O'LEARY v. HYDE et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ABIGAIL LIMA DA SILVA 	)
O’LEARY, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:26-cv-00036-JAW
)
PATRICIA HYDE, in her 	)
official capacity as Acting 	)
Field Office Director of Enforcement 	)
and Removal Operations, 	)
Boston Field Office, Immigration 	)
and Customs Enforcement, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Because the court lacks jurisdiction over a noncitizen’s challenge to an
Immigration Judge’s decision to deny her bond and the noncitizen’s challenge to her
conditions of confinement are moot, the court grants the government’s motion to
dismiss the noncitizen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
Abigail Lima Da Silva O’Leary, a resident of Massachusetts, is a citizen of
Brazil who entered the United States on a B-2 visitor visa in 2017. Verified Pet. for
Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 17) (Pet.). Ms. O’Leary
is married to a U.S. citizen and is pursuing adjustment of status based on a pending
1 	For the purposes of Respondents’ motion to dismiss and consistent with the parties’
stipulation, the Court reviews the relevant facts as pleaded in Ms. O’Leary’s verified petition and
accompanying attachments. 	Verified Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(ECF No. 17); Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 10).
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I-130 petition filed by her spouse. Id. ¶ 1. She has also filed an I-485 application for
adjustment of status with the Executive Office of Immigration Review. Id.
Ms. O’Leary also reports that she overstayed her B-2 visa and is subject to
removal proceedings. 	Id. 	Specifically, on October 9, 2025, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Ms. O’Leary and detained her at Cumberland
County Jail pending her removal proceedings.2 	Id. ¶ 2. 	On October 16, 2025, Ms.
O’Leary appeared before an Immigration Judge for a bond hearing, where the
Immigration Judge determined Ms. O’Leary posed a danger to the community and
denied her bond. 	Id. ¶ 3; Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 10), Attach. 2, Order of the
Immigration Judge (IJ Order); id., Attach. 3, Bond Memo. On October 28, 2025, Ms.
O’Leary appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) the Immigration
Judge’s bond denial, which Ms. O’Leary asserts remains pending. Pet. ¶ 4.
On January 21, 2026, Abigail Lima Da Silva O’Leary filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, which she later supplemented with a verified petition on February 19,
2026. Id.; Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1).
In 	her 	petition, 	Ms. 	O’Leary 	alleges 	her 	bond 	hearing 	was 	constitutionally
inadequate, depriving her of her due process right to “a meaningful custody hearing.”
2 	In her petition, Ms. O’Leary alleges she was arrested without a “judicial warrant.” Id. ¶ 2. In
response, Respondents provided a copy of the I-200 administrative warrant authorizing Ms. O’Leary’s
October 9, 2025 arrest as an attachment to their motion to dismiss. Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss, Attach.
1, Warrant for Arrest of Alien. The Court understands that Ms. O’Leary was saying that she had not
been arrested pursuant to a judicial arrest warrant, which would be true, and instead was arrested
pursuant to an administrative arrest warrant, which would also be true. However, in her response
opposing Respondents’ motion to dismiss, Ms. O’Leary is silent about the I-200 arrest warrant and
does not reallege she was arrested without a warrant. Pet’r’s Resp. in Opp’n to Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss
(ECF No. 14). The Court therefore accepts Respondents’ representation that Ms. O’Leary was arrested
pursuant to an I-200 administrative warrant.
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Pet. ¶ 5. 	Ms. O’Leary’s petition also challenges her conditions of confinement,
explaining that, due to her asthma, she “faces urgent medical and safety concerns”
regarding her risk of exposure to COVID-19. Id. ¶ 6.
On January 21, 2026, shortly after Ms. O’Leary filed her petition, the Court
issued a seventy-two-hour emergency stay, temporarily enjoining Respondents from
transferring Ms. O’Leary outside the District of Maine. Emer. Order Concerning Stay
of Transfer or Removal (ECF No. 2) (Emer. Order). 	The following day, January 22,
2026, Respondents filed an emergency motion requesting permission to transfer Ms.
O’Leary to the ICE Boston Field Office, located at 1000 District Avenue, Burlington,
Massachusetts, 	because 	Cumberland 	County 	Jail 	(CCJ), 	Ms. 	Oleary’s 	current
detention site, had no additional bed space. 	Resp’ts’ Emer. Mot. to Transfer at 1-2
(ECF No. 6). 	That same day, the Court entered the following order, granting
Respondents’ emergency motion.
