TAMAKI v. TAMAKI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
STEPHANIE TAMAKI, 	)
)
Plaintiff 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:23-cv-00312-LEW
)
ATSUSHI TAMAKI a/k/a ATCHAN 	)
TAMAKI, 	)
)
Defendant 	)
SUPPLEMENTAL INDICATIVE RULING AND ORDER ON
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
This matter is currently under appeal, effectively depriving this Court of jurisdiction
over Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 86) filed on April 22, 2025,
seeking Rule 60(b) relief based on lack of service, newly discovered evidence and/or a
fraud or misrepresentation by Plaintiff. 	In a prior Indicative Ruling dated June 17, 2025
(ECF No. 90), I indicated that I would hold a hearing to weigh testimony concerning the
rigor of efforts to serve Defendant before Plaintiff filed a motion and received authorization
to perform service by alternate means.1 Although I did not conduct an immediate hearing
due to the pendency of the appeal, on November 21, 2025, I granted Plaintiff’s Motion for
Hearing. Order at 10-12 (ECF No. 97). The matter proceeded to a testimonial hearing on
January 12, 2026. 	Following the hearing, the parties provided the Court with closing
1 See Plaintiff’s Motion for Alternate Service (ECF No. 5); Order on Motion for Service by Alternate
Means (ECF No. 6). See also Order on Pl.’s Mot. for Reconsideration at 2-3 (ECF No. 97).
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arguments, both orally and in writing. The matter is now under advisement. Additionally,
I previously reserved judgment on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 89). 	See
Nov. 21, 2025 Order at 10 (ECF No. 97).
For reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment would be
granted but for the pendency of the appeal. 	Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
is now denied.
BACKGROUND
In this action, Plaintiff Stephanie Tamaki sues her childhood stepfather, Defendant
Atchan Tamaki, alleging that he sexually assaulted her when she was a minor in his
household.2 On October 13, 2023, United States Magistrate Judge John Nivison granted
Plaintiff’s Motion for Service by Alternate Means, finding, based on one-sided evidence,
that:
Plaintiff has made multiple efforts to serve Defendant in hand with the
complaint and summons through a local sheriff, but Defendant has either
refused to receive the documents or has failed to respond to attempts to
contact him at his home. 	The record establishes that (a) Defendant resides
and works in Cumberland County, (b) Defendant has avoided service, (c)
Plaintiff has demonstrated due diligence in her efforts to serve Defendant,
and (d) service by alternate means would provide Defendant with the
necessary notice of Plaintiff’s cause of action.
See ECF No. 6 at 2-3.
On October 26, 2023, Plaintiff’s process server, Sam Rinaldi, left a copy of the
complaint, a summons, and the Order on Motion for Service at Defendant’s home address
2 Because Plaintiff and Defendant share the same last name, and because Defendant appeared as a witness
at the most recent hearing, to avoid confusion I will hereafter refer to Defendant by his last name and will
continue to refer to Plaintiff as Plaintiff.
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and at Defendant’s work address (so called “drop service”). Aff. of Service (ECF No. 8).
Plaintiff’s counsel also advised the Court that he mailed a copy of the documents to both
addresses. Id.
In support of the Motion for Alternate Service, Plaintiff provided an affidavit in
which it was asserted that the sheriff “[o]n multiple occasions” attempted service at
Defendant’s home and that on all occasions a car was in the driveway but nobody answered
the door. Aff. in Supp. of Mot. for Alternate Service ¶ 7 (ECF No. 5-1 & Pl.’s Hr’g Ex.
5). 	The affidavit also disclosed that service attempts at Defendant’s place of business
included an encounter with Defendant during which Defendant refused to accept service.
Id. ¶ 6. 	According to the affiant, Attorney Robert Levine, an attempt was also made to
obtain a waiver of service through counsel, but counsel (who represented Defendant in an
earlier, related matter) reported that he was not authorized to sign a waiver of service or
had not heard back from Defendant on the subject. Id. ¶¶ 2-4.
