Pierce v. Golden Meadow Town et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DAWN PIERCE
VERSUS
TOWN OF GOLDEN MEADOW, ET AL.
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-2178
SECTION “C” (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Pending before me is Plaintiff Dawn Pierce’s “Motion to Determine Conflict-Free
Counsel.” ECF No. 20. Defendants Town of Golden Meadow, its Mayor Joey Bouziga, Police
Chief Michelle Lafont, and Officer Tristan Gaspard timely filed an Opposition Memorandum, and
Plaintiff timely filed a Reply Memorandum. ECF Nos. 21, 22. No party requested oral argument
in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the court agrees that oral argument is unnecessary.
Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the
applicable law, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons stated
herein.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dawn Pierce filed this § 1983 action against Mayor Joey Bouziga, Police Chief
Michelle Lafont, and Officer Tristan Gaspard in their respective official and personal capacities
and a Monell claim1 against the Town of Golden Meadow (the “Town”) after her arrest for sharing
publicly available lingerie photographs of her nephew’s fiancée. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 18, 19, 21, 110-
17, 133-147. She also asserts state tort claims and asserts the Town is vicariously liable for same
under LA. CIV. Code art. 2320. Id. ¶¶ 157-167, 175-182, 189-194. In their Answer, Defendants
concede that Mayor Bouziga, Chief Lafont, and Officer Gaspard were employees of the Town at
1 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
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all relevant times acting in their official capacities. ECF No. 6 at 3-4 (¶¶ 18-19, 21). Defendants
assert, among other defenses, that none of the acts by the individual defendants support a valid
Monell claim; that none of the individual defendants’ actions warrant a finding of vicarious
liability on part of the Town and do not support a theory of respondeat superior under state law;
and that all of their actions were done for legitimate governmental reasons. Id. at 21-22 (¶¶ 8, 11-
12). No Scheduling Order has been issued.
Defendants are all represented by Keith Detweiler. 	Plaintiff requested that Defendants
admit the Town “will fully indemnify each individual Defendant for all relief obtained” through
the litigation. ECF No. 20-2 at 13. Defendants initially objected to the Request for Admission.
Id. However, according to Plaintiff’s counsel’s March 11, 2026, email memorializing a meet-and-
confer conference, Detweiler reported that the Town has decided not to fully indemnify the
individual defendants and, at Plaintiff’s suggestion, agreed to provide affidavits in accordance with
the requirements this Court ordered in Lou v. Lopinto (“Lou affidavit”). ECF No. 20-4 at 5-6; see
Civ. No. 21-80, ECF No. 58 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2022).2 Detweiler’s April 9, 2026, email indicates
that he was preparing the “affidavits as discussed.” 	ECF No. 20-4 at 2. 	As of April 21, 2026,
however, Plaintiff had not received Lou affidavits, and thus, filed this motion. ECF No. 20-4 at 2.
II. 	THE PENDING MOTION
Plaintiff now files this “Motion to Determine Conflict-Free Counsel” asking the Court to
disqualify Detweiler from representing both the individual defendants and the Town in the absence
of Lou affidavits. ECF No. 20. While unclear, Plaintiff suggests that Detweiler’s simultaneous
representation of the individual defendants and the Town raises a material limitation conflict under
Rule 1.7(a)(2) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct (“LRPC”) and the American Bar
2 In Lou, the Court addressed a virtually identical conflict of interest issue by requiring both defendants and their
counsel provide separate affidavits to establish the defendants’ informed consent. Civ. No. 21-80, ECF No. 58.
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Association's (“ABA”) Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 	ECF No. 20-1 at 2-3 (quoting
M ODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 23, which states that “simultaneous representation”
is governed by Rule 1.7(a)(2)). 	Plaintiff asserts that this conflict “threatens the integrity of the
proceedings” and discusses cases from district courts in the Fifth Circuit that have found a material
limitation conflict arises when a municipality and its employees are represented by the same
counsel and a plaintiff’s § 1983 action asserts both a Monell claim against the municipality and
personal capacity claims against the employees. Id. at 2, 7-8 (discussing Shadid v. Jackson, 521
F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Tex. 1981); Nagle v. Gusman, No. 12-1910, 2015 WL 1525827 (E.D. La. Apr.