Based on Respondents’ representations that a housing emergency exists
at [CCJ] that makes transfer to Massachusetts imperative, and its
further representation that the Court will have ongoing jurisdiction over
the case and that Respondents will not raise venue as an issue in its
responses, the Court hereby modifies the January 21, 2026 emergency
stay to permit Ms. O’Leary’s transfer to the District of Massachusetts
consistent with Respondents’ representations in its emergency transfer
motion. 	Respondents are enjoined from transferring Ms. O’Leary
outside the District of Massachusetts and District of Maine for the
period of at least seventy-two hours from the date and time of this
amended order. 	The Court further orders Respondents provide Ms.
O’Leary reasonable access to counsel during the period of her detention
in Massachusetts.
Order (ECF No. 7) (Am. Emer. Order).
The next morning, on January 23, 2026, Ms. O’Leary filed a motion requesting
the Court issue an order requiring Respondents to return Ms. O’Leary to the District
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of Maine. Mot. to Modify Emer. Order and Other Relief (ECF No. 8). In her motion,
Ms. O’Leary alleged her transfer violated the Court’s January 21, 2026 no-transfer
order because Respondents removed Ms. O’Leary from the District of Maine before
the Court issued is amended emergency no-transfer order. 	Id. ¶ 10. 	Ms. O’Leary’s
motion also challenged Respondents’ stated emergency basis for their requested
modified no-transfer order, alleging that CCJ, based on available information, “was
not operating at capacity” but rather had “ample capacity” to house detainees, like
Ms. O’Leary. 	Id. ¶ 8. 	Accordingly, Ms. O’Leary sought an order from this Court
finding Respondents violated the Court’s January 21, 2026 no-transfer order, and as
an appropriate sanction for this violation, an order requiring Respondents to release
Ms. O’Leary or, alternatively, to return her to CCJ or another appropriate facility
within the District of Maine. Id. at 5.
Later that same day, January 23, 2026, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss
Ms. O’Leary’s petition, Mot. to Dismiss, and a response to Ms. O’Leary’s motion,
confirming ICE transferred Ms. O’Leary outside the District of Maine before the
Court 	issued 	its 	amended 	no-transfer 	order, 	and 	acknowledging 	Respondents’
transfer of Ms. O’Leary violated the Court’s January 21, 2026 no-transfer order.
Resp. to Pet’r’s Mot. at 2 (ECF No. 9). Respondents further explained that they will
no longer house immigration detainees at the CCJ.3 Resp. to Pet’r’s Mot. at 2.
3 	Counsel for Respondents state that Respondents’ transfer of Ms. O’Leary prior to the Court
issuing its amended no-transfer order and the fact that ICE will no longer house immigration
detainees at CCJ were not known to counsel at the time they filed Respondents’ emergency transfer
motion. 	Id. 	The Court accepts counsel’s representation and does not impute to their counsel
Respondents’ conceded violation of the Court’s January 21, 2026 order.
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Given these developments, the Court held a teleconference of counsel later that
evening on January 23, 2026, and, upon the parties’ agreement, issued the following
order.
In light of the Government’s representation that Abigail Lima Da Silva
O’Leary was transferred to Massachusetts in direct violation of this
Court’s Orders, ECF Nos. 2, 7, the Court ORDERS Ms. O’Leary’s
immediate 	release 	on 	personal 	recognizance, 	subject 	to 	standard
conditions of release on personal recognizance, while the merits of her
underlying habeas petition, ECF No. 1, are pending. The Court further
ORDERS the Government cannot re-detain Ms. O’Leary while the
merits of her habeas petition are pending.
Min. Entry (ECF No. 12) (Release Order). 	At the teleconference, the parties agreed
the Court’s release order resolved Ms. O’Leary’s motion to return her to the District
of Maine, Order (ECF No. 13) (Order Mooting Pet’r’s Mot. to Modify Emer. Order and
Other Relief), and set a schedule to complete briefing on Respondents’ motion to
dismiss Ms. O’Leary’s petition. Min Entry.