Despite the service by alternate means, Defendant did not appear and answer the
complaint. On November 21, 2023, Plaintiff moved for entry of default, which was granted
the same day. See ECF Nos. 11, 12. On December 6, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s
motion for attachment in the amount of $2,000,000.00. 	See ECF No. 13. 	There is no
indication in the record that Plaintiff did anything with the Order of Attachment and
Attachment on Trustee Process at that time.
On December 28, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment, which the Court
heard on March 28, 2024. See ECF Nos. 15, 20. At the default judgment damages hearing,
Plaintiff appeared and testified concerning the nature and extent of the harms she suffered
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as a result of the alleged childhood abuse. Her allegations of abuse were accepted as true
by virtue of the default. 	Also appearing at the hearing was process server Sam Rinaldi.
Mr. Rinaldi testified that before he made the alternate “drop service” authorized by the
Court he made “three efforts” to serve Defendant at his home. Dmg. Hr’g Tr. at 9 (ECF
No. 68). Concerning the drop service at Defendant’s workplace, Rinaldi testified that he
entered the establishment and saw Defendant coming toward him down the hallway.
However, according to Mr. Rinaldi, Defendant “turned around and took right off.” Id. at
7. Rinaldi left the drop service documents on the counter, but a female employee (Haiying
Yang) picked them up and followed Rinaldi out of the building, whereupon she put the
documents into Rinaldi’s pocket.3 Id. at 8. Somehow Rinaldi left the documents behind,
but the employee retrieved them, beat Rinaldi to his car, and stuffed them in the door. Id.
Rinaldi drove away, circled back, and placed the documents indoors at the foot of a
stairway. 	Id. 	Based on this testimony, I proceeded on the assumption that drop service
was effective.
On March 29, 2024, I entered judgment by default in favor of Plaintiff in the amount
of $4,000,000.00. 	See ECF No. 23.4 	On May 29, 2024, execution was issued on the
Judgment. 	See ECF No. 30. 	On June 27, 2024, the U.S. Marshals Service served the
execution on a number of entities owned by Defendant and on a number of financial
3 Mr. Rinaldi explained that he felt that Defendant recognized him because Rinaldi had made service on
Defendant, in hand, in an earlier, related litigation. However, as will soon be related, on cross examination
at a later hearing Rinaldi stated he could not be certain that the person who turned away and departed was
in fact Defendant.
4 The Court amended the judgment on April 26, 2024, to address the fact that Defendant had changed his
name. (See ECF No. 26 n.1.)
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institutions. See ECF Nos. 34-40. That same day, Mr. Tamaki, proceeding pro se, filed a
Motion for Relief from Default Judgment. 	See ECF No. 41. 	In effect, upon receipt of
actual notice, Mr. Tamaki scrambled into the courthouse seeking relief from the default
judgment. In a one-page letter to the Court, dated June 26, Mr. Tamaki acknowledged an
awareness that “the old gentleman tried” to serve him at his place of business in August of
2023 (i.e., before the drop service), but Mr. Tamaki had been too busy and “couldn’t sign
what [he] didn’t know.” Id. Mr. Tamaki also stated that he was accustomed to receiving
letters from Attorney Levine seeking money, and that his ex-wife “threw them away” to
preserve his health. Id. Mr. Tamaki stated that he first learned that something was amiss
when he got a call from counsel for his corporation, on June 25, 2026, who reported that
“something” was “going on.” Id.; see also second letter dated June 27, 2024 (ECF No. 42).
On July 2, 2024, Mr. Tamaki filed another letter (ECF No. 45) stating that “all our money”
in a bank account “was taken out,” evidently referring to a hold placed on the account due
to either the execution or the attachment order.
On July 4, 2024, counsel entered his appearance on behalf of Mr. Tamaki. On July
5, 2024, Mr. Tamaki’s counsel filed an amended motion for relief from the Default
Judgment. See ECF No. 50. The motion was supported by three witness declarations. Mr.
Tamaki attested that the accusations of child abuse are false and that a prior related
litigation by Plaintiff’s older sister had caused him great emotional turmoil with significant
health consequences. 	(That matter ended in a settlement, not in a verdict against Mr.
