FMGI, Inc. v. South LA Contractors, LLC, et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
FMGI, INC. 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-1234
SOUTH LA CONTRACTORS, LLC, 	SECTION: “D” (2)
ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Default Judgment, filed by Applicant FMGI,
Inc. (“FMGI”).1 The Motion is unopposed. After careful consideration of FMGI’s
memorandum, the record, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This suit arises from a Subcontract Agreement (the “Subcontract Agreement”)
to perform work pertaining to the construction of sitework and drainage scopes of
work at a Floor and Décor store located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.2 FMGI is a
corporation organized under the laws of the state of Georgia and has its principal
place of business in Georgia.3 Respondent South LA Contractors, LLC (“SLC”) is a
Louisiana liability company comprised of a sole member, Respondent Bradford James
Melancon (“Melancon”), who is a Louisiana citizen.4
On August 26, 2021, FMGI and SLC entered into the Subcontract Agreement
to perform sitework and drainage scopes of work at the Floor and Décor Store in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.5 Section 24.2 of the Subcontract Agreement provides as
1 R. Doc. 17.
2 R. Doc. 1 at p. 2.
3 Id. at p. 1.
4 Id.
5 R. Doc. 1-2 at p. 1.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 1 of 22

2
follows:
Dispute 	Resolution 	of 	Claims 	between 	Contractor 	and
Subcontractor.
Meeting Prior to Arbitration. If a dispute arises concerning the
construction or interpretation of this Agreement, the meaning of this
Agreement, a breach of this Agreement, enforcement of a lien filed by
Subcontractor, 	or 	any 	other 	matter 	touching 	on 	or 	affecting 	this
Agreement, the Parties shall meet at Contractor’s principal place of
business or conduct a conference by telephone concerning the disputed
issues in an attempt to resolve the dispute. 	If, after reasonable notice
or a 	written 	request 	to 	participate 	in 	such 	meeting 	or telephone
conference, the Subcontractor indicates its unwillingness to do this
obligation shall be waived and Contractor may immediately commence
arbitration.6
Arbitration by Henning arbitration and Mediation Services. If
the Parties are unable to resolve the dispute among them during the
meeting or telephone conference as described in Section 24.2.1, the
dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration by the Henning
Mediation and Arbitration Service, Inc. (“Henning”) located in Atlanta,
Georgia, 	under 	that 	organization’s 	then 	current 	arbitration 	rules
applicable 	to 	construction 	disputes. 	If 	Henning 	does 	not 	have
construction rules specific to construction disputes, the matter shall be
resolved under its general arbitration rules. That arbitration will be
held at Contractor’s offices in Woodstock, Georgia (See Page 1 of this
document for the address of those offices). Neutral arbitrator in local of
project site.7
On or about December 29, 2021, SLC filed a Construction Arbitration Rules Demand
for Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) setting forth
allegations that it was due additional compensation arising out of extra work
completed and damages for wrongful termination.8 Gilbert Camarena, Manager of
ADR Services at the AAA, confirmed receipt of SLC’s demand on January 3, 2022.9
6 R. Doc. 1-1 at p. 20, Section 24.2.1 of the Subcontract Agreement; R. Doc. 1-1 at p. 57.
7 R. Doc. 1-1 at pp. 20–21, Section 24.2.2 of the Subcontract Agreement; R. Doc. 1-1 at pp. 57–58.
8 R. Doc. 1 at p. 2; see R. Doc. 1-3 at pp. 11–12.
9 R. Doc. 1-3 at pp. 11–12.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 2 of 22

3
Camarena, 	however, 	advised 	that 	the 	arbitration 	clause 	in 	the 	Subcontract
Agreement “does not specify that the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) will
administer the arbitration. As result [sic], the AAA cannot proceed further without a
court order or the consent of the parties. Therefore, I will need to obtain the parties’
agreement to have the AAA administer the arbitration.”10
On January 6, 2022, Lionel Postic, counsel for FMGI, advised Camarena as
follows, in pertinent part:
Prior to committing to the arbitration being administered by the AAA, I
have been asked to confirm the following information:
1. 	The AAA Rules that will apply to the arbitration are the current
version of the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules.
2. 	The arbitration will be conducted by a single arbitrator.
3. 	To the maximum extent possible, conferences and hearings will be
conducted via Zoom while Covid is surging.
4. 	If necessary, the final arbitration hearing will be conducted via
Zoom.
5. 	Claimant will allow me to represent FMGI (and, if necessary, the
Owner—see Paragraph 8, below) during the arbitration process and
hearing even though I am not admitted to the Bar is Louisiana.
6. 	The cost of the arbitrator will be shared equally by the Claimant and
FMGI.
7. 	Any litigation against the Owner will be stayed while the arbitration
is pending.
8. 	If the Owner wants any claims that the Claimant has against the
Owner, the Claimant will agree those claims will be resolved as part
of the arbitration.11
10 Id. at p. 11.
11 Id. at p. 8.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 3 of 22

