LINAREZ v. STAMPER et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
YUBIZAY DEL CARMEN 	)
TORREALBA LINAREZ, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:26-cv-00101-JAW
)
DERRICK STAMPER, in his 	)
official capacity as Chief Patrol 	)
Agent of Houlton Sector, U.S. Border 	)
Patrol, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Finding the government’s detention of a noncitizen without a hearing violates
due process, the court grants the noncitizen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and
orders 	the 	government 	to 	provide 	the 	noncitizen 	a 	bond 	hearing 	before 	an
Immigration Judge within fourteen days of this order.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
Yubizay del Carmen Torrealba Linarez, a resident of Maine, is a Venezuelan
citizen who fled to the United States in December 2024 after experiencing violence
and political persecution in her home country. 	Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ¶¶ 1, 17-22 (ECF No. 1) (Pet.). On December 20, 2024,
Ms. Linarez attended a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) One appointment,
1 	For the purposes of Ms. Linarez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Court reviews the
relevant facts as pleaded in her verified petition, verified status report, and accompanying
attachments to each.
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where CBP granted Ms. Linarez parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Id. ¶¶
23-24; Attach. 2, Asylum Declaration; Attach. 3, 1-94 Admission Record. Thereafter,
Ms. Linarez moved to Maine, where she has resided ever since. Id. ¶ 26. Ms. Linarez
applied for asylum within one year of her arrival to the United States. 	Id. ¶ 28;
Attach. 4, Asylum Application Fee Receipt. 	Although Ms. Linarez maintains her
parole set no conditions requiring assurances she would appear at her hearings, she
reports that at some point the U.S. Department of Homeland Security initiated
removal proceedings against her by issuing a notice to appear. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.
On February 25, 2026, CBP agents arrested Ms. Linarez on her way to work.
Id. ¶ 34. 	She remains detained in CBP custody in Fort Fairfield, Maine. 	Id. ¶ 36;
Min. Entry (ECF No. 6). On February 26, 2026, alleging her immigration detention
violates federal law and the United States Constitution, Ms. Linarez filed a verified
petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking her immediate release from immigration
detention or, alternatively, a bond hearing in Immigration Court. Pet. ¶¶ 43-78. That
same 	day, 	the 	Court 	issued 	a 	seventy-two-hour 	emergency 	order, 	enjoining
Respondents from transferring Ms. Linarez outside the District of Maine. 	Emer.
Order Concerning Stay or Transfer of Removal (ECF No. 3) (Emer. Order).
At the teleconference of counsel on February 27, 2026, Respondents confirmed
Ms. Linarez was in their custody in Fort Fairfield, Maine at the time Ms. Linarez
filed her petition, clarifying there were no issues of personal jurisdiction or venue for
the Court to consider. 	Min. Entry. 	The parties also agreed to extend the Court’s
emergency order blocking Ms. Linarez’s transfer outside the District of Maine until
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the Court’s resolution of its forthcoming order to show cause. 	Id. 	Immediately
following the teleconference, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why Ms.
Linarez’s petition should not be granted, O.S.C. (ECF No. 7), and, consistent with the
parties’ agreement, extended the emergency no-transfer order until the Court issues
its ruling on the order to show cause. Order (ECF No. 8) (Order).
On February 28, 2026, Ms. Linarez filed a status report, informing the Court
of her deteriorating health and requesting a status conference. Pet’r’s Status Report
Regarding Her Health and Req. for Status Conf. (ECF No. 9) (Status Report). 	The
Court held a teleconference with counsel on March 2, 2026, at which the parties
agreed to expedite their briefing so the Court could quickly rule on the pending show
cause order before determining the proper course of action regarding Ms. Linarez’s
health concerns. 	Min. Entry (ECF No. 12). 	That same day, March 2, 2026,
Respondents filed their response to the order to show cause, opposing Ms. Linarez’s
petition, Return and Resp. to O.S.C. in Opp’n to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF
No. 11) (Resp’ts’ Opp’n), and Ms. Linarez filed her reply. Pet’r’s Reply in Supp. of Pet.
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 13) (Pet’r’s Reply).
