Crossland v. Brooks et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DANNY TREY CROSSLAND, 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 26-345
WARDEN BROOKS, ET AL. 	SECTION “P”(3)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Danny Trey Crossland, a Louisiana state prisoner, filed this pro se
and in forma pauperis civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans With
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., against Rayburn Correctional
Center, Warden Brooks, Dr. Juan Martinez, Warden Travis Day, Nurse Tiffany Nola,
Secretary of the Department of Public Safety & Corrections Gary E. Westcott,
Warden Keith Bickham, and the Louisiana Secretary of State.
In his complaint, Crossland claims that he has a progressive neurological
disease, spino cerebellar 	ataxia, which causes issues with vision, balance, walking,
coordination, speech, memory, and requires him to utilize a wheelchair.1 Crossland
claims that he has sought, but was denied medical parole.2 He explains that, in March
2025, he was referred to a neurologist at UMC.3 According to Crossland, several
months 	later, 	the 	neurologist 	agreed 	to 	recommend 	him 	for 	medical 	parole.4
Approximately one week later, Dr. Martinez, the physician at Rayburn Correctional
1 R. Doc. 1 at 6–8
2 Id.
3 Id. at 6.
4 Id.
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Center, informed Crossland that his request for medical parole had been denied.5 In
July 2025, Crossland wrote the parole board seeking medical parole and was advised
that he must obtain such a recommendation from the medical section of the
institution where he is incarcerated, from the institution’s warden, and then from the
Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, who then must submit
a recommendation to the parole board for consideration.6 Crossland specifically
claims that Dr. Martinez and Nurse Tiffany Nola denied him a medical parole
recommendation.7 He asserts that Dr. Martinez told the “Warden” that he is not
“permanently 	disabled” 	and, 	therefore, 	he 	is 	not 	eligible 	for 	medical 	parole.8
Crossland claims that he filed an administrative grievance in August 2025, but it was
rejected.9
Crossland requests the Court “help [him] put pressure on the doctor/infirmary
to follow the chain of command and give the Warden a recommendation regarding
medical parole for [him].10 He also seeks monetary damages.11
5 Id. at 7.
6 Id. at 7; R. Doc. 1-1 at 1.
7 Id. at 6–8.
8 Id. at 6. For purposes of the medical parole program overseen by the Department of
Public Safety and Corrections, an offender who, because of an existing medical or
physical condition, is “[p]ermanently disabled” may be considered for medical parole.
La. Rev. Stat. § 15:574.20(A) and (B)(1)(a). A “‘[p]ermanently disabled offender’
means any offender who is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which is or can be expected to be permanently irreversible.” Id. at
(B)(1)(a).
9 Id. at 8.
10 Id. at 5.
11 Id.
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I. 	Mandatory Screening Provisions
“There is no absolute right to be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in civil
matters; rather it is a privilege extended to those unable to pay filing fees when the
action is not frivolous or malicious.” Startti v. United States, 415 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th
Cir. 1969). 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) thus directs, in relevant part, that courts “shall
dismiss [an in forma pauperis plaintiff’s] case at any time” if the plaintiff’s
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or is determined to
be frivolous.
In addition, because Crossland is incarcerated, he is subject to the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That statute mandates that federal courts “review,
before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a
complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
Regarding such lawsuits, federal law similarly requires:
On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A complaint is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Berry v.
Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). This standard, “when
applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also
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the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A
“complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it does not
contain ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
II. 	Analysis
Crossland filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In pertinent part, that
statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, “[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citation omitted).
Crossland also mentions that “possibly” his rights under the ADA have been
violated.12 Under Title II of ADA, a plaintiff states a claim for relief is he alleges
that “(1) that he has a qualifying disability; (2) that he is being denied the benefits
of services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is
otherwise 	discriminated 	against 	by 	the 	public 	entity; 	and 	(3) 	that 	such
12 Id. at 5–6.
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discrimination is by reason of his disability.” Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th
Cir. 2011) (citing Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671–72 (5th
Cir. 2004)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To have a qualifying disability, a plaintiff
must demonstrate “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. at 499–500
(internal quotations omitted).
“State prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public entity[.]’”
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998)). A prison’s failure
to attend to the medical needs of a prisoner alone, however, does not violate the
ADA. Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 F. App’x 368, 377 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted). Further, intentional discrimination is required in order to recover
compensatory damages under the ADA. Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d
567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002).
Even liberally construed,13 Crossland’s claims against defendants should be
dismissed because they are frivolous, fail to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, and/or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
13 The Court must liberally construe a pro se civil rights complaint. See Moore v.
McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994).
