Tran v. Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Company et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MY THI NHU TRAN, ET AL. 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 24-1933
GULF COAST BANK & TRUST CO., ET AL. 	SECTION: D(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Plaintiffs’ 	Motion 	for 	Reconsideration 	of 	Summary
Judgment as to Trieu Law, LLC.1 Defendants oppose the Motion.2 Plaintiffs filed a
reply.3 After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the
applicable law, the Motion is DENIED.
I. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS4
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) “allows parties to seek reconsideration of
interlocutory orders and authorizes the district court to ‘revise[] at any time’ ‘any
order or other decision . . . [that] does not end the action.”5 Under Rule 54(b), “the
trial court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems
sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or
clarification of the substantive law.”6 Whether to grant a motion to reconsider under
1 R. Doc. 317.
2 R. Doc. 322.
3 R. Doc. 332.
4 In the interest of judicial economy, and because the factual and procedural history of this case was
set out in great detail in several previous Orders and Reasons, it adopts the Factual Background as
set forth in those rulings. See R. Doc. 299 and 227.
5 Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
6 Id. (quoting Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990),
abrogated on other grounds, Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Case 2:24-cv-01933-WBV-MBN Document 366 Filed 10/16/26 Page 1 of 8

2
Rule 54(b) “rests within the discretion of the court.”7 Still, the broad authority to
reconsider an interlocutory order under Rule 54(b) “must be exercised sparingly in
order to forestall the perpetual reexamination of orders and the resulting burdens
and delays.”8 Motions for such reconsideration “are not the proper vehicle for
rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments.”9
On September 18, 2026, the Court issued an Order and Reasons granting
Summary Judgment as to Trieu Law, LLC (“TLL”).10 On September 29, 2026,
Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Reconsider.11 Plaintiffs seek reconsideration
regarding the dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation claim. Plaintiffs argue
that the Order answered a “materially different duty question” than the one posited
by Plaintiffs.12 Plaintiffs assert their claim “did not depend upon TLL originating the
loan, selecting the loan product, underwriting the credit, or verbally promising
Plaintiffs a particular financing result. Rather, ‘[t]he claim arises from TLL’s own
7 Namer v. Scottsdale Insur. Co., 314 F.R.D. 392, 393 (E.D. La. 2016) (Africk, J.) (quoting Bernard v.
Grefer, Civ. A. No. 14-887, 2015 WL 3485761, at *5 (E.D. La. June 2, 2015) (Fallon, J.)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
8 Southern Snow Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 548, 564–65 (E.D. La. 2013)
(citing 18B C HARLES A. WRIGHT & A RTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478.1 (2d ed.
2002)).
9 Whale Cap., L.P. v. Ridgeway, No. CV 22-2570, 2024 WL 894866, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2024)
(Currault, M.J.) (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
10 R. Doc. 299.
11 R. Doc. 317. The Court addresses fn 1 in Plaintiffs’ Motion in which it is seemingly suggested that
Plaintiffs did not have a “fair, adequate, or meaningful opportunity to oppose summary judgment.” See
R. Doc. 317 at fn 1. Counsel failed to include that the Court held a status conference with all counsel
to discuss the case, including Plaintiffs’ Motion for Extension of Time. During that status conference,
counsel informed the Court that it had timely filed the oppositions. Nevertheless, the Court inquired
with counsel as to whether there was additional information that he was unable to include in his
oppositions in support of his arguments. During that conference, counsel was unable to provide the
Court with any information that he had obtained and wished to be included that might further support
his arguments in his opposition brief. See R. Doc. 289, fn 6.
12 R. Doc. 317-1 at p. 2.
Case 2:24-cv-01933-WBV-MBN Document 366 Filed 10/16/26 Page 2 of 8

