Master Insulation, Inc. v. GH Mechanical & Services, LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MASTER INSULATION, INC. 	* 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-5638
VERSUS 	* 	JUDGE ELDON E. FALLON
GH MECHANICAL & SERVICES, LLC, 	* 	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
C.D.W. SERVICE, LLC, ST. AUGUSTINE 	KAREN WELLS ROBY
HIGH SCHOOL, INC., AND LEXON 	*
INSURANCE COMPANY
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment filed by Plaintiff Master
Insulation, Inc. (“Master Insulation”) against Defendant GM Mechanical & Services, LLC (“GH
Mechanical”). R. Doc. 46. The Clerk entered a preliminary default against GH Mechanical on
April 9, 2024. R. Doc. 25. GH Mechanical has not appeared in this case, nor contacted the Court
to its knowledge. Having considered the briefing, record, and applicable law, the Court will
GRANT IN PART Master Insulation’s motion for the following reasons.
I. 	BACKGROUND
GH Mechanical hired Master Insulation to complete insulation work on a construction
project at St. Augustine High School. R. Doc. 2 at 2–3. The January 2022 subcontract, together
with its two authorized change orders (the “Insulation Agreement”) yielded a total contract price
of $346,500.00. Id. at 3. Master Insulation brings the instant suit alleging inter alia that GH
Mechanical failed to pay the full contract price despite its proper performance. See generally id.
Plaintiff avers that it performed all its obligations in strict accordance with the Insulation
Agreement, in a thorough and workmanlike manner, and free from defects in both materials and
workmanship. Id. at 3. It also regularly invoiced GH Mechanical as it completed performance. Id.
The Insulation Agreement attached to the Complaint provides that GH Mechanical “shall pay
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[Master Insulation] monthly Progress Payments” in accordance with certain listed terms. R. Doc.
2-2 at 3. However, beyond making an initial payment of $5,482 in February 2022, GH Mechanical
allegedly failed to make payments on the remaining five invoices. R. Doc. 2 at 3; see also R. Doc.
48. Thus, Master Insulation contends that GH Mechanical owes it the remaining outstanding
principal balance of $341,018.00. R. Doc. 2 at 3–5.
As a result of GH Mechanical’s failure to pay, Master Insulation brought the instant suit
and asserted claims for breach of contract pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 1906, suit on open account
pursuant to La. R.S. § 9:2781, failure to make prompt payment pursuant to La. R.S. § 9:2784, and
unjust enrichment pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2298. R. Doc. 2 at 5–7, 10. It also asks for
attorneys’ fees as provided by La. R.S. § 9:2781 as well as interest and costs. Id. at 6.
Master Insulation served GH Mechanical with its complaint on November 28, 2023. R.
Doc. 16. GH Mechanical failed to file its responsive pleadings within the twenty-one-day period.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A). As a result, Master Insulation filed a Motion for Entry of Default on
April 8, 2024. R. Doc. 24. The Clerk entered a preliminary order of default the next day. R. Doc.
25. By the end of October 2025, about a year and a half later, GH Mechanical still had not appeared
in this suit; as there had been no other relevant action by Plaintiff in this case, the Court ordered
Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. R. Doc. 43.
Plaintiff then filed this motion for entry of final default. R. Doc. 46.
II. 	PRESENT MOTION
Master Insulation seeks a default judgment against GH Mechanical as a consequence of its
unresponsiveness to the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s September 2023 complaint. R. Doc. 46. In
support of its position that default judgment is appropriate, Plaintiff submitted two affidavits of
Dana Hansen, its Finance Manager, who attested to details of the contract price, the six invoices,
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and GH Mechanical’s payment history. R. Docs. 46-2, 48-1. Master Insulation also submitted the
subcontract and its change orders, copies of paid and unpaid invoices, and Master Insulation’s
internal accounting report for GH Mechanical. R. Docs. 46-1, 48-2. Master Insulation avers that
default judgment is procedurally proper, that it has pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate its
entitlement to the entry of judgment in its favor on all four of its legal theories against GH
Mechanical, and that it is entitled to relief in the total amount of $502,076.10, which is the
aggregate of the outstanding principal balance owed under the contract, statutory penalties,
interest, and attorneys’ fees. R. Doc. 46-1 at 5–10. GH Mechanical has filed no response to Master
Insulation’s motion.
III. 	APPLICABLE LAW
To attain a default judgment, a plaintiff must first file a motion for entry of default. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(a). The motion must have attached an affidavit that notes the facts of the defendant’s
“fail[ure] to plead or otherwise defend.” Id. The court clerk must enter the default when the
plaintiff’s documentation is in order. Id. Thereafter, the party seeking final judgment must apply
to this Court for a default judgment if the plaintiff’s claim is not for a sum certain. Fed R. Civ. P.