Tamaki.) 	When Defendant received a demand letter from Attorney Levine concerning
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Plaintiff’s claim, his blood pressure spiked.5 	Thereafter, his ex-wife, Haiying Yang, a
cohabitant of his home, discarded all mail of the kind that came to the home. 	Then in
August of 2023, Defendant understood that there was a process server at his business but
the man did not remain and did not leave behind any documents when Defendant requested
that he wait a few minutes. According to Defendant, he only learned of the pendency of
this lawsuit when an attorney agent of his company told him on June 25, 2024, that a lien
was placed on his business property. See ECF No. 50-3.
Haiying Yang’s declaration is consistent. She can neither read nor write in English
fluently but aggressively discarded “junk mail” which arrived in abundance at the home
address, understanding that any mail of consequence to Mr. Tamaki’s business interest
always goes to his company’s post office box. 	Ms. Yang did not recognize any formal
papers left at the residence as having dire legal import. Ms. Yang also states that she was
the woman who encountered Mr. Rinaldi at the business address on the day he attempted
drop service (October 26, 2023) and that when she heard he was delivering mail from
Attorney Levine she had an immediate negative reaction and sought to protect Mr. Tamaki
because of the distress he experienced in connection with his stepdaughters’ accusations.
She agrees with Mr. Rinaldi that she returned the papers to Rinaldi’s car but denies ever
laying hands on him. She states that she withheld information of the encounter from Mr.
Tamaki to protect his health. See ECF No. 50-4.
5 Likely Attorney Levine’s August 1, 2023, demand letter, which letter (ECF No. 52-4) was directed to
Defendant’s former counsel.
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The third declaration is that of the translator who took down Ms. Yang’s testimony
in Mandarin and translated it to English. See ECF No. 50-5.
On August 2, 2024, I issued my order denying relief from the Judgment. See ECF
No. 59. In essence, in that order I looked with disfavor on Mr. Tamaki’s presentation for
shifting responsibility to Ms. Yang. 	I determined that Mr. Tamaki had not raised a
sufficient justification for relief from judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, or
excusable neglect, noting in particular that he admitted his awareness that a process server
had tried to serve him in August 2023, and from that time forward he should have
monitored his mail and curtailed Ms. Yang’s mail-screening responsibilities. Order at 7-
9. I also looked to Mr. Rinaldi’s testimony about other close encounters with Mr. Tamaki,
in particular the occasion when Mr. Tamaki allegedly turned away and departed when Mr.
Rinaldi approached him in a workplace corridor. 	Id. at 10. 	I chose to exercise my
discretion by denying relief from the Default Judgment based on evidence suggesting
active evasion of service, trusting as well that drop service would have achieved actual
service. Id.
On August 27, 2024, Mr. Tamaki filed his notice of appeal (ECF No. 60).
On April 22, 2025, Mr. Tamaki filed a renewed Motion to Vacate and Set Aside
Judgment (ECF No. 86). 	That Motion is currently in part denied and in part under
advisement and the subject of this Supplemental Indicative Ruling. 	Through the Motion,
Mr. Tamaki seeks relief based in part on new evidence, which basis for relief I indicated I
would deny in an order dated November 21, 2025 (ECF No. 97 at 7-8). 	However, in an
earlier indicative ruling dated June 17, 2025 (ECF No. 90), I determined that Mr. Tamaki’s
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request for relief based on the alleged impropriety of the motion for alternate service raised
a substantial issue worthy of a hearing. I called the hearing because Mr. Tamaki presented
evidence suggesting that, prior to the motion for alternate service, the process server had
neglected to ever attempt to serve him at his residence. Id. at 2-3.
The hearing was conducted on January 12, 2026. 	That was the first occasion on
which I heard from Mr. Tamaki in person and on which his counsel was able to cross
examine the process server. Plaintiff led in the presentation of evidence.