3
title, settlement, LLC, HUD, document, notarial, and closing conduct.’”13 Plaintiffs
contend that the Court “reduced the claim to whether TLL had a generalized duty to
explain loan terms—without addressing whether reasonable care was required in the
very title, settlement, entity, document, and closing functions through which TLL
encountered and implemented that contradictory structure.”14 Plaintiffs assert that
the Louisiana Title Insurance Act “confirm[s]” the duty proposed by Plaintiffs.15
Therefore, Plaintiffs argue, reconsideration is appropriate to vacate the dismissal of
the negligent misrepresentation claim against TLL.
In Response,16 Defendants argue reconsideration is improper in this matter for
several reasons. First, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs do not identify newly
discovered evidence, an intervening change in controlling law, or any manifest error
requiring reconsideration.”17 Defendants argue that the present Motion is improper
because it rests on mere disagreements with the Court’s legal reasoning.18 Next,
Defendants argue that Louisiana law requires a specific legal duty to be identified,
which Plaintiffs failed to do.19 Defendants point to the expert report of Peter Title,
who found there was no duty to counsel Plaintiffs or to explain the documents.20
Defendants contend that while the case relied on by Plaintiffs, Barrie v. V.P.
Exterminators, Inc., stands for the proposition that duty may be informed by the
13 Id. at p. 4 (quoting R. Doc. 270 at p. 14).
14 Id. at p. 6.
15 Id. at pp. 8-9.
16 R. Doc. 322.
17 Id. at p. 2.
18 Id.
19 Id. at pp. 3-4.
20 Id. at p. 4.
Case 2:24-cv-01933-WBV-MBN Document 366 Filed 10/16/26 Page 3 of 8

4
undertaking actually assumed, it is materially different from this case.21 Defendants
note “Barrie is readily distinguishable from the current situation because the
[information given] was demonstrably wrong,” unlike the present case where no false
or incorrect information was given.22 Next, Defendants argue that regardless of
whether there was a duty, Plaintiffs claims still fail because they cannot identify any
false information provided by TLL.23 Finally, Defendants assert that reliance on the
Louisiana Title Insurance Act is improper because the theory is raised for the first
time on reconsideration, and does not impose a fiduciary obligation. For all of these
reasons, Defendants argue that reconsideration is improper.
In Reply,24 Plaintiffs assert Defendants’ Response confirms that Plaintiffs
have consistently plead their duty theory, but the Court has failed to answer the
correct theory question. Plaintiffs argue that their formulation of duty is narrow: TLL
owed “whatever duty Louisiana law attaches to the substantive settlement and
informational functions it actually undertook.”25 Plaintiffs contend that Barrie
requires the court to identify the undertaking and determine what duty was owed
based on that inquiry.26 Plaintiffs also assert that both the report of Peter Title and
the Defendant’s argument as to the accuracy of the documents rely on the “disputed
premise” 	of 	what 	documents 	were 	actually 	authorized 	or 	executed.27 	Finally,
Plaintiffs argue that their citation to the Louisiana Title Insurance Act is not a new
21 Id. at p. 5 (citing Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So.2d 1007 (La.1993)).
22 Id.
23 Id. at p. 6.
24 R. Doc. 332.
25 Id. at p. 4.
26 Id.
27 Id. at pp. 5-7.
Case 2:24-cv-01933-WBV-MBN Document 366 Filed 10/16/26 Page 4 of 8

5
theory, but rather a citation to reinforce an existing theory.28 For these reasons,
Plaintiffs argue that TLL’s Response in Opposition confirms Plaintiffs’ argument and
show that the Court answered a different question than was asked.
Plaintiffs fail to meet the standard for reconsideration. “When there exists no
independent reason for reconsideration other than mere disagreement with a prior
order, reconsideration is a waste of judicial time and resources and should not be
granted.”29 	Plaintiffs 	give 	no 	new 	facts, 	authority, 	or 	argument 	warranting
reconsideration of the Order.
For a negligent misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff must show that there was
“a legal duty on the part of the defendant to provide correct information.”30 “Whether
a duty is owed is a question of law.”31 Plaintiffs argue that the Court did not properly
analyze the argument they presented in the original Response in Opposition to TLL’s
Motion for Summary Judgment: “The duty depends on the defendant’s undertaking,
the purpose of the information, and the foreseeable reliance of the person for whose
benefit the information is supplied.”32
As noted in the Order, Plaintiffs failed to establish any duty on behalf of the
TLL.33 Barrie does allow the Court to review a case based on its facts to determine if
there is “a duty is owed to this particular plaintiff to protect him from this particular
28 Id. at p. 9.
29 Whale Cap., L.P. v. Ridgeway, No. CV 22-2570, 2024 WL 894866, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2024)
(Currault, M.J.) (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
30 Kadlec Med. Ctr. v. Lakeview Anesthesia Assocs., 527 F.3d 412, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)
31 Barrie, 625 So. 2d at 1015.
32 R. Doc. 270 at pp. 14-15.
33 R. Doc. 299 at p. 34.
Case 2:24-cv-01933-WBV-MBN Document 366 Filed 10/16/26 Page 5 of 8

