CASTILLO GONZALEZ v. STAMPER et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JESUS EDUARDO CASTILLO 	)
GONZALEZ, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:26-cv-00120-JAW
)
DERRICK STAMPER, in his 	)
official capacity as Chief Patrol 	)
Agent of Houlton Sector, U.S. Border 	)
Patrol, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Finding the government’s detention of a noncitizen without a hearing violates
due process, the court grants the noncitizen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and
orders 	the 	government 	to 	provide 	the 	noncitizen 	a 	bond 	hearing 	before 	an
Immigration Judge within fourteen days of this order.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
Jesus Eduardo Castillo Gonzalez, a resident of Skowhegan, Maine, is a citizen
of Venezuela who fled to the United States in 2016 after threats against his life his
home country. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ¶¶ 1, 17-
19 (ECF No. 1) (Pet.). 	On September 15, 2016, Mr. Gonzalez entered the United
States on a B-2 Visitor Visa, initially settling in Florida, before moving to Skowhegan,
1 	For the purposes of Mr. Gonzalez’s petition and consistent with the parties’ stipulation, the
Court reviews the relevant facts as pleaded in Mr. Gonzalez’s March 7, 2026 verified petition and
accompanying attachments. Min. Entry (ECF No. 6).
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Maine for work in 2025 and to be with his two adult sons. 	Id. ¶¶ 19-21. On March
11, 2024, Mr. Gonzalez received temporary protected status (TPS), expiring on
October 2, 2026. Id. ¶ 23; id., Attach. 4, TPS Grant Notice. However, on September
8, 2026, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the termination of
Venezuelan TPS, effective November 7, 2025. Id. ¶ 25. Mr. Gonzalez maintains DHS
never initiated removal proceedings against him and that he currently does not have
a removal case against him in Immigration Court at the time he filed this petition.
Id. ¶ 26.
On February 25, 2026, U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents arrested
Mr. Gonzalez while he was making a delivery for work at his employer, Backyard
Farms. Id. ¶ 41. Since his arrest, he has remained in CBP custody at Fort Fairfield
Station in Fort Fairfield, Maine. Id. ¶ 34; Min. Entry (ECF No. 6).
On March 7, 2026, Mr. Gonzalez filed a verified petition for writ of habeas
corpus, seeking his immediate release from immigration detention or, alternatively,
a bond hearing in Immigration Court. 	Pet. 	That same day, the Court issued a
seventy-two-hour emergency order, enjoining Respondents from transferring Mr.
Gonzalez outside the District of Maine. Emer. Order Concerning Stay or Transfer of
Removal (ECF No. 3) (Emer. Order).
At the teleconference of counsel on March 9, 2026, Respondents confirmed Mr.
Gonzalez was in their custody in Fort Fairfield, Maine when he filed his petition,
clarifying there were no issues of personal jurisdiction or venue for the Court to
consider. Min. Entry. The parties also agreed that, for purposes of this order, there
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are no factual disputes for the Court to resolve in this matter and stipulated to the
facts in Mr. Gonzalez’s verified petition and its accompanying attachments. 	The
parties also agreed to forgo an evidentiary hearing and oral argument, allowing the
Court to resolve this matter on the parties’ briefing only.
That same day, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why Mr.
Gonzalez’s petition should not be granted, and extended the Court’s March 7, 2026
no-transfer order pending further order of the Court, but authorizing Respondents to
remove Mr. Gonzalez outside the District of Maine if necessary for him to attend a
bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. O.S.C. (ECF No. 7).
On March 10, 2026, Respondents filed their response to the order to show
cause, opposing Gonzalez’s petition. Return and Resp. to O.S.C. in Opp’n to Pet. for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 8) (Resp’ts’ Opp’n). On March 13, 2026, Mr. Gonzalez
filed his reply. Reply to Gov’t’s Return and Resp. to O.S.C. (ECF No. 11) (Pet’r’s Reply).
