Caceres v. Department of Developmental Services

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
MIRCA BENITEZ CACERES, on Behalf of
Israel David Caceres,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENTAL
SERVICES,
Respondent.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
26-40159-DHH
ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT AND RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL
October 13, 2026
Hennessy, M.J.
On June 18, 2026, Mirca Benitez Caceres (“Caceres”) who is not represented by counsel,
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“§ 2254”) on behalf of her
adult son Israel David Caceres, who subject to a guardianship order of the Middlesex Probate
and Family Court. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will order that his action be
reassigned to a District Judge and recommend to the District Judge that the petition be dismissed.
I. Order for Reassignment to a District Judge
Pursuant to General Orders (10-1) and (09-3), a case may be randomly assigned, at the
time of filing, to a Magistrate Judge. However, absent the parties’ consent to the final
assignment of this case to a Magistrate Judge, a Magistrate Judge is without jurisdiction to
involuntarily dismiss an action. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
This action was drawn to the undersigned Magistrate Judge under the above-described
protocol. As set forth below, the Court concludes that this action is subject to dismissal without
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prejudice. Because all the parties have not consented to the final assignment of this case to a
Magistrate Judge, the Court orders that this action be reassigned to a District Judge.
II. Review of the Petition
Under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, before ordering that a § 2254 petition be
served, the presiding judge must “examine” the pleading, and, “[i]f it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,
the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases, R. 4. Having so reviewed the petition, the Court concludes that
Caceres has not stated a basis for habeas relief for her son.
According to Caceres, the “guardianship has Decree of Dismissal (Nov. 23, 2021)” and
“DDS refuses to hand it over.” (ECF No. at 2). Caceres states, “We call upon the Department of
Developmental Services [to] comply with the honorable Judge, Thomas J. Barbar, order on
November 23, 2021 and release our son today.”1 Id. at 4.
III. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Guardianship Context
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (emphasis added).
1 The exhibits to the petition do not show that the “Decree of Dismissal” to which Caceres refers nullified the
guardianship order. Caceres filed with the petition a one-page “Decree of Dismissal” from the action In re Israel
Caceres, Case No. 16-16P6082, in the Middlesex Family and Probate Court. (ECF 1-1 at 2) [sic]. The Decree
indicates that it concerns a petition filed in that action on November 22, 2021. Id. The Decree is signed by Judge
Barbar and is dated November 23, 2021. Id. The number “129” is hand-written in the lower right-hand corner of
the document. Id. The docket sheet of that case, which Caceres submitted with the § 2254 petition, indicates that
entry 129 was the denial of a “General Petition,” filed the previous day, not an order vacating or dismissing the
guardianship. Id. at 13.
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“It is settled law that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction does not extend to state court
disputes over child custody.” See Hemon v. Office of Public Guardian, 878 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir.
1989) (citing Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982)).
The Supreme Court has held that the federal habeas corpus statue, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, does not
confer federal jurisdiction to consider a collateral attack on a state court judgment involuntarily
terminating parental rights. See id. at 14 (citing Lehman, 458 U.S. at 502). The Court’s refusal
to allow a party to use federal habeas relief to challenge child custody determinations is
grounded largely in federalism with the Court stating: “[t]he federal writ of habeas corpus,
representing as it does a profound interference with state judicial systems and the finality of state
decisions, should be reserved for those instances in which the federal interest in individual
liberty is so strong that it outweighs federalism and finality concerns.” Id. (citing Lehman, 458
U.S. at 515-16); see also Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103
(1st Cir. 1978) (holding that the federal interest in child custody hearings is not sufficient to
trigger a federal habeas remedy on behalf of the mother). The First Circuit has also reasoned
that, in the child custody context, the rights asserted by an aggrieved parent are only
speculatively the rights of the person who is actually “in custody.” See id. at 15 (citing
Sylvander, 584 F.2d at 1111-12).
In Hemon, the First Circuit extended the logic of Lehman and Sylvander to the
guardianship context: “the same concerns about federalism and finality that counsel against
federal habeas jurisdiction over child custody disputes also counsel against federal habeas
jurisdiction regarding guardianship.” Id. (collecting cases). In doing so, Hemon reasoned that
“[d]isputes regarding guardianship are no less matters of purely local concern than are child
custody disputes. Accordingly, the federal interest in guardianship matters is no more substantial
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than the very weak federal interest in child custody matters found insufficient in Lehman and
Sylvander to justify federal habeas jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Brown v. Brown, 541 F. Supp. 688,
693 (N.D. Ind. 1982)).
Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Caceres’ petition.
IV. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing:
1. The Clerk shall reassign this case to a District Judge.
3. The Court RECOMMENDS to the District Judge that the petition be DENIED for
lack of jurisdiction and that the action be DISMISSED.2
So ordered.
/s/ David H. Hennessy
David H. Hennessy
United States Magistrate Judge
2 The Parties are hereby advised that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), they are entitled
to object to the Court’s Report and Recommendation by filing a specific written objection with the Clerk of this
Court within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation. Such written objections must
specifically identify the portion of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for
those objections. The Parties are further advised that the First Circuit has repeatedly indicated that failure to comply
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) shall preclude further appellate review. See, e.g., M. v. Falmouth Sch. Dep’t, 847 F.3d
19, 26 (1st Cir. 2017); Keating v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 848 F.2d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 1988).
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