Plaintiff first called James Adams, who also serves process on behalf of the
Cumberland County Sheriff’s Office. Mr. Adams stated that he accompanied Mr. Rinaldi
to Defendant’s home twice, once on an unknown date to attempt service in hand and once
to make the alternate drop service on October 26, 2024. 	According to Mr. Adams, on
October 26, 2024, Mr. Tamaki opened the door but then began to close it when Adams
stated he was there to drop off paperwork. 	Adams testified that Tamaki said “no” but
Adams inserted the papers into the door as it closed and left them there. Tr. at 9-10. On
cross examination, Adams testified that he never completed any paperwork or kept any
notes concerning the purported service efforts at the Tamaki residence. Oddly, Mr. Rinaldi
had never indicated in the context of prior service-related offers of proof that Mr. Adams
had all but achieved in-hand service in an actual encounter with Mr. Tamaki during the
October 26 alternate drop service. Mr. Rinaldi had represented that he performed the drop
service rather than Adams.
There were other concerns that arose during Mr. Adams’s testimony. 	Mr. Adams
testified that he might have made the first service in 2022 rather than 2023. 	Adams also
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testified that when he was contacted by Plaintiff’s counsel to prepare for his testimony, he
did not remember any dates or any specifics at all about the service he purportedly
performed for this case. Id. at 24. Recalled to the witness stand later in the hearing, Mr.
Adams testified that he “pretty much” remembers that the first time he and Mr. Rinaldi
went to Mr. Tamaki’s residence, Rinaldi told him he had been to the residence to attempt
service the day before. 	Id. at 82. 	This would be the only evidence of a third attempt at
service at the Tamaki residence. Mr. Adams also stated that he attempted service at both
the front and side door, without providing any other description of the property. 	The
assertion concerning a side door is somewhat odd given the layout of the Tamaki residence.
See ECF No. 118-1. 	For all of these reasons, I find Mr. Adams’s testimony entirely
unreliable.
Plaintiff’s second witness was Mr. Tamaki. 	Mr. Tamaki testified that he never
before encountered Mr. Adams. Id. at 41. Mr. Tamaki testified that in August 2023, when
Mr. Rinaldi came to his place of work, he was unloading seafood with a forklift and
understood that Mr. Rinaldi wanted him to sign some paperwork. Mr. Tamaki thought he
needed some time to read the paperwork, so asked Rinaldi to wait. 	Mr. Rinaldi did not
wait and did not leave the paperwork. Id. at 46-47, 70-71. Contrary to assertions made in
support of the Motion for Alternate Service (ECF No. 5-1 ¶ 6), Mr. Tamaki did not refuse
service on this date.
Plaintiff’s third witness was Sam Rinaldi. Mr. Rinaldi testified that he went to Mr.
Tamaki’s residence more than once and to the place of business “many times.” Id. at 86.
Although Mr. Rinaldi did not name Ms. Yang, he testified that when he encountered her at
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the place of business on October 26, 2023, that she pleaded with him, in evident fear, “to
please take the paper back.” 	Id. at 91. 	Concerning that service effort and the prior
representation that Mr. Tamaki allegedly turned away in the corridor and left the scene to
attempt to prevent service, Mr. Rinaldi testified that he could not guarantee that the person
he saw turn and walk away was, in fact, Mr. Tamaki. Id. at 106.
Although Mr. Rinaldi relied on the service paperwork to recall what efforts were
made at service, and although the paperwork does not indicate incontrovertibly that there
were service attempts at Mr. Tamaki’s residence, Rinaldi testified reliably that the service
attempts on August 10 and September 29 included attempts made at both Mr. Tamaki’s
residence and his place of work. However, these were the only efforts Mr. Rinaldi made
to serve Mr. Tamaki before drop service was authorized. 	Ultimately, Mr. Rinaldi could
not confidently testify that he attempted service three times at the residence before drop
service was authorized. Id. at 109-18.
Based on the record and testimony, my findings regarding the service efforts on Mr.
Tamaki are as follows, in chronological order.
August 10, 2023
On August 10, 2023, a Thursday, Mr. Rinaldi made a single service attempt at both
the residence and the place of work, neither of which achieved service. At the residence,
nobody was home. At the place of work, Mr. Tamaki was operating a forklift and asked
Mr. Rinaldi to wait, thinking that there was something Mr. Rinaldi wanted him to sign and
that he should take a moment to review it. 	Mr. Rinaldi, understanding that there was no
need for Mr. Tamaki to read anything, left the premises without waiting and without
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leaving the papers, evidently thinking Mr. Tamaki was simply evading service. 	Mr.
