RATCLIFFE v. BRP US INC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
STEPHEN J. RATCLIFFE, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:20-cv-00234-JAW
)
BRP U.S., INC., et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF STEPHEN J. RATCLIFFE’S MOTION IN LIMINE
TO PRECLUDE THE DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF DANNY CONDON,
WHOSE REMOTE DEPOSITION TESTIMONY WAS AIDED BY SOMEONE
IN THE ROOM
A plaintiff in a product liability case moves to preclude the introduction of a
witness’s deposition transcript because his mother was present and allegedly assisted
him in the taking of his deposition. 	The defendants object, arguing the deposition
transcript is admissible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32 and that plaintiff’s
counsel did not take action to correct the perceived irregularity at that time. 	The
court agrees with the defendants and dismisses the motion without prejudice.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On July 30, 2019, a utility terrain vehicle (UTV) driven by Stephen J. Ratcliffe
overturned, causing significant injuries. Compl. ¶ 15 (ECF No. 1). On July 2, 2020,
Mr. Ratcliffe brought product liability claims against both BRP U.S., Inc. (BRP), the
manufacturer; 	and 	Tidd’s 	Sport 	Shop, 	Inc. 	(Tidd’s), 	the 	distributor; 	asserting
negligence and strict liability claims against both, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 17-57.
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On October 4, 2024, Mr. Ratcliffe filed a motion in limine requesting the Court
preclude the presentation of the deposition transcript of Danny Condon, one of BRP’s
layperson witnesses, based on the presence and alleged assistance of his mother
during his deposition. Pl. Stephen J. Ratcliffe’s Mot. in Lim. To Preclude the Dep. Tr.
of Danny Condon, Whose Remote Dep. Test. Was Aided by Someone in the Room (ECF
No. 181) (Pl.’s Mot.). 	On October 15, 2024, BRP opposed Mr. Ratcliffe’s motion,
claiming that Mr. Ratcliffe has not argued Mr. Condon’s incompetence or cited legal
authority for the preclusion of his testimony based on a third party’s presence in the
room. Def. BRP’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. in Lim. To Preclude the Dep. Tr. of Danny Condon
(ECF No. 192) (BRP’s Opp’n). Tidd’s also opposed Mr. Ratcliffe’s motion on October
15, 2024, arguing that the presence of the witness’s mother had no material impact
on Mr. Condon’s testimony and that Plaintiff’s counsel proceeded with the deposition
despite awareness of her presence. Def. Tidd’s Sport Shop, Inc.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot.
In Lim. to Preclude Dep. Tr. of Danny Condon (ECF No. 211) (Tidd’s Opp’n).
II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. 	Stephen 	J. 	Ratcliffe’s 	Motion 	to 	Preclude 	the 	Deposition
Transcript of Danny Condon
Mr. Ratcliffe moves to exclude the deposition transcript of Mr. Condon, a
thirty-six-year-old eyewitness to the accident underlying this lawsuit, on the basis
that “his mother was in the room with him and assisting him with his answers”
during his remote deposition, which was held via Zoom. Pl.’s Mot. at 1. The Plaintiff
emphasizes “[t]he transcript reflects that [the witness’s] mother, Lisa Condon,
whispered answers to him, gave him advice on how to answer questions, and Mr.
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Condon admitted under oath that his mom was helping him.” 	Id. 	Specifically, Mr.
Ratcliffe directs the Court to the following passages from the deposition transcript:
Q. 	How did your cousin get up on the top of that? 	Did he go in the
middle of it or did he have to go to the left or the right of it to get up top
where you were?
THE WITNESS: 	What’s he mean?
MS. CONDON: 	It doesn’t matter, just --
A. 	Straight up.
MR. MEGA: 	Wait a minute. Wait a minute. I just want to
make a record here. Who is that, your mom, in the room with you,
Mr. Condon?
THE WITNESS: 	Yup.
MR. MEGA: 	Okay.
MS. CONDON: 	I am also his legal guardian.
MR. MEGA: 	I see.
BY MR. MEGA:
Q. 	So let me ask some questions about that, and I don’t want to pry
into your private life, sir, but if people are going to want to present
testimony later on, I need to understand a few things. 	Okay, Mr.
