UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-00173-SDN
)
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF 	)
EDUCATION, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER ON MOTION TO RECUSE
In this case, the federal Government is suing the Maine Department of
Education on claims that Maine is violating Title IX by allowing transgender athletes
to compete in girls’ sports. The Government has served a third-party subpoena on the
Maine Principals’ Association, the governing body for interscholastic youth sports in
Maine; the subpoena seeks, among other things, information about several named
individuals, one of whom is related to a Court employee.
When we (the undersigned judges) discovered this connection during our
review of pending motions to quash the subpoena, we disclosed it to the parties out
of an abundance of caution. We told the parties at a conference that, after carefully
considering the issue, we had concluded we could remain impartial and that our
recusal was not mandated by law or the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.
Nevertheless, we gave the parties one week to file any motions to recuse.
The Government has now filed a motion to recuse, arguing 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
requires our recusal. See Motion (ECF No. 69). Section 455(a) provides that any judge
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or magistrate judge “shall disqualify” herself “in any proceeding in which” her
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” “[W]hat matters under” section
“455(a) is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.” Microsoft Corp. v.
United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., regarding recusal)
(cleaned up). In evaluating whether our impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
we must consider “the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the
surrounding facts and circumstances.” Id.
We relayed the following facts and circumstances to the parties at our
conference. The employee in question performs administrative functions for the
Court, does not work in our respective chambers, is not involved in any judge’s
substantive decision-making process, and has no role whatsoever in the adjudication
of this case. Neither the employee nor the employee’s relative is a party to this case,
nor have they otherwise appeared. Finally, we have no personal knowledge of the
facts at issue in this case from the employee or any other source.
To the extent more context is needed, we further note that we (1) are not
directly involved in the employee’s supervision; (2) do not work closely with the
employee; 	and 	(3) 	interact 	with 	the 	employee 	infrequently, 	usually 	by 	email.
Additionally, we have never met or interacted with the relative of the employee
named in the Government’s subpoena.1
1 Based on these facts and circumstances, we also reject any passing argument by the Government, see
Motion at 1, that we must recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), which requires judges to recuse
themselves when they have “a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.”
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We are satisfied—as other courts have been in similar situations—that a
reasonable observer with knowledge of all these facts and circumstances would not
question our impartiality. Cf. Smulley v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., No. 21-2124-cv,
2022 WL 16753118, at *3 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 2022) (“[W]e are unconvinced that a
reasonable person would conclude that the court’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. 	As 	the 	District 	Court 	noted, 	other 	courts 	have 	deemed 	recusal
unnecessary 	where 	a 	ministerial 	court 	employee 	uninvolved 	in 	substantive
decision-making has a connection, through family, to counsel.” (cleaned up)); In re
Horne, 630 F. App’x 908, 910-11 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e are unable to locate any cases
suggesting that a judge’s administrative employee’s relationship with a witness is
grounds for the judge’s recusal. To the contrary, recusal is warranted on the basis of
a judicial employee’s relationships only when the employee has (or appears to have)
a role in the substantive decision-making process.”); Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking,
Inc., 787 F.3d 1297, 1313 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding a judge’s impartiality could not be
reasonably questioned where he “screened” his law clerk “from substantive work on”
a case in which her husband was hired to monitor trial); Bey v. Bruey, No. 09-1092
(JBS/AMD), 2010 WL 276076, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2010) (declining to recuse merely
because some defendants were “employees of the courthouse in which the” judge sat
where the judge did not hire, supervise, or have regular contact with the employees
in question); United States v. Haff, No. C1-00-75, 2001 WL 627426, at *1 (D.N.D.
Jan. 24, 2001) (“A family member of a fellow judge, a family member the judge at
issue may or may not have met but with whom the judge clearly does not have a
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personal relationship, is indirectly involved in the case, perhaps as a witness, perhaps
only as a part of the story that will be related at trial. This is insufficient to give ‘the
average person on the street’ reasonable questions about a judge’s impartiality.”).
The Government focuses primarily on our earlier decisions to recuse in Libby
v. Fecteau, No. 1:25-cv-00083-MRD, a District of Maine case also involving issues
related to transgender student athletes. Motion at 1. If the “conflict” is the same as
in Libby, the Government posits, recusal is “clearly” mandated “here as well.”
Id. at 3; see Reply (ECF No. 74) at 1-3.
The circumstances of this case, however, are materially different from those in
Libby. In Libby, a State Representative challenged the constitutionality of the Maine
House of Representatives’ decision to censure her for posting about a transgender
student athlete on social media. All the judges in this District recused themselves
from the Libby case because, as Chief Judge Lance E. Walker explained in a public
statement at the time, “an employee of the District of Maine [was] involved in or
directly impacted by the controversy underlying [the] litigation.” Statement by Chief
U.S. District Judge Lance E. Walker Regarding Laurel D. Libby et al v. Ryan M.
Fecteau et al. (March 12, 2025), https://www.med.uscourts.gov/news/statement-chief-
us-district-judge-lance-e-walker-regarding-laurel-d-libby-et-al-v-ryan-m
[https://perma.cc/NY4T-AX3B].
This case, by contrast, is not about any specific person. It is a dispute between
two governments over a statewide policy, the resolution of which will largely turn on
issues of law. Any involvement in the underlying controversy by the employee or the
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employee’s relative is tangential, and any impact this case might have on them will
be 	incidental. 	A 	reasonable 	observer 	with 	knowledge 	of 	these 	different
circumstances—as well as the circumstances outlined above—would not doubt our
ability 	to 	be 	impartial 	based 	on 	our 	prior 	recusals. 	Cf. 	Microsoft 	Corp.,
530 U.S. at 1302-03 (Rehnquist, C.J., regarding recusal) (declining to recuse where a
ruling might have a significant but indirect effect on the justice’s son’s legal practice
because 	giving 	“such 	broad 	sweep 	to” 	section 	“455(a) 	seems 	contrary 	to 	the
‘reasonable 	person’ 	standard 	which 	it 	embraces”); 	United 	States 	v. 	Cherry,
330 F.3d 658, 665-66 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding a reasonable observer would not
question 	a 	judge’s 	impartiality 	merely 	because 	the 	judge 	has 	an 	attenuated
connection to a person “tangential[ly]” involved in a case); United States v. Merkt,
794 F.2d 950, 960 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding a judge’s “disqualification was not required
under” section “455 merely because he voluntarily withdrew from another case”
involving the same defendant because “a reasonable person would” not “harbor
doubts about” the judge’s impartiality “based solely on his prior recusal”).
Finally, although the Government did not raise the issue, we have again
considered whether the Code of Conduct for United States Judges requires our
recusal. See Canon 2 (“A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.”); Canon 3C(1) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or
herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned . . . .”). In doing so, we sought the advice of the Committee on Codes of
Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which opined in an advisory
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letter 	to 	us 	that 	the 	Code 	of 	Conduct 	did 	not 	require 	our 	recusal 	in 	these
circumstances. For the same reasons outlined above, we agree with the Committee.
At bottom, we are satisfied that we can remain fair and impartial in this case
and that a reasonable observer with knowledge of the surrounding facts and
circumstances would not question our impartiality simply because a court employee’s
relative is named in the Government’s subpoena. We will, of course, reevaluate our
conclusion if either the employee or the relative becomes more directly involved in
this case. But, as things stand now, the Government’s motion seeking our recusal is
DENIED.
Dated: March 5, 2026
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
United States District Judge
/s/ Karen Frink Wolf
United States Magistrate Judge
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