Neyland et al v. Hutson et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RICHARD NEYLAND, ET AL.
VERSUS
SHERIFF SUSAN HUTSON, ET AL.
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 23-1773
SECTION “B” (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Pending before me is Plaintiff Richard Neyland’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. ECF No. 109.
Defendant Sheriff Susan Hutson failed to file an Opposition Memorandum. No party requested oral
argument, and the court agrees that oral argument is unnecessary.
Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the applicable
law, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the
reasons stated herein.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 15, 2026, the undersigned granted in part Plaintiff Richard Neyland’s Fourth Motion
to Compel Discovery Responses but denied sanctions. See ECF Nos. 107, 110. A hearing was held
on April 15, 2026, during which this Court granted the motion in part, ordering ESI discovery, and
awarded Plaintiff reasonable fees and costs contingent upon submission of an appropriate motion with
supporting documentation. See ECF No. 107. Plaintiff filed this Motion for Attorneys’ Fees seeking
to recover $2,966.67 in attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 109. Plaintiff contends he reached this figure using
the lodestar method and Johnson factors. See ECF No. 109-1. Defendant Sheriff Susan Hutson failed
to file an Opposition Memorandum.
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II. 	APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. The Lodestar Method
Federal courts typically use the “lodestar method” as a guide to determine attorneys’ fee
awards,1 which provides “an objective basis to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s
services.”2 	Under the lodestar method, “the number of hours reasonably spent on the case [is
multiplied] by an appropriate hourly rate in the community for such work.”3 The reasonable hourly
rate is based on the prevailing market rate for similar services by similarly trained and experienced
lawyers in the relevant legal community.4 	The party seeking attorneys’ fees bears the burden of
establishing the reasonableness of the fees, and it must provide adequate documentation of the hours
expended and demonstrate the use of billing judgement.5 	The party opposing the attorneys’ fees
requested bears the burden of showing that a reduction is warranted and should provide an adequate
basis of why and how the fees are unreasonable in the case.6
Once the lodestar has been determined, the court must consider the weight and applicability
of the twelve Johnson factors.7 If the Johnson factors warrant an adjustment, the court may make
modifications upward or downward to the lodestar.8 	“The lodestar may not be adjusted due to a
Johnson factor, however, if the creation of the lodestar award already took that factor into account.”9
1 Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993).
2 	Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
3 Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2006).
4 Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002).
5 La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
6 Id. at 329 (citing U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[A] party
advocating the reduction of the lodestar amount bears the burden of establishing that a reduction is justified.”)).
7 Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91-94 (1989); see Watkins, 7 F.3d at 457 (citations omitted). The twelve factors are (1) the time
and labor involved; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to this case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether fee
is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations; (8) the amount involved and results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation
and ability of counsel; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
8 Watkins, 7 F.3d at 457 (citation omitted).
9 Heidtman v. County of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1043 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 319–
20 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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The lodestar is presumed to be a reasonable calculation and should be modified only in exceptional
circumstances.10
B. Lodestar Calculation
1. 	Reasonable Hourly Rate
In determining the reasonable hourly rate, the court is not bound by the amount charged by
the attorney.11 Rather, the “appropriate hourly rate . . . is the market rate in the community for th[e]
work.”12 The rate must be calculated “at the ‘prevailing market rates in the relevant community for
similar services by attorneys of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.’”13
Satisfactory evidence of the reasonableness of the rate includes an affidavit of the attorney performing
the work and information of rates actually billed and paid in similar lawsuits.14
Plaintiff seeks to recover an hourly rate of $400 for 7.82 hours of work completed by attorney
John Adcock. See ECF No. 109-1 at 5. Plaintiff submits an affidavit of another practitioner attesting
to the reasonableness of the rate. ECF No. 109-4. If the hourly rate sought is not opposed, it is prima
facie reasonable.15 Defendant did not oppose Plaintiffs’ motion, and thus, the hourly rate of $400 is
deemed prima facie reasonable. The Court, however, expressly notes that it makes no determination
of whether the hourly charged rate is reasonable within the community.
10 Watkins, 7 F.3d at 457 (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)).
11 Village Shopping Ctr. P’ship v. Kimble Dev. LLC, 287 So. 3d 882, 886 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2019); St. Blanc v. Stabile, 114
So. 3d 1158, 1160 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2013) (citing Jackson Square Towne House Home Ass’n, Inc. v. Hannigan, 867 So.
2d 960, 965–66 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2004)).
12 Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.,
685 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2012)); accord. McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that
“‘reasonable’ hourly rates ‘are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community’”
(quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984))); Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 328 (“To determine reasonable rates, a court
considers the attorneys’ regular rates as well as prevailing rates.”).
13 Int’l Transp. Workers Fed’n v. Mi-Das Line, SA, No. 13-454, 2013 WL 5329873, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 2013)
(quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895).
14 Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11; Int’l Transp. Workers Fed’n, 2013 WL 5329873, at *3; Creecy v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 548 F. Supp. 2d 279 (E.D. La. 2008).
15 Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 328 (citation omitted); Powell v. Comm’r, 891 F.2d 1167, 1173 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted);
White v. Imperial Adjustment Corp., No. 99-3804, 2005 WL 1578810, at *5 (E.D. La. June 28, 2005) (Engelhardt, J.)
(citation omitted) (holding that attorney’s requested hourly rate is prima facie reasonable when it is the customary billing
rate, the rate is within the range of prevailing market rates and the rate is not contested).
