Alphonso v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections State of Louisiana

ERIN WILDER-DOOMES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GLENN ALPHONSO 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-605-BAJ-EWD
STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH
THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, ET AL.
NOTICE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation has
been filed with the Clerk of the U.S. District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have 14 days after being served with the
attached report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations set forth therein. 	Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY 	NO 	EXTENSION 	OF 	TIME 	SHALL 	BE 	GRANTED 	TO 	FILE
WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on January 21, 2026.
S
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GLENN ALPHONSO 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-605-BAJ-EWD
STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH
THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, ET AL.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the Motion to Remand (“the Motion”),1 filed by Glenn Alphonso
(“Plaintiff”) which is opposed by Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
(“DPSC”) and Captain Brandon Montgomery (“Montgomery”) (collectively “Defendants”). 2
Because the record reflects that Montgomery was served and did not timely consent to removal, it
is recommended3 that the Motion be granted, remanding this case to the Twentieth Judicial District
Court for the Parish of East Feliciana, State of Louisiana. 	As removal was objectively
unreasonable, it is also recommended that Plaintiff be awarded just costs and actual expenses
incurred as a result of the removal upon Plaintiff providing additional information.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Petition for Damages, asserting claims against Defendants for use of
unnecessary and excessive force and retaliation in Louisiana state court on March 3, 2025.4 DPSC
removed the case to this Court on July 9, 2025, asserting that the Court has federal subject matter
1 R. Doc. 6 and see R. Doc. 21 (reply memorandum).
2 R. Doc. 12.
3 See, e.g., Davidson v. Georgia-Pacific, L.L.C., 819 F.3d 758, 765 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[A] motion to remand is a
dispositive matter on which a magistrate judge should enter a recommendation to the district court subject to de novo
review.”).
4 R. Doc. 1-3, p. 1.
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jurisdiction as Plaintiff asserts that his Eighth Amendment Rights were violated by Montgomery
and brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for that violation.5 The Notice of Removal also states
that Montgomery had not been served when the case was removed.6
On July 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand, asserting that Montgomery was
properly served on June 9, 2025, and that DPSC failed to obtain unanimous consent to removal,
requiring remand of the case as removal was procedurally defective.7 Additionally, Plaintiff
contends that removal was improper because there was no original subject matter jurisdiction over
any claim pleaded in this case against the removing defendant, DPSC. 8 Finally, Plaintiff asks the
Court to award just costs and actual expenses, including attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the
improper removal.9
Montgomery answered Plaintiff’s Petition on July 22, 2025.10 On August 4, 2025,
Defendants filed their opposition to the Motion, asserting that service on Montgomery was
defective because DPSC’s Legal Headquarters only received a service citation directed to DPSC,
not to Montgomery.11 Defendants further argue that the Court has original jurisdiction over the
case, including the claims against DPSC. 12
5 R. Doc. 1, ¶ 1, citing R. Doc. 1-3, p. 5, ¶¶ 21-23.
6 R. Doc. 1, ¶ 3.
7 R. Doc. 6-2, p. 1.
8 Id. at pp. 1, 2-3.
9 Id. at p. 3.
10 R. Doc. 8.
11 R. Doc. 12, pp. 1-2, 4.
12 Id. at pp. 2-3.
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In reply, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ opposition admits that Montgomery was served
through his agent for service of process, Rhonda Weldon, and, therefore, there is no doubt that the
Notice of Removal was filed without the consent of all defendants.13
II. 	LAW AND A NALYSIS
A. Applicable Legal Standards
“When a civil action is removed solely under [28 U.S.C.] section 1441(a), all defendants
who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.”14
According to the Fifth Circuit, the “rule of unanimity” requires that each served defendant join in
the notice of removal or that there be a “timely filed written indication from each served
defendant…that it has actually consented to such action.”15 “If defendants are served at different
times, and a later-served defendant files a notice of removal, any earlier-served defendant may
consent to the removal even though that earlier-served defendant did not previously initiate or
consent to removal.”16 “Formal service is also required to trigger a defendant’s obligation to join
in or consent to removal.”17
The Fifth Circuit has explained that while only consent to removal is required, “a defendant
must do so itself.”18 Accordingly, to demonstrate a defendant’s consent to removal requires “some
timely filed written indication from each served defendant, or from some person or entity
purporting to formally act on its behalf in this respect and to have authority to do so, that it has
