Ramsey et al v. Independent Specialty Insurance Company et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONICA S. RAMSEY, ET AL.
VERSUS
INDEPENDENT SPECIALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 23-632
SECTION “B” DIV. (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Pending before me is a Motion to Quash filed by Non-Parties Velocity Claims, LLC and
Velocity Risk Underwriters, LLC. 	ECF No. 75. 	Plaintiffs Monica Ramsey and Roger Dale
Ramsey filed an Opposition Memorandum, and movants filed a Reply Memorandum. ECF Nos.
76, 77. No party requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the court agrees
that oral argument is unnecessary.
Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the
applicable law, the Motion to Quash is GRANTED for the reasons stated herein.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Monica S. Ramsey and Roger Dale Ramsey filed suit against their insurer and
its claims processor seeking to recover for losses incurred as a result of Hurricane Ida as well as
extra-contractual damages and attorneys’ fees alleging failure to properly adjust the loss, failure
to reasonably estimate the damages, and failure to timely pay insurance proceeds. 	ECF No. 1.
Plaintiffs’ claims against Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. have been dismissed and,
although Plaintiffs’ claims against their insurer were initially stayed, that stay was lifted. 	ECF
Nos. 16, 33, 72.
Non-parties Velocity Claims, LLC and Velocity Risk Underwriters, LLC now move to
quash subpoenas duces tecum issued to them on the bases that the subpoenas were not properly
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served, require compliance beyond the geographical limitations of Rule 45(c), impose undue
burden and seek disclosure of privileged or confidential information. ECF No. 75. Velocity Risk
Underwriters, LLC is a managing general agent that administers insurance policies, Velocity
Claims, LLC provides claims administrative services, and both entities are formed under Delaware
law and have their principal places of business in Nashville, Tennessee. ECF No. 75-1 at 1-2; see
also ECF Nos. 75-3, 75-4.
Movants assert that Plaintiffs served the subpoenas duces tecum on their Louisiana
registered agent via Federal Express and seek production of numerous documents at Plaintiffs’
counsel’s office in New Orleans. ECF No. 75-1 at 2-4; see also ECF Nos. 75-5, 75-6. As such,
they argue the subpoenas were not properly served because Rule 45 requires personal service, and
production cannot be demanded over 500 miles from their offices in Nashville. ECF No. 75-1 at
5-7. In addition, movants argue the subpoenas impose an undue burden and seek documents that
are outside of the scope of discovery and are confidential and/or privileged. Id. at 7-12.
In Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that movants’ motion to quash is procedurally improper and
untimely. ECF No. 76. Plaintiffs argue that movants’ failure to issue timely objections and/or file
a motion to quash precludes them from now seeking relief. ECF No. 76 at 1-2. Alternatively,
Plaintiffs ask that they be allowed to re-issue and properly serve the subpoenas. Id. at 2.
In Reply, movants argue that that the Motion to Quash was filed on January 29, 2026,
which was the compliance date for the subpoenas and within 14 days of Plaintiff’s service. ECF
No. 77 at 2. Further, they argue the 14-day deadline for objections does not apply to motions to
quash, which need only be filed “timely,” and had Plaintiffs’ filed a motion to enforce subpoena,
same would necessarily have been denied because they were facially invalid and served
improperly. Id. at 2-4. Movants also reiterate their burden and relevance arguments. Id. at 4-5.
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II. 	APPLICABLE LAW
A. Scope of Discovery
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the parties to
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ 	relative 	access 	to 	relevant 	information, 	the 	parties’ 	resources, 	the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within
this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
FED. R. C IV. P. 26(b)(1). Information need not be admissible into evidence to be discoverable. Id.
Rather, the information merely needs to be proportional and relevant to any claim or defense. Id.
The threshold for relevance at the discovery stage is lower than the threshold for relevance
of admissibility of evidence at the trial stage.1 This broader scope is necessary given the nature of
litigation, where determinations of relevance for discovery purposes are made well in advance of
trial; facts that are not considered in determining the ultimate issues may be eliminated in due
course of the proceeding.2 At the discovery stage, relevance includes “[a]ny matter that bears on,
or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the
case.”3 	Relevant evidence thus has the tendency to make a fact that is of consequence in
determining an action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.4
The relevancy evaluation necessarily begins with an examination of the pending claims
and defenses.5 Discovery should be allowed unless the party opposing discovery establishes that
the information sought “can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of the party seeking
1 Rangel v. Gonzalez Mascorro, 274 F.R.D. 585, 590 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citations omitted).
2 Id. at 590 n.5 (citation and quotations omitted).
3 Id. at 590 (citations omitted).
4 FED. R. E VID. 401.
5 Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Crescent Ford Truck Sales, Inc., No. 02-3398, 2006 WL 378523, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb.
17, 2006) (Zainey, J.).