Condon?
A. 	(Nodding head.)
MS. CONDON: 	You need to answer out loud.
A. 	Yes.
BY MR. MEGA:
Q. 	So your mom is helping you a little bit there.
A. 	Yeah.
. . . .
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Q. 	Okay. Is a doughnut different than driving in a circle?
MR. BROGAN: 	Jeff, so that we know and can remember for
the record ---
A. 	Because the back tires spinning really fast, and the ass end’s
sliding around, into a doughnut. (Gesturing)
MR. BROGAN: 	Would you do me a favor and just describe
what he’s doing with his hands for you?
MR. MEGA: 	I can’t describe -- I would prefer he explain
what he’s talking about rather than --
A. 	I said spin tires.
BY MR. MEGA:
Q. 	Yes.
A. 	You spin the tires real quick, and you turn the handle really
quick, and you make the thing spin very quickly, and the ass end kind
of like fish tails around.
Q. 	Okay.
A. 	It’s like doing it with an old muscle car.
Q. 	Okay.
MS. CONDON: 	Into a circle, is that what you mean?
THE WITNESS: 	Yeah, into a circle.
MR. MEGA: 	Wait a minute. Wait a minute. This is a first
for me in a deposition. 	Let the record reflect that I think I just
heard his mom say, “Into a circle, is that what you mean?”
BY MR MEGA:
Q: 	Is that what your mom just said?
A. 	Yeah. It’s a doughnut.
MS. CONDON: 	Sir, can I speak up for a minute?
MR. MEGA: 	Well, why don’t we get your name, and we’ll
make an accurate record, and you can get on camera. Sure.
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MS. CONDON: 	My name is Lisa Condon.
MR. MEGA: 	Okay.
MS. CONDON: 	And the only reason I mentioned, does he
mean circles, sometimes he has a hard time recalling some words
that he wants to say.
MR. MEGA: 	Okay.
MS. CONDON: 	So I was asking him, “Do you mean in a
circle?” so he could clarify it for you.
MR. MEGA: 	Okay.
A. 	I’ll put it in a[n] easy phrase. He was drifting as into a circle. I’ll
put it that way. Easy phrasing for people.
. . . .
Q. 	And in those rotations, those clockwise rotations, are you saying
that the front axle stayed planted in one spot?
A. 	It probably just caught on a rock. All it takes. Even with a small
quad.
MS. CONDON: 	That’s not what he’s asking.
MR. MEGA: 	Let the record reflect that the deponent’s
mother said, “That’s not what he’s asking.”
Id. at 1-4. (quoting id., Attach. 1, Dep. of Danny Condon at 20:1-24; 25:13-27:8; 28:22-
29:4 (ECF No. 192-1) (Condon Dep. Tr.)).
Mr. Ratcliffe insists that his attorney objected, on the record, to the use of the
deposition at the time that it was taken, as reflected by the following exchange:
MR. MEGA: 	I want to put something on the record.
MR. BROGAN: 	Let’s do it right now.
MR. MEGA: 	I did not notice this deposition. 	The deposition
started, and apparently the deponent’s mother is his legal guardian, who
is sitting literally right with him. 	And at times I have heard her help
provide answers to certain questions or try to interpret his thoughts or
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what he means to say, and I don’t know if I’ve captured every time. I’m
doing the best I can to, if I hear that, to repeat it and make sure it’s on
the record, but that’s not, in my opinion, how a deposition is supposed to
proceed. 	She’s not under oath. 	He’s there. 	Apparently, she’s his
guardian, and this is going on, and I would object to the use of this
deposition based on that alone.
Id. at 4 (quoting Condon Dep. Tr. at 30:3-18).
Mr. Ratcliffe asserts that “Mr. Condon’s testimony was clearly tainted by Ms.
Condon’s above assistance or interference” by coloring his testimony “as to the
movements of plaintiff’s vehicle leading up to and at the time of the rollover.” Id. at
4. 	As such, he asks the Court to preclude introduction of Mr. Condon’s deposition
testimony into evidence. Id.