55(b). Although the court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations against the defendant as truthful,
it is not obliged to recognize the amount of damages sought as fact. U.S. For Use of M-CO Constr.,
Inc. v. Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987).
The petitioner “is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right.” Gather v. Ingle,
75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996). The district judge possesses the discretionary authority to enter
a default judgment. Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977). To determine whether to
enter a default judgment, the Court must consider “1) whether the entry of default judgment is
procedurally warranted, 2) whether a sufficient basis in the pleadings based on the substantive
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merits for judgment exists, and 3) what form of relief, if any, a plaintiff should receive.” Graham
v. Coconut LLC, No. 16-606, 2017 WL 2600318, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 15, 2017) (citing Lindsey
v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998)); Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat. Bank,
515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).
First, to determine if the entry of default judgment is procedurally warranted, two requisites
must be met. The movant must make “a prima facie showing” that the Court possesses personal
and subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant in default. Viahart, LLC v. Does 1-54, No. 18-
604, 2021 WL 777083, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2021), aff’d sub nom., No. 21-40166, 2022 WL
445161 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022). If the movant makes this prima facie showing, the Court will then
assess six factors to determine the necessity of the default judgment. Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. The
Court must decide “(1) whether material issues of fact are at issue, (2) whether there has been
substantial prejudice, (3) whether the grounds for default are clearly established, (4) whether the
default was caused by a good faith mistake or excusable neglect, (5) the harshness of a default
judgment, and (6) whether the court would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the
defendant’s motion.” Id.
The second requisite of the default judgment analysis requires the Court to evaluate
whether the plaintiff’s pleading adheres to the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., 788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015). Although the
defendant’s default marks its admission to the plaintiff’s allegations, the Court cannot enter a
default judgment without finding a sufficient factual basis within the pleading. Nishimatsu Constr.
Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. The pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Additionally, the facts within the
complaint must “‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level’ and into the ‘realm of plausible
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liability.’” Viahart, 2021 WL 777083, at *4 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555, 557 n.5 (2007)).
The third and final prong of the analysis requires the Court to determine damages. Rule
55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a “court may conduct hearings . . .
when, to enter of effectuate judgment, it needs to . . . determine the amount of damages.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(b)(2). This clause confers a broad discretionary authority to the district court. See James
v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993). No hearing need be conducted when the plaintiff seeks
liquidated or calculable damages rather than unliquidated damages. United Artists Corp. v.
Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979). The Court here has determined that Plaintiff seeks
calculable damages, so a hearing was not necessary.
IV. 	ANALYSIS
The Court finds that all three default judgment requirements are satisfied by the record in
this case. Both procedural tests are satisfied: Plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to make a prima facie
showing of jurisdiction, and the Court, as explained below, finds that the six procedural factors
support an entry of default judgment. Next, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s pleadings contain
sufficient facts to raise its right to relief above a speculative level on two of its four claims. Finally,
the amount of damages is ascertainable on the record before the Court. The Court addresses each
of these conclusions below.
A. Default Judgment is Procedurally Proper.
Two separate analyses are required to be conducted before determining that default
judgment is procedurally proper. First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the Court
has personal and subject matter jurisdiction. See Viahart, 2021 WL 777083, at *3. Plaintiff pleaded
that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because the parties are completely diverse and the
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amount-in-controversy exceeds $75,000.00. R. Doc. 2 at 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Master
Insulation is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. R. Doc. 5. GH
Mechanical, upon Plaintiff’s information and belief, is a Texas limited liability company whose
two members are domiciled in Louisiana and Texas. R. Doc. 2 at 1. Thus, the parties are completely
diverse. The amount in controversy is also satisfied because Plaintiff seeks to recover the
outstanding balance owed under the contract of $341,018.00, among other money damages. Id. at
5. Finally, the Court has personal jurisdiction over GH Mechanical since one of the members is
domiciled in Louisiana. Id. at 1. Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of both personal and
subject matter jurisdiction.
Second, the Court must find that the six-factor test shows that default judgment is
procedurally proper. Viahart, 2021 WL 777083, at *3. The Fifth Circuit considers the following
six factors in determining whether a default judgment is necessary: “(1) whether material issues of
fact are at issue, (2) whether there has been substantial prejudice, (3) whether the grounds for
default are clearly established, (4) whether the default was caused by a good faith mistake or
excusable neglect, (5) the harshness of a default judgment, and (6) whether the court would think
itself obliged to set aside the default on the defendant's motion.” Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893.