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A. Crossland’s § 1983 Claims
1. 	Rayburn Correctional Center
Initially, Crossland named the Rayburn Correctional Center as a defendant.14
“A prison may not be sued because it is merely a building, not a ‘person’ subject to
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Sanders v. Rayburn Correctional Center, No. 13-6122,
2014 WL 2700848, at *2 (E.D. La. June 13, 2014); accord Hodge v. B.B. Sixty Rayburn
Correctional Center, No. 08-3193, 2008 WL 4628586, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2008);
Thomas v. Rayburn Correctional, No. 07-9203, 2008 WL 417759, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb.
13, 2008); Carlisle v. Rayburn Correctional Center, No. 07-451, 2007 WL 550054, at
*2 (E.D. La. Feb. 16, 2007).
As such, Crossland’s § 1983 claim against Rayburn Correctional Center is
improper and must be dismissed.
2. 	Warden Bickham, Secretary Westcott, & the Secretary of State
in their Individual Capacities
Crossland’s complaint fails to include any allegations whatsoever against
Warden Bickham, Gary E. Westcott, and the Secretary of State.15 The United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has held: “Plaintiffs suing governmental
officials in their individual capacities ... must allege specific conduct giving rise to a
constitutional violation. This standard requires more than conclusional assertions:
The plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to the constitutional claims.” Oliver
v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[p]ersonal
14 R. Doc. 1 at 1, 4.
15 See id. at 6–8.
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involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action,” Thompson v.
Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983), and such involvement must be specifically
alleged. That rule applies even where, as here, a plaintiff has sued supervisory
officials.16 Sanchez v. Young County, 866 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Supervisors
cannot 	be 	held liable 	for 	constitutional violations 	... 	if 	they 	had 	no 	personal
involvement.”). Therefore, a complaint asserting individual-capacity claims against
supervisory officials must include well-pled allegations of their personal involvement
or some other form of causation to connect them to a violation purportedly committed
by their subordinates. Marks v. Hudson, 933 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 2019). That
requires factual specificity. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002)
(“Plaintiffs suing governmental officials in their individual capacities ... must allege
specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation. This standard requires
more than conclusional assertions: The plaintiff must allege specific facts
giving rise to the constitutional claims.” (emphasis added; citation omitted)).
Crossland’s mere listing of Warden Bickham, Secretary Westcott, and the
Louisiana Secretary of State as defendants without making any factual allegations
connecting them to his claim does not suffice to state a claim against them. See Tuley
16 This is true because “[i]t is black-letter law ... that § 1983 does not create respondeat
superior liability.” McNeal v. LeBlanc, 90 F.4th 425, 431 (5th Cir. 2024); accord
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (“In a § 1983 suit ... – where masters do
not answer for the torts of their servants – the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a
misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Thompkins v. Belt,
828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not
liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”).
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v. Heyd, 482 F.2d 590, 594 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that the mere inclusion of names
and notations of office in the caption does not suffice to state a claim); Jones v. Ledet,
Civ. Action No. 19-10969, 2019 WL 6040091, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 2019) (“Where
... a plaintiff has merely listed individuals as defendants in the complaint but made
no factual allegations against them, no cognizable individual-capacity claim has been
stated against those defendants.”), adopted, 2019 WL 6036706 (E.D. La. Nov. 14,
2019).
Thus, Crossland’s § 1983 claims against Warden Bickham, Secretary Wescott,
and the Secretary of State in their individual capacities should be dismissed.
3. 	Warden 	Day, 	Warden 	Brooks, 	Warden 	Bickham, 	Secretary
Westcott, & the Secretary of State in their Official Capacities
To the extent that Crossland seeks to name Warden Day, Warden Brooks,
Warden Bickham, Secretary Wescott, and the Secretary of State in their official
capacities, his claim fares no better. Wardens Day, Brooks, and Bickham are
employed at RCC, which is a state Department of Corrections facility. See, e.g.,
Francois v. Rigdon, No. 08-3485, 2009 WL 1379723, at *4 (E.D. La. May 14, 2009);
Demouchet v. Rayburn Corr. Ctr., No. 07-1694, 2008 WL 2018294, at *3 (E.D. La. May
8, 2008). Secretary Westcott and the Secretary of State are state officials.
First, state officials and employees sued in their official capacities for monetary
damages are not considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Stotter v. University of Texas, 508 F.3d 812,
821 (5th Cir. 2007).
Second, the Eleventh Amendment forbids federal courts from entertaining a
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suit for monetary damages brought by a citizen against his own State. Pennhurst St.
Sch. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984); Voisin’s Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799
F.2d 183, 185–86 (5th Cir. 1986). A state may expressly waive this Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53–54
(1996); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (holding that a state’s consent
to suit against it in federal court must be expressed “unequivocally”); Welch v. Dep’t
of Highways, 780 F.2d 1268, 1271-73 (5th Cir. 1986). The State of Louisiana has
neither consented to suit nor waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Government, 279 F.3d 273, 281 (5th
Cir. 	2002) 	(“By statute, 	Louisiana has refused any 	... 	waiver of 	its 	Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity regarding suits in federal court. See La. Stat. Ann.