2, 2015) (Vance, J.); Rogers v. Smith, No. 20-517, ECF No. 274 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2023) (Milazzo,
J.); Brown v. Burmaster, No. 22-847, 2025 WL 1019399 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2025) (Fallon, J.)).
In Opposition, Defendants assert that, at this early stage, “there is no obvious conflict of
interest,” directly adverse conflict, or material limitation conflict. ECF No. 24 at 2-3 (discussing
Breaud v. Cantrell, No. 24-1865, 2025 WL 2646113 (E.D. La. Sept. 15, 2025) (Brown, J.)). Even
if there were a material limitation conflict, Defendants state that they are willing to waive it
because they are aligned in their defenses and not likely to change their positions. Id. at 2.
In Reply, Plaintiff asserts Defendants’ current stance on alignment does not ameliorate the
conflict because § 1983 cases involving Monell and individual capacity claims present a structural
conflict. ECF No. 25 at 1-2. Plaintiff also asserts Defendants misunderstand Breaud as to whether
this conflict is “open and obvious” and its factual similarity to this case. Id. at 1-3.
III. 	APPLICABLE LAW
A. Standard for Disqualification
Although a “‘district court is obliged to take measures against unethical conduct occurring
in connection with any proceeding before it[,]’ it must not impose the sanction of disqualification
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‘cavalierly.’”3 A motion to disqualify counsel is a substantive motion affecting the rights of the
parties and is determined by applying standards developed under federal law.4 	They are
“‘generally disfavored’ and ‘require a high standard of proof’ so as to not deprive a party of its
chosen counsel.”5 	Conflict of interests are generally best-settled between the client and his
attorney,6 and the party moving for disqualification is burdened with showing an actual conflict
exists.7 	“All of the facts particular to a case must be considered, in the context of the relevant
ethical criteria and with meticulous deference to the litigant's rights.”8
Disqualification cases are governed by state and national ethical standards adopted by the
court.9 When considering attorney disqualification, the court considers (1) the district’s local rules;
(2) the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct; (3) the ABA's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility; and (4) the state rules of conduct.10 Local and national ethical canons are useful
guides, but they are not controlling.11 Nor are they mechanically applied.12 Applying an exacting
standard for a motion to disqualify is necessary to protect a party's right to counsel of choice and
3 Nagle, 2015 WL 1525827, at *4 (alterations in original) (quoting In re ProEducation Int’l, Inc., 587 F.3d 296, 299–
300 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[D]epriving a party of the right to be represented by the attorney of his or her choice is a penalty
that must not be imposed without careful consideration.”)).
4 F.D.I.C. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1311-12 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 543
(5th Cir. 1992).
5 Mose v. Keybank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 11-162, 2011 WL 2790199, at *1 (M.D. La. July 14, 2011) (citing F.D.I.C. v. U.S.
Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Katrina Canal Breches Consol. Litig., 2008 WL 3845228, at *3
(E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2008)).
6 F.D.I.C., 50 F.3d at 1315.
7 Treece v. Perrier Condo. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 3d 530, 535 (E.D. La. 2021) (Morgan, J.) (citing United
States v. DeCay, 406 F. Supp. 2d 679, 683 (E.D. La. 2005)); Galderma Lab’ys, L.P. v. Actavis Mid Atl. LLC, 927 F.
Supp. 2d 390, 398 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (“[Movant] must establish that there is a conflict of interest under the applicable
ethics standards and if so, that disqualification is the proper remedy.” (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1546 (5th
Cir. 1994) (placing the burden of establishing a conflict on the client seeking disqualification))); Mose, 2011 WL
2790199, at *2.
8 F.D.I.C., 50 F.3d at 1314.
9 Id. at 1311–12 (quoting In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1992)).
10 Id. at 1312; Horaist v. Dr.'s Hosp. of Opelousas, 255 F.3d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 2001).
11 F.D.I.C., 50 F.3d at 1314.
12 Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1569 (5th. Cir. 1989); Church of Scientology of Cal.
v. McLean, 615 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1980).