B. 	BRP’s 	Opposition 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Preclude 	the
Deposition Transcript of Danny Condon
BRP asks the Court to deny Mr. Ratcliffe’s motion to exclude Mr. Condon’s
deposition transcript. It explains that Mr. Condon was an eyewitness to the accident
underlying this case and that he “provided sworn deposition testimony under oath on
April 26, 2021[,] [b]ecause Mr. Condon resides more than 100 miles from the location
of this trial.” BRP’s Opp’n at 1. BRP notes that it identified relevant portions of Mr.
Condon’s deposition transcript for presentation at trial, id. (citing BRP’s Dep.
Designations (ECF No. 167)), and that Mr. Ratcliffe himself “also served designations
indicating an intent to offer portions of Mr. Condon’s deposition into evidence during
Plaintiff’s case in chief.” Id. (citing Pl. Stephen J. Ratcliffe’s Dep. Tr. Designations at
12 (ECF 186)). 	BRP calls Mr. Ratcliffe’s attempt to preclude BRP from using Mr.
Condon’s deposition while simultaneously designating portions of his testimony for
his own use “inconsistent.” Id. at 1-2. It further asserts the deposition may be used
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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32 and that the eyewitness testimony “is
plainly relevant.” Id. at 2.
BRP notes that Mr. Ratcliffe cites a single basis for precluding Mr. Condon’s
deposition transcript: the presence of his mother in the room during the taking of his
deposition. 	Id. 	It explains that “[Mr. Condon’s] mother is his legal guardian” and
that “[h]e suffers from bipolar disorder and lives off disability income”; while
disclaiming this affects his competency to testify, BRP insists “it likely explains why
his guardian was present as an observer.” Id. at 2 n.1. BRP points out “Plaintiff does
not argue that Mr. Condon is incompetent to testify,” nor does he cite any legal
authority in his motion “standing for the proposition that a witness’s deposition
transcript is rendered inadmissible if a third party is present.” 	Id. at 2. 	BRP
contends “[t]he mere presence of a third party during a deposition does not render
testimony that is otherwise competent and relevant inadmissible,” and asks the
Court to deny Mr. Ratcliffe’s motion on that basis. Id.
BRP first argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32 permits the use of
Mr. Condon’s deposition transcript. Id. at 2-3 (citing F ED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(B) (“[a]
party may use for any purpose the deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, if
the court finds: . . . that the witness is more than 100 miles from the place of hearing
or trial . . ..”) (alterations made by Defendant). 	BRP indicates Mr. Condon lives in
Houlton, Maine, which is more than 100 miles from the scheduled location of this
trial in Bangor, Maine, id. at 3, and submits the Court may take judicial notice of this
fact. Id. at 3 n.2 (citing Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1346 (8th Cir. 1976)
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(finding that “the district court properly took judicial notice of the fact that” the
witness is more than 100 miles from the place of trial)).
BRP 	characterizes 	“[t]he 	real 	issue 	of 	whether Mr. 	Condon’s 	deposition
transcript can be properly admitted [as] one of competency,” and points out “on this
issue, Plaintiff’s Motion is silent.” 	Id. 	Citing Federal Rule of Evidence 601, BRP
maintains that state rules of evidence control the matter of witness competence in a
civil case when state law supplies the rule of decision and notes that, as a federal
matter predicated on diversity jurisdiction, that is the case here. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.
1332). BRP thus quotes Maine Rule of Evidence 601 as providing:
(a) Every person is competent to be a witness unless these rules provide
otherwise.
(b) A person may not be a witness if the court finds that:
(1) The person cannot communicate about the matter so that the
judge and jury can understand, either directly or through an
interpreter;
(2) The person cannot understand the duty, as a witness, to tell
the truth;
(3) The person had no reasonable ability to perceive the matter;
[or]
(4) The person has no reasonable ability to remember the matter.