13 R. Doc. 21.
14 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A); see also Baxter v. Anderson, No. 16-142, 2016 WL 3748720, at *3 (M.D. La. June 21,
2016).
15 Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262, n.11 (5th Cir. 1988).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C).
17 Coleman v. Burlington Ins. Co., No. 24-512, 2024 WL 3843029, at *2 (W.D. La. July 3, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 24-512, 2024 WL 4369729 (W.D. La. Oct. 1, 2024), citing T.E. Const. Specialties, Inc.
v. Vista Benefits, Inc., No. 03-184, 2003 WL 22259075 (W.D. Tex. 2003).
18 Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1262, n.11.
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actually consented to such action. Otherwise, there would be nothing on the record to ‘bind’ the
allegedly consenting defendant.”19 As explained by this Court, “various district court decisions in
the Fifth Circuit applying Getty Oil have consistently rejected representations from one party that
the other parties consent in the removal and have therefore granted a motion to remand.” 20 Finally,
properly served and joined defendants must join in the removal within the thirty-day period in
which the removal itself must be filed.21 Failure to join all defendants in the removal is a procedural
defect that cannot be remedied after the thirty-day removal period.22
But there are exceptions to the rule of unanimity. “A removing defendant is not required
to obtain consent to removal from: (1) improperly joined defendants or those alleged to be
fraudulently joined; (2) nominal or formal parties; (3) non-forum defendants who have not been
served at the time of removal.”23 “Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has acknowledged that
‘exceptional circumstances’ might warrant departure from the rule of unanimity; however, the
circumstances that generally warrant the granting of this exception typically ‘relate to plaintiff
19 Id.
20 Allement v. Ameristep Corp., No. 13-498, 2013 WL 12183655, at *5 (M.D. La. Dec. 30, 2013), citing, inter alia,
Crowley v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., No. 12-775, 2012 WL 3901629, at *3-4 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2012) (explaining that
“courts within the Fifth Circuit have construed strictly the requirement for written consent by all of the defendants and
overwhelmingly have held that statements on behalf of nonmoving defendants in a notice of removal are insufficient”
and further finding that affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion to remand by the non-removing defendants
“attesting to their consent” were untimely filed after the 30-day period for removal had ended such that the removal
was procedurally improper); Goldman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 11-1414, 2011 WL 3268853, at *3 (E.D. La.
July 28, 2011) (granting motion to remand because statement in notice of removal that “all other named
defendants…consent” did not constitute sufficient written consent from all defendants); Jacob v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., No. 02-2199, 2002 WL 31375612 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2002) (notice of removal indicating that co-defendant “does
not object to this matter being removed to federal court” was insufficient).
21 Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1262.
22 Grand Texas Homes, Inc. v. Am. Safety Indem. Co., No. 12-1773, 2012 WL 5355958, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30,
2012), citing Moody v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey, 753 F.Supp. 198, 199 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
23 Moten v. Mesa Underwriters Specialty Ins. Co., No. 21-1920, 2021 WL 6066917, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 12, 2021),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-1920, 2021 WL 6066911 (W.D. La. Dec. 22, 2021); see also World
Prayer Tabernacle v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, No. 22-2289, 2022 WL 4949125, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct.
4, 2022) (citations omitted).