On February 13, 2026, Ms. O’Leary filed her response, opposing Respondents’
motion to dismiss. 	Pet’r’s Resp. in Opp’n to Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 14)
(Pet’r’s Opp’n). 	On February 18, 2026, Respondents filed their reply, and the Court
took Respondents motion to dismiss under advisement on February 19, 2026. Reply
in Further Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) (Resp’ts’ Reply).
II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. 	Abigail Lima Da Silva O’Leary’s Petition for writ of Habeas
Corpus
Ms. O’Leary’s petition for writ of habeas corpus alleges her detention violates
the Immigration Nationality Act (INA) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 	Pet. at 1-2, ¶¶ 24-60. 	Specifically,
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Ms. O’Leary maintains that her bond hearing before an Immigration Judge was
constitutionally inadequate and that, given Ms. O’Leary’s serious medical needs and
the CCJ’s COVID-19 conditions and procedures, her conditions of confinement are
unreasonably harsh and dangerous. Id. She seeks, among other remedies, a writ of
habeas corpus ordering her immediate release or, in the alternative, an order
requiring Respondents both to provide her a constitutionally adequate bond hearing
and to take immediate steps to address her health concerns related to her conditions
of confinement. Id. at 17-20.
B. 	Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
Respondents oppose and move to dismiss Ms. O’Leary’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over her habeas claims
pursuant to the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9)
and 1226(e). Mot. to Dismiss at 1, 5-7. Should the Court determine it has jurisdiction
to review Ms. O’Leary’s petition, Respondents maintain that the Court should decline
to grant her requested relief. Id. at 7-9. Finally, Respondents maintain Ms. O’Leary’s
January 23, 2026 release moots her conditions of confinement claim. 	Id. at 9.
Accordingly, Respondents move to dismiss Ms. O’Leary’s petition. Id. at 9-10.
C. 	Abigail Lima Da Silva O’Leary’s Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss
Ms. O’Leary opposes Respondents’ motion to dismiss, arguing that neither
§§ 1252(b)(9) nor 1226(e) strips this Court of jurisdiction over her claims because she
raises a due process claim to the constitutional adequacy of her bond hearing and
does not seek to relitigate the substance of the Immigration Judge’s discretionary
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bond determination. 	Pet’r’s Opp’n at 2, 8-15. 	Moreover, because the Court retains
jurisdiction to review her claims and her habeas petition plausibly alleges a due
process violation, Ms. O’Leary argues dismissal is unwarranted. 	Id. 15-16. 	Lastly,
Ms. O’Leary maintains her conditions of confinement are not mooted by her release.
Id. at 16-17. Accordingly, Ms. O’Leary asks this Court to deny Respondents’ motion
to dismiss. Id. at 18.
D. 	Respondents’ Reply
In reply, Respondents reiterate and further support their motion’s argument
that 	dismissal 	is 	warranted 	on 	jurisdictional 	grounds. 	Resp’ts’ 	Reply 	at 	1-3.
Respondents 	further 	maintain 	that 	Ms. 	O’Leary’s 	petition 	and 	opposition 	to
Respondents’ motion to dismiss fail to prove subject matter jurisdiction. 	Id. at 3-4.
Finally, 	Respondents 	explain 	that 	the 	“unique 	facts 	of 	this 	case 	invariably
demonstrate [Ms. O’Leary] . . . will not be returned to ICE custody at the CCJ,”
mooting her conditions of confinement claim. 	Id. at 4-5. 	Accordingly, Respondents
ask this Court to grant the motion to dismiss Ms. O’Leary’s petition. Id. at 5.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Section 1252(b)(9)
The INA “channels immigration claims through the administrative process
and sharply limits judicial review while that process is ongoing.” Sicha v. Bernal, No.
1:25-cv-00418-SDN, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169007, at *10 (D. Me. Aug. 29, 2025)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)). Specifically, § 1252(b)(9), known as the “zipper clause,”
provides:
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Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation
and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from
any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the
United States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final
order under this section.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). In other words, the zipper clause “squeezes claims relating to
removal into the administrative process, only to release them for judicial review once
a final administrative order is issued.” Sicha, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169007, at * 10.
Until a final order of removal issues, § 1252(b)(9) strips federal courts of jurisdiction
to hear challenges to removal proceedings. 	8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (“[N]o court shall
have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus . . . or by any other provision of law (statutory or
nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of law or fact”).
