Wilson v. City of Bogalusa et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PAULA REED WILSON, individually and on
behalf of the Estate of Orrin Patrick Thomas
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 24-714
KENDALL 	BULLEN, 	Chief, 	in 	his 	official
capacity, ET AL.
SECTION “N”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.1 Plaintiff
Paula Reed Wilson, suing individually and on behalf of the Estate of Orrin Patrick
Thomas, opposed.2 Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion.3 Having
carefully considered the parties’ memoranda, the record, and applicable law, the
Court grants the motion in part.
I. 	Background
This case arises from the arrest, incarceration, and death of Orrin Patrick
Thomas while in the custody of the City of Bogalusa’s jail. Thomas’s estate brings this
action on his behalf against the City of Bogalusa and members of the Bogalusa Police
Department: Chief of Police Kendall Bullen, in his official capacity, Captain Janice
Johnson, individually, and Officer Lisa Erwin, individually, as well as unnamed John
Doe defendants.4 The following background summary includes uncontested facts
except as otherwise noted:
1 Rec. Doc. 27.
2 Rec. Doc. 29.
3 Rec. Doc. 30.
4 Rec. Doc. 1.
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On March 23, 2023, officers of the Bogalusa Police Department arrested
Thomas 	for 	suspected 	methamphetamine 	possession, 	resisting 	an 	officer, 	and
criminal mischief at a local convenience store.5 They transported him to the Bogalusa
Jail/Detention Center where he was detained.6 An officer’s field test of the substance
found 	in 	Thomas’s 	pocket 	at 	the 	time 	of 	his 	arrest 	tested 	positive 	for
methamphetamines.7 When Thomas arrived at the jail, two employees were working
the day shift: Officer Champagne and her partner Zach Miller.8 Champagne stated
that no intake form was completed for Thomas and she made no assessment of him,
though it was clear to her that he was under the influence.9 Thomas was detained in
the padded room that the jail uses to house detainees who are intoxicated until they
are able to go through the booking process.10 This cell is under continuous video
monitoring on a 55-inch screen that the jail officials “constantly look up at” as they
are able.11
Champagne and her partner made the decision not to complete the Bogalusa
Police Jail Booking Medical Sheet, which asks, among other things, whether a
detainee is unconscious or has any visible signs requiring medical attention, because
Thomas “wasn’t in his right mind” to give clear information.12 The jail had a medical
5 Rec. Doc. 27-4 (Arrest Report, Ex. B).
6 Id.
7 Id.; Rec. Doc. 27-3 at 42:3-11, 43:1-2 (Mullen Dep. Tr., Ex. A).
8 Rec. Doc. 27-12 at 22:19-22 (Champagne Dep. Tr., Ex. N).
9 Id. at 14:9-10, 15:8-21.
10 Id. at 18:10-13, 19:1-10:15, 20:6-15; Rec. Doc. 27-10 ¶ 5 (Warden Charles McDaniel Decl., Ex. J).
11 Rec. Doc. 27-10 ¶ 5 (Ex. J); Rec. Doc. 27-12 at 20:16-21:18 (Ex. N); Rec. Doc. 27-9 at 30:10-15
(Erwin Dep. Tr., Ex. I) (jail officials are “always looking at [the monitor]”); see Exs. O, P, Q, and R
(continuous video feed of Thomas in cell).
12 Rec. Doc. 27-12 at 23:10-24:7, 25:2-17, 34:20-35:10, 38:1-6 (Ex. N).
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sheet completed for Thomas dated July 14, 2017, indicating that Thomas had a
medical history of diabetes mellitus, seizure disorder, brain aneurysm, stroke,
underlying cardiac disease, and substance abuse.13 Champagne did not review this
sheet from 2017 when Thomas was brought into the jail.14
The recorded videos show Thomas in the padded cell, progressing from pacing,
sitting, and ultimately lying down and exhibiting jerking movements.15 During her
shift, which ended between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m., Champagne observed him only
walking and talking to himself, acting simply like a person under the influence, such
that there was no reason for her to call EMS based on her observations.16
Named defendants Captain Janice Johnson and Corrections Officer Lisa Erwin
worked a night shift on March 23, 2023, and thus neither had been present during
Thomas’s arrest and subsequent booking at the jail.17 Johnson was assigned to the
patrol division night shift as a supervisor and was not formally assigned to the jail.18
She was working in her office, located in the same building as the jail,19 when
Bogalusa Corrections Officer Zachary Lemaire summoned her to the padded cell in
which Thomas was being held.20 At approximately 6:32 p.m., it had become apparent
to Lemaire that Thomas might need medical attention.21 Thomas was face down and
13 Id. at 34:20-35:10, 38:1-6; Rec. Doc. 29-2 § III (Dr. Edler Medical Aff.).
14 Rec. Doc. 27-12 at 35:8-10 (Ex. N).
15 Exs. O, P, Q, and R.
16 Rec. Doc. 27-12 at 26:18-27:16, 30:3-31:10 (Ex. N).
17 Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 14:15-21 (Johnson Dep. Tr., Ex. G); Rec. Doc. 27-9 at 17:19-18:7, 20:6-10 (Ex. I).
18 Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 11:12-25, 13:3-17 (Ex. G); Rec. Doc. 27-8 (Bogalusa Police Department Incident
Report by Johnson, Ex. H).
19 Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 13:14-17 (Ex. G).