§ 	13:5106(a).”). 	Without 	a 	waiver, 	the 	Court 	is 	without 	jurisdiction 	to 	hear
Crossland’s claim for monetary relief against defendants Warden Day, Warden
Bickham, Warden Brooks, Secretary Wescott, and the Secretary of State in their
official capacities. Williams v. Thomas, 169 F. App’x 285, 286 (5th Cir. 2006);
Alphonse v. Louisiana Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corrs., No. 18-6133, 2018 WL 3979854,
at *3 (E.D. La. July 31, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 3970466 (E.D. La. Aug. 20, 2018).
Accordingly, Crossland’s § 1983 claims for monetary damages against Wardens
Day, Bickham, and Brooks, Secretary Wescott, and the Secretary of State in their
official capacities should be dismissed without prejudice.17
17 Eleventh Amendment immunity deprives the district court of jurisdiction and,
therefore, dismissal of claims on that basis must be without prejudice. Anderson v.
Jackson State University, 675 F. App’x 461, 464 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
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4. 	Dr. Martinez & Nurse Tiffany Nolan
Crossland recognizes that the first step of the medical parole procedure is to
secure a recommendation from the medical section of the correctional institution to
the warden.18 Only after receipt of the recommendation from the medical section may
a warden then submit a recommendation to the Secretary of the Department of Public
Safety and Corrections.19 Crossland claims that Dr. Martinez denied him a medical
parole recommendation at the first step and that Nurse Nolan “backed” Dr. Martinez,
and “helped [his] medical parol[e] get denied.”20
Crossland does not allege that Dr. Martinez or Nurse Nolan denied him any
medical treatment. Rather, it is clear that he simply disagrees with Dr. Martinez’s
medical opinion that, for purposes of medical parole, Crossland is not permanently
disabled as a result of his neurological disease. But mere disagreement with Dr.
Martinez’s opinion does not establish deliberate indifference and is not actionable
under § 1983. See Bell v. State Prison Officials, No. 1:22-CV-01128, 2023 WL 3071122,
at *5–6 (W.D. La. Jan. 24, 2023) (inmate’s disagreement with medical staff’s failure
to write a permanent duty status exempting him from work due to medical condition
was insufficient to state a claim under § 1983), adopted, 2023 WL 3067095 (W.D. La.
April 24, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-30339, 2024 WL 2863293 (5th Cir. June 6, 2024); Grimes
v. Fitts, 5:22-CV-12, 2024 WL 2290584, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 21, 2024) (disagreement
with doctor’s assessment and conclusion that inmate had no need for a bottom bunk
18 R. Doc. 1-1 at 1.
19 Id.
20 R. Doc. 1 at 6–8.
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did not state an Eighth Amendment claim); Grizzle v. Fitts, 5:22-CV-017-BQ, 2022
WL 17818101, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2022) (disagreement with doctor’s intake
assessment 	of 	inmate’s 	mental 	and 	physical 	condition 	did 	not 	amount 	to 	a
constitutional violation), appeal dismissed, 22-11193, 2023 WL 3932325 (5th Cir. May
16, 2023); Ladner v. Woodall, 2:12-cv-131-MTP, 2014 WL 29114, at *6 (S.D. Miss.
Jan. 3, 2014) (disagreement with medical opinion that inmate did not need a new pair
of diabetic shoes did not support a finding a deliberate indifference).
Moreover, and significantly, Louisiana parole statutes do not give rise to a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. Young v. LeBlanc, No. 20-
30430, 2022 WL 2072861, at *4 (5th Cir. June 9, 2022); see Sinclair v. Ward, 205 F.3d
1338, 1999 WL 1338408, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999); Stevenson v. Louisiana Board of Parole,
265 F.3d 1060, 2001 WL 872887, at *1 (5th Cir. July 11, 2001). As a result, there is
“no 	constitutionally 	protected 	interest 	in 	parole 	consideration 	without 	a
constitutionally protected interest in parole release.” Id.
Thus, Crossland’s § 1983 claims related to his request for medical parole must
be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim.
5. 	Warden Day and Warden Brooks in their Individual Capacities
Crossland claims that, on August 15, 2025, after Dr. Martinez denied him a
medical parole recommendation, he filed an administrative grievance to Warden Day,
but the grievance was ultimately rejected.21 He also mentions Warden Brooks as
21 Id. at 8.
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being involved in the grievance procedure.22
The denial of his Crossland’s administrative grievance does not entitle him to
relief. A prisoner has no protected liberty interest in either the adequacy or the result
of prison administrative grievance procedures. Smith v. Horton, 670 F. App’x 872,
873 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005); Eason
v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325–26 (5th Cir. 1996)). The Fifth Circuit has held that a
prisoner does not have a constitutionally protected interest in having his grievances
resolved to his satisfaction. Bonneville v. Basse, 536 F. App’x 502, 503 (5th Cir. 2013)
(citing Geiger, 404 F.3d at 374).
