Cornwell v. Extreme Tactical Components, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRIAN CORNWELL 	* 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-926
VERSUS 	* 	JUDGE ELDON E. FALLON
EXTREME TACTICAL COMPONENTS, 	* 	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
LLC, A.K.A. EXTREME AIR RIFLES, LLC, 	MICHAEL B. NORTH
A.K.A. EXTREME BIG BORE AIR RIFLES, 	*
TEXAS MACHINE PARTS, LLC, DANNY
DUKE, AND JOHN WILEY 	*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court are two motions. Plaintiff Brian Cornwell moves for a mistrial and the
setting of a new trial. R. Doc. 100. Defendants Texas Machine Parts, Danny Duke, and John Wiley
(“Defendants”) filed a motion for entry of judgment or, alternatively, motion for entry of judgment
as a matter of law. R. Doc. 101. The parties oppose each others’ motions. R. Docs. 103, 104.
Defendants replied in support of their initial motion and requested oral argument. R. Docs. 105,
106. The Court denied the request. R. Doc. 107. Considering the record, briefing, and applicable
law, the Court now rules as follows.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This is a products liability action brought by Plaintiff Brian Cornwell who was injured
while using Defendants’ air rifle. Trial commenced on February 2, 2026, on three Louisiana
Products Liability Act (“LPLA”) theories: design defect, inadequate warning, and breach of
express warranty. See R. Doc. 72. After listening to three days of evidence and testimony, on
February 4, 2026, the jury returned a conflicting verdict. R. Doc. 97. Specific to the inadequate
warning claim, the jury found that Defendants were negligent insofar as the product was
unreasonably dangerous and that the unreasonably dangerous condition proximately caused
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Plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 2. The jury then found that Plaintiff’s injury did not arise from a reasonably
anticipated use of the air rifle by the Plaintiff. Id. Thus, the jury found that Plaintiff did not prove
all elements of his inadequate warning claim, as the LPLA requires both a finding that Defendants
were negligent and that Plaintiff was injured during a reasonably anticipated use of the product.
See La. R.S. § 9:2800.54 (“The manufacturer of a product shall be liable to a claimant for damage
proximately caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably
dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the
claimant or another person or entity.”). The jury continued, however, and found that Plaintiff was
entitled to monetary damages in the amount of $200,000, reduced by 55% for Plaintiff’s
comparative negligence. R. Doc. 97 at 4.
II. 	PRESENT MOTIONS
Both parties now move for post-trial relief. R. Docs. 100, 101. First, Plaintiff asks for a
new trial. R. Doc. 100. Plaintiff takes the position that the verdict form conflicts insofar as the
verdict form reveals that the jury did not understand that it could not award damages unless it
found liability. Id. Defendants oppose the motion, submitting that the verdict form is not
inconsistent and that a mistrial is procedurally inappropriate at this time. R. Doc. 104.
Defendants move for an entry of judgment pursuant to Rules 49(b)(2) and 58 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. R. Doc. 101. Alternatively, they ask for the entry of judgment as a matter
of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. As to their request for an
entry of judgment on the present verdict form, Defendants submit that the general verdict and the
individual answers are consistent because, to recover under any LPLA theory—not just the
inadequate warning claim—the jury would have needed to find that Plaintiff’s injury arose from a
reasonably anticipated use of the air rifle. 101-1 at 8–10. Thus, the answers are consistent because
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under any LPLA theory, Plaintiff bore the burden of proving two things: Defendants’ negligence,
and that Plaintiff’s injury arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product. Id. Defendants
submit that the Court should disregard the jury’s damages award, as it may under Rule 49(b)(2),
because the jury was simply “completing the assignment” by answering the entire verdict form.
Id. at 11. Defendants press that the Court should, in accordance with Fifth Circuit precedent,
reconcile the jury’s answers and enter a verdict wholly in favor of Defendants because the jury
entered a general verdict that Plaintiff failed to prove that Defendants were negligent and that
Plaintiff’s injuries resulted from a reasonably anticipated use of the product.
Alternatively, Defendants ask the Court enter judgment as a matter of law on all claims. Id.
at 13. First, Defendants submit that the Court should honor the jury’s perspective that Plaintiff did
not meet his burden of proof on any of the three LPLA claims. Id. They contend that the Court
should at least enter judgment as to the design defect and breach of express warranty claims. Id.
And if the Court were concerned about the jury’s finding of Defendants’ negligence on the
inadequate warning claim, the Court should enter judgment in their favor nonetheless because
Defendants met their burden of showing that Plaintiff was a sophisticated user. Id. Since Plaintiff
is a sophisticated user, Defendants had no duty to warn him of the dangerous condition, and
judgment as a matter of law in their favor is appropriate on that claim. Id.
