USA v. Johnson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 24-221
AARON TEROD JOHNSON 	SECTION I
ORDER
Before the Court is the government’s motion1 in limine requesting that the
Court take judicial notice of the laws of the State of Louisiana. Defendant Aaron
Terod Johnson (“Johnson”) filed a response2 in opposition. For the foregoing reasons,
the Court GRANTS the government’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The superseding indictment charges Johnson with three counts: sex trafficking
of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1) and 1591(b)(2) (Count 1); coercion
and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2422(b) (Count 2); and interstate transportation of a minor for criminal sexual
activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (Count 3).3
With respect to Count 2, the statute pursuant to which Johnson is charged
states:
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or
foreign 	commerce, 	or 	within 	the 	special 	maritime 	and 	territorial
jurisdiction of the United States knowingly persuades, induces, entices,
or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to
1 R. Doc. No. 87.
2 R. Doc. No. 106.
3 See generally R. Doc. No. 51.
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engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be
charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined
under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (emphasis added). Likewise, with respect to Count 3, the statute
pursuant to which Johnson is charged states:
A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not
attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any
commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with intent
that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined
under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). In other words, both counts contemplate reference to one or more
underlying criminal laws. See §§ 2422(b), 2423(a).
The superseding indictment references two Louisiana state criminal statutes.4
In Count 2, the superseding indictment references Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:80,
and in Count 3, the superseding indictment references Louisiana Revised Statute
§ 14:82.5
The government asks this Court to take judicial notice of “the existence and
text of those laws.”6 The government also provides in its motion the specific portions
of both Louisiana statutes it asks the Court to take judicial notice of, and it asks the
Court to instruct the jury of the same.7 Specifically, it asks the Court to “take judicial
notice and instruct the jury as follows:”
4 See id.
5 Id. at 2–3.
6 See R. Doc. No. 87-2, at 1.
7 See id. at 1–2.
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Felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, La. R.S. § 14:80
§ 80. 	Felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile.
A. 	Felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed when:
(1) A person who is seventeen years of age or older has sexual
intercourse, with consent, with a person who is thirteen years of
age or older but less than seventeen years of age, when the victim
is not the spouse of the offender and when the difference between
the age of the victim and the age of the offender is four years or
greater.
B. 	As used in this Section, “sexual intercourse” means anal, oral, or
vaginal sexual intercourse.
C. 	Lack of knowledge of the juvenile’s age shall not be a defense.
Emission 	is 	not 	necessary, 	and 	penetration, 	however 	slight, 	is
sufficient to complete the crime.
Prostitution; definition; penalties; enhancement, La. R.S. § 14:82
§ 82 Prostitution; definition; penalties; enhancement.
A. Prostitution is:
(1) The practice by a person of indiscriminate sexual intercourse
with others for compensation.
(2) 	The solicitation by one person of another with the intent to
engage in indiscriminate sexual intercourse with the latter for
compensation.8
Johnson acknowledges that the government “has stated the law correctly” with
respect to both Louisiana statutes.9 However, Johnson asks this Court to take judicial
notice of the fact that § 14:82 “is initially a misdemeanor charge.”10 In addition,
8 See id.
9 See R. Doc. No. 103, at 1.
10 See id.
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Johnson objects to the government “arguing what it believes Louisiana law says, and
instead to let the statue(s) speak for itself, as it is the best evidence.”11
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 governs the court’s power to take judicial notice
of adjudicative facts. F ED. R. EVID. 201. Rule 201, however, does not apply to
legislative facts. See F ED. R. EVID. 201(a) (“This rule governs judicial notice of an
adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact.”); see also Quatrevingt v. Landry, No. 19-
1171, 2019 WL 4112051, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2019) (Milazzo, J.). “Adjudicative
facts are simply the facts of the particular case,” whereas, “[l]egislative facts . . . are
those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether
in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment
of a legislative body.” See F ED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note to 1972
proposed rules; see also Quatrevingt, 2019 WL 4112051, at *6.
It is not that Rule 201 “prohibit[s] a court from taking judicial notice of
legislative facts, it simply does not govern them.” Stukenberg v. Abbott, No. 11-84,
2017 WL 74371, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2017) (citing F ED. R. EVID. 201 advisory
committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules); see also Matter of Waller Creek, Ltd., 867
F.2d 228, 238 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1989) (endorsing the court’s power to take judicial notice
of legislative facts). This means a court can take judicial notice of legislative facts
without having to satisfy any of the requirements of Rule 201. See id.; see also
11 See id. (citing F ED. R. EVID. 1002).
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Quatrevingt, 2019 WL 4112051, at *6 (“Plaintiff therefore asks this Court to take
notice of a legislative fact rather than an adjudicative fact, meaning his request is not
governed by Rule 201.”); see also Waller Creek, 867 F.2d at 238 n. 14 (“The power of a
federal court to take judicial notice of legislative facts is less constrained than its
power to take notice of adjudicative facts.”) (taking judicial notice of a city ordinance).
