Cornwell v. Extreme Tactical Components, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRIAN CORNWELL 	* 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-926
VERSUS 	* 	JUDGE ELDON E. FALLON
EXTREME TACTICAL COMPONENTS, 	* 	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
LLC, A.K.A. EXTREME AIR RIFLES, LLC, 	MICHAEL B. NORTH
A.K.A. EXTREME BIG BORE AIR RIFLES, 	*
TEXAS MACHINE PARTS, LLC, DANNY
DUKE, AND JOHN WILEY 	*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Defendant Kinsale Insurance Company
(“Kinsale”). R. Doc. 52. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. Considering the record, briefing, and
applicable law, the Court now rules as follows.
I. 	BACKGROUND & PRESENT MOTION
This is a products liability case arising from an alleged injury caused by an air rifle. Plaintiff
Brian Cornwell alleges that on March 25, 2021, he ordered a “big-bore air rifle” online directly
from the manufacturing defendants through their website. R. Doc. 39 at 2. He maintains that he
read the instructions accompanying the product, which directed users that “you may need to cover
the barrel with your finger when filling.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that on January 11, 2023, he was
filling the product with air with his thumb over the barrel, as directed by the instructions. Id. The
rifle discharged, and Plaintiff’s “left thumb was blown open” leaving Plaintiff with no “bone tip.”
Id. at 2.
Plaintiff initially sued the alleged manufacturer and its company owners. R. Doc. 2-2. He
later amended his complaint to name Kinsale as an alleged insurer of the manufacturer. R. Doc.
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39. According to the second supplemental complaint, Plaintiff received a copy of “a policy of
liability insurance number 0100148803-0 . . . which was in effect on the date of plaintiff’s injury”
during discovery. Id. at 1–2. Thus, he asserts that Kinsale is “solidarily liable with its insureds for
all damages.” Id. at 1.
Kinsale now moves to have all claims brought against them dismissed because the policy
referenced in the second supplemental complaint—Policy No. 0100148803-0 (the “Policy”)—
covers a year-long period between the rifle purchase date and the date of injury, so the Policy does
not provide coverage. R. Doc. 52-1. Specifically, the Policy contains exclusions which prohibits
coverage “when a bodily injury arises out of a product sold before [the Policy start date], or after
the Policy [end date].” Id. at 4. Kinsale attached a copy of the Policy to its motion, which notably
(1) bears the same policy number as the one in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, and (2) states
that the policy period is from April 28, 2021, to April 28, 2022. R. Doc. 52-2. Plaintiff does not
oppose the motion.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed “for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2008)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A claim is plausible on its face when the
plaintiff has pled facts that allow the court to “draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 570. A court must liberally construe the complaint in light most
favorable to the plaintiff, accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences
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in favor of the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). However, courts “do not
accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Arias-
Benn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 F.3d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess
Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Because the Court is sitting in diversity, it must apply state substantive law, and in determining
which state’s substantive law controls, the Court will apply the forum state’s choice-of-law. In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir. 2007). Louisiana’s choice-of-law rules
provide that “the law of the state where the insurance contract was issued and executed generally
governs the interpretation of that contract.” Pioneer Expl., LLC v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 512
(5th Cir. 2014) (citing Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 1999)). The choice-of-law
analysis is not relevant, however, if the laws of the states do not conflict. Mumblow v. Monroe Broad.,
Inc., 401 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 2005).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Kinsale presses that Plaintiff cannot have a viable claim against them pursuant to the plain
language of the Policy. Plaintiff does not contest any of Kinsale’s representations of the policy
period nor the exclusions. Similarly, he does not dispute that the Policy attached to the motion to
dismiss is the one noted in the second supplemental complaint. For the following reasons, the
Court will grant Kinsale’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
As a threshold matter, the Court may consider the Policy attached to the motion to dismiss
because the Policy was expressly referenced in the second supplemental complaint and is central
to Plaintiff’s claims. In re Katrina Canal Breaches, 495 F.3d at 205; Collins v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000) (“In so attaching, the defendant merely assists
the plaintiff in establishing the basis of the suit, and the court in making the elementary
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determination of whether a claim has been stated.”). In reading the Policy, the Court turns to state
law for guidance on interpretation, with the understanding that “under both Texas and Louisiana
law, insurance policies are to be interpreted in accordance with general rules governing
interpretation of contracts.” Aggreko, LLC v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., 942 F.3d 682, 688 (5th
Cir. 2019). Therefore, regardless of whether Louisiana or Texas substantive law would apply to
the interpretation of the Policy here, under either state system the “words and phrases contained
[in insurance contracts] should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (discussing
Louisiana and Texas cases).
The Policy plainly states that the policy period began on April 28, 2021. R. Doc. 52-2 at 1.
The Policy’s “Prior Work” exclusions provides that the Policy “does not apply to ‘bodily
injury’ . . . arising out of ‘your product’ that was . . . sold . . . before” April 28, 2021. Id. at 54. The
second supplemental complaint states that Plaintiff purchased the at-issue air rifle on March 25,
2021—over a month before the Policy came into effect. R. Doc. 39 at 2. Thus, the Policy excludes
coverage for Plaintiff’s bodily injury because he purchased the air rifle over a month before the
policy period began, and the Policy excludes coverage of bodily injuries arising out of products
purchased before the Policy’s effective date.
Wholly independent from the foregoing, coverage would also be excluded under the Policy
based on the date of Plaintiff’s injury. The second supplemental complaint maintains that Plaintiff
injured his thumb on January 11, 2023. R. Doc. 39 at 2. The Policy provides in its “Coverages”
section that “[t]his insurance applies to ‘bodily injury’ . . . only if . . . [t]he ‘bodily injury’ . . .
occurs during the policy period.” R. Doc. 52-2 at 6. The policy period terminated on April 28,
2022. Id. at 1. Plaintiff’s injury occurred nearly nine months after the termination of the policy
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period. R. Doc. 39 at 2. Therefore, the Policy issued by Kinsale and referenced in the second
supplemental complaint does not provide coverage for Plaintiff’s date of injury.
Overall, because the Policy excludes coverage for Plaintiff’s bodily injury based both on
the purchase date of the air rifle and the actual date of injury, Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable
claim against Kinsale. The Court will grant the motion to dismiss.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss, R. Doc. 52, is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims
against Kinsale Insurance Company are hereby DISMISSED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of January, 2026.
THE HONORABLE ELDON E. FALLON
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