All six factors favor the entry of default judgment in this case. First, there are no issues of
material fact because GH Mechanical “by [its] default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
allegations of fact.” See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206. Second, the record does not suggest that
GH Mechanical has been prejudiced in any way. To the Court, Master Insulation is the party
prejudiced by GH Mechanical’s failure to appear and defend itself in this suit because “the
adversarial process has been brought to a halt” and it could be difficult for Master Insulation to
recover damages on its successful claim. See Viahart, 2021 WL 777083, at *3. Third, GH
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Mechanical’s failure to answer, coupled with Master Insulation’s proper adherence to all default
judgment procedural rules, demonstrates that the grounds for default are clearly established.
Fourth, there is no record evidence to show that GH Mechanical’s absence in this suit is caused by
good faith mistake or excusable neglect. Fifth, default judgment is not unduly harsh here because
GH Mechanical has had over two years to respond to Master Insulation’s allegations, so it has had
ample opportunity to defend against Plaintiff’s claims. Finally, the Court sees no basis for it to be
obligated to set the default aside on GH Mechanical’s motion.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that a default judgment is
procedurally warranted.
B. Master Insulation Pleaded Sufficient Facts to Show Entitlement to Default on Two of
Its Claims.
Master Insulation brought four distinct claims against GH Mechanical: breach of contract
pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 1906, suit on open account pursuant to La. R.S. § 9:2781, failure to
make prompt payment pursuant to La. R.S. § 9:2784, and unjust enrichment pursuant to La. Civ.
Code art. 2298. R. Doc. 2 at 5–7, 10. Before the Court can enter default judgment on any of
Plaintiff’s four legal theories, it must determine whether the supporting factual allegations are
well-pleaded and in accordance with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206; Wooten, 788 F.3d at 498. The Court finds that Master Insulation
has pleaded sufficient facts to support its entitlement to default judgment on two of its four asserted
claims.
1. 	Breach of Contract
Because this case is based on diversity jurisdiction, Master Insulation bases its breach of
contract claim in Louisiana law. In Louisiana, “[a] contract is an agreement by two or more parties
whereby obligations are created, modified, or extinguished.” La. Civ. Code art. 1906. “A contract
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is formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance.” La. Civ. Code
art. 1927. Every contract also includes an obligation for the parties to perform in good faith. La.
Civ. Code art. 1983. “‘The central elements of a breach of contract action are the existence of a
contract, the party’s breach thereof, and damages.’” JMF Med., LLC v. Team Health, LLC, 490 F.
Supp. 3d 947, 973 (M.D. La. Sept. 29, 2020) (quoting Favrot v. Favrot, 2010-0986 (La. App. 4
Cir. 2/9/11), 68 So. 3d 1099, 1108–09). “‘An obligor is liable for damages caused by his failure to
perform a conventional obligation.’” Favrot, 2010-0986, 68 So. 3d at 1109 (quoting La. Civ. Code
art. 1994).
Master Insulation implicitly maintains that the Insulation Agreement constitutes a valid,
binding contract under Louisiana law. See R. Doc. 46-1 at 5. The Court finds no evidence in the
record to suggest that this contract is invalid. The Insulation Agreement obligated Master
Insulation to perform certain insulation services with certain materials, and in exchange, GH
Mechanical was obligated to pay the contract price. Id. at 5–6; see also R. Doc. 46-2 at 4–16.
Based on Master Insulation’s internal account report, R. Doc. 48-1 at 6, GH Mechanical has
breached its obligations by failing to pay five of the six invoices issued by Master Insulation
pursuant to the Insulation Agreement. The Court concludes that GH Mechanical is liable for the
amounts it owes to Master Insulation under the Insulation Agreement, which totals $341,0180.00.
R. Doc. 48-1.
2. 	Suit on Open Account
La. R.S. § 9:2781 provides that claimants may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees for the
prosecution and collection of an open account claim if the amount owed is not paid within thirty
days after sending written demand. An open account is defined as “any account for which a part
or all of the balance is past due whether or not the account reflects one or more transactions and
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whether or not at the time of contracting the parties expected future transactions.” Id. at (D). “In
determining whether a contract falls under the open account statute, courts in Louisiana consider,
among other things, whether the ‘total cost or price [is] . . . left open or undetermined.’” EW
Polymer Grp., LLC v. GSX Int’l Grp., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 232, 238 (M.D. La. 2022) (quoting
Factor King, LLC v. Block Builders, LLC, 193 F. Supp. 3d 651, 658 (M.D. La. 2016)). Because
the open account statute imposes attorneys’ fees awards as a penalty, it must be strictly construed.
24/7 Restoration Specialists, LLC v. Young, 634 F. Supp. 3d 287, 290 (E.D. La. 2022).