20 Rec. Doc. 27-8 (Ex. H).
21 Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 14:5-6 (Ex. G); Rec. Doc. 27-8 (Ex. H).
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acting “weird, like tweaking out.”22 Lemaire also was assigned to the evening shift
and had not been present when Thomas was arrested and placed in the padded cell.23
Upon observing Thomas, Johnson promptly directed that EMS be called to evaluate
Thomas.24 Because Thomas was lying face down, Lemaire turned him over, at which
time they observed dried blood around his mouth.25 Johnson and Lemaire held his
head up and opened his mouth to ensure his airway was clear.26 Thomas was
conscious,27 but his eyes were closed, he was slightly jerking, he was muttering and
clenching his jaws, and his speech was incoherent.28 Thomas’s hands were also
clenched.29
EMS personnel from Northshore Ambulance Service arrived at approximately
6:37 p.m.30 Erwin arrived while EMS was on the scene.31 Johnson then returned to
her duties supervising the patrol night shift, and, before doing so, briefed Erwin, who
was the supervisor over the jail at that time. Johnson passed along to Erwin an
inquiry from EMS—“they’re wondering whether or not you want to transport him.”32
EMS asked Thomas questions (to which he provided unintelligible responses),
felt his skin, and observed Thomas’s extremities shaking but ultimately advised that
22 Rec. Doc. 27-13 at 17:20-24 (Lemaire Dep. Tr., Ex. S).
23 Id. at 14:20-15:11; Rec. Doc. 27-14 (Bogalusa Police Department Incident Report by Lemaire, Ex.
T).
24 Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 52:10-19 (Ex. G).
25 Id. at 48:11-17, 49:19-22, 58:12-19, 59:9-19; Rec. Doc. 27-13 at 26:2-11 (Ex. S).
26 Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 58:12-19, 59:9-19 (Ex. G); Rec. Doc. 27-8 (Ex. H).
27 Rec. Doc. 27-13 at 25:18 (Ex. S).
28 Rec. Doc. 27-8 (Ex. H); Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 51:24-52:9, 55:20-56:7, 60:8-9 (Ex. G); see also Rec. Doc. 27-
13 at 25:19-26:1 (Ex. S) (Lemaire testified that Thomas was “mumbling” and the only coherent word he
recalls was “Bogalusa”).
29 Rec. Doc. 27-8 (Ex. H).
30 Rec. Doc. 27-19 (Bogalusa Police Department Incident Report by Jeanfreau, Ex. Z).
31 Rec. Doc. 27-9 at 20:19-21:2 (Ex. I).
32 Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 70:15-23, 71:4-10, 79:11-80:2 (Ex. G); Rec. Doc. 27-9 at 43:10-16 (Ex. I).
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Thomas was likely not having a seizure as initially believed.33 Incident reports
prepared by Johnson and Lemaire state that EMS advised that Thomas’s condition
was not likely life threatening.34 However, Collin Magee, the EMS paramedic who
assessed Thomas, testified that in response to a jail officer asking him if there was a
life threat, Magee responded that he “cannot assess for life threats” and “can’t
medically clear this patient.”35 Magee further testified that the jail “decided just to
keep him at the jail to keep an eye on him.”36 Despite this decision, Magee testified
that if it had been his decision “I would have [taken] him to the hospital.”37 This view
was also expressed by his EMT partner, who testified that he wanted to take Thomas
to the hospital but did not have the authority to make any recommendation to the
officers.38
Erwin called Warden Charles McDaniel to ask him if the corrections officers
should authorize EMS to transport Thomas to the hospital.39 The warden had
completed his shift earlier and the day and was at his home. Erwin could not recall
whether a corrections officer or EMS personnel told her that Thomas’s condition was
not life threatening.40 The warden submitted a declaration stating that Erwin told
him that EMS personnel had determined that Thomas was not suffering a life-
33 Rec. Doc. 27-15 at 18:8-8-19 (Magee Dep. Tr., Ex. U); Rec. Doc. 27-8 (Ex. H); Rec. Doc. 27-16 at 20:6-
21:16 (Creppel Dep. Tr., Ex. V). There is disputed testimony as to whether EMS took Thomas’s pulse or
vitals.
34 Rec. Doc. 27-8 (Ex. H); Rec. Doc. 27-14 (Ex. T); see also Rec. Doc. 27-13 at 35:17-25 (Ex. S) (Lemaire
recalled EMS making this statement).
35 Rec. Doc. 27-15 at 20:7-10 (Ex. U); see also id. at 21:9-10 (“We are not allowed to medically clear any
patient.”).