As such, Crossland’s § 1983 claim related to the denial of his administrative
grievance against Warden Day and Warden Brooks in their individual capacities
must be dismissed.
6. 	ADA Claim
As indicated, Crossland made a conclusory reference to the ADA.23 Initially,
the Rayburn Correctional Center is not a distinct juridical entity capable of being
sued under the ADA. McGuire v. Lafource Parish Work-Release Facility, No. 09-6755,
2009 WL 4891914, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2009) (citation omitted). Further, Crossland
cannot sue any of the defendants in their individual capacities under the ADA.
Nottingham, 499 F. App’x at 377 n. 6.
To the extent Crossland attempts to sue the defendants in their official
22 Id.
23 Id. at 5–6.
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capacities, he fails to state a claim under the ADA. Assuming that Crossland has
alleged a qualifying disability, he nevertheless fails to satisfy the second and third
prongs of the Title II inquiry. Crossland has not alleged that any of the defendants
intentionally excluded him from participating in some service, benefit or program at
Rayburn Correctional Center or otherwise discriminated against him based on his
disability. He provides no facts that the recommendation for medical parole for denied
because of his disability. Rather, Dr. Martinez did not submit a recommendation for
medical parole to the Warden based on his medical opinion that Crossland is not
permanently disabled. Further, a mere disagreement with diagnosis or medical
treatment does not state a claim under the ADA. Hernandez v. Britt, No. H-20-4377,
2022 WL 2374876, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2022) (inmate failed to state a claim under
ADA where doctor did not offer him a rollator or wheelchair based on her medical
opinion), aff’d sub. nom., No. 22-20323, 2023 WL 3562990 (5th Cir. May 19, 2023);
Bell, 2023 WL 3071122, at * 8 (“That other medical care providers may have reached
a different medical judgment at earlier or later points in Bell’s prison medical care
does not constitute proof that Defendants discriminated against him by reason of any
disability under the ADA.”).
For all these reasons, Crossland’s ADA claim against defendants should be
dismissed.24
24 As Crossland fails to state an ADA claim against the defendants in their official
capacities, the Court need not address the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
See Block v. Texas Bd. of L. Exam’rs, 952 F.3d 613, 617 (5th Cir. 2020) (While the
Eleventh Amendment inquiry in the context of ADA Title II claims is nuanced, courts
“do not reach that question unless and until it is decided” that the plaintiff has stated
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7. 	Release from Custody
Finally, in essence, Crossland seeks that he be released from custody. Such a
request must be sought in a habeas corpus proceeding. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S.
750, 750 (2004) (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars
affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus….”); see Kennedy v. State of
Texas Pardons & Paroles, 136 F. App’x 712, 713 (5th Cir. 2005); Thomas v. Torres,
717 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1983); Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 283 	n.4 (5th Cir.
1994). This § 1983 civil rights proceeding is not the appropriate means of pursuing
that type of habeas corpus relief. Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750; Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Hernandez v. Livingston, 495 F. App’x 414, 417 (5th Cir.
2012). Crossland should pursue any such habeas corpus relief in a properly filed state
or federal proceeding, if appropriate.25
RECOMMENDATION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Crossland’s § 1983 and ADA claims
against defendants Rayburn Correctional Center, Warden Day, Warden Brooks,
Warden Bickham, Secretary Gary E. Westcott, and the Secretary of State be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as they are frivolous and/or fail to state a claim
on which relief may be granted.
ALTERNATIVELY, it is RECOMMENDED Crossland’s § 1983 claims for
monetary 	damages 	against 	defendants 	Warden 	Day, 	Warden 	Brooks, 	Warden
a claim under Title II.).
25 See La. Rev. Stat. § 15:574.20; La. Admin Code tit. 22, §XI-307; La. Rev. Stat. §
15:1177, et seq.
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Bickham, Secretary Gary E. Westcott, and the Secretary of State in their official
capacities be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE on the basis of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Crossland’s § 1983 and ADA claims
against defendants Dr. Juan Martinez and Nurse Tiffany Nola be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE as they are frivolous and/or fail to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.
It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Crossland’s request for habeas relief
be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as legally frivolous and for seeking relief
that cannot be granted in a § 1983 civil rights proceeding.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party
has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) superseded by statute on other grounds.
New Orleans, this 25 th day of March, 2026.
__________________________________________
EVA J. DOSSIER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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