II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
Mr. Gonzalez alleges his detention violates the Immigration Nationality Act
(INA) and his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Pet. ¶¶ 41-93. Mr. Gonzalez maintains he is illegally categorized as a
mandatory detainee pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), rather than a discretionary
detainee under § 1226(a).2 Id. He argues Respondents’ failure to conduct an initial
2 	Consistent with the parties’ agreement at the March 9, 2026 teleconference of counsel, Mr.
Gonzalez maintains his lawful status pursuant to his revoked TPS as a Venezuelan National, but
withholds pursuing that the specific challenge, without conceding the argument, given pending
disposition at the U.S. Supreme Court. 	See Min. Entry; Pet’r’s Reply at 1-2 (acknowledging
Respondents’ termination of Venezuela’s TPS designation remains in effect pursuant to a stay order
pending the U.S. Supreme Court’s disposition of the legal challenges to the revocation’s lawfulness).
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custody determination and issue a warrant within forty-eight hours of his detention
violates the INA, associated regulations, and his due process rights. Id. He seeks a
writ of habeas corpus ordering his immediate release and an order not to re-detain
him absent a material change in circumstances. Id. at 17.
In 	their 	opposition, 	Respondents 	maintain 	Mr. 	Gonzalez 	is 	properly
categorized as a mandatory detainee under § 1225(b)(2), as dictated by controlling
agency precedent. 	Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 1-2. 	However, Respondents acknowledge that
“the caselaw from this Court [has] uniformly sustain[ed] challenges to DHS’s
interpretation of § 1225” and they concede Mr. Gonzalez’s petition is not substantially
distinguishable from that line of caselaw. Id.
In his reply, Mr. Gonzalez argues that Respondents have failed to show cause
why his petition should not be granted. 	Pet’r’s Reply. 	Consistent with the body of
caselaw 	within this District, 	combined with 	Respondents’ concession 	that 	Mr.
Gonzalez’s petition is not substantially distinguishable from that line of cases and
their failure to produce the warrant authorizing his arrest, Mr. Gonzalez urges the
Court to order his immediate release and enjoin Respondents from re-detaining him
without a material change in circumstances. Id. at 3-11.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that it retains jurisdiction over Mr.
Gonzalez’s habeas petition. 	“District courts are limited to granting habeas relief
‘within their respective jurisdictions,’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004)
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(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)), and “with respect to habeas petitions ‘designed to
relieve an individual from oppressive confinement,’ the traditional rule has always
been that the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of confinement.’” Id. (quoting
Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961)). 	Furthermore, under habeas law,
jurisdiction in a particular district is established when a petitioner is physically
present in the district at the same moment a petition is filed there on his behalf.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 435 (2004); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952);
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 190 (1948). Here, the Court retains jurisdiction over
this matter, because Mr. Gonzalez filed his habeas petition when he was in custody
in the District of Maine.
B. 	The Merits
Consistent with the mass of recent caselaw addressing this question on similar
facts, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2) is inapplicable to Mr. Gonzalez, and he is
therefore subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) and entitled to an initial
custody determination and, if denied release, a bond hearing before an Immigration
Judge to review that initial custody determination.
1. 	Statutory Framework
a. 	Mandatory Detention under Section 1225(b)(2)
Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” defined as a noncitizen
“present in the United States who has not been admitted” or “who arrives in the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two
categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings
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v. 	Rodriguez, 	583 	U.S. 	281, 	287 	(2018) (plurality 	opinion). 	Relevant 	here 	is
§ 1225(b)(2).3 	Under § 1225(b)(2) “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall
be detained” for the duration of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus,
§ 1225(b)(2) creates a mandatory detention scheme. 	See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297
(2018) (“[N]either § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond
hearings”). 	As other courts have recognized, this language requires that “several
conditions must be met” to impose mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). 	Lopez
Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). 	Specifically, the
noncitizen must be: “(1) an applicant for admission; (2) seeking admission; and (3) not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 	Id.; Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F.
Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025).
b. 	Discretionary Detention under Section 1226(a)
By contrast, § 1226 governs the “usual removal process” with an evidentiary
hearing before an immigration judge. Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 108 (2020). 	Section 1226(a) gives immigration authorities power to issue
an administrative warrant and either continue detention for removal proceedings or
3 	Section 1225(b)(1) subjects arriving noncitizens and “certain other” noncitizens “initially
determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” to
expediated removal proceedings. 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii).
Noncitizens subject to expedited removal can avoid removal with successful asylum claims. However,
if a noncitizen detained under § 1225 does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of
persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he is detained until removed. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),
(B)(iii)(IV). Mr. Gonzalez is an expired B-2 visa holder, and Respondents assert only that Mr. Gonzalez
is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), not § 1225(b)(1).
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release the noncitizen on “bond . . . or conditional parole.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).
Section 	1226(a) 	thus 	“establishes 	a 	discretionary 	detention 	framework 	for
noncitizens.” 	Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d 265, 268 (D. Mass. 2025). 	However,
§ 1226’s discretionary detention regime has one exception: immigration authorities
“shall take into custody” any noncitizen involved in certain enumerated criminal
activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). None of those criminal activities is at issue here.
Once 	arrested 	under 	§ 1226(a), 	immigration 	authorities 	make 	an
individualized initial custody determination after which they have discretion to
release a noncitizen if the noncitizen can “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer
that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien
is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2025). 	If the
immigration officer opts for continued detention, the noncitizen may seek review of
that decision at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)
(2025). At a bond hearing, the government bears the burden of proving “by clear and
convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community” or “by
preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). 	An immigration judge’s decision to
continue detaining a noncitizen may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3).
In Jennings, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the difference between
the statutes, explaining that § 1225(b)(2) “authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under,” while § 1226(a) “authorizes
the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome
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of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis supplied); see also id.
at 288 (explaining that, “once inside the United States” a noncitizen “present in the
country may still be removed” under “Section 1226”) (emphasis supplied)).
2. 	Applicable Statutory Basis for Detention
As Respondents concede, recent decisions from district courts within the First
Circuit and elsewhere have consistently rejected Respondents’ interpretation of
§ 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme under similar factual circumstances. See
Mercado v. Francis, No.25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232876, at *9-10,
n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining that similarly situated petitioners “have
prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 [out of 362] cases decided by
over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the
United States”) (collecting cases); Lopez v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-863, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 233128, at *6 (D. Vt. Nov. 17, 2025) (rejecting DHS’s application of § 1225(b)
mandatory detention to re-detain noncitizen originally released under § 1226(a));
Caiza v. Scott, 1:25-cv-00500-JAW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195270, at *7-8 (D. Me.
Oct. 2, 2025) (collecting cases).
The phrase “‘seeking admission’ is undefined in the statute but necessarily
implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 218. As other
courts to reach this issue have explained, ‘seeking admission’ “contemplates that
those arriving, i.e. those who appear at the border or a port of entry, [who] must be
inspected.” Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-cv-10029 (LJL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199,
at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025); see also Wazilada v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00768, 2025
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2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *11 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025) (same); Rodriguez-Acurio,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233224, at *64-71 (same); Coalition for Humane Immigrant
Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 81-94 (D.D.C. 2025) (same).
As a noncitizen continuously residing in the United States since March 20,
2019, Mr. Gonzalez is not “seeking admission,” and he is therefore not subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). 	See Moraes v. Joyce, No. 2:25-cv-00583-
JAW, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234386, at *9-10 (D. Me. Dec. 2, 2025); Chogllo Chafla v. Scott,
804 F. Supp. 3d 247, 264 (D. Me. 2025). 	Rather, as a noncitizen “already in the
country pending the outcome of removal proceedings,” Mr. Gonzalez is subject to
discretionary detention under § 1226(a), Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, and he is entitled
to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41.