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to discourage the use of such motions as a trial tactic.13 	The court must be conscious of its
responsibility to preserve a reasonable balance between the need to ensure ethical conduct on the
part of lawyers appearing before it and other social interests, such as the right of a party to counsel
of choice and an attorney's right to freely practice law. 14
When considering a motion to disqualify, a court should first look to its local rules.15 Local
Civil Rule 83.2.3 of this district adopts the LRPC as its rules of conduct.16 The relevant LRPC is
virtually identical to its counterpart under the Model Rules,17 and the “Fifth Circuit has recognized
the . . . Model Rules . . . as the national standards to consider in reviewing motions to disqualify.”18
Thus, the Court considers both the LRPC and Model Rules in this analysis.19
A. Disqualification Under Rule 1.7(a)(2)
Rules 1.7 of the LPRC and Model Rules govern concurrent conflicts of interest, including
material limitation conflicts. Rule 1.7 in pertinent part states:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict
of interest exists if:
. . .
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibility to another
client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the
lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
13 F.D.I.C., 50 F.3d at 1315 (finding a tortured justification for disqualification based on a possible conflict reflected
a tactic to delay and harass rather than a conscientious professional concern).
14 Woods v. Covington Cty. Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478
F.2d 562, 564–65 (2d Cir. 1973)); see also F.D.I.C., 50 F.3d at 1313 (citing Woods, 537 F.2d at 813).
15 ProEducation Int’l, 587 F.3d at 299 (quoting F.D.I.C., 50 F.3d at 1312).
16 E.D. La. L.R. 83.2.3 (adopting the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Louisiana State Bar Association).
17 Compare LA. RULES OF P RO. CONDUCT r. 1.7, with M ODEL RULES OF P RO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 (A M. BAR ASS ’ N 2025).
See CEF Funding, L.L.C. v. Sher Garner Cahill Richter Klein & Hilbert, L.L.C., No. 09-6623, 2010 WL 2773116, at
*2 & n.12 (E.D. La. July 9, 2010) (Africk, J.) (finding, among others, LRPC 1.7 identical to Model Rule 1.7 (citing
Lange v. Orleans Levee Dist., No. 97-987, 1997 WL 668216, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 1997) (Clement, J.))).
18 W. Bankers Cap., Inc. v. Kirton McConkie, P.C., No. 23-5124, 2025 WL 522542, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 2025)
(Long, J.) (quoting ProEducation Int’l, 587 F.3d at 299).
19 Id. (citing ProEducation Int’l, 587 F.3d at 299). Because the relevant rules under the LRPC and Model Rules are
virtually identical, the Court interchangeably refers to them.
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(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.20
A material limitation conflict exists when there is a significant risk that the representation
of one client will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client.21
Simultaneous representation of codefendants in litigation is governed by Rule 1.7(a)(2).22 	As
Comment 8 of Model Rule 1.7 explains, a material limitation “conflict of interest exists if there is
a significant risk that a lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course
of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other responsibilities
or interests.”23 “The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to
the client”; however, the possibility of future harm “does not itself require disclosure or consent.”24
The court considers “the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does,
whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in
considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf
of the client.” 25
Notwithstanding a conflict under Rule 1.7(a), clients may consent to representation if all
four conditions of paragraph (b) are met. However, “some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning
that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the
20 LA. RULES OF P RO. CONDUCT r. 1.7; M ODEL RULES OF P RO. CONDUCT r. 1.7.
21 LA. RULES OF P RO. CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2); MODEL R ULES OF P RO. CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2); Johnson v. Clark Gin Serv.
Inc., No. 15-3290, 2016 WL 7017267, at *9 (E.D. La. Dec. 1, 2016) (Brown, J.).
