Gemelli v. State of Louisiana et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TIMOTHY M. GEMELLI 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 19-13424
STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL. 	SECTION “H”(2)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Timothy M. Gemelli’s Motion for Relief from Final Judgment
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), as supplemented by his Supplemental Rule 60(b)(6) Motion,
and his Second Addendum, which have been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a
Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).1 Defendant Michelle Canepa
filed a response to the motion, and Gemelli filed a reply.2
I. 	Background
In October 2019, Gemelli filed this pro se and in forma pauperis federal civil action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the State of Louisiana, St. Bernard Parish, Judge Jeanne
Juneau, District Attorney Perry Nicosia, Assistant District Attorney Mikey Morales, Assistant
District Attorney Charles Ward, the St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff James Pohlmann,
Deputy Michelle Canepa, Clerk of Court Randy Nunez, Melissa Evans, and Brooke Kerrigan. This
case arose out of Gemelli’s arrest on January 11, 2017, for aggravated incest of D.G., his daughter,
when she was between the ages of four and eight and during which the Gemelli family lived in
both St. Bernard Parish and Colorado. Gemelli was tried in St. Bernard Parish in January 2019 and
1 Rec. Docs. 210, 211, 216, 217.
2 Rec. Docs. 215 and 221.
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 1 of 12

2
acquitted of all charges.3 After his acquittal in St. Bernard Parish, Gemelli was extradited to
Boulder County, Colorado, tried for aggravated incest of his daughter, and ultimately convicted of
those charges by a Colorado jury on December 17, 2019.4
Gemelli generally alleged that defendants wrongfully arrested and incarcerated him, and
violated his federal and state constitutional rights during his St. Bernard Parish criminal
proceedings and his incarceration in the St. Bernard Parish Jail.5 He further alleged that defendants
slandered and made false accusations against him, resulting in loss of his businesses, property, and
reputation.6 At a hearing held pursuant to Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985),
Gemelli testified that Nicosia, Ward and Morales did not turn over exculpatory cell phone and text
message evidence to his defense attorney in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).7
He also raised a Fifth Amendment double jeopardy claim based on his Colorado aggravated incest
conviction, which he claimed was based on the same incidents and charges on which he was
previously acquitted in St. Bernard Parish.8 Specifically with regard to Deputy Canepa, Gemelli
alleged that he was unconstitutionally “seized” under the Fourth Amendment based on Deputy
Canepa’s arrest warrant affidavit of probable cause that included material omissions of fact, which
resulted in his arrest and incarceration in the St. Bernard Parish Jail for two years.9
3 Rec. Doc. 43 at 3.
4 Rec. Doc. 43 at 3–4. Gemelli’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. People v. Gemelli, 545 P.3d 518 (Colo. App.
2023), cert. denied, No. 24SC173, 2024 WL 4595465 (Colo. Oct. 21, 2024).
5 Rec. Doc. 6 at 8–12.
6 Id. at. 9.
7 See Rec. Doc. 43 at 7–8.
8 Rec. Doc. 7 at 1.
9 Rec. Doc. 43 at 41–42.
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 2 of 12

3
Gemelli voluntarily dismissed all claims against defendants Evans and Kerrigan.10 The
District Court dismissed nine other defendants and various claims with prejudice except for
Gemelli’s Fourth Amendment illegal seizure claim against Deputy Canepa.11 In doing so, the
District Court found that Gemelli’s double jeopardy claim necessarily implies the invalidity of his
Colorado conviction, which had not been set aside, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994).12 The District Court also found that Gemelli was not prejudiced by the prosecutors’ failure
to disclose exculpatory cell phone and text message evidence as Gemelli admitted that the timing
and contents of the subject text messages were brought to the attention of the jury in the St. Bernard
Parish trial, and he was ultimately acquitted of the charges in St. Bernard Parish.13 Gemelli,
therefore, failed to state a claim under Brady.14
Gemelli’s motion to file a second amended complaint seeking to add new claims against
nineteen new defendants was denied.15 To the extent that Gemelli alleged claims arising from the
criminal investigation, incarceration and criminal court proceedings in Boulder County, Colorado,
the Court found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants based on their
lack of sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state of Louisiana.16
On April 28, 2022, the District Court appointed Gemelli counsel to represent him as to his
remaining claim against Canepa.17 On June 26, 2023, the District Court denied Gemelli’s motion
10 Rec. Docs. 26 and 27.
11 Rec. Docs. 27, 56, 57; Rec. Doc. 43 at 41–42.
12 Rec. Doc. 57; Rec. Doc. 43 at 40–41.
13 Id.; Rec. Doc. 43 at 17–18.
14 Id.; Rec. Doc. 43 at 18.
15 Rec. Docs. 53 an 58.
16 Rec. Doc. 58 at 10–11.
17 Rec. Doc. 139.
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 3 of 12