Tamaki, not understanding that there was nothing for him to actually read or sign in Mr.
Rinaldi’s presence, and that the encounter would simply involve a hand-off of papers, in
fact was not trying to evade service.
August 15, 2023 to September 1, 2023
After the initial failed attempt at service, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed Mr. Tamaki’s
former counsel to request waiver of service of a summons. Mr. Tamaki’s former counsel,
Attorney Walter Mckee, responded that he was not authorized to waive service on Mr.
Tamaki’s behalf. 	Plaintiff’s counsel forwarded the response to members of the firm
proposing that they ask Sam Rinaldi to “make another effort” at service. Pl.’s Hr’g Ex. 9.
Although the evidence of this correspondence invites an inference that perchance whatever
communication occurred between Attorney McKee and Mr. Tamaki gave Mr. Tamaki
actual notice of a pending civil action in which he was the named defendant, I am not so
persuaded on the record. I credit Mr. Tamaki’s testimony that he did not have actual notice
of a pending civil action until he learned of it as a consequence of the Marshals’ service of
the writ of execution. His lack of awareness may be the product of a failure to exercise the
care that more cautious people would observe, but still I found Mr. Tamaki’s protestations
of ignorance believable and on that basis conclude that he did not have actual notice of the
pendency of this civil action through his communication with Attorney McKee.
September 23, 2023
Mr. Rinaldi did not attempt service again until Saturday, September 23, 2023, once
more trying both locations but failing to achieve service at either. Mr. Adams accompanied
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Mr. Rinaldi for the visit to the residence. Nobody answered. The visit to the place of work
was uneventful. Mr. Tamaki was not contacted, presumably because he was not present.
Mr. Rinaldi went to the place of work alone and has offered no details concerning the visit.
October 6-13, 2023
On October 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed her motion for leave to serve Mr. Tamaki by
alternate means. 	On October 13, 2023, Magistrate Judge Nivison issued an order
approving service by alternate means relying exclusively on counsel’s affidavit to find that
Mr. Tamaki avoided service, Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to serve him, and
alternate service by drop service and mail would provide the needed service. Based on the
finding I have now made with the benefit of cross examination, I conclude that the Motion
for Alternate Service would have been denied as too hasty, had the facts as I have found
them been evident at the time, given that the effort was far from exhausting and involved
only two days on which service was attempted casually at two locations.
October 26, 2023
On October 26, 2023, a Thursday, Mr. Rinaldi traveled to Mr. Tamaki’s residence
with Mr. Adams. 	Someone left the service documents at the door, consistent with the
authorization to perform alternate drop service. 	Nobody answered the door, contrary to
Mr. Adams’s testimony. 	Mr. Tamaki never acquired the service documents left at his
residence on October 26, 2023. Nor did he ever acquire the service documents sent to the
residence by mail. 	Ms. Yang disposed of the documents without understanding their
import or else in a misguided effort to spare Mr. Tamaki emotional upset. 	She did not
inform Mr. Tamaki of what she had done.
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Also on October 26, 2023, Mr. Rinaldi went to the place of work unaccompanied
by Mr. Adams. Contrary to his prior representations, he did not see Mr. Tamaki turn around
in the hallway and walk away to evade service. 	Mr. Rinaldi’s prior attestation and
testimony that this had occurred was based on an unreliable memory, as he acknowledged
at the most recent hearing on cross examination. Mr. Rinaldi attempted to leave the service
documents at the place of work but Ms. Yang intercepted them and brought them outdoors
to prevent their delivery. 	Mr. Rinaldi returned later and left the documents in an
undisclosed location inside the building. 	Mr. Tamaki did not acquire these documents,
likely because Ms. Yang disposed of them. What became of the service documents mailed
to the street address of the place of work is not known. The business uses a post office box
and there is no evidence that the documents were ever mailed to the post office box. If the
mail reached someone inside the building, Mr. Tamaki never saw the service documents
or learned of them.