In Ms. Linarez’s February 28, 2026 status update, she informed the Court of
her deteriorating health, primarily from a large ovarian cyst that causes her vaginal
bleeding resulting in anemia that requires daily liquid iron supplements to mitigate
her abnormally low iron levels, as well as kidneys stones for which she also took
medication, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) arising from the events that
led her to flee her home country and seek asylum in the United States. Status Report
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¶¶ 1-6. 	Ms. Linarez reports worsening symptoms and declining health because she
does not have access to her medication and supplements while she is detained in CBP
custody. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. A letter from her doctor warns of “permanent organ dysfunction
and damage,” including “kidney damage” and “heart failure” from her continued
detention without access to her medication and supplements. 	Status Report, Attach.
1, Dr. Blanas Letter.
II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
Ms. Linarez alleges her detention violates the Immigration Nationality Act
(INA) and her due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Pet. ¶¶ 43-78. Ms. Linarez maintains she is illegally categorized as a
mandatory detainee pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), rather than a discretionary
detainee under § 1226(a) who is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration
Judge. Id. ¶¶ 70-78. Ms. Linarez argues that her detention without a bond hearing
violates her Fifth Amendment due process rights. 	Id. ¶¶ 43-69. 	She seeks, among
other remedies, a writ of habeas corpus ordering her immediate release, or in the
alternative, an order requiring an Immigration Judge to provide her a bond hearing
as soon as possible. Id. 15-16.
In their opposition, Respondents maintain Ms. Linarez is properly categorized
as a mandatory detainee under § 1225(b)(2), as dictated by controlling agency
precedent. 	Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 1-2. 	However, Respondents acknowledge that “the
caselaw 	from 	this 	Court 	[has] 	uniformly 	sustain[ed] 	challenges 	to 	DHS’s
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interpretation of § 1225” and they concede Ms. Linarez’s petition is not substantially
distinguishable from that line of caselaw. Id.
In her reply, Ms. Linarez argues that Respondents have failed to show cause
why her petition should not be granted. Pet’r’s Reply at 2-3. Consistent with the body
of caselaw within this District, combined with Respondents’ concession that this Ms.
Linarez’s petition is not substantially distinguishable from that line of cases and the
health risks that continued detention poses to Ms. Linarez and the wellbeing of her
young daughter, Ms. Linarez argues she is entitled to immediate and unconditional
release pending her bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. Id. at 3-5; Dr. Blanas
Letter. 	Should the Court not order her immediate release, she maintains, in the
alternative, she is still entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. Pet’r’s
Reply at 5.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that it retains jurisdiction over Ms.
Linarez’s habeas petition. 	“District courts are limited to granting habeas relief
‘within their respective jurisdictions,’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)), and “with respect to habeas petitions ‘designed to
relieve an individual from oppressive confinement,’ the traditional rule has always
been that the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of confinement.’” Id. (quoting
Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961)). 	Furthermore, under habeas law,
jurisdiction in a particular district is established when a petitioner is physically
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present in the district at the same moment a petition is filed there on her behalf.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 435 (2004); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952);
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 190 (1948). Here, the Court retains jurisdiction over
this matter, because Ms. Linarez filed her habeas petition when she was in custody
in the District of Maine.
B. 	The Merits
Consistent with the mass of recent caselaw addressing this question on similar
facts, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2) is inapplicable to Ms. Linarez, and she is
therefore subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond
hearing before an Immigration Judge.
1. 	Statutory Framework
a. 	Mandatory Detention under Section 1225(b)(2)
Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” defined as a noncitizen
“present in the United States who has not been admitted” or “who arrives in the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two
categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings
v. 	Rodriguez, 	583 	U.S. 	281, 	287 	(2018) (plurality 	opinion). 	Relevant 	here 	is
§ 1225(b)(2).2 	Under § 1225(b)(2) “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
2 	Section 1225(b)(1) subjects arriving noncitizens and “certain other” noncitizens “initially
determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” to
expediated removal proceedings. 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii).
Noncitizens subject to expedited removal can avoid removal with successful asylum claims. However,
if a noncitizen detained under § 1225 does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of
persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” she is detained until removed. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),
(B)(iii)(IV). 	Ms. Linarez is an asylum applicant, and Respondents assert only that Ms. Linarez is
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), not § 1225(b)(1).