4
In response, on January 11, 2022, Jason Bonaventure, counsel for SLC, sent a reply
email to Mr. Postic, copying Mr. Camarena of AAA, advising that:
I have discussed the conditions sent by Mr. Postic with my client.
We are amenable to all as stated, with the exception of number 4,
7 and 8.
4. I think we already covered and are in agreement. Unless there
is some mandate that prevents an in-person final arbitration, the
arbitration should be conducted in-person.
7 & 8. We will agree to stay the proceedings and will even hold off
filing a petition unless the matter is still not resolved within
eleven (11) months of the prescriptive period under the Louisiana
Private Works Act, which is currently one year after the filing the
Statement of Claim or Privilege (filed 1/3/22). It is my client’s
desire to have this matter resolved between FMGI and itself well
prior to this event.
We have not had any communication with the Owner since the
filing of the lien, although the lien was received by their agent in
Louisiana on 1/6/22. So, we are unaware of the owner’s intent at
this time and would rather not speculate. Since we agree to hold
off on filing a petition to enforce the lien claims, there is no reason
for the owner’s involvement provided arbitration is concluded
before 	the 	running 	of 	the 	prescriptive 	period. 	The 	decision
rendered by the arbitrator will be final and can be entered as an
enforceable judgment in state or federal court. IF [sic] FMGI is
successful, the lien itself will be unenforceable. Allowing the
owner to arbitrate a defense to the ‘potential’ enforcement of a
lien would only muddy the waters.
If Mr. Postic is in agreement, I believe the parties are ready to
move forward with AAA.12
Thereafter, Postic advised Camarena that “FMGI is agreeable to have the AAA
administer this arbitration[,]” and arbitration proceedings took place from October
14, 2024 through October 16, 2024 at the law office of Simon, Peragine, Smith &
12 Id. at p. 3.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 4 of 22

5
Redfearn, LLP in New Orleans, Louisiana.13 On December 20, 2024, Arbitrator H.
Bruce Shreves awarded FMGI $1,079,383 in total fees plus interest on the unpaid
award at the Prime Interest Rate Published in the Wall Street Journal, pursuant to
Section 24.2 of the Subcontract Agreement (the “Award”).14 On January 9, 2025, SLC
filed a Motion to Amend the Arbitration Award, which the Arbitrator denied on
January 29, 2025.15 Over one month later, on March 6, 2025, Brad Melancon filed an
Affidavit to Dissolve Limited Liability Company pursuant to La. R.S. § 12:1335.1.16
FMGI filed an Application to Confirm Arbitration Award in this Court on June
17, 2025.17 FMGI asks the Court to “enter a Final Judgment confirming the December
20, 2024 Reasoned Award in AAA Case No. 01-21-0018-1725 against both SLC and
Melancon.”18 Both SLC and Melancon were served by the United States Marshal’s
Service on July 17, 2025 in Lafayette, Louisiana.19 Thereafter, on August 25, 2025,
the Court issued an Order to Show Cause ordering FMGI, absent an appearance by
Defendants SLC and Melancon, to show cause as to why those defendants should not
be dismissed for plaintiff's failure to prosecute.20 On September 4, 2025, FMGI filed
a Motion for Entry of Default against SLC and Melancon,21 in which the Clerk
granted the Motion and entered default against both Respondents.22
13 R. Doc. 1-1 at p. 1; R. Doc. 1-4 at p. 1.
14 R. Doc. 1 at p. 3; R. Doc. 1-1 at pp. 10–11.
15 R. Doc. 1-5.
16 R. Doc. 1-6 at pp. 8–9.
17 R. Doc. 1.
18 Id. at p. 6.
19 R. Doc. 7; R. Doc. 8.
20 R. Doc. 9.
21 R. Doc. 10.
22 R. Doc. 12.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 5 of 22

