Canyon v. Entergy Operations, Inc.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SAMUEL CANYON 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 25-1721
ENTERGY OPERATIONS INC. 	SECTION “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Entergy Operations, Inc.’s Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim on Grounds of Preemption (Doc. 11). For
the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This diversity matter arises out of the termination of Plaintiff Samuel
Canyon from his employment as a supervisor in the radiation protection
department at Defendant Entergy Operations, Inc.’s nuclear power plant,
Waterford 3, in Killona, Louisiana. Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated in
retaliation for raising concerns about radiological and environmental safety.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he became a supervisor in the
radiation protection department at the Waterford 3 nuclear power plant in
early 2023. Between October 2023 and August 2024, he generated condition
reports 	relating 	to 	violations 	of 	plant 	procedures 	“directly 	related 	to
radiological safety,” including adequacy of air samples, unqualified workers,
and falsification of records. In 2025, Plaintiff alleges he reported “multiple
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environmental 	and 	public 	safety 	violations,” 	including 	the 	unmonitored
release of radioactive water, the use of radiation detection equipment by
unqualified personnel, and a chilled work environment that discouraged the
filing of adverse condition reports. Plaintiff raised his concerns with Defendant
and 	with 	the 	U.S. 	Nuclear 	Regulatory 	Commission 	(“NRC”) 	in 	a 	formal
meeting on April 2, 2025. He alleges that, shortly after the meeting, he was
placed on administrative leave and ultimately terminated on May 19, 2025.
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	his 	termination 	was 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Louisiana
Environmental Whistleblower Act.
In the instant Motion, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim
against it, arguing that it is preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Plaintiff opposes.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”1 A claim is
“plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”2
A court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must “draw
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”3 The court need not, however,
accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.4 To be legally
sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the
1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
2 Id.
3 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
4 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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plaintiff’s claims are true.5 If it is apparent from the face of the complaint that
an insurmountable bar to relief exists and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief,
the 	court 	must 	dismiss 	the 	claim.6 The 	court’s 	review 	is 	limited 	to 	the
complaint and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are
central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.7
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that his termination was in violation of the Louisiana
Environmental Whistleblower Act (“LEWA”), which provides that:
A. No firm, business, private or public corporation, partnership,
individual 	employer, 	or 	federal, 	state, 	or 	local 	governmental
agency shall act in a retaliatory manner against an employee,
acting in good faith, who does any of the following:
(1) Discloses, or threatens to disclose, to a supervisor or to a public
body an activity, policy, practice of the employer, or another
employer with whom there is a business relationship, that the
employee reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental
law, rule, or regulation.
(2) Provides information to, or testifies before any public body
conducting 	an 	investigation, 	hearing, 	or 	inquiry 	into 	any
environmental violation by the employer, or another employer
with whom there is a business relationship, of an environmental
law, rule, or regulation.8
Defendant argues that because Plaintiff’s claims relate to “radiological
safety,” they are preempted pursuant to field preemption granted by Congress
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (“AEA”). The AEA grants the federal
5 Id.
6 Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57.
7 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
8 LA. REV. S TAT. § 30:2027.
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government 	exclusive 	jurisdiction 	over 	radiological 	safety 	at 	commercial
nuclear power plants.9 Defendant argues that because the field of radiological
safety is preempted by federal law, it is therefore not regulated by Louisiana’s
environmental laws or regulations and falls outside of the LEWA. It notes that
Congress protects nuclear whistleblowers from retaliation through the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974 (“ERA”) and that Plaintiff has also filed a nearly
identical complaint under the ERA before the NRC and the U.S. Department
of Labor.10
In response, Plaintiff does not dispute that Congress has given the NRC
exclusive jurisdiction over radiological safety.11 He also does not appear to
dispute 	that 	the AEA preempts 	any 	claim under the LEWA relating 	to
radiological 	safety.12 	Rather, 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	Defendant 	has
9 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 239 (1984) (noting that Congress
has vested the “NRC with exclusive regulatory authority over the safety aspects of nuclear
development”).