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admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall
be detained” for the duration of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus,
§ 1225(b)(2) creates a mandatory detention scheme. 	See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297
(2018) (“[N]either § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond
hearings”). 	As other courts have recognized, this language requires that “several
conditions must be met” to impose mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). 	Lopez
Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). 	Specifically, the
noncitizen must be: “(1) an applicant for admission; (2) seeking admission; and (3) not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Id.; Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F.
Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025).
b. 	Discretionary Detention under Section 1226(a)
By contrast, § 1226 governs the “usual removal process” with an evidentiary
hearing before an immigration judge. Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 108 (2020). 	Section 1226(a) gives immigration authorities power to issue
an administrative warrant and either continue detention for removal proceedings or
release the noncitizen on “bond . . . or conditional parole.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).
Section 	1226(a) 	thus 	“establishes 	a 	discretionary 	detention 	framework 	for
noncitizens.” 	Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11571, 2025 Dist. LEXIS 128085, at *4-5
(D. Mass. Jul. 7, 2025). 	However, § 1226’s discretionary detention regime has one
exception: immigration authorities “shall take into custody” any noncitizen involved
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in certain enumerated criminal activities. 	8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). 	None of those
criminal activities is at issue here.
Once 	arrested 	under 	§ 1226(a), 	immigration 	authorities 	make 	an
individualized initial custody determination after which they have discretion to
release a noncitizen if the noncitizen can “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer
that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien
is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2025). 	If the
immigration officer opts for continued detention, the noncitizen may seek review of
that decision at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)
(2025). At a bond hearing, the government bears the burden of proving “by clear and
convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community” or “by
preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). 	An immigration judge’s decision to
continue detaining a noncitizen may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3).
In Jennings, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the difference between
the statutes, explaining that § 1225(b)(2) “authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under,” while § 1226(a) “authorizes
the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome
of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis supplied); see also id.
at 288 (explaining that, “once inside the United States” a noncitizen “present in the
country may still be removed” under “Section 1226”) (emphasis supplied)).
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c. 	Parole Pursuant to Section 1182(d)(5)(A)
“Parole 	pursuant 	to 	Section 	1182(d)(5)(A) 	serves 	a 	unique 	function.”
Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, No. 2:25-cv-6065 (NJC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
233224, at *34 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025). 	Although § 1182(d)(5)(A) does not grant
admission to the United States, it allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to
permit certain noncitizens “on a case-by-case basis” to enter or remain in this country
only for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A); 	Jennings, 	583 	U.S. 	at 	288. 	For 	example, 	§ 1182(d)(5)(A) 	is
simultaneously the only method of parole for those subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b), but it also covers asylum applicants who obtain advance parole to
travel into and out of the United States. Caiza v. Scott, No. 1:25-cv-00500-JAW, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211907, at *16 (D. Me. Oct. 28, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(f)).
However, parole is “not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien[,] and
when the purposes of such parole . . . have been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) mandates
that “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he
was paroled.” Id. Thereafter the parolee’s case “shall continue to be dealt with in the
same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Id.
In other words, parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A) “employs a legal fiction whereby non-
citizens are physically permitted to enter the country but are nonetheless ‘treated,’
for legal purposes, ‘as if stopped at the border.’” 	Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-11613-
BEM, 	2025 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	141724, 	at 	*9 	(D. 	Mass. 	July 	24, 	2025)
(quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139).
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2. 	Applicable Statutory Basis for Detention
The parties agree Ms. Linarez was paroled into the United States pursuant to
§ 1182(d)(5)(A), and neither party disputes that Ms. Linarez is “an applicant for
admission” or that she is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
Instead, the question here, as with so many immigration habeas cases to reach the
district courts in recent months, is whether Ms. Linarez is “seeking admission” such
that she is subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
As Respondents concede, recent decisions from district courts within the First
Circuit and elsewhere have consistently rejected Respondents’ interpretation of
§ 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme under similar factual circumstances. See
Mercado v. Francis, No.25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232876, at *9-10,
n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining that similarly situated petitioners “have
prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 [out of 362] cases decided by
over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the
United States”) (collecting cases); Lopez v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-863, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 233128, at *6 (D. Vt. Nov. 17, 2025) (rejecting DHS’s application of § 1225(b)
mandatory detention to re-detain noncitizen originally released under § 1226(a));
Caiza, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195270, at *7-8 (collecting cases).3
3 	Most often, though not applicable here, this Court and other district courts have held that a
noncitizen continuously residing in the United States for more than two years cannot be considered
actively seeking admission and are therefore not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)
See, e.g., Chogllo Chafla v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-00437-SDN, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *35 (D.