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conduct and are justified in order to prevent an injustice.’”24
The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is strictly construed and any doubt as to the
propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand.25 The removing party bears the burden
of showing, if challenged, that the removal was procedurally proper.26 A violation of the rule of
unanimity renders a removal procedurally defective, requiring remand.27
B. The Record Establishes that Montgomery was Served and Properly Joined Before
Removal
Another division of this Court addressed in Washington v. Department of Public Safety and
Corrections whether service on a former DPSC employee through statutory agent, Rhonda
Weldon, triggered an obligation for that defendant to consent to removal.28 On the citation in
Washington, the name of the former employee was struck through when Rhonda Weldon accepted
service.29 Additionally, the plaintiff in Washington was silent in response to the defendant’s
assertion that the former employee had not been properly served, and attempted to obtain the
former employees home address and obtain a private process server a few months after service
was attempted on Rhonda Weldon.30
24 Moten, 2021 WL 6066917, at *2, citing Ortiz v. Young, 431 Fed.Appx. 306, 307-08 (5th Cir. 2011). See also Day
v. Danny, No. 15-832, 2016 WL 1033536, at *5 (M.D. La. Feb. 17, 2016) (citing Ortiz, 431 Fed.Appx. at 307, and
stating, “The Fifth Circuit, however, later indicated that such an exception generally would be granted only when
defendant’s lack of consent to removal stemmed from plaintiff’s conduct.”).
25 Gasch v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2007).
26 Scott v. Off. Depot, Inc., No. 14-791, 2015 WL 2137458, at *3 (M.D. La. May 7, 2015), citing Manguno v.
Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).
27 Getty Oil Corp., 841 F.2d at 1262.
28 No. 25-55, 2025 WL 1749973 (M.D. La. May 19, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 25-55, 2025 WL
1749652 (M.D. La. June 24, 2025).
29 Id., at *2.
30 Id.
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Washington is inapplicable to this case because (1) Defendants concede that Montgomery
was an employee of DPSC at the time citation was received,31 (2) there is no strike out on the
citation containing Montgomery’s name,32 and (3) there is evidence in the record that Montgomery
was served through Rhonda Weldon, who is authorized to accept service on behalf of DPSC
employees, including Montgomery.33 Washington is, however, instructive on how service through
Rhonda Weldon on employees of DPSC occurs.34
Defendants’ opposition to remand in this case states, “[t]he record from the 20th JDC
contains only one completed return of service showing June 9, 2025 service on Capt. Montgomery,
through DPSC’s Legal Headquarters at 504 Mayflower Street, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802.
However, DPSC’s Legal Headquarters only received a service citation directed to the DPSC but
not Capt. Montgomery (Exhibit 1).”35 Further, Defendants’ sole argument regarding whether
Montgomery was properly joined and served is that the citation that was served on DPSC did not
contain Montgomery’s name.36
31 R. Doc. 12, p. 4.
32 R. Doc. 1-3, p. 16 (identifying service on DPSC through the Attorney General’s office and on Montgomery and
DPSC through Rhonda Weldon); see also R. Doc. 1-3, p. 17 (service return dated June 9, 2025 showing service
through Rhonda Weldon and listing Montgomery and co-defendant, Gary Westcott, Secretary of DPSC).
33 See R. Doc. 6-4, p. 1. Defendants do not contest that Rhonda Weldon can accept service on behalf of Montgomery
and courts, including this one, have recognized that Ms. Weldon can accept service for current DPSC employees. See
R. Doc. 6-4; see also Washington, 2025 WL 1749973, at *2 (stating that Plaintiff attempted to serve a former DPSC
employee through Rhonda Weldon); Hutchinson v. Reed, No. 24-1532, 2025 WL 451838, at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 21,
2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 24-1532, 2025 WL 449825 (W.D. La. Feb. 10, 2025) (“The court is
aware from other cases that there is an arrangement for the DOC to accept service through Ms. [Rhonda] Weldon,
who is employed at the DOC Legal Office, for current DOC employees.”); see also Parker v. Walker, No. 23-663,
2024 WL 4942404, at *2 (M.D. La. Oct. 23, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 23-663, 2024 WL
4942373 (M.D. La. Dec. 2, 2024) (citing to an affidavit from Rhonda Weldon stating that she is the authorized agent
to accept service on behalf of DPS&C employees).