6
FMGI filed the instant Motion for Default Judgment on September 25, 2025.23
FMGI specifically avers that it has followed a two-step process for obtaining a default
judgment.24 According to FMGI, it “has already completed the first step, with the
Clerk of Court entering defaults against both Respondents on September 4, 2025 (R.
Docs. 12, 12-1). Nonetheless, Respondents have still failed to file responsive pleadings
or otherwise appear and defend against FMGI’s Application.”25 As it pertains to the
second-step, FMGI contends:
In this case, the Award was issued on December 20, 2024 in New
Orleans, Louisiana. FMGI timely filed its Application with this Court
on June 17, 2025. No party has sought to vacate the Award, there is no
basis to vacate or modify the Award, and the three-month delay for
moving to vacate the Award has long expired. Although the Award is for
a sum certain, FMGI is requesting that the Court (rather than the Clerk
of Court) enter default judgment and confirm the Award. Should the
Court deem an evidentiary hearing necessary, FMGI will be prepared to
present evidence of the Arbitrator’s entry of the Award and as otherwise
required by the Court in connection with the entry of default judgment
against Respondents.26
Thus, FMGI requests that the Court enter default judgments against SLC and
Melancon, along with a final judgment confirming the Award.27 As of the date of this
Order and Reasons, SLC and Melancon have failed to make an appearance in the
above-captioned matter.
23 R. Doc. 17.
24 R. Doc. 17-1 at p. 4.
25 Id.
26 Id. at p. 5.
27 Id.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 6 of 22

7
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)28 “provides for expedited judicial review
to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards.”29 9 U.S.C. § 9 specifically provides:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the
court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration,
and shall specify the court, then at any time within one year after the
award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so
specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court
must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is
specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be
made to the United States court in and for the district within which such
award was made.
Notice of the application shall be served upon the adverse party, and
thereupon the court shall have jurisdiction of such party as though he
had appeared generally in the proceeding. If the adverse party is a
resident of the district within which the award was made, such service
shall be made upon the adverse party or his attorney as prescribed by
law for service of notice of motion in an action in the same court. If the
adverse party shall be a nonresident, then the notice of the application
shall be served by the marshal of any district within which the adverse
party may be found in like manner as other process of the court.30
“The FAA reflects a national policy favoring arbitration.”31 Considering this strong
policy, “‘judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow.’”32 “Under
the FAA, the court ‘must’ confirm an award unless the award is vacated under Section
10 or modified or corrected under Section 11.”33
28 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.
29 Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008).
30 9 U.S.C. § 9.
31 Cooper v. WestEnd Capital Management, L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 2016)(citing Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 581),
32 Id. (quoting Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 674 F.3d 469, 471–72 (5th Cir. 2012)).
33 Id. (quoting Hall Street Associates, L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 582). An award may be vacated “(1) where
the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 7 of 22

8
B. Default Judgment
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the process in which a
party may seek judgment due to the default of an opposing party. 	“[D]efault
judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by
courts only in extreme situations.”34 “A party is not entitled to a default judgment as
a matter of right, even where the defendant is technically in default.”35 Accordingly,
a default judgment is appropriate only when “the adversary process has been halted
because of an essentially unresponsive party.”36
A plaintiff seeking default judgment must proceed through two steps: (1) the
plaintiff must petition the clerk of court for an entry of default and (2) if the plaintiff’s
claim is not for a sum certain, then the plaintiff “must apply to the court for a default
judgment.”37 	In order for the clerk of court to enter a default against a defendant
pursuant to Rule 55(a), the plaintiff must show “by affidavit or otherwise” that the
defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.”38 	Beyond that requirement,
however, the entry of default is largely mechanical. Upon the clerk’s entry of default,
the defendant is deemed to have admitted the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct
in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” 9
U.S.C. § 10.
34 Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead
and Savings Ass’n., 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989)).
35 Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir.
1977)).
36 Sun Bank, 874 F.2d at 276 (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432
F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
37 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
38 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 8 of 22

9
allegations.39
After the entry of default, “the Court may enter a default judgment against a
party when it fails to plead or otherwise respond to the plaintiff's complaint within
the required time period.”40 	Where a plaintiff is not seeking a sum certain and
therefore must apply to the court for a default judgment, “[t]he disposition of a motion
for the entry of a default judgment ultimately rests within the sound discretion of the
court.”41 	A court may enter a default judgment only if the plaintiff has stated a
cognizable legal claim supported by well-pleaded factual allegations, which the court
accepts as true.42
C. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”43 A dispute is “genuine” if it is
“real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.”44 Further,
a fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.”45 	When assessing whether a genuine dispute regarding any material fact
exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from
39 Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).
40 Granite State Ins. Co. v. Delta Marine Env’t, LLC, No. CV 18-3571, 2018 WL 6067552, at *1 (E.D.
La. Nov. 20, 2018) (Africk, J.) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)) (emphasis added).
41 Id. at *2 (citing Mason, 562 F.2d at 345).
42 See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206 (“There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment
entered.”); Lewis, 236 F.3d at 767.
43 FED. R. C IV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
44 Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilkinson v. Powell,
149 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1945)).
45 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 9 of 22