4
for summary judgment and granted defendant Canepa’s motion for summary judgment.18 The
District Judge found that D.G.’s report alone that Gemelli molested her when she was a child
between the ages of four and eight was sufficient to constitute probable cause to issue a warrant
for Canepa to arrest Gemelli for aggravated incest.19 The District Judge further found that any
alleged omissions or material misstatements in Canepa’s affidavit did not vitiate probable cause.20
The District Judge also found that Defendant Canepa was entitled to qualified immunity and that
Gemelli failed to state a claim against Canepa under state law.21 Judgment was issued accordingly
on June 27, 2023.22
Gemelli, through counsel, filed a motion to amend or alter judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e).23 The District Judge denied relief, finding no manifest error or law or fact.24
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the dismissal of the case and
the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion, found as follows:
Timothy M. Gemelli appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. §
1983 civil rights action and denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
motion to alter or amend. Gemelli contends that the district court erred in
dismissing his claim that Louisiana state prosecutors failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and in granting
summary judgment in favor of Officer Michelle Canepa and dismissing his claim
that the affidavit in support of the warrant for his arrest omitted material
information and included misrepresentations. Gemelli does not challenge the
district court’s dismissal of any other defendant or claim or the denial of his motion
to alter or amend; accordingly, he has waived these issues. See Yohey v. Collins,
985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). To the extent that he raises additional arguments
in his reply brief, we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time
in a reply brief. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994).
18 Rec. Doc. 188.
19 Id. at 7–11.
20 Id. at 7–13.
21 Id. at 11–13.
22 Rec. Doc. 189.
23 Rec. Doc. 190.
24 Rec. Doc. 193.
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 4 of 12

5
As to the Brady claim, dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state
a claim are reviewed in the same way as dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 209-10 (5th Cir. 2016).
Dismissal is appropriate where a complaint does not “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Gemelli argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim that prosecutors
failed to turn over cellphones and text messages containing exculpatory evidence
demonstrating that the victim was retaliating against him because he had told the
victim that he would no longer support her financially. Under Brady, a defendant’s
due process rights are violated if the prosecution “withholds evidence that is
favorable to the accused and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.”
United States v. Swenson, 894 F.3d 677, 683 (5th Cir. 2018). “Evidence is not
suppressed if the defendant knows or should know of the essential facts that would
enable him to take advantage of it.” United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 246
(5th Cir. 2002).
Here, the cellphones and text messages containing evidence of the victim’s
retaliatory motive were not suppressed because the allegedly favorable evidence
was brought to the jury’s attention through the victim’s testimony that she filed
criminal charges against Gemelli only nine days after receiving a message from
Gemelli stating that he would no longer support her financially. See id. Moreover,
as any evidence on the cellphones and in the text messages would be cumulative to
the victim’s testimony, this evidence was not material. See United States v.
Brumfield, 89 F.4th 506, 514-15 (5th Cir. 2023), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June
18, 2024) (No. 23-7746). The district court did not err in dismissing this claim. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Gemelli also argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of Officer Canepa and dismissing his Fourth Amendment claim as the
affidavit filed in support of the arrest warrant contained material omissions and
misrepresentations. We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de
novo. Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1108 (5th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment
is appropriate when the pleadings and evidence show “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), notwithstanding the approval
of a warrant application by an independent magistrate, a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights are violated if (1) an affiant intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, includes a false statement or omits a material fact and (2)
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 5 of 12