34 See Washington, 2025 WL 1749973, at *2, citing Hutchinson, 2025 WL 451838, at *2 (discussing Ms. Weldon’s
ability to accept service for DOC employees).
35 R. Doc. 12, pp. 1-2. DPSC stated that Montgomery was not served and attached no evidence confirming that
statement in support of the Notice of Removal. See R. Doc. 1, ¶ 3.
36 R. Doc. 12, p. 4. Defendants’ opposition states:
La. CCP Art. 1202 states that a citation for service must contain the name of the person to whom it
is addressed. In this case, there was no citation served directly on Capt. Montgomery. The citation
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Despite Defendants’ contention, the record reflects that Montgomery was served through
Rhonda Weldon, based on the service return attached to DPSC’s Notice of Removal and to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.37 The citation contains Montgomery’s name and complies with La.
Code Civ. Proc. art. 1202 insofar as Defendants object to the form of the citation attached to their
opposition.38 Though under Louisiana law, citation and service are “essential in civil actions” and
“without them all proceedings are absolutely null,”39 here, there is evidence that a citation was
served which contained Montgomery’s name in compliance with La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 1202.40
Defendants contend that they never received this citation while simultaneously citing to the state
court record, which reflects service with adequate citation on Montgomery through Rhonda
Weldon.41 Indeed, Defendants’ argument is directly contradicted by the service return, dated June
9, 2025, which was attached to the Notice of Removal, filed by DPSC. 42
Defendants admit that if Montgomery’s name was on the citation they received, service
would be proper.43 Since the record reflects that (1) a citation that was served on Rhonda Weldon
contains Montgomery’s name, (2) Defendants do not contest that Rhonda Weldon can accept
for service received by DPSC could have accomplished service on Capt. Montgomery, who DPSC
employed at the time, but failed to do so because the citation received by the DPSC (Exhibit 1) did
not list Capt. Montgomery as a party to whom it was directed.
Defendants acknowledge that service was otherwise appropriate. Id.
37 See R. Doc. 1-3, p. 17; R. Doc. 6-3.
38 See R. Doc. 1-3, p. 17 (listing Captain Montgomery and DPSC on the service return); R. Doc. 12-1 (listing DPSC
on the service return); see also La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 1202. Though Defendant contends the citation received did
not bear the name of Montgomery, the state court record attached to DPSC’s Notice of Removal reflects a citation
bearing Montgomery’s name that was served on Rhonda Weldon.
39 La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 1201(A).
40 “The ‘plaintiff must bear the burden of insuring correct citation,’ and if the citation ‘bears the wrong name of the
person to whom it should be addressed, plaintiff, not defendant, must precipitate the correction by the clerk.’”
Coleman, 2024 WL 3843029, at *3, quoting Vicknair v. City of New Orleans, 522 So.2d 624, 626 (La.App. 4 Cir.
1988). There is no evidence that the citation containing Montgomery’s name is deficient.
41 See R. Doc. 12, pp. 1-2, citing R. Doc. 1-3, p. 17.
42 R. Doc. 1-3, p. 17.
43 R. Doc. 12, p. 4.
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service on Montgomery’s behalf, and (3) there is no other evidence that service was improper,
Defendants have failed to establish that Montgomery was not properly cited and served before
removal. Defendants’ argument in opposition that they did not receive service as documented in
the state record is unpersuasive. Plaintiff asked the clerk to serve two citations in this case.44
Defendants submit one citation, without Montgomery’s name, as evidence that they never received
the other citation, with Montgomery’s name, which is stamped as having been served through
Rhonda Weldon and which is attached to the Notice of Removal, filed by DPSC. 45 Defendants’
statement that service of this document was not received is, therefore, controverted by the record
evidence.