22 M ODEL RULES OF P RO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 23.
23 M ODEL RULES OF P RO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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basis of a client’s consent.”26 These prohibited representations exist in the absence of any one of
the first three conditions of Rule 1.7(b): 	(1) the lawyer reasonably believes he will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to the each affected client; (2) the representation is
not illegal; and; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a client by one client against
another of the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding.27 	When multiple clients are
involved, the question of whether consent is permissible must be resolved as to each client.28
Even when the representation is subject to consent, each affected client must give
“informed consent, confirmed in writing.”29 “Informed consent requires that each affected client
be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that
the conflict could have adverse effects on the [their] interests.”30 “When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the
common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-
client privilege and the advantages and risks involved.”31 While the movant bears the burden of
proving a disqualifying conflict of interest, “the attorney asserting the excuse of informed consent
has the burden of showing that his . . . client has given informed consent.”32
IV. 	ANALYSIS
A. Standing
Cognizant that motions to disqualify may be used as tactical weapons in litigation, courts
are reluctant to disqualify an attorney based on an alleged conflict of interest raised by opposing
26 M ODEL RULES OF P RO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 14.
27 Id. at cmts. 15-17.
28 Id. at cmt. 14.
29 Id. at 1.7(b)(4).
30 Id. at cmt. 18. The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and risks involved. Id.
31 Id.
32 Waneck v. CSX Corp., No. 17-106, 2017 WL 11695758, at *8 n.3 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 25, 2017) (citing Galderma
Lab’ys, 927 F. Supp. 2d at 398; El Camino Res., Ltd. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 623 F. Supp. 2d 863, 879 (W.D. Mich.
2007)), R.&R. adopted, 2017 WL 5157394 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 7, 2017).
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counsel rather than a former client.33 	This requirement, sometimes referred to as standing,34 is
subject to narrow exceptions when unethical conduct is “manifest and glaring” or “open and
obvious” such that the court has a plain duty to act.35 	Even when the movant is not the former
client, a federal court “is obliged to take measures against unethical conduct occurring in
connection with any proceeding before it,”36 including alleged conflicts of interest.37 Such duty is
self-imposed by the court’s authority “to determine who may practice before [it] and to regulate
the conduct of those who do” that is within the court’s inherent judicial power.38
Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s standing to seek disqualification, asserting there is no
“obvious” conflict. ECF No. 24 at 3. However, Plaintiff has invoked the Court’s inherent power.
See ECF No. 20-1 at 2. Further, as the court explained in Breaud, there is an “open and obvious”
potential conflict of interest when the same attorney represents both a municipality and its
employees in a § 1983 action.39 Thus both that exception and the Court’s duty to regulate attorney
conduct require it to address the merits of Plaintiff’s motion.
B. Conflict Arising from Simultaneous Representation in § 1983 Action
1. 	Claims Under § 1983
Section 1983 creates a damages remedy for the violation of federal constitutional or
statutory rights under color of state law:
33 In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1976).
34 Although the Fifth Circuit has used the term “standing,” this “standing” is not to be confused with the Article III
requirement of standing. Id. at 88; In re Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d 383, 402 n.20 (3d Cir. 2006).
35 Nagle, 2015 WL 1525827, at *3 (citation modified) (quoting Yarn Processing, 530 F.2d at 88-89); see also In re
Andry, No. 15-2478, 2020 WL 5982898, at *10 n.116 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 2020) (Morgan, J.); Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v.
Gargoyle Mgmt. Inc., No. 24-38, 2024 WL 5424896, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2024).
36 Woods, 537 F.2d at 810.
37 United States v. Roark, 288 F. App’x 182, 186 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We have recognized a district court’s inherent
authority to take measures against conflicts of interest when they arise ‘in connection with any proceeding before it.’”
(quoting Woods, 537 F.2d at 510)).
38 Id. (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
39 2025 WL 2646113, at *4 (quoting Nagle, 2015 WL 1525827, at *8).
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law . . . .40
“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using their badge of authority to deprive
individuals of federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”41
Generally, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements to establish § 1983 liability:
(1) 	deprivation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law;
(2) 	that occurred under color of state law; and
(3) 	was caused by a state actor.42
Section 1983 claims may be brought against persons in their personal or official capacity
or against a governmental entity, such as a municipality.43 “Personal-capacity suits seek to impose
personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law.”44 It is
only the “performance of official duties” that creates the liability for a personal capacity claim,45
which is why a plaintiff must show that an official, “acting under color of state law, caused the
deprivation of a federal right” to establish personal liability in a § 1983 action.46 	Their private
actions are not actions “under color of state law” and thus not actionable under § 1983,47 because
neither § 1983 nor the Fourteenth Amendment protects against private acts.48 	Available to an
40 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
41 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978)).