6
harm.”34 The Court did undertake this analysis in its Order and found that Plaintiffs
failed to identify any law that imposes a duty on TLL sufficient to allow the negligent
misrepresentation claim to continue.35 Plaintiffs give no reason why they failed to
cite to, or rely on the Louisiana Title Insurance Act in its Opposition to the Motion
for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs contend that the Act recognizes that “a title
insurer or producer may operate in a fiduciary capacity as a closing, escrow, or
settlement agent.”36 Plaintiffs failed to quote the entirety of that Louisiana statute.
Louisiana Revised Statute 22:532(A) provides:
A. A title insurer or a title insurance producer may operate in a fiduciary
capacity as a closing, escrow, or settlement agent, provided that:
(1) All funds deposited with the title insurer or the title insurance
producer in connection with any closing, escrow agreement, or security
agreement shall be deposited or submitted for collection to a qualified
financial institution no later than the close of the next business day
following receipt or, in the case where a borrower has a right of
rescission, no later than the close of the next business day following the
termination of the right of rescission, in accordance with the following
requirements:
(a) All funds collected for the business of title insurance shall be
deposited and held in an escrow account as defined herein, in the name
of the title insurer or title insurance producer and clearly titled as an
escrow, settlement, closing, or trust account.
(b) The funds shall be property of the person or persons entitled to them
under the provisions of the escrow instructions, and shall be identified
for each depositor in the manner that permits the funds to be identified
on an individual basis.
(c) The funds shall be used only in accordance with the terms of the
escrow instructions.
34 Barrie, 625 So. 2d at 1016.
35 R. Doc. 299 at 34. See Bergman v. New England Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 1989) (“It is not
unusual for the attorney representing one party to prepare the instruments which are to be signed by
all parties. It would stun the practicing bar to learn that when an attorney did so, he or she became
accountable as the attorney for all parties-signatory.”); see also Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek,
262 So. 2d 350, 359 (1972) (“It is not the duty of an attorney who is retained to check a title on property
and pass an act of sale to investigate the preliminary negotiations of the parties and involve himself
in questions of how the parties arrived at the stated price.”).
36 R. Doc. 317-1 at p. 8 (citing La. R.S. 22:511(B), 22:532(A)).
Case 2:24-cv-01933-WBV-MBN Document 366 Filed 10/16/26 Page 6 of 8

7
(2) Funds held in an escrow account shall be disbursed only pursuant to
escrow instructions specifying how and to whom the funds may be
disbursed.
(3) Funds held in a security agreement for the purpose of clearing,
writing over, or insuring over an exception to title shall be disbursed
only pursuant to a written agreement specifying:
(a) 	The 	necessary 	actions 	to 	satisfy 	the 	obligation 	under 	the
arrangement.
(b) The duties of the title insurer or the title insurance producer with
respect to disbursement of the funds held, including a requirement to
maintain evidence of the disposition of the title exception before any
balance may be paid over to the depositor or his designee.
(4) Funds held in connection with a real estate closing where no escrow
instructions or security agreement is applicable shall be disbursed in
accordance with a signed closing or disbursement statement.37
Thus, under that Louisiana Act, a title insurer may operate in a fiduciary capacity
provided that it has fulfilled the four provisos, including subparts, as set forth in the
law. 	There 	is 	no 	summary 	judgment 	evidence 	of 	the 	satisfaction 	of 	those
requirements, or of any violation of that Act.
Mere 	disagreement 	with 	the 	Court’s 	finding 	is 	not 	grounds 	for
reconsideration.38 The Court recognizes its inherent authority under Rule 54 to
reconsider and reverse its prior decision “for any reason it deems sufficient, even in
the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the
substantive law.”39 The Court finds no miscarriage of justice in denying the motion
for reconsideration.
37 La. R. S. 22:532(A).
38 Whale Cap., L.P., 2024 WL 894866, at *1.
39 Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 185.
Case 2:24-cv-01933-WBV-MBN Document 366 Filed 10/16/26 Page 7 of 8

8
II. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of
Summary Judgment as to Trieu Law, LLC40 is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, October 16, 2026.
_____________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
40 R. Doc. 317.
Case 2:24-cv-01933-WBV-MBN Document 366 Filed 10/16/26 Page 8 of 8