Additionally, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Preliminary Default and for Hearing on
Confirmation of Default against Montgomery in this case.46 Montgomery did not oppose the
Motion for Preliminary Default, but did make an appearance in the case by filing an Answer.47
Importantly, a default judgment cannot be entered when a defendant has not been properly
served.48 If Montgomery contended that service was improper or that he was not served, he could
have asserted that argument in response to the Motion for Entry of Preliminary Default. Instead,
he answered the suit, making an appearance only eight days after the Motion for Entry of
Preliminary Default was filed.49
44 R. Doc. 1-3, pp. 14, 16.
45 See R. Doc. 1-3, p. 17; R. Doc. 12-1.
46 R. Doc. 7.
47 R. Doc. 8.
48 See Espinoza v. Humphries, 44 F.4th 275, 276 (5th Cir. 2022), quoting Jenkens & Gilchrist v. Groia & Co., 542
F.3d 114, 123 n.6 (5th Cir. 2008) (“A defendant cannot default if he had no duty to answer the suit—and he need not
answer until ‘service has been perfected.’”).
49 R. Doc. 8.
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Any doubts regarding removal must be resolved in favor of remand.50 The record evidence
establishes that Rhonda Weldon received service in this case for Defendant Brandon Montgomery,
a DPSC employee, on June 9, 2025.51 Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are contradicted by
the record. When the case was removed on July 9, 2025, Montgomery’s consent was, therefore,
required to satisfy the rule of unanimity. It is undisputed that Montgomery’s consent was not in
the record at the time of removal. Additionally, any contention that Montgomery’s Answer
constituted his consent to removal is without merit. Montgomery and DPSC were served the same
day, on June 9, 2025.52 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), removal was required within thirty days of
service,53 and any consent had to be submitted to the court within the same thirty days.54 Even if
Montgomery did consent to removal in his Answer, because it was not filed until July 22, 2025,
that consent would not be timely.
Removing Defendant, DPSC, bears the burden to establish that removal is procedurally
proper when challenged. Because Montgomery was properly joined and served at the time of
removal, his consent to removal was required within the applicable time period under 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b). As Montgomery’s consent to removal was not timely filed, the rule of unanimity is
violated, and no exceptions that warrant departure from the rule of unanimity in this case have
been shown. Therefore, the Court must remand the case to the Twentieth Judicial District Court
for the Parish of East Feliciana, State of Louisiana. Because remand is required on this ground, it
50 Gasch, 491 F.3d at 281-82.
51 R. Doc. 1-3, p. 17.
52 R. Doc. 1-3, p. 17; R. Doc. 12-1.
53 In a case involving federal question subject matter jurisdiction, the removal clock begins to run from service of the
initial pleading where the complaint affirmatively reveals on its face that it contains an issue of federal law. Leffall v.
Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff’s Petition alleged claims for civil rights
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. R. Doc. 1-3, p. 5, ¶ 21.
54 Montgomery filed his Answer on July 22, 2025, and claims his consent was given in a question he answered while
filing his Answer. R. Doc. 1-3, p. 17; R. Doc. 8; R. Doc. 12, p. 2 (“In the course of filing his answer, the PACER
system asked Capt. Montgomery if he agreed to removal, and he indicated that he did agree to it.”).
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is not necessary to reach Plaintiff’s argument that removal was improper because the federal claims
were not asserted against the removing defendant.55
C. Plaintiff is Entitled to Costs and Fees because DPSC’s Removal was Objectively
Unreasonable
Plaintiff additionally asks this Court to award him costs and actual fees, including
attorney’s fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) based on DPSC’s improper removal.56 Under §
1447(c), an order remanding a case “may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses,
including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” However, there is no automatic
entitlement to an award of attorney fees under § 1447(c), as the clear language of the statute makes
such an award discretionary.57 In applying § 1447(c), courts consider “the propriety of the
removing party’s actions based on an objective view of the legal and factual elements in each
particular case.... In other words, the question we consider in applying § 1447(c) is whether the
defendant had objectively reasonable grounds to believe the removal was legally proper.”58
“[C]ourts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an
objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.”59
The rule of unanimity is a clear rule that this Circuit has enforced for over thirty years.60
DPSC’s removal of the case was objectively unreasonable as the state court record reflects service
55 See R. Doc. 6-2, pp. 1, 2-3. It should be noted, however, that this claim was rejected by another division of this
Court in Washington, 2025 WL 1749973, at *2 (“In his Petition, Plaintiff raises claims under federal law that give rise
to this Court’s jurisdiction, and indeed Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that federal claims
were made only against Ellis and not the removing defendant. But nothing in the removal statutes or any jurisprudence
cited by Plaintiff limits the right to remove based on federal question to a defendant against whom a federal claim is
directly asserted. See Hutchinson, 2025 WL 451838 (collecting cases properly removed by defendants at whom federal
claims were not directed).”).