42 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
43 Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)).
44 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).
45 Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civ. Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 484 (5th Cir. 2000).
46 Graham, 473 U.S. at 166; see also Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 776 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“Generally,
if an officer is performing their official duties, their acts ‘are included [within the meaning of under color of state law]
whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it’ though ‘acts of officers in the ambit of their personal
pursuits are plainly excluded.’” (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945))).
47 See Tyson v. Sabine, 42 F.4th 508, 523 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 465 (5th
Cir. 2010)); see also Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harris v. Rhodes, 94 F.3d 196,
197 (5th Cir. 1996)).
48 See Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194 (2024).
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official sued in his personal capacity are personal immunity defenses, such as qualified or “good
faith” immunity for his performance of discretionary functions. 49 Should a plaintiff succeed on
her personal capacity claim, that victory is against the individual defendant and not the entity that
employs him; there is no imposition of fee liability on the latter.50
To hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for its employee’s conduct, it is insufficient to
rely on theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.51 Rather, the plaintiff must show the
“the municipality itself cause[d] the constitutional violation at issue” through the “execution of the
government’s policy or custom” by that employee.52 	She must establish three elements: “(1) a
policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a ‘violation of constitutional rights whose moving force
is the policy or custom.’”53 Unlike individuals sued in their private capacity, “municipalities have
no immunity from damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations.”54
Because a municipality is only liable under § 1983 “when the entity itself is a moving force
behind” the constitution deprivation, 55 a plaintiff must show the employee’s conduct was a
performance of his official duties,” i.e. action under color of law.56 A municipality is not liable if
49 Lucas v. City of Thibodaux, No. 24-1943, 2026 WL 570415, at *9 (E.D. La. Mar. 2, 2026) (Long, J.) (quoting Hafer
v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
50 Graham, 473 U.S. at 167-68.
51 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95).
52 Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1115 (5th Cir. 2006)
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91).
53 Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 280 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694)).
54 Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 388 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Owens v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657
(1980); and citing Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Unlike government officials
sued in their individual capacities, municipal entities and local governing bodies do not enjoy immunity from suit,
either absolute or qualified, under § 1983.”); Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 759 (5th Cir.
1993) (“While qualified immunity shields a city's officers from damages caused by their transgression of rights not
‘clearly established’ at the time of their conduct, the city itself is ‘strictly liable’ for all constitutional violations
committed pursuant to its policies.”)).
55 Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (citation modified).
56 See Turner, 229 F.3d at 478 (“The performance of official duties creates two potential liabilities, individual-capacity
liability for the person and official-capacity liability for the municipality.”).
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the conduct at issue is private conduct because there is no constitutional injury that it caused.57
2. 	Potential for Conflict of Interest in § 1983 Action
In the § 1983 context, conflicts may arise in two different ways: (1) an employee may be
able to transfer some liability to the municipality by demonstrating that his actions were taken in
accordance with an official policy; and (2) the municipality might try to avoid liability by arguing
that the employee was acting outside the scope of their official duties.58 Although the Fifth Circuit
has not provided a binding rule on whether a material limitation conflict exists when an attorney
simultaneously represents a municipality and an individual government official in a § 1983
action,59 it has warned that “a serious problem of conflict of interest could exist in . . . 1983 actions
in which one attorney represents both a county and a county official individually.”60 Thus, there
is a “need for sensitivity” to the potential for conflicts in this situation.61
A municipality may avoid liability by showing that the employee was not acting
within the scope of his official duties, because his unofficial actions would not be
pursuant to municipal policy. The employee, by contrast, may partially or
completely avoid liability by showing that he was acting within the scope of his
official duties. If he can show that his actions were pursuant to an official policy,
he can at least shift part of his liability to the municipality. If he is successful in
asserting a good faith immunity defense, the municipality may be wholly liable
because it cannot assert the good faith immunity of its employees as a defense to a
section 1983 action.62
Courts within the Fifth Circuit follow this logic in analyzing this issue.63
57 See Bustos, 599 F.3d at 467 (noting “a municipality cannot be liable ‘[i]f a person has suffered no constitutional
injury at the hands of the individual police officer’” and affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s Monell claim based on
officers’ private conduct (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986))).