Me. Sept. 21, 2025). 	Rather, a noncitizen “already in the country pending the outcome of removal
proceedings” is subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a), Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, and is
therefore entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at
41. This limitation comes from language in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), which courts across the country have
consistently read to extend to § 1225(b)(2), too. See Moraes v. Joyce, No. 2:25-cv-00583-JAW, U.S. Dist.
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The phrase “‘seeking admission’ is undefined in the statute but necessarily
implies some sort of present-tense action.” 	Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 218. 	As other
courts to reach this issue have explained, ‘seeking admission’ “contemplates that
those arriving, i.e. those who appear at the border or a port of entry, [who] must be
inspected.” Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-cv-10029 (LJL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199,
at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025); see also Wazilada v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00768, 2025
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *11 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025) (same); Rodriguez-Acurio,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233224, at *64-71 (same); Coalition for Humane Immigrant
Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 81-94 (D.D.C. 2025) (same).
In the context of § 1182 parole, the D.C. District Court has explained that when
the statute is “[r]ead according to its plain meaning, a noncitizen ‘arriving’ in the
United States would be one who is in the process of reaching his or her destination
(the United States) and making an appearance here,” but “[i]t would not naturally be
read to refer to someone who previously reached the United States via a port of entry,
underwent inspection at that port of entry, and then was paroled into the United
States.” 	Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rts., 805 F. Supp. 3d at 90-91; see also 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (providing for “inspection of other aliens”) (emphasis supplied).
Although the expiration of § 1182 parole returns the parolee “to the custody
from which he was paroled,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), district courts across the
country have consistently held that the expiration of § 1182 parole does not require
treating the noncitizen as if they had never been paroled in the first place. 	See
LEXIS 234386, at *9-10 (D. Me. Dec. 2, 2025). Ms. Linarez entered the United States in December
2024 on parole, she therefore has not resided continuously inside the country for more than two years.
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Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1726, at *8-9 (W.D.
Mich. Jan. 6, 2026); see also Qasemi, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199, at *30-35
(rejecting the argument that § 1182(d)(5)(A)’s prescription that a noncitizen be
returned to the “custody” from which they were paroled requires a return to the
detention authority to which they would have been subject prior to any grant of
parole); Rodriguez v. Rokosky, No. 25-17419 (CPO), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250239,
at *4-6 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2025) (same); see also Walizada v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00768,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *38-39 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025) (calling absurd the
idea that the expiry of petitioner’s parole now placed him in the “perpetual status” of
an “arriving alien”); Caiza, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211907, at *16 (“However, it does
not necessarily follow that all those paroled under § 1182(d)(5)(A) were detained
under § 1225 in the first instance”); Aviles-Mena v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06783-RFL,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173976, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2025) (“termination of parole
does not generally require treating noncitizens as if they had never been paroled in
the first place”).
Instead, “[s]ection 1182(d)(5)(a) suggests that rather than reverting to any
prior status, a noncitizen whose parole has expired is treated like the vast majority
of undocumented immigrants currently living in this country who are not subjected
to expedited removal” and mandatory detention under § 1225(b). Qasemi, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 261199, at *34 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also
Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233224, at *52-58 (same); Vasquez-Rosario
v. Noem, No. 25-cv-7427, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13849, at *20-21 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26,
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2026) (same); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
213487, at *14-19 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); Coalition for Humane Immigrant
Rts, 805 F.Supp.3d at 81-94 (same); Harmanpreet Singh v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-
01821, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260000, at *4-7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025) (same);
Walizada, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *38-39 (same); Rokosky, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 250239, at *4-6 (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 204373, at *20-21 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same); Aviles-Mena, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 173976, at *10 (same).
This logic applies neatly to the facts in Ms. Linarez’s case, who, having
previously been paroled by CBP, is already present in the United States with a
pending asylum application. 	The expiration of her parole does not renew the
requirement to return to a port of entry and undergo a new inspection or screening.