56 R. Doc. 6-2, p. 3.
57 Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 291 (5th Cir. 2000).
58 Id. at 293.
59 Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).
60 Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1262 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1988). The rule of unanimity is also codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1446. See
Weatherspoon v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, No. 17-98, 2017 WL 2486363, at *3 (M.D. La. May 19, 2017),
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on Montgomery, yet DPSC removed the case without his consent, stating that he was not served.61
Defendants’ contention that Montgomery was not served prior to removal ignores the service
evidence on the face of the record attached to DPSC’s own Notice of Removal. Once Plaintiff
sought remand based on the clear procedural defect in removal, DPSC should have realized its
mistake and acknowledged that remand was proper. DPSC’s argument against remand is premised
on incorrect factual information that a simple review of documents in DPSC’s possession at the
time of removal could and should have resolved. In failing to follow and acknowledge proper
removal procedure, DPSC has delayed the underlying state court proceedings and wasted this
Court’s resources.
Under these circumstances, removal of this case was not objectively reasonable and an
award of just costs and actual expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred as a result of the
removal, is warranted. Additionally, since DPSC was the only removing defendant, the costs
should be paid exclusively by DPSC. However, as Plaintiff has not quantified his “just costs” or
provided evidence of “any actual expenses, including attorney’s fees,” it is recommended that the
any award be made after supporting evidence is submitted by Plaintiff, which should be provided
during the fourteen-day period for filing objections to this Report and Recommendation.62 If
Plaintiff fails to timely provide adequate supporting evidence, the request for attorney’s fees
should be denied.
report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Weatherspoon v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 17-98, 2017 WL 2485226
(M.D. La. June 8, 2017) (citation omitted). Though there are exceptional circumstances that warrant departure from
the rule of unanimity, nowhere does DPSC argue the application of an exception, nor is any apparent from the record.
61 R. Doc. 1, ¶ 3; R. Doc. 1-3, p. 17.
62 See, e.g., National Credit Union Administration Bd. v. Heard McElroy & Vestal LLC, No. 21-1081, 2021 WL
2944891, at *5 (W.D. La. June 28, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-1081, 2021 WL 2942524
(W.D. La. July 13, 2021).
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ERIN WILDER-DOOMES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
III. 	RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand63 be GRANTED and this
case be REMANDED to the Twentieth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Feliciana,
State of Louisiana.
Because remand is recommended and because Defendant Brandon Montgomery has
answered the suit and asserted defenses, IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that all pending
motions64 be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, including Plaintiff Glenn Alphonso’s request
for a hearing on confirmation of default.65
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s request for just costs and actual
expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred as a result of filing the Motion to Remand be
GRANTED and those fees be paid by Removing Defendant, Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections. By no later than February 4, 2026, the Plaintiff Glenn Alphonso should
provide a supplemental memorandum and supporting evidence to quantify the amounts sought,
including attorney’s fees, incurred as a result of the removal. If Plaintiff fails to timely provide
supporting evidence, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the request for attorney’s fees and costs be
DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, January 21, 2026.
S
63 R. Doc. 6.
64 See R. Docs 7, 11.
65 R. Doc. 7.
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