Ross v. Taylor et al

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
FREDERICK LARRY ROSS, JR. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
24-743-JWD-RLB
RYAN TAYLOR, ET AL
NOTICE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the Clerk
of the United States District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served
with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN
OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on December 11, 2025.
S
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
FREDERICK LARRY ROSS, JR. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
24-743-JWD-RLB
RYAN TAYLOR, ET AL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
Doc. 23). Defendants move for summary judgment relying upon the pleadings, a Statement of
Undisputed Facts, their Declarations, certified copies of ARP No. EHCC-2023-740, disciplinary
reports for July 11, 2023, the plaintiff’s mental health and medical records, the plaintiff’s Conduct
Report, and EHCC institutional polices titled Use of Force, Suicide Prevention, and Use of
Chemical AG. The Motion is not opposed.
Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to well-established legal principles, summary judgment is appropriate where there
is no genuine disputed issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A party moving for summary
judgment must inform the Court of the basis for the motion and identify those portions of the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if
any, that show that there is no such genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra,
477 U.S. at 323.
If the moving party carries its burden of proof under Rule 56, the opposing party must direct
the Court’s attention to specific evidence in the record which demonstrates that the non-moving
party can satisfy a reasonable jury that it is entitled to a verdict in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty
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Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 248. This burden is not satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to
alleged material facts, by unsworn and unsubstantiated assertions, by conclusory allegations, or by a
mere scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Rather,
Rule 56 mandates that summary judgment be entered against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, 477 U.S. at 323.
Summary judgment is appropriate in any case where the evidence is so weak or tenuous on
essential facts that the evidence could not support a judgment in favor of the non-moving party.
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., supra, 37 F.3d at 1075. In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the
Court must review the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and
the Court may not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual
disputes. International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff’s Allegations
In his Complaint, as amended, the plaintiff alleges the following: On July 11, 2023, the
plaintiff was sitting on the floor waiting to speak with a ranking officer. Defendant Taylor arrived
and placed shackles on the plaintiff’s ankles and dragged him down the tier. Plaintiff’s ankles were
cut by the shackles, and his back was brush burned. The plaintiff was placed in his cell and refused
to be unrestrained until a higher-ranking officer was present. Defendant Taylor then sprayed the
plaintiff with a chemical agent after radioing a fabricated message that the plaintiff was performing
a suicidal gesture. Defendant Njoku failed to intervene as the plaintiff was being sprayed.
Defendant Taylor then entered the plaintiff’s cell with two other officers and assaulted the plaintiff.
The plaintiff requested medical care, but his request was refused by defendant Taylor.
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Qualified Immunity
The defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity in connection with the
plaintiff’s claims. The qualified immunity defense is a familiar one and, employing a two-step
process, operates to protect public officials who are performing discretionary tasks. Huff v. Crites,
473 F. App’x. 398 (5th Cir. 2012). As enunciated in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the first
step in the analysis is to consider whether, taking the facts as alleged in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, the defendant's conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. at 201. Second,
the district court looks to whether the rights allegedly violated were clearly established. Id. This
inquiry, the Court stated, is undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad,
general proposition. Id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a constitutional
right was clearly established is whether it would have been clear to a reasonable state official that
his conduct was unlawful in the situation which he confronted. Id.
Undertaking the qualified immunity analysis, the Court finds that the defendants’ motion
should be granted. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Excessive Force
A use of force by a prison official is excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution only when such force is applied maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Wilkins
v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010), quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Not every
malicious or malevolent action by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action, however,
and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes
from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that such force is not of
a sort “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Hudson v. McMillian, supra, 503 U.S. at 10,
quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).
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The fact that an inmate may have sustained only minimal injury, however, does not end the
inquiry, and an inmate who has been subjected to gratuitous force by prison guards “does not lose
his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape
without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, supra, 559 U.S. at 38. Notwithstanding this, the Court
may consider the extent of injury, if any, as potentially relevant to a determination whether an
alleged use of force was excessive under the circumstances. In addition, other factors that may be
considered in determining whether an alleged use of force has been excessive include the perceived
need for the application of force, the relationship between the need for force and the amount of
force utilized, the threat reasonably perceived by prison officials, and any efforts made to temper
the severity of a forceful response. Hudson v. McMillian, supra, 503 U.S. at 7.
Additionally, a defendant security officer may be found responsible for a failure to intervene
and take reasonable measures to protect an inmate from another officer's excessive use of force. See
Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir.2013) citing Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 916 (5th
Cir.1995). An officer may be liable under § 1983 under a theory of bystander liability where the
officer (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights; (2) has a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act. See Whitley v. Hanna, 726
F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013) citing Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1995).
Defendants have presented competent summary judgment evidence which shows that the
force used was necessary, not excessive, and not used for the purpose of causing harm to the
plaintiff. According to the declarations of the defendants the following occurred on July 11, 2023:
At approximately 9:30 a.m., Sgt. Parker observed the plaintiff self-pleasuring in his cell while
watching her through a mirror. She ordered him to stop, but the plaintiff failed to comply, and his
mirror was confiscated.