Master Insulation’s pleading and briefing fails to address that Louisiana courts “have
consistently drawn the distinction between open accounts and ordinary contracts.” Cong. Square
Ltd. P’ship v. Polk, No. 10-317, 2011 WL 837144, at *4–6 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2011) (discussing
Louisiana cases); see also Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Cobbs, Allen & Hall of La., Inc., No. 2024-
0085 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/24), 405 So. 3d 813, 817 (“To the extent a cause of action for breach
of contract and one for open account are mutually exclusive, and [claimant] cannot succeed under
both theories of recovery, Article 892 authorizes pleading both causes of action in one judicial
demand, if pled in the alternative . . . .”). However, due to GH Mechanical’s failure to appear in
this suit and defend against these claims, this Court does not have the benefit of extensive briefing
that could resolve any potential issues related to Master Insulation’s bringing of both claims.
However, a court in this district recently entered default judgment in favor of a plaintiff on
both breach of contract and suit on open account theories. See Tempest Storm Rentals, LLC v.
Asomeo Env’t Restoration Indus. LLC, No. 24-2421, 2025 WL 1235528 (E.D. La. Apr. 29, 2025).
In Tempest Storm Rentals, the parties had entered into a lease agreement for trucks and other
equipment, and the plaintiff brought suit alleging that the defendant did not pay the regularly
invoiced rental fees over the nine-month period that the plaintiff continuously rented its equipment
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to the defendant. Id. at 1. That court did not wrestle with questions of whether the plaintiff could
prevail on both theories of breach of contract and suit on open account under Louisiana law. See
generally id. Instead, the district court assessed whether the plaintiff had pleaded sufficient facts
and submitted relevant record evidence to support each claim. See id. at 3–4. This Court will do
the same.
“An open account necessarily involves an underlying agreement between the parties on
which the debt is based.” Signlite, Inc. v. Northshore Serv. Ctr., Inc., No. 2005-2444 (La. App. 1
Cir. 2/9/07), 959 So. 2d 904, 907. “To distinguish between an open account and an ordinary
contract, courts consider factors such as ‘(1) whether there were other business transactions
between the parties; (2) whether a line of credit was extended by one party to the other; (3) whether
there are running or current dealings; and (4) whether there are expectations of other dealings.’”
24/7 Restoration Specialists, 634 F. Supp. 3d at 290 (quoting Cambridge Toxicology Grp., Inc. v.
Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169, 174 (5th Cir. 2007)). “To recover on an open account, ‘the creditor must
first prove the account by showing that it was kept in the ordinary course of business and by
introducing supporting testimony regarding its accuracy.’” Tempest Storm Rentals, 2025 WL
1235528, at *3 (quoting Bisso & Miller, LLC v. Marsala, No. 16-585 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/15/17),
215 So. 3d 469, 472). The debtor then has the opportunity to prove the inaccuracy of the account
or that it is entitled to certain credits. Id.
Here, it is plausible that Master Insulation could prevail on an open account claim. The
Insulation Agreement does not have a definite time period and was subject to change orders and
increased prices as the contractual relationship developed. See R. Doc. 46-2. Moreover, at least
one Louisiana court of appeal—with the benefit of the case having made it to the summary
judgment stage—has found that a plaintiff who brought a suit on open account could prevail when
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the subject construction agreement contemplated a definite scope of construction work for a fixed
price. Advanced Leveling & Concrete Sols. v. Lathan Co., No. 2020-0040 (La. App. 1 Cir.
12/10/20), 316 So. 3d 509, 513–14. The affidavits of Master Insulation’s Finance Manager
demonstrate that the unpaid invoices at issue here were issued in the ordinary course of business
and accurately reflect the amounts GH Mechanical still owes under the Insulation Agreement.
Additionally, Master Insulation represents that it demanded payment of the full principal amount
over thirty days ago, in accordance with La. R.S. § 9:2781(A). Thus, Master Insulation’s right to
relief has been raised above a speculative level based on the record evidence and pleading for its
open account claim.
3. 	Failure to Make Prompt Payment
Master Insulation contends that GH Mechanical violated Louisiana’s prompt payment
statute and thus is liable for statutory penalties and reasonable attorneys’ fees. R. Doc. 46-1 at 7–
9; R. Doc. 2 at 6–7. The “[l]ate payment by contractors to subcontractors and suppliers” statute
provides:
A. When a contractor receives any payment from the owner for
improvements to an immovable . . . the contractor shall promptly
pay such monies received to each subcontractor and supplier in
proportion to the percentage of work completed 	. . . . Further,
whenever 	a 	subcontractor 	receives 	payment 	from 	the
contractor, the subcontractor shall promptly pay such monies
received to each sub-subcontractor and supplier in proportion
to the work completed.
. . .