6
the alleged errors or omissions are necessary to the finding of probable cause. Reitz
v. Woods, 85 F.4th 780, 793-94 (5th Cir. 2023). To determine whether false
statements or omitted facts are material to the determination of probable cause,
“courts are to consider the faulty affidavit as if those errors and omissions were
removed, meaning we must examine the corrected affidavit and determine whether
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant survives the deleted false statements
and material omissions.” Id. at 794.
Even assuming that Gemelli’s allegations regarding material omissions in the
affidavit are true, the reconstructed affidavit still contains sufficient facts to lead a
prudent person to believe that a crime had been committed. See id. Under Louisiana
law at the time, aggravated incest was defined as engaging in, among other things,
sexual intercourse, sexual battery, or any other involvement of a child in sexual
activity constituting a crime with a person who is under eighteen years of age and
who is related to the offender. La. Stat. Ann. § 14:78.1. Sexual battery criminalizes
“the intentional touching of the anus or genitals of the victim by the offender.” La.
Stat. Ann. § 14:43.1.
Here, the reconstructed affidavit still contained allegations that the victim told
Officer Canepa that “her biological father had inappropriately touched her between
the ages of four and eight.” “A victim’s accusation identifying an individual as the
perpetrator is generally sufficient to establish probable cause.” Johnson v. Bryant,
No. 94-10661, 1995 WL 29317, 3 (5th Cir. Jan. 17, 1995) (unpublished). Reliance
on a purported victim is justified unless there is an “apparent reason” to disbelieve
the victim’s account. See Roy v. City of Monroe, 950 F.3d 245, 256 (5th Cir. 2020).
While Gemelli claims that the victim’s retaliatory motive was a reason for Officer
Canepa to disbelieve her account, there is nothing in the record suggesting that
Officer Canepa was aware that the victim filed a police report shortly after Gemelli
told the victim that he would no longer support her financially.25
The United States Supreme Court denied Gemelli’s petition for writ of certiorari on March,
24, 2025.26 Gemelli’s petition was rehearing was denied on June 6, 2025.27
Gemelli next filed his pro se motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), as
supplemented. As he has previously, Gemelli claims that his Colorado conviction violates double
jeopardy, and argues that his double jeopardy claim does not necessarily imply the invalidity of
25 Gemelli v. Nicosia, No. 23-30661, 2024 WL 3617304, at *12 (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2024) (footnote omitted).
26 Gemelli v. Nicosia, 145 S. Ct. 1446 (2025)
27 Gemelli v. Nicosia, 145 S. Ct. 2788 (2025).
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 6 of 12

7
his Colorado conviction under Heck.28 Gemelli re-urges his claim that prosecutors failed to comply
with state court orders requiring forensic extraction of two cell phones in violation of Brady.29
Gemelli claims that the Fifth Circuit erred in its finding that the cell phone evidence was not
material.30 He further asserts that the victim’s mother’s “affidavit” was ignored.31 Finally, Gemelli
faults his court-appointed counsel for failing to investigate and raise the Brady issue, include the
mother’s testimony in the summary judgment briefing, and properly rebut “mischaracterizations
in the record.”32
Defendant Canepa responds that Gemelli has not demonstrated manifest error of law or
fact.33 She argues that Gemelli’s motion, as supplemented, raises no new issues that have not
already been fully litigated.34 With regard to Gemelli’s claim that Canepa disobeyed orders of the
St. Bernard Parish criminal court requiring forensic examination and disclosure of Gemelli’s
seized cell phone evidence, Canepa asserts that the issue was fully litigated and that she was not
present at Gemelli’s arrest in St. Tammany Parish, did not seize any items from Gemelli, and,
therefore, she cannot return evidence that was never in her possession.35 Canepa states that all
evidence that she seized was returned to Gemelli’s criminal defense attorney on February 5, 2019.
28 Rec. Doc. 210 at 3–5, 7.
29 Id. at 6–8; Rec. Doc. 211. Gemelli claims that on October 8, 2025, the 34 th Judicial District Court of St. Bernard
Parish granted his petition for return of the cellphones. Rec. Doc. 216 at 2. He further claims that an employee at the
St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Office thereafter informed him that it never was in possession of the property. Id.
30 Id. at 6–7.
31 Id. at 7. Kimberly Gemelli did not submit an affidavit. Rather, it appears that Mr. Gemelli refers to Canepa’s January
10, 2017 interview of Kimberly Gemelli. Rec. Doc. 177-6 at 435–71; Rec. Doc. 181-6 at 435–71.
32 Id. at 7–8; Rec. Doc. 211 at 2; Rec. Doc. 216 at 2–3.
33 Rec. Doc. 215.
34 Rec. Doc. 215-1.
35 Id. at 2–3.
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 7 of 12