36 Id. at 20:11-12.
37 Id. at 21:15-16; see also id. at 25:17-25 (“[H]e should be transported to the hospital.”).
38 Rec. Doc. 27-16 at 13:14-18, 23:15-19 (Ex. V).
39 Rec. Doc. 27-9 at 24:23-25:20 (Ex. I).
40 Id. at 26:16-24 (Ex. I).
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threatening medical emergency or condition that required medical care or transport
to the hospital for treatment.41 The warden made the determination that Thomas
should stay in the padded cell for further observation rather than be transferred to
the hospital based on this information.42 Erwin signed Northshore EMS’s Refusal of
Treatment/Transport form, which, in the first-person voice, states that Thomas
voluntarily refused transportation by Northshore EMS.43
A few minutes after EMS departed, a corrections officer checking on Thomas
found that he did not appear to be breathing.44 Erwin then could not locate a pulse
on Thomas and directed Lemaire to notify dispatch that there was an emergency and
to have EMS return to the jail.45 Officers began performing CPR until EMS arrived
and loaded Thomas into the truck to go to the hospital.46 Magee ventilated Thomas
in the EMS truck, continued CPR, and determined that Thomas was hypoglycemic.47
Thomas was pronounced dead at the hospital.48
A 	postmortem 	examination 	determined 	Thomas’s 	cause 	of 	death 	was
methamphetamine toxicity and the manner of death was accidental.49 Plaintiff’s
expert, Dr. Rayme Michelle Edler, opines that Thomas’s collapse and death were due
to untreated hypoglycemia and metabolic encephalopathy, citing his blood glucose
was less than 10 mg/dL upon his arrival at the hospital, and that earlier medical
41 Rec. Doc. 27-10 ¶¶ 7-8 (Ex. J.).
42 Rec. Doc. 27-10 ¶¶ 7-8 (Ex. J.); Rec. Doc. 27-9 at 25:3-12 (Ex. I).
43 Id. at 36:3-37:3, 38:15-39:17.
44 Id. at 31:18-24.
45 Id. at 32:2-12.
46 Id. at 33:8-14; Rec. Doc. 27-16 at 15:5-24 (Ex. V).
47 Rec. Doc. 27-15 at 31:17-32:21 (Ex. U).
48 Id. at 31:17-32:21.
49 Rec. Doc. 27-11 (Postmortem Examination, Ex. K).
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intervention more likely than not would have prevented his death.50
Bogalusa jail personnel “have basic medical training including CPR and are
instructed to call EMS if any inmate appears to need to be medically evaluated.”51
Champagne and Erwin confirmed that they and the other jail officials received first
aid training,52 and that their training and experience is that a jail official should call
EMS if he or she determines a detainee needs medical help.53 The warden then makes
the decision whether or not to take the detainee to the hospital.54 The travel time
from the jail to the hospital is approximately four or five minutes.55
Defendants now seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
II. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”56 “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the
action.”57 When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court
considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence.”58 All reasonable inferences are drawn in
50 Rec. Doc. 29-2 §§ IX-XII.
51 Rec. Doc. 27-10 ¶ 14 (Ex. J).
52 Rec. Doc. 27-9 at 15:2-3 (Ex. I); Rec. Doc. 27-12 at 12:11-17 (Ex. N)
53 Rec. Doc. 27-9 at 15:3-6 (Ex. I); Rec. Doc. 27-12 at 33:25-34:10 (Ex. N).
54 Rec. Doc. 27-12 at 36:15-19 (Ex. N).
55 Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 64:16-19 (Ex. G).
56 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
57 DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005).
58 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008); see
also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000).
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favor of the nonmoving party.59 There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no
reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party, thus entitling the moving
party to judgment as a matter of law.60
If the dispositive issue is one for which the moving party will bear the burden
of persuasion at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which
would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.”61
If the moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the
moving party successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to
the nonmoving party to direct the Court’s attention to something in the pleadings or
other evidence in the record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a
genuine issue of material fact does indeed exist.62
On the other hand, if the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party
will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden
of production by either (1) submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential
element of the nonmovant’s claim, or (2) demonstrating there is no evidence in the
record to establish an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.63 When proceeding
under the first option, if the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to
dispute the movant’s contention that there are no disputed facts, a trial would be
59 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
60 Smith v. AmedisysInc., 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).
61 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (citation modified).
62 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24.
63 St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987); Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th
Cir. 1987); see also 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2727.1 (2016) (discussing Celotex summary-judgment burden of proof standard).
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useless, and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.64
When, however, the movant is proceeding under the second option and is seeking
summary judgment on the ground that the nonmovant has no evidence to establish
an essential element of the claim, the nonmoving party may defeat a motion for
summary judgment by “calling the Court’s attention to supporting evidence already
in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving party.”65 Under either
scenario, the burden then shifts back to the movant to demonstrate the inadequacy
of the evidence relied upon by the nonmovant.66 If the movant meets this burden, “the
burden of production shifts [back again] to the nonmoving party, who must either (1)
rehabilitate 	the 	evidence 	attacked 	in 	the 	moving 	party’s 	papers, 	(2) 	produce
additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial as provided in
Rule 56(e), or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary
as provided in Rule 56(f).”67 “Summary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving
party fails to respond in one or more of these ways, or if, after the nonmoving party
responds, the court determines that the moving party has met its ultimate burden of
persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial.”68
Still, “[t]he party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific
evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence
supports the claim.”69 “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift
64 First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
65 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332-33.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 332 n.3.
68 Id.; see also First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 289.
69 Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).
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through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary
judgment.”70
III. 	Analysis
A. 	The claims against defendants Bullen, Johnson and Erwin, sued
in their individual capacities.
Individual defendants Bullen, Johnson, and Erwin assert they are protected
from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity as public officials.71 Government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from civil liability
for damages so long as their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.72 The qualified
immunity analysis thus has two components: “(1) whether a plaintiff alleges or shows
the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) whether the right
in question was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”73 Once a
defendant raises qualified immunity as a defense, “the plaintiff bears a heightened
burden to negate the defense.”74
When demonstrating that a right is “clearly established,” the plaintiff must
show that the defendant officials had “fair warning” under past precedent.75 In doing
so, “she must point to ‘authority at a sufficiently high level of specificity to put a
reasonable official on notice that his conduct is definitely unlawful.”76 Here, Plaintiff
70 Id. (citation modified).
71 Rec. Doc. 4 at 6; Rec. Doc. 27 at 15.
72 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
73 Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021).