Id. at 3-4 (quoting M.R. EVID. 601). BRP avers that Plaintiff’s motion does not suggest
“that Mr. Condon does not have the ability to understand right from wrong, fact from
fiction, or truth from falsity” and argues the presence of his mother does not
undermine Mr. Condon’s competency. Id. at 4. BRP further emphasizes that it has
not designated for presentation at trial any portion of Mr. Condon’s deposition where
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Mr. Ratcliffe alleges Mr. Condon’s mother aided the witness’s testimony. 	Id.
(comparing BRP’s Dep. Designations to Pl.’s Mot. and Condon Dep. Tr.).
BRP continues that the presence and infrequent interjections of Mr. Condon’s
mother 	should 	not 	render 	his 	deposition 	transcript 	inadmissible 	because 	her
involvement only amounted to “telling him to answer questions and that he needed
to ‘answer out loud’” and, on one occasion, “to clarify his answer.” 	Id. at 4-5 (citing
Condon Dep. Tr. at 20:1-5; 28:22-29:4; 20:15-20; 25:3-26:9). 	Thus, BRP rejects Mr.
Ratcliffe’s 	characterization 	that 	Mr. 	Condon’s 	mother 	“answer[ed] 	for 	him 	or
influence[]d his testimony.” Id. at 5 (citing, generally, Condon Dep. Tr.).
Even if the Court accepts that Mr. Condon’s mother influenced his testimony,
BRP says, “such conduct does not render his testimony inadmissible.” 	Id. 	BRP
analogizes to the “more egregious” circumstances in Hartman v. United States, in
which the Eight Circuit rejected the argument that the district court had erred in
denying the plaintiff’s motion to suppress a witness’s deposition despite the witness’s
history of memory problems and the fact that “prior to answering certain questions
[the witness] would confer with his wife.” 	Id. (citing Hartman, 538 F.2d at 1345).
Nevertheless, the Eight Circuit held “[t]hose considerations naturally affected the
credibility of [the witness] and the weight to be given to his testimony, but they do
not call for the suppression of the entire deposition.” 	Id. (citing Hartman, 538 F.2d
at 1345). 	Contrasting Hartman to the case at bar, BRP notes “Mr. Condon did not
confer with his mother prior to providing his answers,” contending that he “testified
under oath and on his own.” Id. BRP avers “[t]hroughout the 45 pages of testimony,
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she spoke on only a handful of occasions and in most instances, only when she was
directly addressed by counsel.” Id. (citing Condon Dep. Tr. at 20:5, 20:12, 20:20. 26:7-
8, 26:17-18, 26:22, 26:24-27:5, 29:2, 29:21-22, 29:25, 33:6-14, 33:22-35:15, 36:20,
43:21, 45:13, 48:8-10).
In sum, BRP asks the Court to permit the introduction of Mr. Condon’s
deposition transcript at trial.
C. 	Tidd’s Sport Shop, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion To
Preclude Deposition Transcript of Danny Condon
Tidd’s filed a separate opposition to Mr. Ratcliffe’s motion, in which it argues,
first, that there is no evidence in the record that Ms. Condon’s presence affected her
son’s testimony and, second, that Plaintiff’s counsel continued the deposition despite
his knowledge of Ms. Condon’s presence.1 Tidd’s Opp’n at 1. Asserting Mr. Condon’s
testimony as an eyewitness to the accident “is exceptionally relevant to this case,”
Tidd’s requests the Court deny the Plaintiff’s motion.
Tidd’s begins by reciting three facts allegedly relevant to disposition of this
motion: that Mr. Condon was an eyewitness to the accident underlying this lawsuit;
that Mr. Condon suffers from bipolar disorder and his mother serves as his legal
guardian; and that Ms. Condon attended Mr. Condon’s deposition. Id. at 1-2 (citing
id., Attach. 1, Condon Dep. Tr. at 6:22-24; 9:23-10:7; 20:25-21:7 (ECF No. 211-1)).
Turning to the relevant legal standards, Tidd’s reminds the Court that, to be
admissible at trial, evidence must be relevant and that relevant evidence “must make
1 	In addition to filing its own opposition, Tidd’s notes that it “also joins co-defendant BRP U.S.
Inc.’s opposition to this motion.” Tidd’s Opp’n at 1 n.1.
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a fact in consequence more or less probable that it would be without the evidence.”