10 42 U.S.C. § 5851.
11 Id.
12 See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990) (“[T]he Court in Pacific Gas
concluded that ‘the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety
concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States. . . . [F]or a state law to fall
within the pre-empted zone, it must have some direct and substantial effect on the decisions
made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels.”).
The Court points out that, although no court has addressed this issue as it relates to the
LEWA, courts have generally held that the ERA and AEA do not preempt state law
whistleblower or wrongful discharge claims. Norris v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 881 F.2d
1144, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the ERA did not preempt plaintiff’s state law actions
for wrongful discharge, and stating “[w]e do not see how the bringing of a state law wrongful
discharge action by an employee for a discharge based on whistle blowing can interfere with
the safe operation of nuclear energy plants”); Masters v. Daniel Int’l Corp., 917 F.2d 455, 456
(10th Cir. 1990) (“In light of English, we find that Masters’ state-law claim for retaliatory
discharge is not pre-empted by the [ERA].”); Gaballah v. PG & E, 711 F. Supp. 988, 991 (N.D.
Cal. 1989) (holding that “section 210 of the ERA does not pre-empt a state court action based
on state law, including a discharge in violation of state public policy”). But see Snow v. Bechtel
Const. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1519 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (“To the extent that Snow claims he was
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mischaracterized his allegations as purely relating to radiological safety. He
argues that he has alleged that he also reported environmental and public
safety violations prior to his termination and that he can bring claims under
the LEWA for those complaints. Accordingly, the Court must assess whether
Plaintiff has put forth allegations that he was retaliated against for disclosing
a policy that “is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation” that
does not implicate radiological safety.13
Even viewing Plaintiff’s Complaint in a light most favorable to him, as
the Court must, the Court cannot say that he has alleged a claim under the
LEWA that does not implicate radiological safety. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges
that 	Plaintiff 	was 	terminated 	in 	retaliation 	for 	reporting 	the 	following
violations:
1. “[V]iolations 	of 	plant 	procedures 	directly 	related 	to 	radiological
safety,” 	including 	“concerns 	about 	adequacy 	of 	air 	samples,
unqualified workers, and falsification of records”;
2. “[A] potential unmonitored release of radioactive water from the
Radiologically Controlled Area (RCS) during rainfall”;
3. “[T]he 	use 	of 	radiation 	detection 	equipment 	by 	unqualified
personnel”;
4. “[A] chilled work environment that discouraged the filing of condition
reports” by employees of the radiation protection department.14
wrongfully terminated . . . because he complained about safety violations, his action is
preempted by § 5851 [the ERA]”). However, because Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant’s
Motion on these grounds, the Court does not address this issue.
13 LA. REV. S TAT. § 30:2027.
14 Doc. 1-2. In his opposition, Plaintiff identifies complaints he made regarding other
“categories of protected activity beyond NRC jurisdiction.” Doc. 20 at 3. However, these
complaints were not pleaded.
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Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	attempts 	to 	characterize 	his 	allegations 	as
merely implicating environmental or public safety concerns are belied by the
clear factual allegations of his Complaint. This Court finds that Plaintiff’s
allegations 	are 	expressly 	related 	to 	radiological 	safety, 	an 	area 	of 	law
preempted by federal law.15 The Court finds therefore that he has not alleged
a claim under the LEWA.
Plaintiff has requested leave to amend his Complaint if the Court grants
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. The Fifth Circuit has held that courts “may not
dismiss a complaint under [R]ule 12(b)(6) ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.’”16 Here, Plaintiff has identified complaints he made regarding
other 	“categories 	of 	protected 	activity 	beyond 	NRC 	jurisdiction” 	that 	he
believes may state a claim for relief that is not preempted. Accordingly, the
Court will allow Plaintiff leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff may
amend his Complaint within 20 days of this Order to the extent that he can
remedy the deficiencies identified herein. Failure to amend will result in
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.
15 See English, 496 U.S. at 85.
16 Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000).
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New Orleans, Louisiana this 30th day of December, 2025.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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