74 Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation modified).
75 Hicks v. LeBlanc, 81 F.4th 497, 504 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation modified).
76 Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667, 674 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
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asserts that Thomas had a constitutional right under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to be protected against the use of excessive force without cause or
justification and under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause not to have
his medical needs met with deliberate indifference by Bogalusa jail officials.77 The
Court thus analyzes whether Plaintiff’s allegations meet her burden of showing a
violation of these rights and that the rights were clearly established at the time of
the alleged violation.
1. 	Counts I and II: Unreasonable seizure and use of excessive
force and civil rights conspiracy against Johnson and
Erwin
“Plaintiff does not oppose summary judgment on Count I (unreasonable search
and excessive force) and Count II (conspiracy)” as against Johnson and Erwin in their
individual capacity, to the extent the claims are premised on physical force during
arrest and initial detention.78 Plaintiff acknowledges that Johnson and Erwin were
not present during Thomas’s arrest, that both were assigned to the night shift, and
that Johnson was not formally assigned to the jail.79 Outside of two vague and
conclusory assertions that these and other defendants “used excessive force in the
seizure” of Thomas80 and intended “to physically harm [Thomas],”81 the complaint
77 See generally Rec. Doc. 1; Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001).
78 Rec. Doc. 29 at 20.
79 Rec. Doc. 29-1 ¶¶ 1-3; Rec. Doc. 27-2 ¶¶ 1-3. Despite Plaintiff’s assertion that Johnson gave no
testimony as to when she reported to work on March 23, 2023, Johnson testified, unrebutted by any
evidence cited by Plaintiff, that she was working the night shift, Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 14:19-21 (Ex. G).
Similarly, while the precise time of Erwin’s arrival at work is disputed within an approximate hour
timeframe, there is unrebutted testimony that she arrived in the evening for her shift. See Rec. Doc.
27-9 at 10:18-23 (Ex. I); Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 81:5-7 (Ex. G).
80 Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 22.
81 Id. ¶ 27.
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makes no allegations that Johnson or Erwin used force against Thomas. Nor is there
any hint of excessive force by Johnson or Erwin or anyone else on any of the
continuous surveillance videos from the jail. Nor is there any record evidence that
Johnson or Erwin was present for or conspired with respect to others’ use of excessive
force against Thomas. Bystander liability does not “attach where an officer is not
present at the scene of the constitutional violation.”82 Moreover, a conspiracy must
allege with specificity an agreement among the participants.83 Given the absence of
allegations and record evidence that could plausibly underlie any violation by
Johnson or Erwin of Thomas’s right to be free from excessive force or a conspiracy
with others to that end, these claims are dismissed as to Johnson and Erwin.84
2. 	Count III: Failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments
The entirety of Plaintiff’s allegations in Count III is that, “[u]pon information
and belief, one or more of the Defendants observed some other or one of the
Defendant(s) using objectively unreasonable and excessive force, in violation of
Decedent’s constitutional rights and failed to intervene,” and such failure caused
Thomas’s injuries, and violated the due process rights of Thomas and his mother.85
Because Plaintiff fails to allege that Bullen, Johnson, or Erwin even observed any use
82 Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013).
83 Montgomery v. Walton, 759 F. App’x 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Conclusory allegations
that do not reference specific factual allegations tending to show an agreement do not suffice to state
a civil rights conspiracy claim under § 1983.”) See also McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221,
222 (5th Cir. 1989) (citation modified) (“It is now well settled in this Circuit that mere conclusory
allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material facts, state a substantial claim of
federal conspiracy.”).
84 Counts I and II are alleged against Bullen only in his official capacity. Those claims are addressed infra.
85 Rec. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 32, 33.
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of objectively unreasonable and excessive force in violation of Thomas’s constitutional
rights, Count III fails as to these defendants, to the extent it was alleged against
them at all.
3. 	Count V: Denial of adequate medical care in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that Johnson and Erwin were aware of Thomas’s serious
physical distress through their interactions with him and, as evidenced by their
response and/or nonresponse, intended for harm to occur to him in violation of his
Fourteenth 	Amendment 	right 	to 	due 	process.86 	The 	Fourteenth 	Amendment
guarantees pretrial detainees the “right not to have their serious medical needs met
with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining officials.”87 Thus, a state
official violates a pretrial detainee’s due process right to adequate medical care if the
official “acts with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious medical harm
and resulting injuries.”88 A serious medical need is “one for which treatment has been
recommended or for which the need is so apparent that even laymen would recognize
that care is required.”89
A deliberate-indifference claim requires that the officer (1) was objectively
aware of facts from which the officer could infer that a substantial risk of harm exists,
and (2) had actual, subjective knowledge of the risk of harm.90 “Mere negligence or a
failure to act reasonably is not enough.”91 The plaintiff “must show that the officials
86 Rec. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 41-46.
87 Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).
88 Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2003).
89 Sims v. Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, 949 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).
