Kifor v. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
____________________________________
)
IMRE KIFOR, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
) 	Civil Action No. 26-CV-11536-AK
v. 	)
)
COMMONWEALTH OF 	)
MASSACHUSETTS; MASSACHUSETTS )
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT; and 	)
KIMBERLY S. BUDD, Chief Justice, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KELLEY, D.J.
Plaintiff Imre Kifor (“Kifor”) has filed a pro se Complaint [Dkt. 1] and an Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs [Dkt. 2]. For the reasons set forth
below, this Court GRANTS the Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees
or Costs. The Court dismisses this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and reminds
Kifor that he is subject to the March 31, 2026 Order of Enjoinment.
I. 	Background
On April 1, 2026, Kifor filed a Complaint1 seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary
relief for the alleged violation of his rights under federal and state law. [Dkt. 1]. Named as
1 The full title of the Compliant is “Imre Kifor’s complaint for deprivation of civil rights and
conspiracy to deprive civil rights (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985) against the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and the Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (in official capacity). [Dkt. 1 at 1].
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Defendants are the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
(“SJC”), and Kimberly S. Budd, SJC Chief Justice. [Id. at ¶¶ 5-7]. Kifor asserts claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. [Id. at ¶ 9].
Plaintiff’s Complaint consists primarily of a recounting of child custody proceedings in
Middlesex Probate and Family Court as well as Kifor’s efforts to obtain review of adverse
actions taken against him. [Id. at passim]. Among other things, he alleges that he “has been the
direct and long-term target of a sustained and systemic scheme of ‘reverse discrimination’
operated by the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court, Middlesex Division (the ‘Family
Court’) and the Commonwealth’s agencies,” [id. at ¶ 17], and he further alleges that “[s]ince
January 31, 2022, the SJC has denied every single petition [Kifor] has filed – more than twelve
petitions and applications – without ever substantively engaging with [Kifor’s] documented,
uncontested evidence of discrimination, falsified records, discarded pleadings, and organized
obstruction of justice.” [Id. at ¶ 28]. He complains of the imposition of “gatekeeper” filing
restrictions imposed by the SJC and other courts including this Court.2 [Id. at ¶¶ 20, 32].
II. 	The Application to Proceed Without Prepaying Fees or Costs
Upon review of Kifor’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees
or Costs, the Court concludes that he is without income or assets to pay the $405.00 filing fee.
The Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs [Dkt. 2] is
therefore GRANTED.
2 The Order of Enjoinment provides in part that:
Unless represented by counsel, Imre Kifor is enjoined from commencing any new action
on the civil docket of this Court without first obtaining written approval of a judge of this
Court by filing a written petition seeking leave of Court to do so.
Kifor v Commonwealth, et al., No. 25-CV-11831-AK (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2026) [Dkt. 31 at 2],
appeal filed, No. 26-1346.
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III. 	Screening the Complaint
When a plaintiff seeks to file a complaint without prepayment of the filing fee,
summonses do not issue until the Court reviews the complaint and determines that it satisfies the
substantive requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This statute authorizes federal courts to dismiss a
complaint sua sponte if the claims therein lack an arguable basis in law or in fact, fail to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, a
claim based on a “meritless legal theory” may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). In conducting this review, the
Court liberally construes the pleadings because Kifor is proceeding pro se. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
IV. 	Discussion
The instant action is one in a continuing series of lawsuits stemming from Kifor’s
dissatisfaction with various state court proceedings related to child custody proceedings.
The crux of this action is Kifor’s challenge to rulings made by the Probate and Family Court and
state appeals courts, regardless of how the claims are framed.
Prior to the Order of Enjoinment, Kifor had been warned that if he continues to file
complaints concerning the proceedings in state court, he may be restrained from filing any future
complaints with this Court as well as become subject to other filing restrictions and sanctions.
See Kifor v Commonwealth, et al., No. 23-CV-12692-PBS (D. Mass. Jan. 5, 2024) [Dkt. 17],
aff’d, No. 24-1075 (1st Cir. Nov. 19 2025); Kifor v Commonwealth, et al., No. 25-CV-11831-
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AK (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2026), appeal filed, No. 26-1346. This action was filed on April 1, 2026,
one day after the Cout issued the Order of Enjoinment.
Here, to the extent Kifor brings suit against the SJC Chief Justice and other judicial
defendants, it is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from civil suit for actions taken
in their judicial capacities. Notably, absolute immunity is not pierced by allegations of
corruption or bad faith, nor will a judicial officer “be deprived of immunity because the action he
[or she] took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his [or her] authority.”
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, absolute
judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from damages. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11 (1991).
Although the Complaint references 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Kifor has not identified what
subsection of this statute from which liability could be found. “Section 1985 has three
subsections, each of which sets forth a distinct cause of action.” Donahue v. City of Boston, 304
F.3d 110, 122 n.9 (1st Cir. 2002). To the extent Kifor asserts a conspiracy to interfere with civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the Complaint can be construed as asserting claims under
subsections 2 and 3 of § 1985 which prohibits conspiracies to interfere with the civil rights of
individuals and to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws. As so construed, the
Complaint fails to state a cause of action because his conclusory assertions are speculative and
devoid of supporting factual allegations to establish claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2), (3).
To the extent that Kifor challenges the final outcome of any of his state court proceedings,
his claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.3 That doctrine deprives lower federal
3 The doctrine was created by two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86
(1983).
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courts of jurisdiction over cases brought by non-prevailing parties “complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Efreom v. McKee, 46 F.4th 9, 17 (1st Cir.
2022) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Rather,
“the proper forum for challenging an unlawful state court ruling is the United States Supreme
Court, on appeal of the highest state court’s final judgment.” Davison v. Gov’t of P.R.–P.R.
Firefighters Corps., 471 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (“Final judgments
or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.”). The Court does not have authority to grant
Kifor relief from a state court action that has been terminated. To the extent Kifor is asking this
Court to review or reject the holdings of his previous state court proceedings that he alleges have
caused him injury, such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Additionally, to the extent state court proceedings are ongoing, any claims involving the
current status of such litigation are not properly before this Court under the Younger abstention
doctrine.4 Younger and its progeny prohibit federal courts from interfering with certain pending
state judicial or administrative proceedings. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72
(2013). Here, abstention is required.
Thus, the Complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failing to state a plausible claim for relief. In light of the nature of the claims asserted, the Court
finds that amendment would be futile. Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina, 747 F.3d 15,
23 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that sua sponte dismissal is appropriate only when it is crystal clear
that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be futile).
4 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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V. 	Conclusion
Accordingly,
1. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Dkt. 2] is
ALLOWED.
2. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint [Dkt. 1] is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Clerk shall enter a separate order of dismissal.
3. 	Plaintiff is reminded that he is enjoined from commencing new actions on the
civil docket of this Court without first receiving permission to do so.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2026
/s/ Angel Kelley____________
Hon. Angel Kelley
United States District Judge
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