10
making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”46 While all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, a party cannot defeat
summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or “only
a scintilla of evidence.”47 Instead, summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable
jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.48
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden
of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would
entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.”49 	The
non-moving party can then defeat summary judgment by either submitting evidence
sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact or by
“showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the
reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”50 If, however,
the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue,
the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in
the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s claim.51 The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond
the pleadings and, “by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there
46 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008)
(citations omitted).
47 Id. (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations
omitted).
48 Id. at 399 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
49 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264–65 (5th Cir. 1991).
50 Id. at 1265.
51 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 10 of 22

11
is a genuine issue for trial.’”52
D. Unopposed Summary Judgment
Pursuant to the Eastern District of Louisiana’s Local Civil Rule 7.5, a party
opposing a motion “must file and serve a memorandum in opposition to the motion
with citations of authorities no later than eight days before the noticed submission
date.”53 “In the Fifth Circuit, a district court may not grant a ‘default’ summary
judgment on the ground that it is unopposed.”54 As explained by the Fifth Circuit,
“[a] motion for summary judgment cannot be granted simply because there is no
opposition, even if the failure to oppose violated a local rule.”55 Rather, “[i]f the
moving party fails to meet its burden, the Court must deny its motion for summary
judgment.”56 And “[i]n determining whether the movant has met its burden, the
Court may accept the movant’s evidence as undisputed.”57
III. 	ANALYSIS
As always, the Court must first assure itself of jurisdiction to hear this matter.
The FAA’s “authorization of a petition does not itself create jurisdiction. Rather, the
federal court must have . . . an ‘independent jurisdictional basis’ to resolve the
52 Id. at 324 (quoting FED. R. C IV. P. 56(e)).
53 Local Rule. 7.5.
54 Hughes v. Uber Technologies, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-1775, 2023 WL 8557583, at *2 (E.D. La.
Dec. 11, 2023)(Vance, J.)(citing Morgan v. Fed. Express Corp., 114 F. Supp. 3d 434, 437 (S.D. Tex.
2015) (collecting cases)); see also Aptim Environmental & Infrastructure, LLC v. Allco, LLC, CIVIL
ACTION NO. 23-2587, 2024 WL 1855004, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 29, 2024)(Lemelle, J.)(citing Braly v.
Trail, 254 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 2001)(“If a contradictory motion is unopposed, a district court may not
grant it automatically, but may grant it if the motion has merit.”)).
55 Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir.
1985)(citing John v. La. (Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges & Universities), 757 F.2d 698, 709 (5th
Cir.1985)).
56 Hughes, 2023 WL 8557583, at *2 (citing Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 362 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1995)).
57 Id. (citing Morgan, 114 F.Supp. 3d at 437).
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 11 of 22

12
matter.”58 “Accordingly, an applicant seeking, for example, to vacate an arbitral
award under Section 10 of the FAA must identify a grant of jurisdiction, apart from
Section 10 itself, conferring access to a federal forum.”59 To that end, FMGI alleges
that diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as all parties are diverse
and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.60 The Court agrees.61 Turning to
venue, the Award was issued in the Eastern District of Louisiana, as the arbitration
hearings took place at the offices of Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, L.L.P. in
New Orleans, Louisiana before Arbitrator H. Bruce Shreves.62 Thus, venue is proper
in this Court to enter judgment upon the Award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 9.63
Having determined that jurisdiction and venue are proper in the above-
captioned matter, the Court next addresses whether the Award is binding upon the
parties. FMGI seeks an entry of a default judgment against Defendants SLC and
Melancon, along with a judgment enforcing the Award. As a threshold issue, the
Court first determines the appropriate review of the arbitration reward. The FAA
provides that an application for confirmation of an arbitrator’s award “shall be made
and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions[.]”64
58 Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1, 4 (2022)(quoting Hall Street Associates, L. L. C., 552 U.S. at 582).
59 Ascension Data & Analytics, L.L.C. v. Pairprep, Incorporated, 105 F.4th 749, 753 (5th Cir.
2024)(citation modified).
60 R. Doc. 1 at pp. 1–2. Insofar as FMGI asserts that the FAA provides that “[t]his Court has jurisdiction
over this action pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act,” that is incorrect. See Badgerow, 596 U.S. at
4; see also Ascension Data & Analytics, L.L.C., 105 F.4th at 752–53.
61 FMGI is a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia. R. Doc. 1 at p. 1. SLC
is a limited liability company compromised Melancon as its sole member, who is domiciled in
Louisiana. Id. Further, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 as the Award is for at least $1,079,
383. R. Doc. 1-1 at p. 1. Thus, the Court is satisfied that diversity jurisdiction exists.
62 R. Doc. 1-1 at p. 1.
63 The June 17, 2025 Application is also timely, as it is brought within one year after the Award was
rendered on December 20, 2024. See 9 U.S.C. § 9.
64 9 U.S.C. § 6.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 12 of 22