58 Brown, 2025 WL 1019399 at *2 (citation omitted); see also Breaud, 2025 WL 2646113 at *4; Nagle, 2015 WL
1525827, at *1.
59 Breaud, 2025 WL 2646113, at *4.
60 Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 495 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated on other
grounds, 640 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1981), and on reh'g en banc, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981).
61 Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Cnty. of Fremont, 85 F.3d 489, 494 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gordon v.
Norman, 788 F.2d 1194, 1199 (6th Cir. 1986)).
62 Dunton v. Suffolk County, 729 F.2d 903, 907 (2d Cir.) (relying on Gray, 628 F.2d at 495 n.7), amended by, 748 F.2d
69 (2d Cir. 1984).
63 See Nagle, 2015 WL 1525827, at *1; Brown, 2025 WL 1019399, at *2; Breaud, 2025 WL 2646113, at *4; Moore
v. LaSalle Corr. Inc., No. 16-1007, 2025 WL 2055746, at *2 (W.D. La. July 22, 2025); Surratt v. McClaran, 234 F.
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Despite Plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary, there is no per se “structural” conflict rule that
requires a finding of a material limitation conflict in every §1983 action involving simultaneous
representation of a municipality and its employees sued in their personal capacity.64 Indeed, a per
se rule would be contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that courts should consider “all of the
facts particular to a case . . . in the context of the relevant ethical criteria and with meticulous
deference to the litigant’s rights” when addressing a motion to disqualify.65
The Answer makes clear that the Town and individual defendants have stated that, at all
relevant times, the latter were employees of the former and acted in their respective official
capacity. ECF No. 6 at 3-4 (¶¶ 18-19, 21). The individual defendants in fact assert as a defense
that they acted in their respective official capacity and acted within the course and scope of their
employment. Id. at 25 (¶ 27). While the individual defendants do assert qualified immunity, (Id.
at 23 (¶ 20)), such assertion does not alone establish a conflict of interest between a municipality
and its individual officer.66 And the Town joins the individual defendants in asserting L A. REV.
STAT . § 9:2798.1(B) as a defense, which is only available for acts that are “within the course and
scope of [the latter’s] lawful powers and duties.” Id. at 20 (¶ 2). Thus, there is no inherent conflict
Supp. 3d 815, 822-23 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (distinguishing Dunton), aff’d sub nom., Surratt v. McClarin, 851 F.3d 389
(5th Cir. 2017); see also Rogers, ECF No. 274 at 1 (relying on Nagle’s, and thus Dunton’s, discussion of the conflict).
64 See Dunton, 729 F.2d at 908 n.4.
65 F.D.I.C., 50 F.3d at 1314 (emphasis added). Other courts likewise apply a case-by-case approach. See Johnson,
85 F.3d at 493; Gordon, 788 F.2d at 1197-98; Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142, 1147-48 (7th Cir. 1987); see also
Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2006).
66 Griffin v. County of Suffolk, No. 23-5032, 2024 WL 3675904, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2024) (citing Rodick v. City
of Schenectady, 1 F.3d 1341, 1350 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that “an improper conflict of interest” did not exist where
the City attorney argued that “the officers were acting in their official capacity” and “argued all possible defenses
available to them, including the qualified immunity defense”); Patterson, 440 F.3d at 115 (“[t]he particular conflict
cited in Dunton is simply not present here since “[a]t no time did [the attorney who represented all defendants] assert
that [he corrections officer] was acting ‘outside the scope of his employment’ during the January 1999 assault, as the
attorney had in Dunton.”)); accord. Wallace v. Poulos, No. 08-251, 2008 WL 11367536, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 24, 2008)
(finding “no conflict that prevents . . . counsel from representing [the county and its police officers] in this action at
this time” because all defendants “agree that the police officers acted within the scope of their official duties”); Cupp
v. Smith, No. 20-3456, 2020 WL 5407988, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2020) (finding county’s position that its
employees’ conduct arose out of their employment “undermines any suggestion that [c]ounsel has or will litigate this
case in a way detrimental” to one of its employees).