See Walizada v. Trump, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *26-28; Qasemi, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 261199, at *18-19, 30-35 (same). Neither do Respondents argue that Ms.
Linarez is required to undergo a new “credible fear” interview upon the termination
of her parole. Qasemi, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199, at *18-19; see also Caiza, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211907, at *14-19 (looking to the circumstances of the initial grant
of parole to determine whether § 1226(a) and 1225(b) applied to an expired § 1182
parolee).
Furthermore, Ms. Linarez pursued a lawful pathway to asylum. 	She applied
for and attended her CBP One application appointment before entering the United
States, upon which CBP granted her parole. Pet. ¶¶ 23-24; Asylum Declaration; 1-94
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Admission Record. She has lodged her asylum application before her parole expired.
Pet. ¶ 28; Asylum Application Fee Receipt. She also maintains that her parole set no
conditions requiring assurances she would appear at her hearings and Respondents
do not dispute or argue any violations of her parole conditions, and, although her
parole has expired, Ms. Linarez continues to pursue her asylum application. Pet. ¶¶
25, 28-29. 	Furthermore, the facts of Ms. Linarez’s case are readily distinguishable
from Caiza, in which this Court held that the “circumstances of [an expired § 1182
parolee’s] initial encounters with immigration authorities” indicated he was subject
to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), in part because the government paroled
him due to detention capacity, rather than to parole him in advance of filing an
asylum application. 	Caiza, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211907, at *15 (“[P]arole under
§ 1182 	does 	not 	by 	itself 	demonstrate 	that 	he 	was 	initially 	detained 	under
§ 1225(b)(2)”).
Therefore, any determination as to Ms. Linarez’s detention must be conducted
under the discretionary detention framework of Section 1226(a), which “governs the
process of arresting and detaining noncitizens who have already entered the United
States pending their removal,” including expired parolees within the United States
pending the adjudication of their asylum claim. 	Tumba v. Francis, No. 25-cv-8110
(LJL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219101, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025) (quoting Jennings,
583 U.S. at 288).
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3. 	Due Process
Because Ms. Linarez is currently in the United States, she is “entitled to the
full procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,”
Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513, at *25 (D.
Mass. Sep. 9, 2025), which provides that she will not be “deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. CONST . amend. V; see also Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (explaining “once an alien enters the country, the
legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within
the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent”). As the petitioner, however, Ms. Linarez bears the burden
of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that her detention violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See De Oliveira v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-00291-
LEW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *8 (D. Me. July 2, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H.
v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025) (collecting authority)).
To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply
the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Chafla,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *29 (analyzing procedural due process challenge to
the 	detention 	of 	noncitizen 	held 	pursuant 	§ 1226(a) 	using 	the 	Mathews 	test);
Sampiao, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513, at *26 (same); Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at
27-28 (same). 	Under Mathews, a court must weigh the following three factors: (1)
“the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
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value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s 	interest, 	including 	the 	function 	involved 	and 	the 	fiscal 	and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
a. 	Private Interest
In her petition, Linarez asserts “the most elemental of liberty interests—the
interest in being free from physical detention by [the] government.” 	Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause] protects”). A noncitizen subject detained under § 1226(a) vindicates their due
process rights through a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge who requires the
government either to (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by the preponderance of the evidence
that they pose a flight risk in order to detain them throughout the pendency of their
removal proceedings. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. In this case, Respondents
have refused Ms. Linarez the bond hearing she is guaranteed under § 1226(a) and
have failed to meet their burden for her continued detention as due process requires.
Ms. Linarez has therefore clearly established the first Mathews factor weighs in her
favor.
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b. 	Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The 	second 	Mathews 	factor 	is 	“the 	risk 	of 	an 	erroneous 	deprivation 	of
[Petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The risk
of erroneous deprivation is large where, as here, Respondents have made no showing
that Ms. Linarez presents any public safety or flight risk. 	Accordingly, the second
Mathews factor also weighs heavily in her favor.
c. 	Government Interest
Finally, 	the 	third 	Mathews 	factor 	considers 	the 	“Government’s 	interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 	Id. 	Respondents do
not raise any governmental interest favoring Ms. Linarez’s continued detention
without a bond hearing. 	See Chafla, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *34
(identifying 	governmental 	interest 	in 	favor 	of 	immigration 	habeas 	petitioners’
continued detention without a hearing as an “across-the-board application of an
inapplicable statute”). 	In fact, the public interest weighs against detention without
a hearing. 	See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33 (finding “unnecessary detention” of
noncitizens “imposes substantial societal costs”). 	Thus, the third Mathews factor
weighs against Respondents and in favor of Ms. Linarez.