90 Dyer, 964 F.3d at 380.
91 Mace, 333 F.3d at 625-26.
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refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or
engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any
serious medical needs.”92 The inquiry thus focuses on what each individual officer
knew, “not what they should have perceived but did not.”93 “[A]n incorrect diagnosis
by 	prison 	medical 	personnel 	does 	not 	suffice 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	for 	deliberate
indifference.”94 “Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.”95
The Court addresses Johnson first. On March 23, 2023, Johnson was working
the night shift on patrol for the Bogalusa Police Department.96 She was working in
her office when a corrections officer summoned her to the padded cell in which
Thomas was being held because it had become apparent that Thomas might need
medical attention.97 Upon observing Thomas, she directed that EMS be called to
evaluate Thomas medically.98 She briefed and passed along EMS’s transport inquiry
to 	the 	jail 	supervisor coming 	onto 	shift 	(Erwin) 	before 	returning 	to 	her own
supervisory position.99 There is no evidence that Johnson previously was aware of
Thomas’s presence in the jail. Once a corrections officer notified Johnson that Thomas
might be in distress, Johnson immediately went to observe him and then promptly
ordered a call to EMS. Video surveillance shows that she stayed with Thomas while
waiting for EMS to arrive, holding his head up to ensure he could breathe. These
92 Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation modified).
93 Williams v. City of Yazoo, 41 F.4th 416, 423 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation modified); Dyer, 964 F.3d at
380 (citation modified); see also Thorpe v. Weaver, 180 F.4th 834, 838-39 (5th Cir. 2026) (same).
94 Domino, 239 F.3d at 756.
95 Id.
96 Rec. Doc. 27-2 ¶¶ 3-4; Rec. Doc. 29-1 ¶ 3.
97 Rec. Doc. 27-2 ¶¶ 19-20; Rec. Doc. 29-1 ¶¶ 19-20.
98 Rec. Doc. 27-2 ¶ 21; Rec. Doc. 29-1 ¶ 21.
99 Rec. Doc. 27-7 at 70:15-23, 71:4-10, 79:15-80:2 (Ex. G); Rec. Doc. 27-9 at 43:10-16 (Ex. I).
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undisputed facts reveal that, rather than acting with deliberate indifference or intent
to cause harm to Thomas, Johnson affirmatively sought medical attention for him.
Once EMS arrived, she briefed Erwin on the situation and the transport inquiry. That
Johnson, who is not a medical professional, did not disregard her patrol duties to stay
at the scene while a jail supervisor and EMS were present does not meet the standard
for deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Count V is dismissed as to Johnson.
The Court next turns to Erwin. On March 23, 2023, Erwin worked an evening
shift and thus, like Johnson, was not present during Thomas’s arrest or booking.
Upon Erwin’s arrival at Thomas’s cell, Johnson briefed Erwin as to why EMS was
called and their transport inquiry. Erwin testified that either an “EMS guy” or a
“corrections officer”—she was not sure which of the two—told her that Thomas was
not suffering a life-threatening event.100 There is a significant factual dispute over
not only what Erwin told the warden, but, as relevant to that dispute, also whether
EMS made such a comment at all. Both EMS personnel gave deposition testimony
that they lacked authority to make any recommendation on transport, did not tell the
officers that Thomas’s condition was likely not life threatening, and would have
transported him if it had been their decision.101 Incident reports and other deposition
testimony, meanwhile, state that EMS personnel did tell officers that Thomas’s
condition was likely not life threatening.102 Warden McDaniel, who was not present
and was relying on Erwin’s communications, directed that Thomas should not be
100 Rec. Doc. 27-9 at 26:16-24 (Ex. I).
101 Rec. Doc. 27-15 at 20:7-12, 21:15-16, 25:17-25 (Ex. U); Rec. Doc. 27-16 at 13:14-18, 23:15-19 (Ex. V).
102 Rec. Doc. 27-8 (Ex. H); Rec. Doc. 27-14 (Ex. T); see also Rec. Doc. 27-13 at 35:17-25 (Ex. S) (Lemaire
recalled EMS making this statement).
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transported to the hospital based on Erwin’s assertion that EMS did not think
Thomas was suffering a life-threatening medical condition, and the record does not
reflect that she provided additional information about Thomas’s condition to the
warden.
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury could find
that Erwin was objectively aware of a substantial risk of harm to Thomas and had
actual subjective knowledge of the risk of harm. An official’s “knowledge of a
substantial risk of harm may be inferred if the risk was obvious.”103 A jury could find
that Erwin, knowing that Thomas would be denied medical attention, “misstated the
severity” of Thomas’s condition to those who would have provided help (i.e., the
warden) when Thomas obviously required medical attention.104
Thomas’s right to adequate medical care while in state custody was clearly
established at the time. A right is “clearly established” if it is “sufficiently clear that
a reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that
right.”105 Prior decisions need only give “reasonable warning” that the conduct
violated constitutional rights, even if “notable factual distinctions” exist in the
precedents relied upon.106
Precedent firmly established at the time of the conduct at issue that a detainee
could demonstrate a constitutional violation by showing an official “refused to treat
103 Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842-
43 (1994)).
104 See Dyer, 964 F.3d at 385.
105 Easter, 467 F.3d at 465 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (modification in
original).
106 Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation modified).
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him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any
similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical
needs.”107 Several cases are sufficiently similar to provide “reasonable warning” to
Erwin.