Therefore, 	any 	determination 	as 	to 	Mr. 	Gonzlaez’s 	detention 	must 	be
conducted under the discretionary detention framework of Section 1226(a), which
“governs the process of arresting and detaining noncitizens who have already entered
the United States pending their removal,” including expired parolees within the
United States pending the adjudication of their asylum claim. Tumba v. Francis, No.
25-cv-8110 (LJL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219101, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025)
(quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288).
3. 	Detention without a Warrant
Mr. Gonzalez’s petition also challenges his detention on the grounds that
Respondents’ failure to conduct an initial custody determination and issue a warrant
authorizing his continued detention violates the INA, applicable regulations, and due
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process. 	Pet. ¶¶ 41-93. 	He maintains that his ongoing detention is unlawful and,
because Respondents never performed an initial custody determination or ever
produced 	a 	warrant 	authorizing 	his 	ongoing 	detention, 	there 	is 	no 	custody
determination for an Immigration Judge to review at a subsequent bond hearing and
immediate release is therefore warranted. Pet’r’s Reply at 8-10.
Discretionary detention under § 1226(a) requires a warrant. See Jennings, 583
U.S. at 302; see also Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 256-61 (“[A]bsent a warrant
a noncitizen may not be . . . detained under [§] 1226(a)”). Although the INA provides
limited exceptions for warrantless interrogations and arrests, in order to continue to
detain a noncitizen under § 1226, federal law, applicable agency regulation, and
caselaw from this District require immigration authorities to conduct an initial
custody determination and obtain a post-hoc warrant within forty-eight hours of
initially detaining the noncitizen. See, Makuiza v. Wesling, No. 2:26-cv-00044-LEW,
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18216, at *3-12 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1357(a); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 236.1(c)(8), 287.3(d)). In other words, “when arrests are made without a warrant,
a custody determination must ordinarily be made within 48 hours, accompanied by a
notice to appear, and in the case of continued custody a warrant will be issued post
hoc.” 	Id. at *5-6, *7-13 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d)) (ordering § 1226(a) immigration
detainee released after authorities failed to conduct an initial custody determination
and obtain a post-hoc warrant justifying continued detention within forty-eight hours
of warrantless arrest).
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The Court agrees with Mr. Gonzalez that because he is subject to discretionary
detention under § 1226(a), Respondents are required by law to conduct and initial
custody determination within forty-eight hours of his detention, accompanied by a
post-hoc warrant. 	However, the Court does not agree that this conclusion requires
his immediate release. 	Instead, the Court concludes that the 48-hour clock for
Respondents to conduct an initial custody determination begins at the date and time
of this order. 	Unlike in Makuiza, in which the Government initially detained the
noncitizen pursuant to § 1226(a) but “neglected to” “justify[ ] its arrest decision[ ],”
id. at *3-4, 11, in this case, Respondents do not concede Mr. Gonzalez is subject to
§ 1226(a) but rather maintain, consistent with controlling agency precedent, he is
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), which does not require an initial
custody determination or warrant. 	Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 1-2 (citing Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA Sep. 5, 2025)). Moreover, to retroactively apply the
Court’s § 1226(a) determination in this matter would place Respondents in the
untenable position in future cases 	presenting similar circumstances, in which
Respondents 	must 	decide 	whether 	to 	deliberately 	violate 	controlling 	agency
precedent in anticipation of a possible objection a detainee may or may not raise in a
future habeas petition not yet before this Court, and then further guess how this
Court might rule.
Rather, in this case, given that Respondents have maintained since his arrest,
that Mr. Gonzalez is that subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), the
forty-eight-hour custody determination clock begins to run at the time of this Court’s
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determination that Mr. Gonzalez is subject to § 1226(a). Accordingly, the Court will
order Respondents to conduct an initial custody determination of Mr. Gonzalez
pursuant to § 1226(a), at which point they may either release him or continue to
detain him. If Respondents continue his detention, they must obtain an authorizing
warrant and, as the Court concludes below, later provide Mr. Gonzalez a bond hearing
before an Immigration Judge.