The Court concludes that Respondents’ detention of Ms. Linarez without a
bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) therefore violates her due process rights.
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C. 	Current Status
Ms. Linarez filed her petition on February 26, 2026, Pet., and immediately
following her filing, the Court issued an emergency order, ordering Respondents not
to transfer her outside the District of Maine for at least seventy-two hours. 	Emer.
Order at 1. On February 27, 2026, the Court held a telephone conference of counsel
in which Respondents confirmed that Ms. Linarez is being held in Fort Fairfield,
Maine, and the Court extended the emergency order enjoining Respondents from
transferring her outside the District of Maine “until the Court issues its ruling on the
order to show cause.” Order.
There are two interrelated issues. First, the Court is ordering the Respondents
to provide Ms. Linarez with a bond hearing. 	If her presence at the bond hearing
requires her to travel outside the District of Maine, her travel would technically
violate the current geographic restriction in the order of the Court. 	Therefore, the
Court amends its Order dated February 27, 2026 as follows:
The Court therefore ENJOINS Respondents from removing Yubizay del
Carmen Torrealba Linarez outside the District of Maine pending further
order of the Court. However, if her presence at the ordered bond hearing
requires her to be outside the District of Maine, the Court ORDERS that
the Respondents may remove her from the District of Maine solely for
the purpose of attending the hearing to return her to the District of
Maine immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing, if bond is denied.
The second interrelated issue is Ms. Linarez’s current medical condition. See
Status Report at 1-4. 	Dr. Blanas, Ms. Linarez’s treating physician, described a
potentially very serious prognosis, if Ms. Linarez does not quickly obtain adequate
medical treatment. 	There are two possibilities. 	First, the Respondents could
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continue to detain Ms. Linarez pending her bond hearing, but, given the potential
seriousness of her medical conditions, the Court would require the Respondents to
demonstrate that she will obtain adequate medical care if she is detained. 	Second,
the Court could release Ms. Linarez under appropriate bond conditions pending her
bond hearing by an Immigration Judge.
The Court views Ms. Linarez, based on the limited information before it, as a
good candidate for release pending the bond hearing. 	Ms. Linarez not only has the
medical conditions that require her to maintain contact with her treating physician,
but she also has a four-year-old daughter for whom she is responsible. 	The Court
suggests that counsel confer and determine whether they can agree to a release plan
with appropriate conditions to assure her appearance at the to be scheduled bond
hearing. The Court will hold a conference of counsel as soon as possible to obtain the
positions of the parties.
A third alternative is for the Court to either retain or release Ms. Linarez based
on the current record or any additional information the parties wish to present. The
Court will discuss the appropriate resolution of these issues at the telephone
conference of counsel.
In the interim, the Court ORDERS that the Respondents not remove Yubizay
del Carmen Torrealba Linarez outside the District of Maine, except if necessary to
attend any scheduled bond hearing, pending further order of the Court.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Finding Respondents’ continued detention of Ms. Linarez without a bond
hearing 	violates 	federal 	law 	and 	the 	Fifth 	Amendment 	of 	the 	United 	States
Constitution, the Court GRANTS Yubizay del Carmen Torrealba Linarez’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and enjoins Respondents from denying Ms.
Linarez a bond hearing on the basis that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies to her and
further 	ORDERS 	Respondents 	shall 	provide 	Ms. 	Linarez 	a 	bond 	hearing 	in
accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) within fourteen days of the date of this order.
Lastly, the Court ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within five days of Ms.
Linarez’s bond hearing, stating whether Ms. Linarez has been granted bond, and, if
her request was denied, the reasons for that denial.
Finally, 	the 	Court 	ORDERS 	the 	Clerk’s 	Office 	to 	schedule 	a 	telephone
conference with counsel as soon as possible.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 3rd day of March, 2026
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