8
In his reply, Gemelli asserts that he is currently litigating the return of his cellular phones
in state court.36 He claims that Canepa coordinated the investigation and search, and, thus, caused
the phones to be seized and was obligated to comply with state court orders, locate the phones, and
perform the extraction.37 He argues that District Court and Fifth Circuit’s findings regarding his
Brady claim are erroneous.38 He further argues that the Court, in granting Canepa’s motion for
summary judgment, misunderstood D.G.’s timeline and credited Canepa’s tainted affidavit.39
II. 	Discussion
Rule 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered earlier; (3) fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or it is based on an earlier judgment that has been
reversed or vacated, or that applying the judgment prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any
other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b)(1)–(6). Relief under Rule 60(b) is
“uncommon” and “will be afforded only in ‘unique circumstances.’ ” Lowry Dev., LLC v. Groves
& Assocs. Ins., Inc., 690 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2012); Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281,
287 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Wilson v. Atwood Group, 725 F.2d 255, 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1984)).
Here, Gemelli brings his motion under the “catch-all” clause of Rule 60(b)(6). Relief under
this provision is available “only if extraordinary circumstances are present.” Hess v. Cockrell, 281
F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Disagreement with the court’s ruling is not a basis
36 Rec. Doc. 221 at 2–3.
37 Id. at 4.
38 Id. at 3–4.
39 Id. at 9–10.
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 8 of 12

9
for relief under Rule 60(b), and a Rule 60(b) motion is not an opportunity to relitigate a decision
simply because the plaintiff is unhappy with the result. See, e.g., Carter v. Dolce, 741 F.2d 758,
760 (5th Cir. 1984); Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 735 (5th Cir. 1977). For the following
reasons, the grounds advanced by Gemelli do not entitle him to relief.
First, a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be used to vacate a judgment which was been affirmed
following an appeal. Doyle v. Slidell Police Dept., No. 96-3361, 2000 WL 174886, at *2 (E.D.
La. Feb. 11, 2000); Reilly v. Herrera, 729 F. App’x 760, 764 (11th Cir. 2018) (Rule 60(b) does not
grant a district court authority to alter, amend, or grant relief from an appellate court’s rulings).
Thus, to the extent that Gemelli disagrees with the Fifth Circuit’s findings related to his Brady
claim and his claim related to Canepa’s affidavit in support of the arrest warrant, he is not entitled
to relief.
Next, Gemelli simply rehashes his prior arguments and assertions that his Colorado
conviction violates double jeopardy, which the District Court found to be barred under Heck. He
contends that the claim does not clearly implicate the validity of his Colorado conviction. As
explained above, however, the mere disagreement with the Court’s ruling is not a basis for relief
under Rule 60(b). Carter, 741 F.2d at 760. Nor may Rule 60(b) be used as a substitute for appeal
once the time for such has passed. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 699 F.2d 693, 695 (5th Cir.
1983). Gemelli’s claim that his Colorado conviction violates double jeopardy clearly implicates
the validity of that conviction. To the event that Gemelli also claims that the withholding of Brady
evidence led to his Colorado conviction, that claim also necessarily implies the invalidity of his
conviction. Bwondara v. Tarrant Cty., TX, No. 4:25-cv-00813-O-BP, 2025 WL 3144983, at *6
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2025), adopted, 2025 WL 3143270 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2025); Knod v. City
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 9 of 12