13
In light of this provision, district courts within the Fifth Circuit are split on whether
to apply a default judgment standard in the context of enforcement of arbitration
awards.65 Another Section of this Court has faced this precise question, in which that
court advised:
Despite concerns that Rule 55 does not operate well in the context of a
motion to confirm or vacate an arbitration award, other courts continue
to use the default judgment standard in an arbitration application.
Without resolving the somewhat academic conflict, and in the interest
of 	completeness, 	we 	also 	consider 	plaintiffs’ 	request 	for 	award
confirmation 	from 	the 	more 	strenuous 	standard 	of 	a 	motion 	for
summary judgment.66
This Court, too, agrees with the above analysis and considers FMGI’s Motion for
Default Judgment under the standard for an unopposed motion for summary
judgment, in addition to the default judgment standard. The Court first analyzes
whether FMGI has satisfied the statutory prerequisites enumerated in the FAA. The
Court then analyzes whether FMGI has met its burden under a default judgment and
unopposed motion for summary judgment standard. Lastly, the Court determines
whether Melancon is personally liable for any judgment issued against SLC. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court confirms the Award against SLC and finds that
Melancon is personally liable for the Award under Louisiana law.
65 Compare Carter & Carter Construction LLC v. Masram Mechanical LP, Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-
00517-X, 2025 WL 3852944, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025)(“Rule 55 does not operate in the context of
applications to confirm arbitration awards; rather, an unanswered application to confirm an
arbitration award should be treated as akin to an unopposed motion for summary judgment.”)(citation
modified), with White Oak Realty, LLC v. Fortress Group, USA, LLC, CIVIL ACTION No. 16-2235,
2016 WL 3167714, at *1 (E.D. La. June 7, 2016)(Africk, J.)(granting motion for default judgment in
the context of an application to confirm an arbitration award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 9).
66 Aptim Environmental & Infrastructure, LLC, 2024 WL 1855004, at *3 (citation modified).
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 13 of 22

14
A. FMGI 	has 	satisfied 	the 	FAA’s 	prerequisites 	to 	confirm 	an
arbitration award.
The Fifth Circuit has expressly held that “resort to AAA arbitration will be
deemed both binding and subject to entry of judgment unless the parties expressly
agree otherwise.”67 “A district court should enforce an arbitration award as written—
to do anything more or less would usurp the tribunal's power to finally resolve
disputes and undermine the pro-enforcement policies of the New York Convention.”68
Therefore, “[j]udicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited. So long as the
arbitrator's decision draws its essence from the . . . agreement and the arbitrator is
not fashioning his own brand of industrial justice, the award cannot be set aside.”69
Here, the Subcontract Agreement provides that arbitration shall take place
with a “[n]eutral arbitrator in local of project site.”70 Further, the parties agreed to
proceed with arbitration with the AAA.71 Specifically, the parties consented to
arbitrate under the AAA’s Construction Arbitration Rules and on the condition that
“[t]he decision rendered by the arbitrator will be final and can be entered as an
enforceable judgment in state or federal court.”72 And nowhere else in the parties’
email conversation did they contest—or even raise the issue—that the Award would
not be final and enforceable.73 Thus, because the Fifth Circuit has determined that
“resort to AAA arbitration will be deemed both binding and subject to entry of
67 McKee v. Home Buyers Warranty Corp. II, 45 F.3d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 1995).
68 Wartsila Finland OY v. Duke Capital LLC, 518 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2008) .
69 Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2 Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 889 F.2d 599,
602 (5th Cir. 1989)(internal quotation marks removed).
70 R. Doc. 1-1 at pp. 20–21, Section 24.2.2 of the Subcontract Agreement; R. Doc. 1-1 at pp. 57–58.
71 R. Doc. 1-3 at pp. 3–12.
72 Id. at p. 3.
73 Id. at pp. 3–12.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 14 of 22