Id. at 2 (citing F ED. R. EVID. 401, 402). 	However, Tidd’s says, “[r]elevant evidence
may be excluded if ‘its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.’” 	Id.
(quoting F ED. R. EVID. 403). 	Tidd’s also directs the Court to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 32, which it summarizes as “allow[ing] a party to introduce into evidence
deposition testimony of any party that is unavailable at trial, including those who are
more than 100 miles from the place of trial.” Id.
In the present case, Tidd’s points out, “[t]he plaintiff does not cite any rule of
evidence or civil procedure to support his arguments that Mr. Condon’s testimony
should be precluded.” 	Id. 	Tidd’s further notes that Mr. Ratcliffe “has designated
excerpts from Mr. Condon’s testimony to be used during the plaintiff’s case in chief,”
which it posits amounts to tacit acknowledgment that Mr. Condon lives more than
100 miles from the assigned federal courthouse and is thus unavailable to testify at
trial. 	Id. 	Tidd’s adds that the Plaintiff does not contend Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 32 prohibits the introduction of Mr. Condon’s testimony, but merely that
Ms. Condon’s conduct should make it inadmissible. Id.
Tidd’s also argues that the transcript of Mr. Condon’s deposition reveals Ms.
Condon did not materially affect her son’s testimony. 	Id. 	It rejects Plaintiff’s
contention that Ms. Condon “whisper[ed] answers to Mr. Condon” or that she gave
him advice on how to answer questions; rather, Tidd’s points out the “help” Ms.
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Condon provided was “telling Mr. Condon that he needed to answer out loud.” 	Id.
(citing Condon Dep. Tr. at 20:1-21). Tidd’s avers that Plaintiff’s counsel did not ask
Mr. Condon whether his mother had “whispered answers” to him, but instead
“provided instructions to Ms. Condon, which she followed throughout the rest of the
deposition.” Id. at 3 (citing Condon Dep. Tr. at 34:19-35:16). Tidd’s emphasizes that
Plaintiff’s counsel continued the deposition after being made aware of Ms. Condon’s
presence; he did not “seek to exclude Ms. Condon from the deposition or suggest any
other remedy to his alleged concerns.” Id.
Tidd’s insists Mr. Condon’s testimony “remained the same” after instructions
were given to Ms. Condon, indicating the lack of material impact of her presence on
his testimony. Id. Therefore, Tidd’s asks the Court to deny Mr. Ratcliffe’s motion to
preclude the introduction of Mr. Condon’s deposition. Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Court concludes the deposition testimony of Mr. Condon is admissible
under Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus declines to preclude
its introduction at trial.
Mr. Ratcliffe urges the Court to preclude the deposition transcript as evidence
at trial based on “assistance or interference” by the deponent’s mother. Pl.’s Mot. at
4. However, as the Defendants properly point out, he cites no legal authority for this
request. The Defendants make several points in opposition, including that the
testimony of the eyewitness is highly relevant, that the Plaintiff himself has
designated sections of the same transcript for presentation at trial, that Plaintiff
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makes no arguments regarding the deponent’s competence, and that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 32 permits its introduction. BRP’s Opp’n at 1-2; Tidd’s Opp’n at 2-3.
The Court finds the Defendants’ arguments persuasive in this dispute. While
the presence and assistance of a third party at a deposition is unusual, Plaintiff’s
counsel became aware of her presence when the deposition began, subsequently
permitted her to remain, and even solicited responses from her on several occasions.
Condon Dep. Tr. at 20:1-24; 25:13-27:8; 28:22-29.4.
Ms. Condon’s first answer occurred at page six in the deposition transcript,
supplying her address when her son could not remember it:
Q. And what’s the address for your mom’s house?
A. I don’t know.
MS. CONDON: 	65 Court Street.
Id. at 6:12-15. 	Plaintiff’s counsel raised no objection to this response. 	Ms. Condon
did not speak for the remainder of defense counsels’ examination. Id. at 6:17-16:8.
The next time Ms. Condon spoke was during Plaintiff’s counsel’s examination.
