consistent with the record at the
hearing, that Taylor had “unknown level” spinal surgery in the past. Taylor argues this past surgery
demonstrates a longitudinal history of consistent, conservative treatment of her spinal pain. But
the fact that the ALJ did not give more attention to this surgery from 2010 does not render the
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ALJ’s opinion lacking in substantial evidence. At this procedural posture, the Court is not
authorized to consider evidence not before the ALJ, re-weigh it, and render a different decision.
Taylor argues the RFC should have included “manipulative restrictions” to account for
Taylor’s “bilateral hand limitations.” D.E. 11 at 8. The ALJ noted that Taylor alleged “problems
gripping with both hands.” D.E. 9 at 129. The ALJ observed that treatment notes include
complaints of “bilateral hand swelling, difficulty gripping with the bilateral hands due to swelling,
pain, and stiffness.” Id. at 130. The ALJ noted nurse Blackburn’s observations that
Hands revealed no tenderness, redness, warmth, or swelling. There was no atrophy,
and the claimant was able to make a fist bilaterally. Grip strength was diminished
when using the Odynometer for the claimant’s age. However, during the physical
examination, when asked to squeeze her hands, the claimant was able to do so well
with a good firm grip. Hand grips were equal and graded 5/5 bilaterally. She could
write with the dominant hand and pick up coins with either hand without difficulty.
Id. at 131. Blackburn found Taylor’s ability to “carry” and push/pull heavy objects was impaired
but otherwise rendered no opinion suggesting limitations associated with Taylor’s hands. Id.
Contrary to Taylor’s characterization, the ALJ did include manipulative limitations in the
RFC. As stated in the opinion,
I have also added manipulative limitations consisting of occasional overhead
reaching and frequent reaching in all other directions, and occasional exposure to
extreme cold. These added limitations are more consistent with the record in its
entirety and the testimony of the claimant. Therefore, the findings of the medical
consultants are partially persuasive.
D.E. 9 at 132. The ALJ’s opinion demonstrates the ALJ was aware of Taylor’s limitations with
her hands. The ALJ took these limitations into account in shaping the RFC, just not to the level
Taylor would have preferred. Given that the ALJ considered this issue and included at least
minimal manipulative restrictions in the RFC, this issue is not so divorced from substantial
evidence that the Court is at liberty to reverse.
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Taylor says the ALJ failed her duty to further develop the record. D.E. 11 at 9. The record
here contains well over two hundred pages of medical records, as well as a physical and
psychological consultive examination, and two levels of analysis from state agency medical
consultants. Taylor provides no reason why the ALJ was obligated to seek additional records or
examinations aside from the hope of a different result.
Taylor argues the ALJ failed to consider the “cumulative effect” of her limitations, instead
improperly treating them in isolation. D.E. 11 at 10. Here, the ALJ’s opinion identified a number
of severe impairments. D.E. 9 at 128. The ALJ appropriately considered these severe impairments
both individually and in combination in determining Taylor’s RFC and that Taylor did not have
an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a listing.
Taylor also seems to take issue with the amending of her alleged onset date. D.E. 11 at 7-
9. She says, “Plaintiff did not concede that disability began in April 2022; rather, the onset date
was amended at the ALJ’s prompting based solely on perceived evidentiary gaps, not a change in
Plaintiff’s symptom testimony or functional capacity.” Id. at 2.
The ALJ’s opinion notes that Taylor alleged disability beginning April 30, 2018. D.E. 9
at 125. However, “The claimant, through advice of counsel, has requested to amend her alleged
onset date of disability to April 1, 2022.” Id. According to the ALJ, “At the hearing, the record
was amended to reflect that the claimant is alleging disability since April 1, 2022, based on the
findings on x-rays of the lumbar, thoracic, and cervical spine at Exhibit 1F.” Id. at 129.
The hearing transcript records the relevant conversation. It begins with the ALJ asking
Tyalor’s attorney:
I just need to ask you before we start, I saw that the onset date is April 30th of 2019
but there’s no evidence that far than most recent. I mean the area to be seen is in
2022. So, I was wondering if you would like to request to amend the onset date
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because I really don’t have no evidence. I cannot go back all the way to 2018 with
no evidence.
D.E. 11 at 144. The attorney then explained that the 2018 date “more lined up” with Taylor
separating from work “rather when her medical conditions started to worsen.” Id. at 144-45. The
hearing then paused so Taylor’s lawyer could explain the situation to Taylor. The lawyer
explained,
the onset date on your application is back in 2018, but your medical records really
don’t start until 2022. And really your medical records are within, you know, the
year beyond your filing date which is the most important year anyway. And so,
what [the ALJ is] asking that we do is make an amendment to your onset date to
match it up more with your records rather than when your work started to trail off.
Would you be [amenable] to making that change just to make sure we’re talking
about a period of the most let’s say the period of time where we have the most
evidence?
Id. at 145. Taylor agreed, so her lawyer moved to amend the onset date to comport with the earliest
documentation, “the April 2022 x-rays of her lumbar spine.” Id. The ALJ granted the motion. Id.
at 146. Taylor provides no authority suggesting this Court can reverse an ALJ’s decision to grant
the claimant’s counsel’s motion to amend the alleged onset date. And the Court finds no reversible
error here.
One final note. The Court disregards—as waived—any new arguments raised the reply
brief. Further, Taylor’s reply brief is 26 pages long, plus a two-page Plaintiff’s Reply Summary.
D.E. 19. Joint Local Civil Rule 7.1(d) provides that replies “may not exceed 15 pages without
leave of Court.” Given Taylor’s pro se status, the Court has considered this reply brief, except to
the extent that it raises new issues or arguments not contained in the opening brief.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court being sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the ALJ’s
decision is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s request to remand (D.E. 11) is DENIED. Judgment will be
entered in favor of the Commissioner by separate contemporaneous order.
This the 13th day of October, 2026.
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