15
judgment unless the parties expressly agree otherwise[,]”74 and the parties have not
agreed otherwise, the Court finds that the Award is binding upon SLC.
Under 9 U.S.C. § 13, a party seeking to confirm an arbitration award must file:
“(a) [t]he agreement; the selection or appointment, if any, of an additional arbitrator
or umpire; and each written extension of the time, if any, within which to make the
award[;] (b) [t]he award[;] [and] (c) [e]ach notice, affidavit, or other paper used upon
an application to confirm, modify, or correct the award, and a copy of each order of
the court upon such an application.”75 “‘This allows the Court to determine whether
a 	valid 	arbitration 	agreement 	and 	award 	exist 	upon 	which 	it 	can 	base 	its
judgment.’”76
Here, in support of its Application to Confirm Arbitration Award, FMGI
provided the Award, the Joint Statement of Uncontested Facts submitted to the
arbitrator, the Subcontract, the email chain demonstrating the parties’ consent to
arbitrate before the AAA, the notice of arbitration hearing dated May 29, 2024, and
the arbitrator’s order on the motion to amend the Award dated January 29, 2025.77
Further, FMGI has provided an Affidavit in Support of Application for Entry of
Default of FMGI’s application upon SLC and Melancon.78 Accordingly, FMGI has
74 McKee, 45 F.3d at 983.
75 9 U.S.C. § 13.
76 Teverbaugh v. Lima One Capital, LLC., CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-mc-159-KS-MTP, 2020 WL
448259, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 28, 2020)(quoting Meekins v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 3:19-
cv-501, 2019 WL 7340300, at *2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 30, 2019)).
77 R. Docs. 1-1–1-5.
78 R. Doc. 10–1. The Court finds that service against SLC and Melancon was proper pursuant to 9
U.S.C. § 9. Melancon was not a resident of the Eastern District of Louisiana – the district in which the
Award was rendered. Accordingly, FMGI was required to serve SLC and Melancon by U.S. Marshal
Service, and it did so. See R. Docs. 7 and 8. Therefore, the Court deems service was proper under § 9.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 15 of 22

16
complied with 9 U.S.C. § 13’s requirements, and the Court finds the existence of an
arbitration agreement.
Moreover, the Court identifies no reason to vacate the Award under Section 10
of the FAA or modify the Award under Section 11 of the FAA.79 SLC was represented
by counsel80 at the arbitration hearings, submitted “excellent pre-hearing and post-
hearing briefs[,]” provided a pre-trial Joint Statement of Uncontested Statement of
Facts, and had two witnesses and an expert testify at the arbitration hearings.81
Additionally, SLC filed a motion to amend the Award, which was denied by the
arbitrator on January 29, 2025.82 Accordingly, not only has there been no objection to
the fundamental fairness of the arbitration proceedings, but the Court’s own review
sees no reason to doubt the fundamental fairness of the arbitration proceedings, as
there is no evidence that the Award arose out of any sort of arbitrator’s misconduct
envisioned by 9 U.S.C. § 10 or error under 9 U.S.C. § 11.
As it pertains to the arbitrator’s award of damages, the Court “will sustain an
arbitration award as long as the arbitrator's decision ‘draws its essence’ from the
contract—even if [it] disagree[s] with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract.”83
“Moreover, the arbitrator’s selection of a particular remedy is given even more
79 See Cooper, 832 F.3d at 544 (“Under the FAA, the court must confirm an award unless the award is
vacated under Section 10 or modified or corrected under Section 11.”)(citation modified).
80 Robert A. Robertson was counsel for SLC at the arbitration hearings. R. Doc. 1-1 at p. 1.
81 R. Doc. 1-1 at pp. 1–2.
82 R. Doc. 1-5.
83 Timegate Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive, L.L.C., 713 F.3d 797, 802 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also United Paperworkers
Intern. Union, AFL–CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“[A]s long as the arbitrator is even
arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court
is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”).
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 16 of 22

