USA v. Johnson

U UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 24-221
AARON TEROD JOHNSON 	SECTION I
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Aaron Terod Johnson’s (“Johnson”) motion1 in
limine to bar the government from improper closing argument. The government filed
a 	response.2 For the reasons 	that follow, 	the 	Court 	DISMISSES 	AS 	MOOT
Johnson’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Johnson seeks to bar the government from making “any inappropriate closing
argument,”3 and objects to any improper remark or argument “on all of the following
grounds:”
violation of the federal due process requirements that the government
shoulder 	the 	full 	burden 	of 	proof; 	infringement 	on 	due 	process’
fundamental fairness guarantee; F.R.E. 403, which forbids offering
evidence that is more prejudicial than probative; evidence in the record;
that the government not to appeal to prejudice; and any other applicable
law.4
He focuses his motion on three “particularly harmful and particularly common”
varieties of improper closing arguments that the prosecution may allegedly make.5
1 R. Doc. No. 93.
2 R. Doc. No. 105.
3 R. Doc. No. 93-1, at 3.
4 Id. at 2–3.
5 See id. at 3.
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First, he argues that the prosecution cannot invoke the authority of the government
to bolster its case.6 Second, that the prosecution cannot appeal to prejudice by
referring to the social impact of the crime.7 Third, that the prosecution is forbidden
from attacking defense counsel and the defense strategy.8 Johnson argues that
limiting the government now, rather than at trial, preserves judicial efficiency,
ensures that “the flow of closing argument is not disrupted by preventable objections,”
and prevents the jury from hearing “improper and inflammatory remarks” that it
cannot unhear.9
The government contends that Johnson’s request is “unnecessarily broad,
generic, and lacks sufficient support.”10 For one, it argues, Johnson’s motion lacks “an
explanation for why he believes that the government may engage in the actions that
are the basis of his motion.”11 According to the government, Johnson’s motion “simply
asks 	that 	the 	Court 	order 	the 	government 	to 	refrain 	from 	garden 	variety
impropriety,” and because the government is “well aware of its obligations under the
law, evidentiary rules, and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and it has no intent
to run afoul of any during its closing argument,” the Court should deny Johnson’s
motion as moot, overbroad, untimely, and premature.12
6 Id.
7 Id. at 3–4.
8 Id. at 4.
9 See R. Doc. No. 93, at 3 (“After all, ‘a rung bell cannot be unrung.’” (quoting United
States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1991)).
10 R. Doc. No. 105, at 1.
11 See id. at 2.
12 See id. at 3.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
“The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow the trial court to rule in advance
of trial on the admissibility and relevance of certain forecasted evidence.” Baker v.
City of McKinney, Texas, 608 F. Supp. 3d 457, 461 (E.D. Tex. 2022). The purpose is
not “to re-iterate matters which are set forth elsewhere in the Rules of Civil Procedure
or Rules of Evidence, but, rather, to identify specific issues which are likely to arise
at trial, and which, due to their complexity or potentially prejudicial nature, are best
addressed in the context of a motion in limine.” Raju v. Murphy, No. 17-357, 2022 WL
1608043, at *1 (S.D. Miss. May 21, 2022); see also Babin v. Plaquemines Par., 421 F.
Supp. 3d 391, 395 (E.D. La. 2019) (Vitter, J.) (“According to the Fifth Circuit, the
purpose of a motion in limine is to prohibit opposing counsel ‘from mentioning the
existence of, alluding to, or offering evidence on matters so highly prejudicial to the
moving party that a timely motion to strike or an instruction by the court to the jury
to disregard the offending matter cannot overcome its prejudicial influence on the
jurors’ minds.” (quoting O’Rear v. Fruehauf Corp., 554 F.2d 1304, 1306 n.1 (5th Cir.
1977))).
For this reason, motions in limine should “raise only issues likely to arise at
trial that require a pretrial ruling due to their complexity or the possibility of
prejudice if raised in a contemporaneous objection.” Snider v. New Hampshire Ins.
Co., No. 14-2132, 2016 WL 9412608, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 27, 2016) (Morgan, J.); see
also McMillian v. Aberdeen Sch. Dist., 22-117, 2024 WL 170764, at *1 (N.D. Miss.
Jan. 16, 2024) (denying the defendant’s motion in limine because “the matters raised
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in the [motion] concern well-settled principles of law” and therefore “fall below the
threshold for an appropriate motion in limine”).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Because the government concedes that it will not make improper arguments
identified by Johnson in his motion, the motion is dismissed as moot. Moreover, the
Court finds Johnson’s motion is overly broad in that it does not demonstrate how the
arguments he seeks to preclude are “likely to arise at trial” or that any specific
government argument may be so “highly prejudicial” that an instruction that the jury
disregard the same would be insufficient. Rather, Johnson articulates well-settled
principles of law that are inappropriate for a motion in limine. Cf. McMillian, 2024
WL 170764, at *1.
To be clear, the Court expects the government to refrain from making improper
remarks or argument. This includes, but is not limited to, any: expression of “personal
belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of
the 	defendant;”13 	“golden 	rule” 	arguments;14 	and 	personal 	attacks 	on 	defense
13 See, e.g., United States v. Gracia, 522 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2008) (“A prosecutor
may argue fair inferences from the evidence that a witness has no motive to lie, but
cannot express a personal opinion on the credibility of witnesses.”); id. (“The subject
remarks of [the] prosecutor share the same basic flaw: A prosecutor’s impermissible
assertion of his own credibility, or that of the government, to bolster the credibility of
a witness.”); United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 336 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(“The prohibition on giving personal opinions prevents a prosecutor from giving the
jury the impression that he has superior knowledge of the facts based on private
information not admitted into evidence.”).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Gaspard, 744 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding
“objectionable” the prosecutor’s statement that “put[] the jury in the role of the
victim”). But see United States v. Jefferson, 258 F.3d 405, 412 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding
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counsel.15 The Court has no reason to anticipate any such inappropriate arguments
by government counsel.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Johnson’s motion16 in limine is DISMISSED AS
MOOT.
New Orleans, Louisiana, November 7, 2025.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
insufficiently prejudicial “the prosecution’s statement, ‘[i]t could have been any
woman in this courtroom, any woman in this city’”) (“Even assuming that the
statement violated the Golden Rule, we do not find it to be sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant the granting of a new trial.”).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d 951, 958 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding
the prosecutor’s comment that “if there’s a zealot in this particular courtroom, it’s the
defense attorney. Thank God he’s a defense attorney and not part of the Government,”
was “not only improper” but also “disgraceful”); United States v. Barnes, 979 F.3d 283,
299 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Attacking defense counsel was unwarranted, unprovoked, and
irrelevant. The district court therefore correctly concluded that the prosecution’s
remarks during rebuttal were improper.”). But see United States v. Boyd, 773 F.3d
637, 645 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming where prosecutor remarked that the defendant’s
legal theory was “one of the most preposterous things I’ve ever heard in my life” and
“one of the dumbest things I have ever heard”).
16 R. Doc. No. 93.
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