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Around 11:00 a.m., the plaintiff was released from his cell, partially restrained, for his
scheduled shower. The plaintiff bypassed the shower, entered the lobby area and laid down on the
floor. Defendant Njoku gave the plaintiff several direct orders to either go to the shower or return to
his cell, but the plaintiff refused. He became verbally aggressive and demanded to speak to a high-
ranking officer. The plaintiff was mad that his mirror had been confiscated.
Defendant Njoku contacted defendant Taylor. When defendant Taylor arrived, the plaintiff
was still laying on the lobby floor and was refusing to follow defendant Njoku’s commands to go to
the shower or back to his cell. Defendant Taylor gave his own similar verbal commands, and the
plaintiff continued to refuse to comply while yelling that he wanted to speak with a higher-ranking
officer.
Defendant Taylor applied leg irons, and he and defendant Njoku escorted the plaintiff back
to his cell. The plaintiff was not dragged. Plaintiff physically resisted the escort by pulling away
from the defendants who were on either side him. After the plaintiff was in his cell, defendant
Njoku issued several verbal commands for the plaintiff to come to the bars to be unrestrained. The
plaintiff refused. Defendant Taylor then gave the plaintiff additional verbal orders to comply, and
the plaintiff eventually came to the bars.
As defendant Njoku began to remove the handcuffs, the plaintiff snatched the handcuff key
and retreated into his cell and removed the handcuffs. Plaintiff was now in possession of his
restraints and the handcuff key which presented a security concern.
Plaintiff then flushed the handcuff key down the toilet, stood on the toilet and crafted a
noose from his waist chain and the handcuffs. The plaintiff placed the noose around his neck. This
appeared to be a suicide gesture, and the defendants perceived it as an immediate threat to safety.
Defendant Taylor radioed for additional officers for an emergency cell entry. While awaiting their
arrival, he gave the plaintiff multiple verbal commands to remove the chain from his neck and come
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down from the toilet. The plaintiff refused and defendant Taylor deployed a single burst of chemical
agent into the plaintiff’s cell. Only after this did the plaintiff comply. Defendant Taylor then
contacted medical while another officer contacted mental health.
Thus, it appears that the plaintiff first caused a disturbance in the lobby. He then created
security risk before finally endangering his safety. At all times the minimal amount of force
necessary to gain compliance was used after the plaintiff refused numerous verbal orders from both
defendants. As such, the force used by defendant Taylor was not excessive and there was no reason
for defendant Njoku to intervene.
In addition to the foregoing, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not filed any opposition in
response to the instant motion. Any opposition was due on or before October 9, 2025. In the context
of a motion for summary judgment, it is well-settled that a plaintiff may not rest upon mere
allegations or assertions contained in his Complaint in opposing a properly supported motion.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, 477 U.S. at 324. Specifically, Rule 56 requires that, in response to
such a motion, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or
by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. Stated another way, in order to meet his burden
of proof, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not sit on its hands,
complacently relying” on the pleadings. Weyant v. Acceptance Insurance Co., 917 F.2d 209, 212
(5th Cir. 1990). When a party does not file an opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the
Court is permitted to consider the facts presented in support of the motion as undisputed and to
grant summary judgment if the facts show that the movant is entitled to judgment in his favor. See
Jegart v. Roman Catholic Church Diocese of Houma - Thibodaux, 384 F. App’x. 398, *2 (5th Cir.
2010).
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In the instant case, despite notice and an opportunity to be heard, Plaintiff has not come
forward with any opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or to the documentary
evidence produced in support thereof. Discovery is closed. Plaintiff’s recently filed Motion to
Compel (R. Doc. 30) is untimely and still does not address or oppose the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Accordingly, there is nothing before the Court which tends to dispute Defendants’ assertions
that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, based upon Plaintiff’s failure in this case
to oppose Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, failure to designate specific evidence in the
record of sufficient caliber and quantity to create a genuine issue for trial, and failure to produce
supporting evidence on his own behalf, the Court concludes that Defendants’ motion is well-taken
and that, on the record before the Court, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff’s allegations may be interpreted as seeking to invoke the
supplemental jurisdiction of this Court over potential state law claims, a district court is authorized
to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction if a plaintiff’s state law claims raise novel or
complex issues of state law, if the claims would substantially predominate over the claims over
which the Court has original jurisdiction, if the Court has dismissed all claims over which it had
original jurisdiction, or for other compelling reasons. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In the instant case, having
recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court further recommends that
supplemental jurisdiction be declined in connection with Plaintiff’s potential state law claims.
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RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the court decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in
connection with any potential state law claims. It is further recommended that Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 23) be GRANTED, and this action be dismissed with prejudice.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on December 11, 2025.
S
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