Despite the apparent breadth of the zipper clause, the First Circuit holds that
an immigration detainee may raise claims “collateral to” the removal process, such
as those that “cannot effectively be handled through the available administrative
process,” in federal court. 	Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t Div. of Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2007). For example, “district courts retain
jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of detention in the immigration context,”
but not over challenges to the proceedings itself. Id. (emphasis supplied).
As relevant here, for the government to subject a noncitizen to discretionary
detention pursuant to § 1226(a), “due process requires the government to either (1)
prove by clear and convincing evidence that she poses a danger to the community or
(2) prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). 	An Immigration Judge’s “decision to
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continue detaining a noncitizen [pursuant to § 1226(a)] may be further appealed to
the BIA.” Id. at 26 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3)).
B. 	Section 1226(e)
Similarly, § 1226(e) severely limits a district court’s jurisdiction to review an
immigration 	detainee’s 	challenge 	to 	discretionary 	detention 	under 	§ 1226(a).
Specifically, § 1226(e) provides that “the Attorney General’s discretionary judgment
regarding the application of [§ 1226] shall not be subject to review” and “[n]o court
may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section
regarding the . . . denial of bond or parole” of any noncitizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). This
provision essentially strips district courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to an
Immigration Judge’s “discretionary decision to keep [a noncitizen] in detention.”
Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 689 (D. Mass. 2018). This provision
removes federal court jurisdiction to hear challenges to an “immigration judge’s
weighing of the evidence and exercise of discretion with respect to dangerousness.”
Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 144 (D. Mass. 2019); see also Pensamiento
v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 688 (D. Mass. 2018) (“Congress has eliminated
judicial review of discretionary custody determinations”).
Section 1226(e) does not, however, deprive them of jurisdiction to hear
constitutional challenges to “the extent of the Government’s detention authority
under the ‘statutory framework’ as a whole.” 	Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33-34
(quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295-96 (2018)). 	District courts in the
First 	Circuit 	have 	reviewed 	an 	Immigration 	Judges’ 	bond 	determinations 	for
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compliance with due process. 	See, e.g., Garcia v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-00585, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 253787, at *11-12, *15 (D.R.I. Dec. 3, 2025) (granting habeas relief);
Mayancela Mayancela v. FCI Berlin, No. 25-cv-00348, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226280,
at *6-7 (D.N.H. Nov. 18, 2025) (denying habeas relief); Dos Reis v. Vitello, No. 25-cv-
10497, 2025 WL 1043434, at *13-15 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2025) (denying habeas relief).
To show that an Immigration Judge failed to comply with due process, a noncitizen
must either “point to the language of the immigration judge’s opinion or demonstrate
that 	‘the 	evidence 	itself 	could 	not—as 	a 	matter 	of 	law—have 	supported’ 	the
immigration judge’s decision to deny bond.” Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140,
143 (quoting Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 240 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)).
Given the highly circumscribed nature of judicial review in this context, courts cannot
override an immigration judge’s bond decision simply because they “might have
reached a different result if considering the issue de novo or in the context of a bail
review in a criminal case.” 	Massingue v. Streeter, No. 19-cv-30159, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64600, at *16 (D. Mass. Apr. 14, 2020). 	Rather, habeas relief is appropriate
only if the Immigration Judge’s “exercise of discretion in denying bond was so
arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process.” Diaz Ortiz, 384 F.
Supp. 3d at 144 (quoting Pratt v. Doll, No. 17-cv-01020, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26976,
at *10 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2019)).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdictional Challenges
Based on the available evidence, the Court concludes that it does not have
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jurisdiction to review Ms. O’Leary’s challenge to the Immigration Judge’s bond
denial. Ms. O’Leary’s challenge falls squarely within the category of claims that the
INA strips from the district courts’ jurisdiction, and the evidence before this Court
does not suggest that the Immigration Judge’s bond denial violated due process.
Instead, Ms. O’Leary may seek relief by appealing to the BIA, and ultimately, the
First Circuit.