In Dyer, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that there was a
genuine dispute concerning whether the officers were deliberately indifferent to the
needs of a detainee in custody where they knew the detainee had violently struck his
head repeatedly in the patrol car and could have sustained head trauma, and neither
independently sought medical care for the detainee nor alerted other officials on duty
as to the possibility that the detainee had seriously injured himself.108 The court held
that a reasonable jury could find that the injuries, from which the detainee would die
within 24 hours “were so severe, and their cause so plainly evident” that the officers
acted with deliberate indifference by failing to seek medical attention, failing to
inform jail personnel of his injuries, and informing jail personnel only that the
detainee had been “medically cleared” before arriving at the jail.109 These facts are
plainly on point here. Viewing the facts in favor of Plaintiff, Erwin was aware of
Thomas’s condition, misstated his need for medical attention to the warden, and
otherwise failed to seek medical care.
Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas110 is also on point. It established that
107 Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (citation modified); see also Easter, 467 F.3d at 465 (quoting Domino for
this proposition).
108 Dyer, 964 F.3d at 382.
109 Id. at 381-82.
110 245 F.3d at 447.
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officials act deliberately indifferent, and violate a detainee’s constitutional rights,
when they ignore the dangers of substance abuse withdrawal and wait for a “manifest
emergency” to summon medical help.111 In Thompson, an official knew that a
detainee had begun colliding with objects in his cell and striking his head as he was
suffering from delirium tremens while withdrawing from alcohol.112 The official
provided some care to Thompson: placing him in a straitjacket (but without a helmet),
providing extra mattresses in his cell, dressing his head wound, and allegedly,
seeking advice from a hospital.113 When her shift ended, however, she instructed her
colleagues not to summon medical help without contacting her and only if Thompson
was dying. Seven hours later, Thompson died from a seizure.114 The court found a
jury question as to whether the official’s behavior was objectively unreasonable given
clearly established law forbids a significantly exacerbating delay or a denial of
medical care to a detainee suffering [substance withdrawal].”115 The court further
concluded that any reasonable jailer “would have recognized the constitutional
obligation to summon medical assistance well before [the detainee] died” and also
would not have instructed colleagues not to obtain help unless the detainee “was on
the verge of death.”116
Here, just as in Dyer, a reasonable jury could find that the injuries, from which
Thomas would die moments later “were so severe, and their cause so plainly evident”
111 Thompson, 245 F.3d at 454.
112 Id. at 458.
113 Id. at 453-54, 463.
114 Id. at 454.
115 Id. at 463 (citation modified).
116 Id. at 464.
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that Erwin acted with deliberate indifference by failing to seek medical attention,
failing to inform the warden of Thomas’s true condition, and instead misstating that
EMS had determined his condition not to be life-threatening. Under the law at the
time of these events, no officer could believe they could lawfully turn away medical
care or could “misstate[] the severity” of a detainee’s condition “to those who could
have sought help” when an objective observer would understand the need for
immediate 	medical 	attention.117 	Existing 	precedent 	placed 	the 	constitutional
question “beyond debate.”118
Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for Erwin on
Count V.
B. 	The claims asserted against Chief Bullen, sued in his official
capacity, and the City of Bogalusa.
Construing the allegations in the complaint broadly in Plaintiff’s favor,
Plaintiff alleges Counts I, II, III, and VI against Bullen, Chief of the Bogalusa Police
Department, in his official capacity.119 Such official capacity are equivalent to suits
against the municipal entity, here, Bogalusa.120 Again construing the allegations
broadly, Plaintiff alleges Counts I, II, III, IV, and VII against the City of Bogalusa.
Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, a municipality or other local
governing body is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when an action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements an official policy or custom adopted or promulgated by
117 See Dyer, 964 F.3d at 385.
118 Id. at 383 (quoting Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
119 Rec. Doc. 1.
120 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
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the locality’s officers.121 Municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory; however, they can be held liable “when execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”122 The
unconstitutional conduct “must be directly attributable to the municipality through
some sort of official action or imprimatur.”123 “[I]solated unconstitutional actions by
municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.”124
To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate a dispute of fact
as to: (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the
moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.125 For each § 1983 count
against Bullen, the plaintiff must establish that Bullen is the final policymaker for
the city and identify the city policy or custom that alleged caused the deprivation of
Thomas’s constitutional rights.126
1. 	Count I: Unreasonable seizure and use of excessive and
deadly force against Bullen and the City
Plaintiff alleges in Count I that Bullen and the City are liable under Monell
and vicariously under Louisiana state law for the conduct of Johnson, Erwin, and
John Doe Defendants in their use of excessive force in the seizure of Thomas,
121 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
122 Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F. 3d 452, 471 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at
691).
123 Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).
124 Id. at 578.
125 Webb of Town of St. Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 2025).
126 Murray v. Town of Mansura, 76 F. App'x 547, 549 (5th Cir. 2003); Treece v. Louisiana, 74 F. App'x
315, 316 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also Hernandez v. Theriot, 38 F. Supp. 3d 745, 746 (M.D. La. 2014) (“A
suit against a municipal Police Chief in his/her official capacity is a suit against the municipality.”)
(citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
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resulting in his death, and in conspiring to restrict facts about the nature of their
conduct.127 As discussed in Section III.A.1, Johnson and Erwin did not participate in
Thomas’s arrest and thus could not have used excessive force against Thomas during
his arrest. Moreover, there is no allegation of any other member of the Bogalusa
Police Department engaging in any excessive force against Thomas. Without a
constitutional violation, there can be no Monell liability. Accordingly, Count I against
the City and Bullen for is dismissed.