17
deference than his reading of the underlying contract. The remedy lies beyond the
arbitrator’s jurisdiction only if there is no rational way to explain the remedy handed
down by the arbitrator as a logical means of furthering the aims of the contract.”84
Here, the arbitrator determined that the total damages awarded to FMGI
equaled $1,079,383 and awarded FMGI interest on the unpaid award from the date
of the Award until paid, accruing at the Prime Interest Rate published in the Wall
Street Journal.85 	Section 24.2.10 of the Subcontract Agreement provided that
interest for an unpaid award may be issued at the Prime Interest Rate published in
the Wall Street Journal.86 Moreover, the parties consented to arbitration on the
condition that Construction Industry Arbitration Rules were applicable.87 Such rules
“allow an arbitrator to award interest at such rate and from such date as the
arbitrator may deem appropriate.”88 Therefore, it is readily apparent that the Award
“draws its essence” from the Subcontract, and the Court must appropriately confirm
the Award.89
B. FMGI is Entitled to an Entry of Default Judgment, or in the
Alternative, Summary Judgment against SLC.
FMGI seeks an entry of a default judgment against SLC and Melancon.90 The
Court first considers whether the initial Entry of Default by the Clerk of Court was
84 Timegate Studios, Inc., 713 F.3d at 803 (citation modified).
85 R. Doc. 1-1 at p. 10.
86 Id. at p. 21, Section 24.2.10 of the Subcontract Agreement.
87 R. Doc. 1-3 at. 8.
88 Carter & Carter Construction LLC, 2025 WL 3852944, at *3 (citation modified).
89 See Glover v. IBP, Inc., 334 F.3d 471, 474 (5th Cir. 2003)(“When an arbitration agreement gives an
arbitrator authority to interpret and apply a contract, the arbitrator's construction of that contract
must be enforced so long as it is rationally inferable from the letter or purpose of the underlying
agreement.”)(citation modified).
90 R. Doc. 17.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 17 of 22

18
appropriate.91 	FMGI has shown by affidavit92 that SLC was served with FMGI’s
Application to Confirm Arbitration Award93 via personal service on its registered
agent 	on 	July 	17, 	202594 	and 	Melancon 	was 	personally 	served 	with 	FMGI’s
Application to Confirm Arbitration Award on July 17, 2025.95 Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12, SLC and Melancon had twenty-one days to file responsive pleadings to
Plaintiffs’ Application to Confirm Arbitration Award.96 	SLC and Melancon did not
make any appearance in this Court, and the record clearly demonstrates that SLC
and Melancon have “failed to plead or otherwise defend.”97 	Well past the 21-day
deadline to file responsive pleadings, FMGI moved for Entry of Defaults against SLC
and Melancon,98 which the Clerk of Court properly entered on September 4, 2025.99
Therefore, the Court finds that the Entry of Defaults against SLC and Melancon were
proper.100 Those Entry of Defaults, too, were mailed to both South LA Contractors,
LLC at 120 E. Gloria Switch Road in Lafayette, Louisiana and to Bradford James
Melancon at 632 Kilchrist Road in Carencro, Louisiana.101
The Court next considers whether FMGI is entitled to default judgment. 	A
court may only enter a default judgment if the well-pleaded factual allegations in the
91 R. Doc. 12.
92 R. Doc. 10-1.
93 R. Doc. 1.
94 R. Doc. 7.
95 R. Doc. 8.
96 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
97 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
98 R. Doc. 10.
99 R. Doc. 12.
100 Id.
101 See R. Doc. 12, Notice of Receipt. The address for Mr. Melancon is the same address as on the
Louisiana Secretary of State documents, including Mr. Melancon’s Affidavit to Dissolve Limited
Liability Company. See R. Doc. 1-6.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 18 of 22

19
pleadings, which the court accepts as true, provide a “sufficient basis” for a default
judgment. 	FMGI argues that it is entitled to judgment on the Award arising out of
the 	Subcontract 	Agreement.102 	The 	Court, 	having 	previously 	established 	that
jurisdiction, venue, and the FAA substantive elements are satisfied, finds that FMGI
would succeed on the merits, thereby providing a “sufficient basis” for a default
judgment against SLC.103
Additionally, analyzing the matter under an unopposed motion for summary
judgment standard, the Court finds that FMGI has demonstrated the absence of a
genuine issue 	of 	material fact. 	As 	established above, FMGI has 	satisfied the
substantive elements to confirm an arbitration award under the FAA. FMGI has
provided the Award, the Joint Statement of Uncontested Facts submitted to the
arbitrator, the Subcontract, the email chain demonstrating the parties’ consent to
arbitrate before the AAA, the notice of arbitration hearing dated May 29, 2024, the
arbitrator’s order on the motion to amend the Award dated January 29, 2025.104 Thus,
accepting FMGI’s evidence as undisputed,105 the Court determines that FMGI is
entitled to summary against SLC, as it has demonstrated an absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.
102 R. Doc. 17.
103 The Court deems it inappropriate to render a default judgment against Melancon, as he was not a
party to the arbitration proceedings. However, such determination does not absolve Melancon of
personal liability of SLC’s debts as the sole member of the limited liability company. See infra
Part.III.C.
104 R. Docs. 1-1–1-5.
105 Hughes, 2023 WL 8557583, at *2 (citing Morgan, 114 F.Supp. 3d at 437).
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 19 of 22