C. If the contractor or subcontractor without reasonable cause fails
to make any payment to his subcontractors and suppliers within
fourteen consecutive days of the receipt of payment from the owner
for improvements to an immovable, the contractor or subcontractor
shall pay to the subcontractors 	and suppliers, 	in addition to
the payment, a penalty in the amount of one-half of one percent
of the amount due, per day, from the expiration of the period
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allowed herein for payment after the receipt of payment from the
owner. . . . In addition, the contractor or subcontractor shall be
liable 	for 	reasonable 	attorney 	fees 	for 	the 	collection 	of
the payments due the subcontractors and suppliers.
La. R.S. § 9:2784 (emphasis added). Here, Master Insulation pleaded in its Complaint that “[u]pon
information and belief, GH Mechanical,” a subcontractor to the prime contractor, “received
payment for all or part of the insulation materials and services provided by Master Insulation more
than fourteen consecutive days ago.” R. Doc. 2 at 7. It further alleged that “GH Mechanical’s
failure to pay is without probable cause.” Id.
Master Insulation cites no record evidence to establish that the prime contractor C.D.W.
Services, LLC (“CDW”) did indeed pay GH Mechanical for the amounts invoiced to GH
Mechanical by Master Insulation. See R. Doc. 46-1 at 7 (citing only to the Complaint to support
its position that “[a]s shown, GH Mechanical received payment for all or part of the insulation
materials and services provided by Master Insulation more than fourteen consecutive days prior to
Master Insulation filing suit.”). Indeed, upon closer inspection of the evidence put into the record
by CDW during its evidentiary hearing for its own default judgment against GH Mechanical, CDW
may not have been aware of Master Insulation’s invoices to GH Mechanical on the project as
Master Insulation completed its work; a spreadsheet suggests that CDW may not have been aware
of Master Insulation’s invoices until Master Insulation sent CDW a lien enforcement letter on
October 26, 2022 and follow-up letter on February 2, 2023. E.g, R. Doc. 33-14 (copies of letters);
33 (spreadsheet titled “St. Augustine High School – Backcharges to GH Mechanical Subcontract
. . . .” listing Master Insulation under a section titled “CLAIM/LIEN”).
In short, Master Insulation did not carry its burden to demonstrate that GH Mechanical
received payment from CDW at any point prior to it sending the October 26, 2022 letter to Master
Insulation. The statute’s payment provisions are not triggered until the subcontractor receives a
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payment from the prime contractor. Without any citation to payments from CDW to GH
Mechanical that could then be immediately paid to Master Insulation, the Court cannot enter
default judgment in favor of Master Insulation on this claim.
Petitioners are “not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right.” Gather, 75 F.3d at
212. They must plead short, plain statements to support that they are entitled to the requested relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). These factual allegations must “‘raise a right to relief above the speculative
level’ and into the ‘realm of plausible liability.’” Viahart, 2021 WL 777083, at *4. Here, Master
Insulation pleaded that “[u]pon information and belief, GH Mechanical received payment for all
or part of the insulation materials and services provided by Master Insulation.” R. Doc. 2 at 7. This
is the only relevant factual allegation in the Complaint that speaks to Master Insulation’s
entitlement to default judgment for GH Mechanical’s violation of Louisiana’s prompt payment
statute. Without other record evidence to support Master Insulation’s claim, this fact does not raise
Master Insulation’s right to relief above a speculative level. Master Insulation is not entitled to
default judgment on its prompt payment claims.
4. 	Unjust Enrichment
In Master Insulation’s motion for entry of default judgment, it states that “[o]nly in the
alternative, and only if the Court were to find [that] Master Insulation has not shown entitlement
to payment under breach of contract, open account, or prompt payment statutes, Master Insulation
seeks compensation under a theory of unjust enrichment.” R. Doc. 46-1 at 7. As the Court has
determined that Master Insulation is entitled to default judgment on its breach of contract and open
account claims, it will not address whether it is entitled to default judgment on its unjust
enrichment claim. E.g., Shaw v. Restoration Hardware, Inc., 93 F.4th 284, 291 (5th Cir. 2024)
(citations omitted) (“While a plaintiff in Louisiana generally may not plead a claim for unjust
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enrichment alongside another legal theory, unjust enrichment is still available when the at-issue
contract is a legal ‘nullity.’”); Patterson v. Dean Morris, LLP, No. 08-5014, 2011 WL 1743617,
at *7 (E.D. La. May 6, 2011) (quoting Walters v. MedSouth Rec. Mgmt., LLC, No. 2010-353 (La.
6/4/10), 38 So. 3d 243, 244) (“‘The unjust enrichment remedy is only applicable to fill a gap in
the law where no express remedy is provided.’”).