2. 	Count II: Civil rights conspiracy against Bullen and the
City
As to Count II, a civil rights conspiracy claim “is not actionable without an
actual violation of section 1983.”128 And where the claim is actionable, it requires “an
agreement among the alleged co-conspirators to deprive [the plaintiff] of [her]
constitutional rights.”129 The operative facts of the alleged agreement must be pled
with specificity. Mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy will not suffice.130
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a civil rights conspiracy only “upon information
and belief” and in conclusory fashion. Even those allegations fail to allege an actual
agreement of the alleged co-conspirators. Instead, plaintiff alleges merely a “common
motive” and “the blessing of the City and Chief Bullen” in support of “conspir[ing] to
127 Rec. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 19-24.
128 Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation modified).
129 Montgomery, 759 F. App’x at 314 (per curiam); see also Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343
(5th Cir. 1994).
130 Montgomery, 759 F. App’x at 314 (per curiam) (“Conclusory allegations that do not reference
specific factual allegations tending to show an agreement do not suffice to state a civil rights
conspiracy claim under § 1983.”); see also McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir.
1989) (citation modified) (“It is now well settled in this Circuit that ‘mere conclusory allegations of
conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material facts,’ state a substantial claim of federal
conspiracy.”).
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hide the truth” of Thomas’s condition and “to refuse to comply with subpoenas” to
cover up their actions. Without any alleged agreement among the alleged co-
conspirators, the Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim in Count II is dismissed against Bullen
and the City.
3. 	Count III: Failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments against Bullen and the City
For the avoidance of doubt, and for the reasons discussed above with respect
to the individual defendants, this claim is dismissed to the extent it is alleged against
Bullen or the City.
4. 	Count IV: Denial of Adequate Medical Care—Conditions of
Confinement against the City of Bogalusa
To establish an official policy for purposes of municipal liability under Monell,
a plaintiff can point to “written policy statements, ordinances, or regulations,” or “a
widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that
fairly represents municipal policy.”131 However, in rare cases, just a single decision
may constitute a municipal policy when the official or entity with “final policymaking
authority” for an action “performs the specific act that forms the basis of the § 1983
claim.”132
Plaintiff alleges that the City of Bogalusa is responsible for having “explicit
policies and/or de facto policies or restrictions regarding conditions at the City of
Bogalusa Jail.”133 These policies included not properly treating detainees such as
131 Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (citation modified).
132 Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation modified).
133 Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 37.
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Thomas for their medical needs or evaluating and monitoring their injuries and/or
illnesses.134
Here, the Court found that a jury may conclude that Erwin violated Thomas’s
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. To survive Defendants’
motion for summary judgment on Count IV, then, Plaintiff must demonstrate the
existence of, or a dispute of material fact over the existence of an official policy
promulgated by the City that was the moving force behind the violation. Plaintiff
describes the custom as: “no medical facility; detection of medical needs by inmate
self-reporting; padded-cell warehousing until detainees ‘come down’; and no medical
assessment because the City ‘cannot afford’ it.”135 Plaintiff 	further describes the
custom as including that the jail’s screening sheet is completed only for detainees
lucid enough to give clear information, two-officer shifts, no assigned observer, no
written monitoring rule, untrained staff, and “three or four prior deaths,” in the past
22 years, including two suicides by hanging.136 Plaintiff argues that the lack of
screening protocol meant that Thomas did not receive medical evaluation until he
was found bleeding on the floor.137
None of these are sufficient to survive Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The undisputed record evidence shows that the staff received medical
134 Plaintiff’s Count IV alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a conditions-of-confinement claim.
Under Fifth Circuit precedent, there is “no meaningful difference” between the elements of a
conditions-of-confinement claim and a Monell claim. Estate of Bonilla ex rel. Bonilla v. Orange Cnty.,
Tex., 982 F.3d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 2020). The standard of causation is the same for both theories of
liability: “the policy or custom must have been the moving force behind the violation.” Id. (citation
modified).
135 Rec. Doc. 29 at 18; see also Rec. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 37-39 (similar complaint allegations).
136 Rec. Doc. 29 at 18; see Rec. Doc. 27-9 at 8:1-3, 11:4-12:5.
137 Rec. Doc. 29 at 19.
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training, and any lack of medical training was not the moving force behind the
constitutional violation. To the extent the other arguments involve an official policy
or custom, they were not the moving force either. Jail officials provided undisputed
testimony that they were monitoring Thomas on the video surveillance almost
constantly, such that the lack of an assigned observer or written monitoring rule was
not the moving force. Officials were aware that Thomas was intoxicated—that’s why
he was in the padded cell—such that recording that information in a form would not
have changed the course of events. Plaintiff acknowledges that Thomas’s intoxication
from methamphetamines is known to mask or mimic symptoms that he might have
been suffering due to hypoglycemia.138 Regardless of the cause, once a corrections
officer observed Thomas in clear distress, he sought Johnson’s assistance, and she
promptly directed a call to EMS. Nor was the two-person shift a moving force behind
the violation. The record shows that correctional officers could and did call for
assistance from the police department or through the dispatch system when needed.
The alleged constitutional violation traces to a lone employee (Erwin) who is not
alleged to have followed any custom or policy when she allegedly ignored what a jury
may find to be Thomas’s obvious need for transport to the hospital and provided
inaccurate information with the warden that she knew would result in Thomas not
receiving medical care. Plaintiff identifies no custom or practice by Bogalusa of
sharing or withholding this type of information or providing inaccurate information
to the warden or other decisionmakers.