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2. 	Documentation of Hours Reasonably Expended and Billing Judgment
The party seeking attorneys’ fees bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the
fees by submitting adequate documentation of the hours reasonably expended and demonstrating the
use of billing judgment.16 Only work of a legal nature is compensable.17 Travel time is allowed at
50% of the hourly rate in the absence of documentation that any legal work was accomplished during
travel time.18
The party seeking fees must also demonstrate the exercise of billing judgment, which refers
to the usual practice of writing off unproductive, excessive, or redundant hours.19 “Ideally, billing
judgment is reflected in the fee application, showing not only hours claimed, but also hours written
off.”20 	The burden is on the party seeking the fee award to prove that they exercised billing
judgment.21 “The proper remedy when there is no evidence of billing judgment is to reduce the hours
awarded by a percentage intended to substitute for the exercise of billing judgment.”22 	As an
alternative to a percentage reduction, the court may exclude hours that were not reasonably expended
16 Creecy, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (citing Wegner v. Standard Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 814, 822 (5th Cir. 1997); Walker v. U.S.
Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (stating party
seeking fees bears burden of documenting and supporting the reasonableness of all time expenditures for which
compensation is sought).
17 Work of a legal nature includes “factual investigation, including locating and interviewing witnesses; assistance with
depositions, interrogatories and document production; compilation of statistical and financial data; checking legal
citations; and drafting correspondence.” Missouri v. Jenkins ex rel. Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989).
18 See, e.g., Watkins, 7 F.3d at 459 (citing Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 856, 858, 861 (N.D. Miss. 1991)
(compensating travel time at a lesser rate)); Shirley, 763 F. Supp. at 861 (citing Catchings v. City of Crystal Springs, 626
F. Supp. 987, 989–90 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (allowing $75.00 per hour for legal work and $37.50 per hour for travel time and
disallowing ministerial work); Kirksey v. Danks, 608 F. Supp. 1448, 1456, 1459 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (allowing $100.00 per
hour for legal services and $50.00 per hour for travel time)).
19 Walker, 99 F.3d at 770.
20 Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 896 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted), vacated in part on other grounds, 903
F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1990).
21 Walker, 99 F.3d at 770 (citation omitted).
22 Id.; see also United States ex rel McNeil v. Jolly, 451 F. Supp. 3d 657, 670 (E.D. La. 2020) (“If a party fails to provide
sufficient evidence of billing judgment, the proper remedy is ‘a reduction of the award by a percentage intended to
substitute for the exercise of billing judgment.’” (citing Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799); Walker v. City of Mesquite, 313 F.3d
246, 251 (5th Cir. 2002) (“If there is no evidence of billing judgment, however, then the proper remedy is not a denial of
fees, but a reduction of ‘the hours awarded by a percentage intended to substitute for the exercise of billing judgment.’”
(citation omitted)).
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and/or conduct a line-by-line analysis of billings.23 “[T]he district court is not required ‘to achieve
auditing perfection,’ as ‘[t]he essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice.’”24
The court need not explicitly calculate the lodestar to make a reasonable award.25
Plaintiff seeks to recover 7.82 hours for drafting, revising, and filing the motion to compel
and for preparing and attending oral argument. See ECF No. 109-1 at 4-7; No. 109-5. The request
reflects the exercise of billing judgment as counsel has not charged for an additional 2.2 hours. ECF
No. 109-5. However, a review of the uncharged time reflects clerical/non-legal time (and thus non-
chargeable). ECF No. 109-5. Further, while counsel notes he charged travel time at 50%, travel time
is allowed at 50% of the normal rate when no work is performed,26 and thus does not fall within the
exercise of billing judgment.
Despite Plaintiff’s counsel’s reductions, the court finds that the 7.82 hours requested, although
related to the motion to compel,27 is somewhat excessive. The Court finds that a further reduction of
the hours spent is necessary. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall be compensated for 7 hours in total at the
hourly rate of $400 per hour, resulting in a fee award of $2,800 for fees incurred with the drafting,
filing and arguing the motion to compel.
C. Adjusting the Lodestar
The Court has carefully evaluated the Johnson factors and finds no adjustment of the lodestar is
warranted.
23 See Fleming v. Elliot Sec. Sols., LLC, No. 19-2348, 2021 WL 4908875, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2021) (citing Hensley,
461 U.S. at 434; Green v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 2002)).
24 DeLeon v. Abbott, 687 F. App’x 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2017) (quotation and citations omitted).
25 No Barriers, Inc. v. Brinker Chili’s Tex., Inc., 262 F.3d 496, 500–01 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wegner, at 822-23).
26 See, e.g., Watkins, 7 F.3d at 459.
27 Leblanc v. Fed Ex Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 19-13274, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 2021) (citations omitted)
(awarding costs for time spent in preparing and filing motion as well as required Rule 37 conference); see also Stagner v.
W. Kentucky Navigation, Inc., No. 02-1418, 2004 WL 253453, at *6 (E.D. La. Feb. 10, 2004) (“However, Rule 37(a) does
not contemplate costs incurred by the party in the normal course of litigation, absent a direct relation to the motion to
compel.”).
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III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Richard Neyland’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (ECF No. 109)
is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff is awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees in
the amount of $2,800.00.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ________ day of May, 2026.
___________________________________
DONNA PHILLIPS CURRAULT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
20th
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