November 2023 through June 2024
Between November 2023 and June 2024 this matter proceeded on the understanding
that multiple attempts at service were made at both addresses and that Mr. Tamaki had
purposefully evaded service and disregarded legal process of which he presumptively was
made aware. In November 2023, the Clerk entered Mr. Tamaki’s default. No notice went
out to Mr. Tamaki. 	At the beginning of December 2023, an attachment was ordered but
evidently was never employed to give Mr. Tamaki actual notice by that means. At the end
of the month of December, Plaintiff filed her motion for default judgment. No notice went
out to Mr. Tamaki. Three months of time went by before the damages hearing. The Default
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Judgment issued near the end of March 2024. In May 2024, Plaintiff applied for a writ of
execution. 	Following issuance of the writ of execution, in late June 2024, the U.S.
Marshals Service served the writ on Mr. Tamaki’s businesses and banks. It was only upon
service by the Marshals that Mr. Tamaki learned both that a lawsuit had been filed against
him in this Court and that he was already subject to a default judgment for $4,000,000.00.
DISCUSSION
A. 	Motion for Relief from Judgment
By Maine law, service by alternate means is authorized only on a showing that the
movant exercised due diligence in attempting to effectuate personal service when the
residential address of the person to be served is known. Me. R. Civ. P. 4(g)(1). The Rule
anticipates that before alternate service will be awarded, the movant must exhaust all
reasonable attempts to serve a defendant. 	Me. R. Civ. P. 4 Advisory Committee Note,
2010 Amendment. The Rule also requires proof either that the person to be served has an
unknowable identity or location or it appears that the person is evading service. 	Me. R.
Civ. P. 4(g)(1).
Based on the affidavit presented in support of the motion for alternate service, it is
no surprise that service by alternate means was authorized. 	However, I now find that
efforts to serve Mr. Tamaki by ordinary means did not fully exhaust all reasonable attempts
and that Mr. Tamaki was not actually evading service. Additionally, I find that even the
service by alternate means failed to provide Mr. Tamaki with notice that this civil action
was in fact pending against him.
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I also find that counsel’s affidavit in support of the motion for service by alternate
means was not knowingly false in regard to either the diligence of service efforts or the
existence of evasion on Mr. Tamaki’s part. Even at the default judgment stage, Mr. Rinaldi
informed the court that he had made three service attempts at Mr. Tamaki’s home address
and that Mr. Tamaki had evaded him during drop service at the place of work. I now find
that those two representations were based on an unreliable memory and are unworthy of
judgment by default. 	But in the context of what occurred before, it was reasonable for
counsel to rely on Mr. Rinaldi’s representations.
As for Mr. Adams’s testimony that he encountered Mr. Tamaki at his door on
October 26, 2023, I find that the testimony is not reliable. Such an encounter would have
been known to Mr. Rinaldi, who accompanied Mr. Adams, yet the first word of it came
only during the most recent hearing and from Mr. Adams rather than Mr. Rinaldi. I do not
find that Mr. Adams’s testimony amounts to perjury, only that his recollection of the day
was too poor to credit such a shocking revelation.6
Plaintiff argues that res judicata bars my new findings because Mr. Tamaki made
successive motions for Rule 60 relief. 	I find that assertion unavailing. 	Ultimately, I
conclude that it would be proper to exercise the discretion authorized by Rule 60, based on
extraordinary circumstances. I so find because I am persuaded that alternate service was
6 I am of the belief that Mr. Adams was confusing service at Mr. Tamaki residence with service at some
other residence. Mr. Adams attempts service between 10 and 15 times a day at various locations. It is to
be expected that without the benefit of contemporaneous notes, of which there were none of probative
value, Mr. Adams’s memory would be unreliable as to the particulars of service efforts made in 2023.
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not actually called for when it was authorized and, in any event, that it did not actually
accomplish the objective of effectuating service.
Given the lack of effective service or actual notice, the Judgment of Default is void
for lack of service and can be set aside at any time pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).