138 Rec. Doc. 29-2 § IX.
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Finally, Plaintiff does not allege that Bogalusa ever previously had a detainee
suffer an overdose or hypoglycemic death due to officers’ failure to obtain medical
care. And Plaintiff certainly doesn’t allege that Bogalusa ever had an incident in
which anyone died or was gravely injured because an official provided inadequate,
misleading, or untrue information to those responsible for making medical care
decisions. Plaintiff provided no information about the “three or four” prior deaths in
the last two decades other than that two were suicides by hanging. For none of these
is there any indication that the deaths involved a similar fact pattern.
Accordingly, Count IV is dismissed.
5. 	Count VI: Monell Municipal Violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Bullen
Plaintiff alleges a Monell municipal violation under § 1983 against Bullen,
arguing that Bullen demonstrated deliberate indifference to the violation of the
constitutional rights of Thomas and other residents of the City of Bogalusa. Plaintiff
alleges this deliberate indifference was manifested through the implementation of
and failure to change policies, procedures, and customs regarding similar incidents
involving Bogalusa residents, including the right to be free from unlawful seizure,
the right to be free from excessive force, and the right to medical care when detained
in jail.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s episodic acts-or-omissions theory of liability is
predicated on the individual defendants’ alleged subjective indifference to Thomas’s
medical needs resulting from a municipal policy or custom. For the reasons discussed
above, this theory of liability is foreclosed.
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To establish liability under Plaintiff’s failure-to-train theory, Plaintiff must
prove: “(1) the city failed to train or supervise the officers involved; (2) there is a
causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged
violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise constituted
deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights.”139 Again, for the
reasons discussed above, this theory of liability is foreclosed.
Finally, Plaintiffs also allege a ratification theory of Monell liability against
Bullen based on his alleged refusal to release requested information about Thomas’s
arrest, detention, and death.140 A policymaker’s ratification may form the basis of
municipal liability if the authorized policymaker approves a subordinate’s decision
and the basis for it.141 Ratification requires the actual approval of a policymaker, not
their mere acquiescence.142 The Fifth Circuit has “narrowed the theory of ratification
to extreme factual situations.”143 Bullen’s alleged refusal to release information is too
far removed from Erwin’s action underlying the constitutional violation to establish
that he approved of her action and the basis for it. Noncompliance with records
requests, whether made by discovery requests or public records requests under state
law, is neither a constitutional violation that is enforceable under Section 1983 nor
the sort of extreme situation that provides ratification liability.144
139 Hutcheson v. Dallas Cty., 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021).
140 Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 53.
141 Sligh v. City of Conroe, 87 F.4th 290, 303 (5th Cir. 2023).
142 Benfer v. City of Bay Town, 120 F.4th 1272, 1287 (5th Cir. 2024).
143 Stacy v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:26-cv-541, 2026 WL 2097231, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 20,
2026) (Barker, J.) (citing Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998) (.
144 See Moreland v. Kolb, No. 24-cv-1424, 2026 WL 1981429, at *10-12 (W.D. La. May 15, 2026), report
and recommendation adopted by 2026 WL 1980863 (W.D. La. July 8, 2026) (Van Hook, J.).
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6. 	Count VII: State Law Violations and Vicarious Liability of
the City of Bogalusa under State Law
Plaintiff alleges that the City is vicariously liable for state law torts by Bullen,
Johnson, Erwin, and John Doe Officers while in the course and scope of their duties
during Thomas’s death. Plaintiffs allege that these individuals breached the duty of
care that custodians owe pretrial detainees in their custody by failing to provide safe
incarceration and medical attention for Thomas, failing to allow him to be treated,
deliberate indifference, and violating official policies.145 Defendants claim these
individual defendants have discretionary-function immunity under La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 9:2798.1.146 Section 9:2798.1 grants immunity from liability to public officers
or employees for the performance or failure to perform discretionary acts within the
course and scope of their employment. This statutory provision provides an exception
to this immunity where the acts or omissions are not reasonably related to public
policy considerations.
Here, even without the protections of § 9:2798.1, the state-law claims for
vicarious liability as to Johnson and Bullen fail because Plaintiff has not put forth
evidence to support any breach of duty by Johnson or Bullen for the reasons discussed
above.
The state-law claim for vicarious liability as to Erwin, however, survives.
There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Erwin violated Thomas’s rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment and thus breached her duty to him. The only
145 Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 55.
146 Rec. Doc. 4 at 8.
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public-policy considerations offered by Defendants for Erwin’s conduct are that the
City’s budget is “extremely limited” and it “cannot afford to send every new inmate
to the hospital to be assessed for unknown health conditions.”147 Whether these
considerations are reasonably related to Erwin’s actions are a fact question. A
reasonable jury could find that these policy considerations were unrelated to Erwin’s
call to the Warden for a transport decision and possible provision of inaccurate or
incomplete information, as her call suggests that resources were available for
transport in at least some instances.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT 	IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment148 is
GRANTED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts I, II, III, and V against
Defendant Captain Janice Johnson, individually, are DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts I, II, and III against
Defendant Officer Lisa Erwin, individually, are DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts I, II, III, and VI against
Defendant Chief Kendall Bullen, in his respective individual and official capacity,
are DISMISSED.
147 See Rec. Doc. 27-2 ¶ 50.
148 Rec. Doc. 27.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts I, II, III, and IV against
Defendant City of Bogalusa are DISMISSED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of October, 2026.
ANNA ST. JOHN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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