C. Master Insulation is Entitled to Relief.
The Court now turns to address damages. Although the Court must accept the veracity of
Master Insulation’s well-pleaded allegations, it is not obligated to take the amount of requested
damages as fact. U.S. For Use of M-CO, Const., Inc., 814 F.2d at 1014. It is upon the Court “to fix
the amount of damages” as it sees fit. Wright v. E-Sys., LLC, No. 12-4715, 2016 WL 7802996, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2016). While Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates
a court’s ability to conduct a hearing to determine the appropriate amount of damages, a hearing
does not need to be conducted when the Court can mathematically calculate the amount of damages
based on the pleadings and record evidence. E.g., James, 6 F.3d at 310. Here, damages are
calculable, so a hearing was unnecessary.
1. 	Damages for Breach of Contract/Amount Owed on Open Account
Master Insulation seeks a total of $341,018.00 contractual/open account in damages
because it is the outstanding principal sum that remains due under the Insulation Agreement. R.
Doc. 2 at 5–6. Master Insulation attached the Insulation Agreement to its Complaint, and the
original contract with its two change orders clearly outline that the total contract price is
$346,500.00. R. Doc. 2-2. Master Insulation submitted evidence of GH Mechanical’s sole payment
of $5,482.00. R. Doc. 48, 48-1. Thus, e Master Insulation is entitled to an award of the remaining
amount due under the Insulation Agreement, or $341,018.00. See also R. Doc. 48-1 (Affidavit of
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Master Insulation’s Finance Manager, attesting that GH Mechanical has an outstanding balance of
$341,018.00 owed to Master Insulation).
2. 	Interest on the Principal Amount
Master Insulation seeks an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to La. Civ. Code art.
2000. “State law governs the award of prejudgment interest in diversity cases.” Harris v. Mickel,
15 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 1994). Under Louisiana law, “[w]hen the object of the performance is
a sum of money, damages for delay in performance are measured by the interest on that sum from
the time it is due.” La. Civ. Code art. 2000. The rate of interest can either be agreed to by the
parties or, in the absence of an agreement, set at the rate of legal interest as fixed by La. R.S.
§ 9:3500. Id.
Master Insulation did not reference, and the Court did not find, a fixed interest rate in the
Insulation Agreement. Accordingly, interest on the amount owed under the Insulation Agreement
will be assessed at the legal rate fixed in La. R.S. § 9:3500. In accordance with the statute, the
interest is measured from the time performance is due. The invoices attached to the Complaint
state that Master Insulation issued its final invoice on September 8, 2022, with a net of thirty days.
R. Doc. 2-3 at 6. Thus, prejudgment interest shall be calculated from October 8, 2022, using the
fixed rate as provided for in La. R.S. § 9:3500.
3. 	Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Master Insulation is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs because it prevailed
on its open account claim. La. R.S. § 9:2781(A) (“any person [who] fails to pay an open account
. . . shall be liable to the claimant for reasonable attorney fees . . . when judgment on the claim is
rendered in favor of the claimant”). When attorneys’ fees are awarded, the Court engages in a two-
step process to determine whether the claimed fees are reasonable. In re Fender, 12 F.3d 480, 487
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(5th Cir. 1994). The first step requires the Court to calculate the lodestar by multiplying the
reasonable number of hours expended and the reasonable hourly rate for each participating
attorney. Id.; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). After the lodestar has been
calculated, the Court may then “adjust[] the lodestar upward or downward depending upon the
respective weights of the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974).” Fender, 12 F.3d at 487. The party requesting fees bears
the burden of proving that the rates charged and hours expended are reasonable. See Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984); Walker v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 99 F.3d
761, 770 (5th Cir. 1996); La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995).
The Court will first calculate the lodestar by determining the reasonable hourly rates and
reasonable number of expended hours. It will then consider whether the lodestar calculation should
be adjusted. Finally, the Court will consider an award for costs.
a. 	Lodestar: Hourly Rate
The Court must first determine the reasonable hourly rate for each participating attorney.
“‘[R]easonable’ hourly rates ‘are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the
relevant community.’” McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Blum, 465 U.S. at 895). “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—
in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
experience and reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11. “An attorney’s requested hourly rate is
prima facie reasonable when [he] requests that the lodestar be computed at [his] ‘customary billing
rate,’ the rate is within the range of prevailing market rates and the rate is not contested.” White v.
Imperial Adjustment Corp., No. 99-3804, 2005 WL 1578810, at *5 (E.D. La. June 28, 2005) (citing
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La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 1995)). “However, the Court may
reduce the hourly rate if it determines that the requested rate is not within the range of prevailing
market rates.” MGMTL, LLC v. Strategic Tech. Inst., Inc., 776 F. Supp. 3d 419, 477 (E.D. La.
2025) (citing Richard v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff's Dep’t, No. 17-9703, 2022 WL 4534728, at
*11 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2022), appeal dismissed sub nom. Richard v. Smith, No. 22-30497, 2023
WL 2845201 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2023)).