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discovery.”6 But Rule 26(b) “has never been a license to engage in an unwieldy, burdensome, and
speculative fishing expedition.”7 Thus, while relevance in the discovery context is broader than
in the trial context, that legal tenet should not be misapplied to allow fishing expeditions in
discovery.8 Indeed, while discovery rules are accorded broad and liberal treatment to achieve their
purpose of adequately informing litigants in civil trials,9 discovery has “ultimate and necessary
boundaries.”10 The Court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed, if it
determines: (1) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (2) the party
seeking discovery had ample opportunity to obtain the information; or (3) the proposed discovery
is outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).11
B. Discovery from Non-Parties Through Subpoenas
Discovery may be obtained from non-parties pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure. “Any person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may serve a subpoena.
Serving a subpoena requires delivering a copy to the named person . . . .” FED. R. C IV. P. 45(b)(1).
The Fifth Circuit requires personal service of a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.12 When the
6 Dotson v. Edmonson, No. 16-15371, 2017 WL 11535244, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2017) (Morgan, J.) (citing Merrill
v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 470 (N.D. Tex. 2005)).
7 Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 2011).
8 Trident Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. GLF Constr. Corp., No. 16-17277, 2017 WL 3011144, at *4 (E.D. La. July 14, 2017)
(citations omitted); see also Crosby, 647 F.3d at 264; Ganpat v. E. Pac. Shipping, PTE, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 3d 305,
311 (E.D. La. 2020) (Morgan, J.).
9 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (citations omitted).
10 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507
(1947)).
11 FED. R. C IV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii).
12 See In re Dennis, 330 F.3d 696, 704 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he rule indicates that proper service requires . . . personal
delivery of the subpoena . . . .”); Weiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 512 F. Supp. 2d 463, 466 (E.D. La. 2007) (Vance, J.)
(“[S]ervice is improper if the person himself is not served with a copy of the subpoena.” (citing Harrison v. Prather,
404 F.2d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 1968)); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Educ. Mgmt., Inc., No. 04-1053, 2007 WL 2127798, at *3
(E.D. La. July 25, 2007) (“A majority of courts in various jurisdictions require personal service of a subpoena and will
not allow the alternate forms of service.” (citing 9A WRIGHT & M ILLER ’ S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CIV.
§ 2454 (2d ed. 1995) and cases cited therein)); see also Accurso v. Cooper Power Sys., Inc., No. 06-848, 2008 WL
2510140, at *4–5 (W.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008) (holding that Rule 45’s requirement of “delivering” means personal
service because “the subpoena extends the Court's jurisdiction over an unwilling non-party and there must be assurance
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“named person” being served is an entity rather than a natural person, service must be effected
upon the entity’s registered agent and not by delivery to the entity’s address or mailroom.13 Proof
of service “must be certified by the server.” FED. R. C IV. P. 45(b)(4).
Although governed in the first instance by Rule 45, non-party subpoenas are also subject
to the parameters of Rule 26.14 “Both Rules 45 and 26 authorize the court to modify a subpoena
duces tecum when its scope exceeds the boundaries of permissible discovery or otherwise violates
the parameters of Rule 45.”15 	And Rule 45 provides additional protections to non-parties.
Specifically, the party issuing a subpoena to a non-party “must take reasonable steps to avoid
imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” FED. R. C IV. P. 45(d)(1).
In that regard, a subpoena must give a prospective deponent reasonable notice, and the court must
quash or modify a subpoena when it “fails to allow a reasonable time to comply.” FED. R. C IV. P.
45(d)(3)(A)(i). 	Courts 	generally 	hold 	that 	“any 	timeframe 	less 	than 	14 	days 	is 	likely
unreasonable.”16 Additionally, the subpoena may command production of documents “within 100
that this nonparty actual[ly] receives this Court process”); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobian-Pont-
a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1312–13 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (distinguishing Rule 4 service by mail as effectuating notice
from Rule 45 service as compulsion and noting that “compulsory process may be served upon an unwilling witness
only in person”).
13 Reese v. Great W. Cas. Co., No. 18-8336, 2019 WL 4930233, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2019) (noting that a corporation
must generally be served by personal service on its agent for service of process, and finding service on receptionist
insufficient); see also in re Newbrook Shipping Corp., 31 F.4th 889, 897 (4th Cir. 2022) (“The second service method
for a corporation also expressly permits “delivering” the complaint to certain officers or agents: “an officer, a
managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” So
to satisfy Rule 45's mandate of “delivering a copy to the named person” when the “person” is a corporation, there
must be delivery to an appropriate agent, as identified by Rule 4(h).” (quoting FED. R. C IV. P. 4(h)(1)(B))).
14 In re Application of Time, Inc., No. 99-2916, 1999 WL 804090, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 1999), aff'd, 209 F.3d 719
(5th Cir. 2000).
15 Hahn v. Hunt, No. 15-2867, 2016 WL 1587405, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2016) (citing FED. R. C IV. P. 45(d)(3);
26(c)(1)(D)), aff’d, 2016 WL 6518863 (E.D. La. Nov. 2, 2016).