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in both the Town and individual defendants having the unified position that the latter “did nothing
illegal and acted in the course and scope of their employment.”67
Plaintiff’s suggestion of adverse interests based on the Town’s defense that the individual
defendants’ actions cannot warrant a finding of vicarious liability pursuant to LA. CIV. Code art.
2320 is unconvincing. See ECF No. 20-1 at 4. Under article 2320, “employers are answerable for
the damage occasioned by their [employees], in the exercise of the functions in which they are
employed.” 	Unlike § 1983 actions, “[m]unicipalities do not enjoy special protection from
vicarious liability under Louisiana law and are subject to respondeat superior like every other
employer.”68 While a municipality’s denial of vicarious liability could indicate that its employee
was not “acting within the course and scope of his employment,”69 that is not necessarily true.
Rather, it could also mean the municipality asserts that its employee did nothing wrong while
acting in the course and scope of his employment.70 The Answer in this case indicates the Town’s
position appears to be the latter. 	See ECF No. 6 at 18 (¶ 192) (“It is admitted Officer Gaspard
acted at all times pertinent herein in his capacity as an employee . . . .”). Of course, the Town and
individual defendants’ respective positions may diverge over time.71 	But the fact that they are
67 Surratt, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 822; see also Nolan v. City of New York, 754 F. Supp. 3d 548, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)
(“When [there is] a ‘unified theory of defense’ . . . , there is no Dunton issue.” (quoting Restivo v. Hessemann, 846
F.3d 547, 581 (2d Cir. 2017))).
68 Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 174 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Brasseaux v. Town of Mamou, 752 So. 2d 815 (La.
2000)).
69 See Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So. 2d 994, 996 (La. 1996) (citing Orgeron v. McDonald, 639 So. 2d 224, 226 (La.
1994)).
70 See, e.g., Frank v. Parnell, No. 18-978, 2019 WL 2438685, at *9 (W.D. La. May 14, 2019) (“If there is no underlying
tort, there can be no basis for the imposition of vicarious liability.” (citing Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d
318 (La. 1994))), R.&R. adopted, 2019 WL 2479462 (W.D. La. June 10, 2019).
71 See Shadid, 521 F. Supp. at 90 (“Defendants correctly observe that ‘no conflict can exist so long as these defendants
make common cause.’ but there is no way of knowing if and when that strategic posture may change.”); Breaud, 2025
WL 2646113, at *5; Brown, 2025 WL 1019399, at *2 (“While the Court acknowledges that at this time both
Defendants assert the same defense that Burmaster acted as a reasonable police officer when he encountered Apollo
on the day in question, they cannot unequivocally guarantee that their ‘unified’ position will remain unchanged before,
during, or after trial. Put simply, there is nothing that restricts the City's ability to change its theory of defense and
shift the blame to Burmaster.”).
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“capable of arguing . . . alternative position[s]” at some later stage is not evidence of a conflict of
interest at this stage.72
Whether a municipality has agreed to indemnify its officer for claims for which liability
can be transferred between them has repeatedly been found to be an indicator that the interests of
the municipality and the officer are aligned and not in conflict.73 	While Plaintiff asserts that
Detweiler advised that the Town has decided not to fully indemnify the individual defendants when
agreeing to provide Lou affidavits (see ECF No. 20-4 at 2, 5-6), Plaintiff does not offer any
statement, email or other evidence from Defendants setting forth that assertion. 	Plaintiff’s
inference that a conflict exists based on discussions during their meet-and-confer, however, is
insufficient to carry the heavy burden of showing an actual material limitation conflict exists in
this case at this time.