This is because “legislative facts present a ‘higher degree of indisputability,’ and
judges possess skills particularly suited to determining what the applicable law is in
a given case.” Waller Creek, 867 F.2d at 238 n. 14 (quoting 10 J. Moore & H. Bendix,
Moore’s Federal Practice).
It is well-settled that a federal court may take judicial notice of state statutes.
See Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885) (“The law of any state of the Union,
whether depending upon statutes or upon judicial opinions, is a matter of which the
courts of the United States are bound to take judicial notice, without plea or proof.”);
see also United States v. White, 258 F.3d 374, 382 n.9 (5th Cir. 2001) (taking judicial
notice of Texas law) (citing Lamar, 114 U.S. at 223)); Greenwald v. Cantrell, 675 F.
Supp. 3d 709, 716 n. 20 (E.D. La. 2023) (Milazzo, J.) (“[T]his Court can take judicial
notice of Louisiana statutes.”).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Having reviewed La. Rev. Stat. §§ 14:80 and 14:82, the Court agrees with the
parties that the government accurately stated the text of both Louisiana statutes.
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Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the same. See Lamar, 114 U.S. at 223;
White, 258 F.3d at 382 n. 9.
In contrast, although the Court finds that it may take judicial notice of the fact
that La. Rev. Stat. 14:80 is a misdemeanor, cf. United States v. Williams, 442 F.3d
1259, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that the district court properly took judicial
notice of the legislative fact that a certain statute was a felony), the Court declines to
do so. The element of §§ 2422(b) and 2423(a) that relies on these state statutes does
not turn on whether the charge is a misdemeanor or a felony. See §§ 2422(b), 2423(a)
(requiring that the defendant “engage in” or intend that another “engage in . . . any
sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense”). The
fact that La. Rev. Stat. 14:80 is a misdemeanor is therefore irrelevant to Johnson’s
case. Cf. McVea v. Swan, No. 14-73, 2014 WL 4471529, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 10,
2014) (declining to judicially notice the text of state statutes that were “completely
irrelevant” to the plaintiff’s case). The Court finds it inappropriate to take pretrial
judicial notice of such fact at this time.
Lastly, the Court finds that Johnson’s invocation of the best evidence rule is
misplaced. The Louisiana statues are part of the applicable law in this case as
elements of the crimes with which Johnson is charged. See, e.g., Fifth Circuit Pattern
Jury Instructions § 2.91. The Court will instruct the jury as to the applicable law,
including the elements of the Louisiana state statutes alleged in the indictment, and
those instructions will control the jury’s deliberations. See id. at § 1.01 (preliminary
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instructions including that the Court “will give [the jury] detailed instructions on the
law at the end of the case, and those instructions will control your deliberations and
decisions”); see also id. at § 2.91 (including a description of the “elements of the crime
as alleged in the indictment” in the pattern instructions for 28 U.S.C. § 2422(b)).
Federal Rule of Evidence 1002, “commonly known as the best evidence rule,
provides that ‘[a]n original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to
prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise.’” United
States v. Cash, No. 24-10243, 2025 WL 2268249, at *7 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 2025) (quoting
F ED. R. EVID. 1002). The government has not indicated, and the Court does not
foresee, that the government will introduce testimony or other evidence to prove what
“Louisiana law says.”12 Put differently, there is no indication at this stage that the
government 	intends 	to 	introduce 	testimonial 	evidence 	“in 	order 	to 	prove 	[the
statutes’] content[s].” F ED. R. EVID. 1002; see also Cash, 2025 WL 2268249, at *7 (“The
best evidence rule ‘comes into play only when the terms of a writing are being
established,’ not when a witness’s testimony is based on personal knowledge.” Id.
(quoting Kiva Kitchen & Bath Inc. v. Cap. Distrib. Inc., 319 F. App’x 316, 322 (5th
Cir. 2009)).
To 	the 	extent 	that 	Johnson 	seeks 	to 	limit 	the 	government’s 	ability 	to
misrepresent the law in argument, the Court reminds the government that it may
not misstate the law. See United States v. Loeffel, 172 F. App’x 612, 618 (5th Cir.
12 R. Doc. No. 103, at 1.
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2006) (finding improper the prosecutor’s remark during closing argument that
misstated the law).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the government’s motion13 in limine is GRANTED.
The Court hereby judicial notice of La. Rev. Stat. § 14:80 and La. Rev. Stat. § 14:82.
New Orleans, Louisiana, November 7, 2025.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13 R. Doc. No. 87.
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