10
of Irving, Tex., No. 3:13–CV–1747–L, 2013 WL 6869634, at *4 n.4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2013)
([Plaintiff’s] claims against the prosecutor would necessarily imply the invalidity of this
conviction. Plaintiff may, however, challenge his conviction in habeas proceedings based on his
assertion that exculpatory evidence was not provided to him in violation of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)); Camp v. Dobbs, 2:11–CV–0140, 2012 WL
75669, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2012). To date, Gemelli has not shown that the Heck conditions
have been met. He not entitled to relief as to this claim.
Gemelli further contends that Kimberly Gemelli’s “exculpatory” statement to Canepa was
ignored by both court-appointed counsel and the District Court. Kimberly Gemelli was interviewed
by Canepa on January 10, 2017.40 At that time, Ms. Gemelli stated that her daughter told her “as
long as she can remember [Mr. Gemelli] slept with his hand down [the victim’s] pants.”41 Ms.
Gemelli admitted that there were times when the victim would sleep in the same bed as Mr. and
Ms. Gemelli, until she was about “threeish.”42 She explained that sometimes she would prop up
the victim due to her acid reflux.43 Ms. Gemelli stated that she “didn’t really notice anything then.
Um, when we moved to Colorado, [she] did notice, um, he had her in the shower with him a few
times.”44
Gemelli’s contention that his counsel failed to include Kimberly Gemelli’s statement to
Canepa in the summary judgment briefing is clearly false. Gemelli’s counsel cited to the statement
in both the motion for summary judgment as well as the response to Canepa’s motion for summary
40 Rec. Doc. 177-6 at 435–71; Rec. Doc. 181-6 at 435–71.
41 Id. at 439; Rec. Doc. 181-6 at 439.
42 Id. at 451, 453; Rec. Doc. 181-6 at 451, 453.
43 Id. at 451; Rec. Doc. 181-6 at 451.
44 Id. at 453, 455; Rec. Doc. 181-6 at 453, 455.
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 10 of 12

11
judgment and also included copies of the full transcript of the statement.45 Further, the District
Court specifically recognized Gemelli’s claim that Canepa omitted from her affidavit that the
victim’s mother stated that the victim would be propped up in a sitting position when she slept in
her parents’ bed due to her acid reflux.46 The District Court found that it “fail[ed] to understand
how this would diminish probable cause, still, it must be noted that her mother stated that D.G.
slept on her chest until she was ‘threeish or so.’ D.G. stated that the molestation occurred when
she was approximately four, so this does not contradict any information included in the affidavit
and thus, does not constitute a material omission.”47 Again, Gemelli’s mere disagreement with the
Court’s finding is not a sufficient basis to warrant relief pursuant to Rule 60(b). Carter, 741 F.2d
at 760.
Finally, Gemelli claims that his court-appointed counsel did not effectively represent him
in this case. As indicated, the District Court appointed counsel to represent Gemelli as to the claim
against Canepa.48 That appointment specifically did not include “any of the dismissed claims in
this case or any appeal or petition of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court nor does it include any
appeal or petition of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to the § 1983 claims against
Deputy Michelle Canepa….”49 Gemelli’s Brady claim had previously been dismissed,50 and, thus,
his counsel could not raise it in the summary judgment briefs. Although Gemelli feels that his
appointed counsel should have taken different action on some issues, the record reflects that
counsel diligently represented Gemelli from the time of the appointment through the denial of the
45 Rec. Doc. 177-1 at 2–11; Rec. Doc. 177-6 at 435–71; Rec. Doc. 181 at 9–10; Rec. Doc. 181-6 at 435–717.
46 Rec. Doc. 188 at 7–9.
47 Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
48 Rec. Doc. 139 at 1.
49 Id.
50 Rec. Doc. 57; Rec. Doc. 43 at 17–18.
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 11 of 12

12
motion to reconsider filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The mere fact that counsel was not
successful does not provide a basis for the Court to provide the relief Gemelli seeks.
For these reasons, Gemelli has failed to identify any extraordinary circumstances justifying
relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), and his motion, as supplemented, should be denied.
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Gemelli’s Motion for Relief from Final Judgment Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), Rec. Doc. 210, as supplemented by his Supplemental Rule 60(b)(6)
Motion, Rec. Doc. 211, and his Second Addendum, Rec. Doc. 216, be DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, in accordance with the Civil Statistical Guide,
the Clerk shall nunc pro tunc OPEN this case for statistical credit for the Court’s consideration of
the motion filed August 19, 2025, and CLOSE the case upon resolution of the motion.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 15th day of December, 2025.
__________________________________________
JANIS VAN MEERVELD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 2:19-cv-13424-JTM-JVM Document 222 Filed 12/15/25 Page 12 of 12