16 Bergeron v. Great West Cas. Co., No. 14-13, 2015 WL 5307685, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2015) (citing Hall v.
Louisiana, No. 12–657, 2014 WL 1652791 (M.D. La. Apr. 23, 2014)); Hall, 2014 WL 1652791, at *13 (quashing
subpoenas that provided 12 and 9 days’ notice); Thomas v. IEM, Inc., No. 06–886, 2008 WL 695230, at *3 (M.D. La.
Mar. 12, 2008) (stating that subpoenas would be quashed where they only allowed 9 business days to respond and
produce documents).
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miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person.” FED.
R. C IV. P. 45(c)(2)(A).
A non-party has three means of challenging a subpoena duces tecum: (1) serving written
objections, (2) filing a motion to quash or modify the subpoena, or (3) seeking a protective order.
The non-party must send written objections to the issuing party within 14 days of service or before
the return date, whichever is earlier. FED. R. C IV. P. 45(d)(2)(B). If the non-party timely provides
written objections, it has satisfied its obligation and need not take any further action. The serving
party may then file a Motion to Compel seeking compliance. F ED. R. C IV. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i).
The non-party may alternatively file a motion to quash or modify or seek a protective order.
Id. at 45(d)(3); FED. R. C IV. P. 26(c). 	The person filing the motion to quash or modify has the
burden of proof to demonstrate that compliance would impose undue burden or expense.17 	To
determine whether the subpoena presents an undue burden, the Fifth Circuit considers the
following factors: (1) relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the party for the
documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the request;
(5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden
imposed.18 “Whether a burdensome subpoena is reasonable must be determined according to the
facts of the case, such as the party's need for the documents and the nature and importance of the
litigation.”19 	The court may also consider the expense and inconvenience to the non-party.20
Generally, modification of a subpoena is preferable to quashing it outright.21
17 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004); see also McLeod, Alexander, Powel &
Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding party resisting discovery must show why each
discovery request is not relevant or otherwise objectionable).
18 Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (citations omitted).
19 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
20 Id. (citation omitted).
21 Id; Tiberi v. CIGNA, Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Linder v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 94 F.3d 693,
698 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[M]odification of a subpoena is generally preferred to outright quashing . . . .”).
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Under Rule 26: “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” 	FED. R. C IV. P.
26(c)(1). 	A protective order may forbid discovery or specify terms for discovery. 	Id.
at 26(c)(1)(A), (B). Rule 26’s requirement of “good cause” to support a protective order places
the burden upon the movant to show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a “particular
and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.”22
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs cite to an earlier set of subpoenas issued in September 2025 in arguing that
movants’ motion to quash is untimely. 	See ECF Nos. 75-5, 75-6 (showing September 2025
issuance and delivery). 	Movants, however, cite to re-issued subpoenas issued in January 2026.
See ECF No. 76-3 at 15, 20 (showing January 2026 issuance and delivery). Although not made
clear, it appears that Plaintiffs initially issued subpoenas in September 2025, but then re-issued
them in January 2026 “because there was a service issue of the subpoena to counsel in the case.”
ECF No. 76-3 at 9, 18, 20. And the process verbal cited by Plaintiffs related to the January 2026
subpoenas, not the September 2025 subpoenas, and they also noted that a service defect with regard
to the September 2025 subpoenas. Id. at 4-6.
Setting aside the inapplicability of Rule 45’s 14-day deadline to a motion to quash,
movants’ motion cannot be considered untimely given that Plaintiffs concede defects as to the
September 2025 subpoenas and the January 15, 2026, subpoena appears to have been delivered
via Federal Express on January 16, 2026, for a required production on January 29, 2026, and
movants filed their motion to quash on January 29, 2026. Accordingly, movants’ motion to quash
cannot be characterized as untimely. 	Moreover, Plaintiffs’ failure to personally deliver the
22 In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3
(5th Cir. 1978)).
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subpoenas to movants’ agents for service or process renders service defective under Fifth Circuit
precedent. 	Further, the subpoenas required production in less than 14 days after service, and
required production beyond 100 miles of movants’ principal offices. For all of these reasons, the
January 2026 subpoenas must be quashed.
Having quashed the subpoenas, it is not necessary to address the burden and scope issues.
Counsel are reminded, however, that cumulative or duplicative discovery is not allowed nor will
overly broad discovery seeking “each and every” or “all” generally described documents survive
a challenge. 	In addition, protective orders are regularly employed to protect confidential or
commercial information, blanket assertions of privilege are improper, and any invocation of
privilege requires delivery of a privilege log. Should Plaintiffs elect to re-issue and properly serve
the subpoenas to require production within the appropriate geographical limitations, counsel are
advised to consider these issues to avoid unnecessary further motion practice.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Velocity Claims, LLC and Velocity Risk Underwriters, LLC’s
Motion to Quash (ECF No. 75) is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ________ day of February, 2026.
___________________________________
DONNA PHILLIPS CURRAULT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
20th
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