Consistent with its duty to take measures against unethical conduct, the Court orders
Defendants to, within 14 days, notify Plaintiff in writing of the Town’s decision regarding
indemnifying the individual defendants for claims for which liability can be transferred between
them. 	Should the Town decide not to fully indemnify, that decision could well establish the
existence of a material limitation conflict for the same attorney representing both the Town and
72 Surratt, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 822.
73 See Griffin, 2024 WL 3675904, at *4 (citing Galloway v. Nassau County, 569 F. Supp. 3d 143, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)
(“the Nassau County Police Officer Indemnification Board agreed to indemnify each individual defendant for all
damages, including punitive damages, which aligns the parties.”); Coggins v. County of Nassau, 615 F. Supp. 2d 11,
33 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the interests of Nassau County and its officers were aligned given the final
determinations of the Nassau County Police Officer Indemnification Board which found that the officer acted within
the scope of their employment); Breaud, 2025 WL 2646113, at *5 (“With no documentation asserting the City's plans
on indemnifying the individual defendants or showing that the City and the individual defendants are completely
aligned in their defense theories, there is a possibility that a conflict of interest could arise in the future.”); Nagle, 2015
WL 1525827, at *3; Restivo, 846 F.3d at 581 (finding as an indicator of alignment that county’s position that it would
fully indemnify county detective); see also Moore, 2025 WL 2055746, at *3 (requiring indemnification agreement to
cure conflict); Brown, 2025 WL 1019399, at *2 (raising concern that individual defendant had informed consent based
on waiver agreement because the agreement had “no mention of the City's indemnification policy – which is contained
in an entirely separate document – that significantly limits its ability to pay for [the defendant’s] compensatory
damages involving certain claims and expressly excludes payment of attorney's fees and legal costs.”).
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individual defendants in this § 1983 case because representation of one client will be materially
limited by his representation of the other. 	Plaintiff then may reurge her motion to disqualify.
Should the Town decide to fully indemnify, Defendants must file Lou affidavits within the 14 days.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
Plaintiff Dawn Pierce’s “Motion to Determine Conflict-Free Counsel” is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE as stated herein.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants notify Plaintiff in writing of the Town of Golden
Meadow’s decision regarding fully indemnifying the individual defendants for claims for which
liability can be transferred between them within 14 days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should the Town of Golden Meadow agree to full
indemnification, within 14 days, counsel for Defendants file a separate Affidavit by each
Defendant to establish informed consent has been provided, which Affidavit should confirm that
counsel (a) met with the defendant; (b) explained the litigation, the claims against the defendant,
and the ways in which the defendant’s interest is potentially adverse to the interests of other
defendants represented by the same counsel; (c) explained the ramifications of the potential
conflicts and the ways in which counsel’s representation of the defendant may be limited by its
obligations to other defendants; (d) explained the effect of the indemnification agreement and the
waiver of potential conflicts; (e) confirmed that the defendant was notified that the Town of Golden
Meadow would pay for separate counsel, if necessary; and (f) confirmed that the defendant was
offered an opportunity to consult with separate counsel regarding the waiver of potential conflicts
before waiving same. 	If anything contained in these Affidavits contain confidential client
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information or information subject to the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, the
Affidavit(s) may be filed UNDER SEAL;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should the Town of Golden Meadow agree to full
indemnification, within 14 days, defense counsel provide his own affidavit averring (a) that he
reasonably believes that he will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each
defendant; (b) that the Meadow of Town has agreed to indemnify the individual defendants for
compensatory damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees; and (c) that counsel has met with each
defendant and (1) explained the litigation, the claims against the defendant, and the ways in which
the defendant’s interest is potentially adverse to the interests of other defendants represented by
the same counsel; (2) explained the ramifications of the potential conflicts and the ways in which
counsel’s representation of the defendant may be limited by its obligations to other defendants;
(3) explained the effect of the indemnification agreement and the waiver of potential conflicts;
(4) confirmed that the defendant was notified that the Town of Golden Meadow would pay for
separate counsel, if necessary; and (5) confirmed that the defendant was offered an opportunity to
consult with separate counsel regarding the waiver of potential conflicts before waiving same. If
anything contained in the Affidavit contains confidential client information or information subject
to the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, the Affidavit may be filed UNDER
SEAL.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ________ day of May, 2026.
___________________________________
DONNA PHILLIPS CURRAULT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
11th
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