First, Ms. O’Leary’s claim against her bond denial is not “collateral to” her
removal proceedings. 	Aguilar, 520 F.3d at 10-11. 	Ms. O’Leary argues that the
Immigration 	Judge “failed to apply 	the constitutionally 	required burdens 	and
standards governing § 1226(a) custody redeterminations in this Circuit.” 	Petr’s’
Opp’n at 8. 	However, this is precisely the category of claims this Court has
consistently found the INA has channeled through the administrative process and
away from the district court. See, e.g., Nunes v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-00357-JAW, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 191132, at *13-14 (D. Me. Sep. 29, 2025) (“It is not uncommon for a losing
party to believe, even sincerely, that a judge failed to properly evaluate evidence and
issued an erroneous ruling, but this type of finding goes to the heart of the
Immigration Judge’s determination at the bond hearing and the Court cannot
conclude it is collateral to the removal proceeding”).
Second, although Ms. O’Leary is correct that § 1252(b)(9) does not strip a
district court of jurisdiction to review the legality of her detention, the evidence before
this Court does not demonstrate she was denied due process such that her detention
may be illegal. 	In Trega v. Bondi, this Court rejected an immigration detainee’s
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argument “that [an] Immigration Judge failed to provide her with due process when
the Immigration Judge held a detention hearing pursuant to Hernandez-Lara.” No.
2:25-cv-00643-JAW, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8737, at *10 (D. Me. Jan. 16, 2026). 	As
explained above, Ms. O’Leary’s argument that “the evidence cited in the custody
proceedings did not establish a present, unmitigable risk under the governing
evidentiary standards,” Pet’r’s Opp’n at 12, fits well within the category of challenge
that the INA removed from this Court’s jurisdiction.
Moreover, her claims of fundamental unfairness are belied by the evidence
before this Court. Rather, Ms. O’Leary received constitutionally required due process
when she appeared before an Immigration Judge who reviewed and heard evidence,
held the Government to its burden of proof, and found by clear and convincing
evidence that Ms. O’Leary is a danger to the community.4 See IJ Order; Bond Memo.
(Denying Ms. O’Leary bond after “weigh[ing] the recency of [her] DUI and that the
police report in the record was highly detailed and reliable” against Ms. O’Leary’s
argument that many of her criminal “charges were dismissed and that she has
4 	Ms. O’Leary argues that the Immigration Judge’s failure to consider “less restrictive
alternatives” to detention violates due process. Pet’r’s Opp’n at 13. However, Ms. O’Leary overreads
the First Circuit’s guidance in Hernandez-Lara, which held that due process places the burden of proof
on the Government, not the immigration detainee, during a § 1226(a) bond hearing, to prove the
immigration detainee poses a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence or a flight
risk by a preponderance of the evidence. Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 39-41. So far, the First Circuit
has not interpreted Hernandez-Lara to require an Immigration Judge to consider alternatives to
detention. See Doe v. Tompkins, 11 F.4th 1, 2 (finding an immigration detainee “entitled to a new
hearing before an IJ at which the government will bear the burden of proving either dangerousness or
flight risk in order to continue det[ention],” but expressly withholding ruling on whether the
Immigration Judge must consider alternatives to detention because the parties had not raised the
issue on appeal). Considering the First Circuit’s silence on alternatives to detention and the fact that
the Court otherwise concludes that Ms. O’Leary’s bond hearing satisfies the due process requirements
articulated in Hernandez-Lara, the Court declines at this time to extend Hernandez-Lara to further
require an Immigration Judge to consider alternatives to detention. In other words, the Court is chary
about expanding First Circuit law without express authority from the First Circuit.
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stopped drinking,” and then concluding that Ms. O’Leary “repeatedly violated laws
in the past and put people in the community in danger when she operated a vehicle
under the influence”). Furthermore, Ms. O’Leary retains the “additional layer of due
process protection,” through her pending BIA appeal, Trega, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8737, at *10-11, and she had failed to demonstrate how her claims “cannot effectively
be handled through the available administrative process.” Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11.
For the same reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(e) removes the Court’s
jurisdiction to review Ms. O’Leary’s challenge to the Immigration Judge’s bond
denial. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003) (holding that § 1226(e) bars an
immigration detainee’s challenge to “a ‘discretionary judgment’ by the Attorney
General or a ‘decision’ that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention
or release”); Oliveira v. Joyce, No. 2:25-cv-00291-LEW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202195,
at *3 (D. Me. Oct. 14, 2025) (“This Court lacks the jurisdiction to award relief to
Petitioner by means of a habeas order that directly reviews the immigration judge’s
bond determination”) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(e), 1252(a)(2), 1252(b)(9)); Diaz Ortiz v.
Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 144 (D. Mass. 2019) (holding § 1226(e) strips district
courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to an “immigration judge’s weighing of the
evidence and exercise of discretion with respect to dangerousness”).
Similarly, the sister district caselaw on which Ms. O’Leary relies does not
overcome the consistent approach from this District in applying Hernandez-Lara to
cases presenting similar facts and legal challenges. See Trega, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8737, at *9-12; Oliveira, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202195, at *3; Nunes, 2025 WL
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2772578, at *11-14. 	Nor does Ms. O’Leary provide any compelling argument or
distinguishing factors that suggests the Court today should break from this approach
under Hernandez-Lara.
Accordingly, the Court finds it lacks jurisdiction to review Ms. O’Leary’s claims
regarding 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	bond 	denial. 	The 	Court 	therefore 	grants
Respondents’ motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds and does not reach the
merits of those claims.
B. 	Conditions of Confinement
As for Ms. O’Leary’s challenge to her conditions of confinement, the Court
agrees with Respondents that her claims are moot. “Article III [of the United States
Constitution] prohibits federal courts from deciding ‘moot’ cases or controversies—
that is, those in which the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Unión de Empleados de Muelles de P.R.,
Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 884 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2018). 	“[E]ven if a suit
present[s] a live dispute when filed, if events change ‘such that . . . the complaining
party winds up with all the relief the federal court could have given [it],’ the case is
‘moot’ and must be dismissed.” 	Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, 52 F.4th 40, 46-
47 (1st Cir. 2022). 	As relevant here, courts generally recognize that a detainee’s
request for facility-specific injunctive relief may be mooted by release. 	See Ford v.
Bender, 768 F.3d 15, 29 (1st Cir. 2014) (“A prisoner’s challenge to prison conditions
or policies is generally rendered moot by his transfer or release”).
Ms. O’Leary challenges the conditions of confinement specific to the CCJ, a
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facility that Respondents maintain will no longer house immigration detainees.5
Resp’ts’ Reply at 4-5. 	In her petition, Ms. O’Leary argues that “her current
confinement” at Cumberland County Jail presented an “unreasonably harsh and
dangerous . . . risk of COVID-19,” because she “has had known exposure to COVID-
19 at the facility.” 	Pet. at 2-3 (emphasis supplied); id. ¶ 43-46. 	In other words,
because Ms. O’Leary’s conditions of confinement arise from a claim about exposure to
COVID-19 at a facility where there is no reasonable prospect she will be detained
again, there is no evidence before this Court to find that the challenged conditions of
confinement are “reasonably expected to recur.” Friend of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). 	Ms. O’Leary’s conditions of
confinement claim against conditions at the CCJ are therefore moot, and the Court
will grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss her claim accordingly.
C. 	Current Status
On January 23, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to release Ms. O’Leary
on her personal recognizance, subject to standard conditions of release on personal
recognizance, and further ordered Respondents not to re-detain Ms. O’Leary while
the 	merits 	of 	her habeas 	petition are 	pending. 	Release Order. 	In 	granting
Respondents’ motion to dismiss, however, the January 23, 2026 release order will
expire upon the Court’s dismissal of Ms. O’Leary’s verified petition. 	The Court
therefore clarifies that Ms. O’Leary remains subject to the standard conditions of her
5 	For purposes of this ruling, the Court accepts the Respondents’ representation as true. If Ms.
O’Leary is detained at the CCJ in the future, she may file a new conditions of confinement claim, based
on the then existing conditions.
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release on personal recognizance. However, Respondents are no longer barred from
re-detaining Ms. O’Leary.6
V. 	CONCLUSION
The 	Court 	GRANTS 	Respondents 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	(ECF 	No. 	10).
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES without prejudice Abigail Lima Da Silva’s
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No.
17) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to her claims related to her October 16,
2025 bond hearing before and Immigration Judge and for mootness as to her claims
related to her conditions of confinement. 	The Court further DISMISSES as moot
Abigail Lima Da Silva’s unverified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 11th day of March, 2026
6 	If the Respondents re-detain Ms. O’Leary, the Court urges counsel for both Ms. O’Leary and
Respondents to work together to make her submission to re-detention as non-confrontational as
possible with prior notice to Ms. O’Leary’s counsel.
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