Precision Etchings & Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem, Ltd., 953 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1992).7
Furthermore, the misrepresentation that underlay the authorization to perform alternate
service should not be rewarded and separately militates in favor of relief.
B. 	Motion for Sanctions
My findings have implications for Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 89).
The Motion for Sanctions began as a request for the Court to impose sanctions against Mr.
Tamaki and his counsel for asserting that Plaintiff’s counsel fabricated Plaintiff’s case (and
her sister’s case before that). 	Since that time, the request has grown to encompass other
developments. 	For example, in their latest briefing on the subject—which was not
authorized—Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that an attorney’s fee or civil penalty sanction
should be imposed based on the idea that Mr. Tamaki’s effort to obtain relief from the
Default Judgment has all along been a charade with no merit whatsoever. 	See Brief in
Support of Mot. to Reconsider Indicative Ruling at 12 (ECF No. 117). I have concluded
otherwise.
7 Although Mr. Tamaki did not cite subsection (4) of Rule 60(b) in support of his Motion for Relief from
Judgment (ECF No. 86), he expressly seeks relief in the Motion based on the contention “that he was never
served with summons and complaint.” Id. at 1. That is sufficient to invoke the relief I have indicated I
would afford on remand, should the First Circuit remand the matter for that purpose. In any event, the
misrepresentation element of Rule 60(b)(3) can also be employed to grant such relief, since the presumption
of service that attended prior rulings grew out of the order that authorized alternate service which in turn
grew out of the misrepresentation.
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To the extent the Motion for Sanctions has also expanded to encompass other
concerns such as bar complaints, a suit by Mr. Tamaki against Attorney Levine, or alleged
defamatory remarks made by Mr. Tamaki on social media, these are not matters for
Plaintiff to pursue in this litigation but for Attorney Levine to pursue in another forum.
That leaves the original request, which was limited to an assertion of a Rule 11
violation for statements made in court papers that Plaintiff’s counsel put Plaintiff up to this
civil action despite the falseness of her cause. 	It also now includes an assertion that Mr.
Tamaki and his counsel have illegitimately called into question Plaintiff’s mental health in
certain filings. 	As to the role of Plaintiff’s counsel in the litigation, I am confident that
Plaintiff’s counsel is above reproach. 	As to which of the parties speaks the truth, and
whether Plaintiff’s allegations grow out of mental health issues, these are matters for the
jury to determine. 	I am not willing to award the requested attorney fee sanction or civil
penalty based on my own findings as to the truth or falsity of ultimate issues in this case,
the subject of which has never before been tried to a verdict. I am also reluctant to award
such a sanction given that the judicial process privilege affords ample room in which
parties and counsel may maneuver when such serious allegations have been leveled across
the aisle. See Dineen v. Daughan, 381 A.2d 663, 664 (Me. 1978). For these reasons, the
Motion for Sanctions is denied.
What I will consider, however, is a new motion to strike from the record any
“immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” pursuant to Rule 12(f) upon a renewed
motion that provides pin-point citations to the offending docket items, although I anticipate
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that the reputation of Plaintiff’s counsel will remain in good standing even if no such
motion is filed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, I now issue this supplemental “indicative ruling
on a motion for relief that is barred by a pending appeal,” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1.
Specifically, this Order is drawn to indicate to the First Circuit Court of Appeals that I will
grant Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment and vacate the Amended Default
Judgment if the matter is remanded with allowance that I do so, specifically because I have
concluded, based on my findings, that Mr. Tamaki has a viable defense, relief from the
default judgment “is appropriate to accomplish justice,” Bouret-Echevarria v. Caribbean
Aviation Maint. Corp., 784 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2015), and relief from default judgment is
not unfairly prejudicial to Plaintiff.
Defendant is advised that pursuant to Rule 62.1 he “must promptly notify the circuit
clerk 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Appellate 	Procedure 	12.1” 	of 	the 	substance 	of 	this
Supplemental Indicative Ruling.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 89) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 20 th day of March, 2026.
/s/ Lance E. Walker
Chief U.S. District Judge
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