Plaintiff opposes the motion. R. Doc. 103. He argues that the jurors followed the verdict
form correctly and logically, applying a commonsense approach, and intended to find Defendants
liable and award Plaintiff damages. Id. Plaintiff highlights that the jury did find Defendants
negligent in failing to warm him of the dangerous aspects of the air rifle and that Defendants’
negligence was the cause of his injuries. Id. Thus, in Plaintiff’s eyes, it is clear that the jury wished
to compensate him for the manufacturer’s negligence. Id. Confusingly, Plaintiff presses that the
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form was not necessarily inconsistent and asks the Court grant judgment as a matter of law in
Plaintiff’s favor, as well as the entry of a $200,000.00 damages award. Id. at 3.
Defendants replied, largely addressing Plaintiff’s arguments with respect to the jury’s
award. R. Doc. 105. They also argue that “Plaintiff effectively concedes the jury’s rejection of” his
design defect and breach of express warranty claims by not addressing those claims in its
opposition. Id. at 5. Therefore, at most, Defendants suggest that if a new trial is ordered, it should
only be on the inadequate warning claim. Id.
III. 	APPLICABLE LAW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49 “articulates the standards courts must follow in
evaluating jury’s verdicts.” Lindsley v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 123 F.4th 433, 439 (5th Cir.
2024) (citing F ED. R. C IV. P ROC . 49). When a jury returns “an internally inconsistent verdict, the
judge has a duty to harmonize the inconsistent responses.” Id. “If the verdict form . . . was a ‘special
verdict’— i.e., one where the jury merely resolves issues of fact—Rule 49(a) would apply.” Id.
(citing Team Contractors, L.L.C. v. Waypoint Nola, L.L.C., 976 F.3d 509, 517 (5th Cir. 2020)). “If,
however, the verdict form was a ‘general verdict’—i.e., one where the jury goes beyond resolving
fact issues and applies law to fact to indicate who won—Rule 49(b) would apply.” Id. at 439–40.
When evaluating a general verdict, “Rule 49(b) . . . lists the actions a district court may
take to resolve inconsistencies in a verdict form and explains in what contexts the court may do
so.” Id. at 440. Rule 49(b)(2) provides that “‘[w]hen the general verdict and the answers are
consistent [with one another], the court must approve, for entry under Rule 58, an appropriate
judgment on the verdict and answers.’” Id. (quoting F ED. R. C IV. P. 49(b)(2)). The following
section, Rule 49(b)(3), explains that “‘[w]hen the answers [to written interrogatories] are
consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict,’ the court may
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(A) enter judgment according to the answers, ‘notwithstanding the general verdict’; ‘(B) direct the
jury to further consider its answers and verdict; or (C) order a new trial.’” Id. (quoting F ED. R. C IV.
P. 49(b)(3)). Finally, Rule 49(b)(4) provides that, “‘[w]hen the answers are inconsistent with each
other and one or more is also inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment must not be entered;
instead, the court must direct the jury to further consider its answers and verdict, or must order a
new trial.’” Id. (quoting F ED. R. C IV. P. 49(b)(4)).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants ask the Court to enter a verdict in their favor pursuant to Rule 49(b)(2) because
the jury’s answers to the verdict form’s questions do not conflict. R. Doc. 101. Plaintiff asks that
the Court grant a new trial and briefly references Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 with no further
analysis. R. Doc. 100. For the following reasons, the Court will not enter judgment at this time and
will order a new trial pursuant to Rule 49(b)(4) and Rule 59(a)(1)(A).
a. 	This Is a General Verdict
The Court must first briefly explain why it assesses this jury verdict form under Rule 49(b)
as opposed to Rule 49(a). The Fifth Circuit recently and thoroughly explained the differences
between special verdicts and general verdicts in Team Contractors, L.L.C. v. Waypoint Nola, L.L.C.
976 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2020). There, the court held that “if the answers to written questions require
jurors to apply the instructed law to their fact-findings, thereby fully explaining who prevails on
all claims against a single defendant, and if relevant, the amount of any monetary award, that is
sufficient for a Rule 49(b) verdict.” Id. at 520. In later explaining Waypoint, the Circuit reiterated
its view “that where detailed jury instructions apprises the jury of the law, that suggests that the
verdict is general, not special.” Lindsley, 123 F.4th at 440 (citing Waypoint, 976 F.3d at 516).
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The verdict form at issue here is a general form because it asks jurors to make factual
findings and apply the language of the LPLA to those factual findings. R. Doc. 97. Moreover, the
Court provided the jury with detailed charges describing the intricacies of the LPLA and the
parameters the jurors would need to use when applying the law to their findings of fact. R. Doc.
95-3. Thus, because the instructions apprise the jury of the law and ask them to apply it to the facts,
Rule 49(b) governs this Court’s evaluation of the verdict form. “The question then becomes—
which section of Rule 49(b) applies?” Lindsley, 123 F.4th at 440.
b. 	Rule 49(b)(4) Applies
Rule 49(b)(4) will apply when the jury’s answers are both inconsistent with each other and
inconsistent with the general verdict. When that rule applies, the district judge “must not” enter
judgment and instead either “direct the jury to further consider its answers and verdict, or must
order a new trial.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 49(b)(4). Importantly, “verdict forms are considered part of the
jury instructions such that appellate courts consider the verdict form ‘in light of’ the instructions.”