In response to one of Attorney Mega’s questions, Mr. Condon replied: “[w]hat’s he
mean?” 	Id. at 20:1-4. 	Ms. Condon said, “[i]t doesn’t matter, just - - “ 	Id. at 20:5.
Attorney Mega then questioned Mr. Condon about the fact his mother was in the
room, but he did not request Ms. Condon to leave nor instruct her to remain silent.
Id. at 20:15-21:7.
Ms. Condon did not speak again until it appeared that her son was having
difficulty expressing himself, and she volunteered: “[i]nto a circle, is that what you
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mean?” Id. at 26:7-8. At that point, Plaintiff’s counsel asked for Ms. Condon’s name,
but again did not ask her to leave the room or remain silent. Id.
Next, when Plaintiff’s counsel asked Mr. Condon about the mechanism for
doing a donut in a UTV, Mr. Condon failed to respond directly to the question and
Ms. Condon volunteered, “[t]hat’s not what he’s asking.” Id. at 28:22-29:2. Although
Plaintiff’s counsel made sure that Ms. Condon’s remark was on the record, he took no
further action. Id. at 29:3-4. After a break, Attorney Mega put on the record that in
his opinion, Mr. Condon’s mother should not be providing answers, and he was
objecting to the use of the deposition on that basis alone. Id. at 30:3-18.
Ms. Condon explained that, due to her son’s mental health condition, she was
present to assist with the deposition and that she “want[ed] him to be able to answer
your questions and not shut down and not say anything.” Id. at 34:16-18. Attorney
Mega replied:
All right. 	So, I’m still questioning him, but my preference is that you,
because you weren’t a witness, and I appreciate what you’re trying to
do, but we’re trying to take sworn testimony. My preference is you not
actively participate and you sit quietly in support.
Id. at 34:19-34. Ms. Condon replied, “[m]m-hmm. I can do that.” Id. at 34:25. She
asked, however, for permission to speak up if she thought her son would not be able
to continue. Id. at 35:4-6. Attorney Mega answered affirmatively, replying “[p]lease
do.” 	Id. at 35:7. 	After a discussion of counsel, Attorney Mega again noted his
objection, but he took no action. Id. at 32:19. In fact, Attorney Mega stated he had
no objection to her “sitting there and keeping quiet during a deposition.” Id. at 32:15-
17. Ms. Condon did not intervene after that that colloquy.
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From the Court’s perspective, this is much to do about nothing. 	First, Ms.
Condon’s contributions to her son’s deposition were minor and immaterial and do not
provide a basis to exclude the deposition.
Next, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32 provides a mechanism for objecting
to the admissibility of deposition testimony, including for an error or irregularity that
occurred during the taking of the deposition. F ED. R. CIV. P. 32(d)(3)(B). Under Rule
32(d)(3)(B), however, an objection based on irregularity at oral examination is waived
if “it relates to the manner of taking the deposition, the form of a question or answer,
the oath or affirmation, a party’s conduct, or other matters that might have been
corrected at that time.” 	Id.
Here, at no point did Plaintiff’s counsel request that Ms. Condon leave the
room, which would have been an obvious cure to whatever issues had been caused by
her presence. Instead, Plaintiff’s counsel allowed her to stay in the room and asked
her to speak up if she thought her son would not be able to continue. Later, Attorney
Mega instructed Ms. Condon not to speak, and she did not. The Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s counsel could have sought to correct the perceived irregularity at the time
the deposition was taken, but in failing to do so, the Plaintiff has waived the right to
object to the testimony’s introduction on this basis.
Defendants also correctly point out that Mr. Ratcliffe does not raise an
argument regarding Mr. Condon’s competence to testify pursuant to Maine Rule of
Evidence 601 or another authority. Nor does the Plaintiff point to particular answers
that it claims were substantively affected by Ms. Condon’s presence or input. Without
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such a basis, the Court sees no reason to preclude the deposition transcript from
introduction at trial.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff Stephen J. Ratcliffe’s
Motion In Limine to Preclude the Deposition Transcript of Danny Condon, Whose
Remote Deposition Testimony Was Aided by Someone in the Room (ECF No. 181).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 8th day of November, 2024
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