Here, Master Insulation seeks attorneys’ fees for work completed by Brad Barback
(partner), Josh Populas (associate), and Jeffrey Matthews (paralegal) between 2023–2025 and
totaling $29,761.50. R. Doc. 46 at 9–10; 46-3 at 3. Master Insulation submits two affidavits of
Brad Barback, a partner at McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC, to support its fees request. R. Doc. 46-3,
49. Mr. Barback explains that he is a partner with eleven years’ experience who focuses his practice
on commercial civil litigation and construction litigation. R. Doc. 46-3 at 2. He attested that he
reduced his standard billable rates in this case by 33%, so his hourly rates in this matter were $345
in 2023, $370 in 2024, and $390 in 2025. R. Doc. 46-3 at 2.
The Court finds that Master Insulation did not submit sufficient record evidence to
demonstrate that these requested rates were reasonable, and the Court determines that a reduction
in hourly rate is warranted here. Recently, a court in this district discussed a reasonable fee award
for an attorney with the same years of experience as Mr. Barback. MGMTL, 776 F. Supp. 3d at
480–81. In that case, an attorney with eleven years of experience requested hourly rates of
$350/hour in 2020, $375/hour in 2021-2022, and $390/hour in 2023. Id. at 478. The court, after
thoroughly reviewing rates that courts had awarded similarly situated practitioners, reduced that
attorneys’ hourly rate for purposes of calculating the lodestar, determining that $250/hour for 2020,
$265/hour for 2021-2022, and $275/hour for 2023 were reasonable. Id. at 480. The Court is
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persuaded that a similar reduction is appropriate here. Thus, Mr. Barback will be awarded an
hourly rate of $275/hour for 2023, $290/hour for 2024, and $300/hour for 2025.
As for the associate, Josh Populas, Master Insulation only requests time billed in 2024 and
at a rate of $295/hour. The record is silent as to Mr. Populas’s years of experience, practice area
focuses, or any other relevant information to assist the Court in determining a reasonable hourly
rate. As such, the Court will assume that Mr. Populas falls within the range of 0-5 years of practice.
The Court is familiar with the local legal market and finds that, without evidence to justify Mr.
Populas’s hourly rate, $295/hour for an associate with 0-5 years’ experience is not within the
customary local range of rates charged. “Judges in this district award attorneys’ fees in the amount
of $200 for work performed by an associate with less than five years of experience.” Girod
LoanCo, LLC v. Heisler, No. 19-13150, 2020 WL 3605947, at *8 (E.D. La. July 2, 2020). As such,
the Court will reduce Mr. Populas’s hourly rate to $200/hour for work performed in 2024.
Finally, Master Insulation requests fees for Jeffrey Matthews, paralegal, at a rate of
$175/hour. The record is silent as to his years of experience or other relevant information to support
his rate’s reasonableness. The Court then employs its own knowledge and experience to form an
independent judgment as to the reasonableness of the requested fees. U.S. Alliance Grp., Inc. v.
Cardtronics USA, Inc., No. 21-1074, 2023 WL 4996550, at *5 (E.D. La. June 23, 2023). “[C]ourts
in this district have found rates between $100 and $150 per hour to be reasonable and within the
prevailing market rates for paralegal work.” Id. at *6. Considering the dearth of evidence, the Court
will reduce Mr. Matthews’s hourly rate to $100/hour.
b. 	Lodestar: Number of Hours
District courts have broad discretion in determining whether the time expended was
reasonable. Haygood v. Morrison, 116 F.4th 439, 447 (5th Cir. 2024). But importantly, it is the fee
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seeker’s responsibility to show the reasonableness of the hours billed and, accordingly, they are
charged with proving that they exercised billing judgment. Walker v. City of Mesquite, Tex., 313
Ff.3d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2002). “Billing judgment requires documentation of the hours charged
and of the hours written off as unproductive, excessive, or redundant.” Saizan v. Delta Concrete
Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2006). Moreover, billing records should not be “so vague
or unilluminating that they preclude[] meaningful review,” and should “contain[] the date, the
number of hours spent (calculated to the tenth of an hour), and a short but thorough description of
the services rendered.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens # 4554 v. Roscoe Indep. Sch. Dist.,
119 F.3d 1228, 1233 (5th Cir. 1997). “The proper remedy when there is no evidence of billing
judgment is to reduce the hours awarded by a percentage intended to substitute for the exercise of
billing judgment.” Walker v. U.S. Dep’t. of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir.
1996) (citation omitted).