4. 	Bond Hearing
Because Mr. Gonzalez is currently in the United States, he is “entitled to the
full procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,”
Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 31 (D. Mass. 2025), which provides that he will
not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST .
amend. V; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (explaining “once an
alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause
applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”). 	As the petitioner,
however, Mr. Gonzalez bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the
evidence that his detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
See De Oliveira v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-00291-LEW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *8
(D. Me. July 2, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn.
2025) (collecting authority)).
To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply
the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 	See
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Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 27-28; see also Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d 247 at
261-264 (analyzing procedural due process challenge to the detention of noncitizen
held pursuant § 1226(a) using the Mathews test); Sampiao, 799 F. Supp 3d at 30, 34
(same). 	Under Mathews, a court must weigh the following three factors: (1) “the
private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s 	interest, 	including 	the 	function 	involved 	and 	the 	fiscal 	and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
a. 	Private Interest
In his petition, Mr. Gonzalez asserts “the most elemental of liberty interests—
the interest in being free from physical detention by [the] government.” 	Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause] protects”). A noncitizen subject detained under § 1226(a) vindicates their due
process rights through a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge who requires the
government either to (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by the preponderance of the evidence
that they pose a flight risk in order to detain them throughout the pendency of their
removal proceedings. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. In this case, Respondents
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have refused Mr. Gonzalez the bond hearing he is guaranteed under § 1226(a) and
have failed to meet their burden for his continued detention as due process requires.
Mr. Gonzalez has therefore clearly established the first Mathews factor weighs in his
favor.
b. 	Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The 	second 	Mathews 	factor 	is 	“the 	risk 	of 	an 	erroneous 	deprivation 	of
[Petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The risk
of erroneous deprivation is large where, as here, Respondents have made no showing
that Mr. Gonzalez presents any public safety or flight risk. Accordingly, the second
Mathews factor also weighs heavily in his favor.
c. 	Government Interest
Finally, 	the 	third 	Mathews 	factor 	considers 	the 	“Government’s 	interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 	Id. 	Respondents do
not raise any governmental interest favoring Mr. Gonzalez’s continued detention
without a bond hearing. 	See Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 263 (identifying
governmental 	interest 	in 	favor 	of 	immigration 	habeas 	petitioners’ 	continued
detention without a hearing as an “across-the-board application of an inapplicable
statute”). In fact, the public interest weighs against detention without a hearing. See
Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33 (finding “unnecessary detention” of noncitizens
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“imposes substantial societal costs”). Thus, the third Mathews factor weighs against
Respondents and in favor of Mr. Gonzalez.
The Court concludes that Respondents’ detention of Mr. Gonzalez without a
bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) therefore violates his due process rights.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Jesus Eduardo Castillo
Gonzalez’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to § 2241 (ECF No.
11). The Court ORDERS Respondents to conduct an initial custody determination of
Mr. Gonzalez pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and associated agency regulation within
forty-eight hours of the time and date of this order. 	If Respondents release Mr.
Gonzalez, the Court ORDERS Respondents to return any of Mr. Gonzalez’s personal
property in their possession to him at the time of release. 	If Respondents continue
Mr. Gonzalez’s detention, the Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Mr. Gonzalez
a bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) within fourteen days of the
date of that custody determination. The Court further ENJOINS Respondents from
denying Mr. Gonzalez an initial custody determination or a bond hearing on the basis
that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies to him.
Lastly, the Court ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within twenty-
four 	hours 	of 	conducting 	his 	initial 	custody 	determination, 	stating 	whether
Respondents released or continued detaining Mr. Gonzalez, accompanied by the
grounds supporting their determination and the warrant authorizing continued
detention. 	If Respondents continue detaining Mr. Gonzalez, the Court ORDERS
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Respondents to file a status report within five days of Mr. Gonzalez’s bond hearing,
stating whether Mr. Gonzalez has been granted bond, and, if his request was denied,
the reasons for that denial.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 17th day of March, 2026
Case 1:26-cv-00120-JAW Document 12 Filed 03/17/26 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:
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