20
C. Melancon is Personally Liable for the Award as the Sole Member of
SLC.
Because SLC was dissolved by affidavit on March 6, 2025, after the Award, the
Court must resolve who is liable for the Award under Louisiana law.106 On January
6, 2025, Bradford Melancon specifically filed an Affidavit to Dissolve Limited
Liability Company, South La Contractors, LLC, pursuant to La. R.S. § 12:1335.1.107
In the Affidavit to Dissolve Limited Liability Company, Mr. Melancon attested that
SLC 	“is 	no 	longer 	doing 	business, 	owes 	no 	debts 	and 	owns 	no 	immovable
property[.]”108 Melancon further attested to the fact that he is the sole member of
SLC.109 La. R.S. § 12:1335.1(A) provides:
In addition to all other methods of dissolution, if a limited liability
company is no longer doing business, owes no debts, and owns no
immovable property, it may be dissolved by filing an affidavit with the
secretary of state executed by the members or by the organizer, if no
membership interests have been issued, attesting to such facts and
requesting that the limited liability company be dissolved. Thereafter,
the members, or the organizer if no membership interests have been
issued, shall be personally liable for any debts or other claims against
the limited liability company in proportion to their ownership interest
in the company. The secretary of state may prescribe and furnish forms
for filing the affidavit.110
The Award was issued on December 20, 2024,111 and the arbitrator denied SLC’s
motion to amend the Award on January 29, 2025.112 Thus, the Award – a debt of SLC
– had been issued when Melancon filed the affidavit on March 6, 2025.113 The plain
106 R. Doc. 1-6 at p. 8; see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
107 R. Doc. 1-6 at p. 8.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 La. R.S. § 12: 1335.1(A)(emphasis added).
111 R. Doc. 1 at p. 3.
112 R. Doc. 1-5.
113 R. Doc. 1-6 at p. 8.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 20 of 22

21
language of the statute is clear that a member shall be personally liable for any debts
of the limited liability company in proportion to their ownership interest exigible at
the time of dissolution.114 Melancon is the sole member of SLC, thereby making him
personally liable for the entirety of the Award.115 To allow otherwise would allow the
members of a limited liability company to “walk away” from any debit simply by filing
an affidavit to dissolve. Such a result flies in the face of the fair administration of
justice. And as a final matter, the record does not indicate that Melancon underwent
any of the procedures set forth in La. R.S. § 12:1338,116 which, if followed, would have
potentially limited his liability for the Award.117 Accordingly, Melancon is personally
liable for the entirety of the Award entered against SLC.
114 See Soriano v. Gulf Coast Lift, LLC, Civil Action No. 12–2744., 2014 WL 949145, at *7 (E.D. La.
Mar. 11, 2014)(Vance, J.)(“A shareholder can in fact be liable for the debts of a limited liability
company, if it is dissolved by affidavit.”)(citing La. R.S. § 12: 1335.1)(emphasis removed).
115 See Brumberger v. Cvitanovich, 13-801 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/9/14), 140 So. 3d 118, 119 (explaining that,
under § 12:1335.1, an LLC’s dissolution makes its members personally liable “for the debts of or claims
against the limited liability company proportionate to each member's ownership interest[]”).
116 See La. R.S. § 12:1338.
117 La. R.S. § 12:1341 provides as follows:
A. A member of a dissolved limited liability company, which has followed the
procedures set forth in R.S. 12:1338, shall not be liable for any claim against the
limited liability company in an amount in excess of such member's pro rata share of
the claim or the amount so distributed to him, whichever is less.
B. A member of a dissolved limited liability company, which has followed the
procedures set forth in R.S. 12:1338, shall not be liable for any claim against the
limited liability company on which an action, suit, or proceeding has not begun prior
to the expiration of the periods described in R.S. 12:1338(C) and (D).
C. The aggregate liability of any member of a dissolved limited liability company for
claims against the dissolved limited liability company shall not exceed the amount
distributed to him in dissolution.
La. R.S. §§ 12:1341(A)-(C).
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 21 of 22

22
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the above reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Default Judgment118 is
GRANTED against SLC.119
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Arbitration Award against SLC is
CONFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that FMGI has two weeks from the date of
this Order and Reasons to file into the record a proposed judgment commensurate
with this Order and Reasons.
New Orleans, Louisiana, March 9, 2026.
______________________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
118 R. Doc. 17
119 As explained above, the Court does not enter a default judgment against Melancon but finds that
he is personally liable for the entirety of the Award issued against SLC.
Case 2:25-cv-01234-WBV-DPC Document 19 Filed 03/09/26 Page 22 of 22