Mr. Barback avers that the 83 total hours spent by him, Mr. Populas, and Mr. Matthews
are reasonable because of the complexity of this matter and its multiple claims, as well as the
amount money at stake. R. Doc. 46-3 at 3–4. He submits that he excluded hours spent on collection
attempts on this matter prior to filing suit, as well as hours spent collecting on related matters. Id.
at 3. He does not explain, however, which line items in his bills that he excluded in his time
calculations, if any. Compare R. Doc. 46-3 with R. Doc. 49.
The Court’s own review of the bills reveals the following total hours billed based on the
record evidence as compared to the total hours Master Insulation seeks to be compensated:
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Attorney/Paralegal 	Year 	Hours billed 	Hours sought
Brad Barback 	2023 	13.6 	4.1
2024 	50.2 	50.2
2025 	21.9 	15.9
Josh Populas 	2024 	11 	11.11
Jeffrey Matthews 	2024 	1.7 	1.7
Total: 	98.4 	83
R. Doc. 46-3 at 3; 49. These calculations are based on the bills in the record which the Court
observes does not include a bill for services rendered in February 2024. See R. Doc. 49. Thus,
based on the record evidence, Master Insulation reduced its billed hours by 15.65% for purposes
of this fee application.
After its own careful review of the bills, the Court concludes that the bills largely reflect
the exercise of billing judgment and are reasonable. However, Master Insulation does not explain
which hours from its bills it decided to exclude in its calculation of 83 hours. Moreover, Mr.
Barback’s affidavit states that he did not include in the fee request any “hours spent collecting on
matters other than [this] litigation” nor “hours spent on collection attempts on this matter prior to
filing suit.” R. Doc. 46-3 at 3. From this statement, the Court cannot determine if the 15.65%
reduction of hours is related to the hours Mr. Barback referenced in his affidavit or related to hours
that he otherwise wished to include in his fee application but did not after exercising billing
judgment. “The proper remedy when there is no evidence of billing judgment is to reduce the hours
awarded by a percentage intended to substitute for the exercise of billing judgment.” Walker, 99
F.3d at 770. From the Court’s review of the record, it finds that a 10% reduction is warranted.
c. 	The Lodestar Calculation
The lodestar is the result of multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the
1 	This time discrepancy was not explained in any briefing or record evidence, but the Court’s own review
revealed that Master Insulation failed to include their bill for services rendered in February 2024. See R. Doc. 49. The
Court believes this caused any numerical discrepancies between counsel’s and the Court’s calculations.
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prevailing hourly rate in the community. Accordingly, the following reflects the Court’s fee award
determination:
Attorney/Paralegal 	Year 	Hours sought 	10% reduction 	Hourly rate 	Totals
Brad Barback 	2023 	4.1 	3.7 	$275 	$1,017.50
2024 	50.2 	45.2 	$290 	$13,108.00
2025 	15.9 	14.3 	$300 	$4,290.00
Josh Populas 	2024 	112 	9.9 	$200 	$1,980.00
Jeffrey Matthews 	2024 	1.7 	1.5 	$100 	$150
Therefore, using the lodestar calculation, Master Insulation is entitled to a fee award of $20,545.50.
d. 	Johnson Adjustments
After the lodestar has been calculated, the Court may then “adjust[] the lodestar upward or
downward depending upon the respective weights of the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974).” Fender, 12 F.3d at 487.
However, there is a strong presumption that the lodestar is reasonable, and it should be modified
only in exceptional cases. See Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800. In the absence of any opposition, the Court
will presume that the lodestar is reasonable and declines to apply any Johnson factors to reduce
the award.
e. 	Costs
Master Insulation does not explicitly request costs in its motion for entry of default
judgment, nor does it address costs in any affidavit or other record evidence. See R. Doc. 46-1. “A
party seeking costs bears the burden of supporting its request with evidence documenting the costs
incurred and proof, when applicable, that a certain item was ‘necessarily obtained for use in the
case.’” Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 2d 696, 709 (E.D. La. 2009) (quoting
Fogleman v. ARAMCO, 920 F.2d 278, 285–86 (5th Cir. 1991)). As Master Insulation has not
2 	Because the February 2024 bill is not in the record, the Court has included in the “Hours sought” category
the total hours billed by Mr. Populas in 2024 that appear in the record—not the hours sought in the fee application.
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explicitly requested costs or referred the Court to any record evidence documenting any costs, the
Court declines to enter an award of costs.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that Master Insulation’s motion for entry of default judgment, R. Doc.
46, is hereby GRANTED. Judgment will be entered in Master Insulation’s favor on its breach of
contract and suit on open account claims. As a result, Master Insulation is entitled to a damages
award of $341,018.00, as well as prejudgment interest calculated from October 8, 2022, using the
fixed rate as provided in La. R.S. § 9:3500. Additionally, Master Insulation is awarded $20,545.50
in attorneys’ fees.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of January, 2026.
THE HONORABLE ELDON E. FALLON
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