Id. (citing Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 23 F.4th 422, 432 (5th Cir. 2022)). So, when
analyzing whether the answers are inconsistent with each other as well as inconsistent with the
general verdict, the Court will look to both the jury instructions and the jury verdict form.
The Fifth Circuit recently evaluated a case where Rule 49(b)(4) applied. In Lindsley v.
Omni Hotel Management Corporation, the Fifth Circuit assessed an Equal Pay Act and Title VII
jury verdict form that did not contain a “go-no-further” instruction, or an instruction advising the
jury not to award damages if they did not find liability. 123 F.4th at 440–41. In observed, however,
that “the jury instructions explicitly conditioned answering the Title VII damages question on the
jury’s finding of Title VII liability.” Id. at 440. Thus, because “verdict forms are considered part
of the jury instructions such that appellate courts consider the verdict form ‘in light of’ the
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instructions,” the court found that “[t]he jury’s answers to special interrogatories were inconsistent
with each other: [Defendant] did not violate Title VII yet owed $25 million for a Title VII
violation.” Id. at 441. Said differently, because the jury instructions contained a go-no-further
instruction, the verdict form implicitly contained a go-no-further instruction; because the go-no-
further instruction told the jury to not award damages if it did not find liability, a finding of no
liability and a finding of damages were answers inconsistent with each other, as well as the general
verdict. See Rule 49(b)(4) (“Answers Inconsistent with Each Other and the Verdict”).
The Circuit further detailed its reasoning as to why Rule 49(b)(4), and not (b)(3), applied
in that case when, at first blush, it could appear that the jury’s answers are simply inconsistent with
the general verdict of no liability rather than inconsistent with each other. It noted that “because
the court instructed the jury that they should only award Title VII damages if they answered the
Title VII liability question in the affirmative, the jury’s negative answer as to liability was
inconsistent with its answers as to the damages question.” Id. at 441 n.5. And in prior circuit cases
where Rule 49(b)(3) applied, “the jury did not receive a charge—either in the jury instructions or
the verdict form itself—to only proceed to the damages issue if they answered affirmatively as to
liability.” Id. Therefore, “the jury’s answers to the liability and damages questions were not
inconsistent with each other (but the damages answer was inconsistent with the general verdict),”
so Rule 49(b)(3) applied in those other cases where the jury lacked go-no-further instructions in
both the verdict form and the charges. Id.
Here, like the verdict form in Lindsley, the verdict form lacked a go-no-further instruction
which would have advised the jury to only award damages if they had found liability on any of the
three LPLA theories. See R. Doc. 97 at 4. However, like the jury charges in Lindsley, the jury
charges used at this trial instructed the jury to only award damages if they found liability. R. Doc.
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95-3 at 32 (“If you find that the Plaintiff Brian Cornwell has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Defendants Texas Machine Parts are liable, in whole or in part, for Plaintiff’s
alleged injuries, then you must determine the damages the Plaintiff has sustained. You should not
interpret the fact that you are given instructions about damages as an indication in any way that
. . . the Plaintiff should, or should not, win this case.”); id. (“I am instructing you on damages only
so that you will have guidance in the event you decide that the Defendants are liable and that the
Plaintiff is entitled to recover money damages from the Defendants.”).
The Court concludes that the jury’s finding of no liability on any of the three LPLA theories
is inconsistent with its damages award because the Court instructed the jury in the jury charges
that it need not award damages unless Plaintiff prevailed on any one of his three claims. Moreover,
despite the lack of an explicit general verdict section, it is clear that the damages award is also
inconsistent with the jury’s general verdict of finding that Plaintiff did not prove each element of
any of the three LPLA claims, despite finding Defendants negligent on the inadequate warning
claim and its negligence a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Therefore, pursuant to Rule
49(b)(4), the Court must not enter judgment and will order a new trial. The Court declines
Defendants’ invitation to enter a judgment as a matter of law in light of this jury’s finding of
negligence on Defendants’ part on at least one LPLA theory.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Considering the foregoing;
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for mistrial and new trial, R. Doc. 100, construed
by the Court as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(A), is hereby GRANTED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for the entry of judgment pursuant
to Rule 49(b)(2) and 58 or, alternatively, motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, R.
Doc. 101, is hereby DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will hold a telephone status conference with
all parties to select a new trial date on Thursday, February 26, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. The parties are
instructed to use the following call-in information and to join in the line five minutes before the
scheduled time:
Dial-in: 	571-353-2301
ID code: 	342 767 621
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 24th day of February, 2026.
THE HONORABLE ELDON E. FALLON
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