Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. William Beaumont Hospital

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM BEAUMONT
HOSPITAL d/b/a BEAUMONT
HEALTH SYSTEM,
Defendant.
___________________________ /
Case No. 23-cv-11560
Hon. F. Kay Behm
United States District Judge
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (ECF No. 28)
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is an employment case brought by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “the Commission”) on June 28,
2023, on behalf of Megan Shefke (“Shefke”), a former Unit Shift Lead
(Charge Nurse) at William Beaumont Hospital (“Beaumont”) in Wayne,
Michigan. Shefke was employed by Beaumont from May 2017 to
January 2020, when she resigned to take a different job. The EEOC
alleges that Beaumont violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) by failing to reassign Shefke to a vacant position for which she
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was qualified. The parties brought competing motions for summary
judgment, and both were granted in part and denied in part, narrowing
the scope of the issues for trial. ECF No. 24.
Defendant now brings a motion for reconsideration of the court’s
order on the parties’ motions for summary judgment, and asks that the
court enter judgment in its favor. ECF No. 28 (Defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration). The court ordered a response, which was received at
ECF No. 30, and finds that no oral argument is necessary to resolve the
issues presented. LR 7.1(h)(3).
For the reasons explained below, the motion for reconsideration is
DENIED.
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The primary dispute on this motion, as presented by Defendant, is
that Shefke did not provide Beaumont with updated medical
documentation until June 2019, and thus Beaumont had no duty to
place her in any of the three open positions prior to that time. Because
all three positions were filled before Shefke provided updated medical
documentation, Beaumont says it is entitled to judgment and
reconsideration of the court’s prior opinion. The relevant facts were set
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out in some detail in the court’s prior opinion, and to prevent needless
repetition, the court assumes familiarity with that opinion. 	See ECF
No. 24; Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. William Beaumont Hosp.,
No. 23-CV-11560, 2025 WL 1831056 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 2025). For
purposes of this motion only, the court highlights a few key facts and
disputes of fact.
One, there is no dispute that each of the three remaining positions
that Shefke claims she should have been transferred to or considered
for had been filled prior to the time Shefke provided Beaumont with
new medical documentation in June 2019. However, there is also no
dispute that Shefke had submitted applications to all three of those
positions months before, while they were advertised as vacant by
Beaumont (there is a dispute as to whether one position was in fact
vacant). 	See ECF No. 24, PageID.756. 	The court has also already
indicated that a jury could find that Shefke had said enough to
Beaumont to put her employer on notice that she was seeking a transfer
as an accommodation at the time she applied to those positions. 	E.g.,
ECF No. 24, PageID.817-22.
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Two, there is no dispute that Beaumont was already aware that
Shefke had Fabry disease, was thus disabled under the meaning of the
ADA, because she had previously provided them medical documentation
and received reasonable accommodations. ECF No. 24, PageID.742-43.
For example, Beaumont had already approved one request for reduced
hours. 	Id.
Three, at least some evidence shows that Beaumont did ask
Shefke for updated medical documentation several times as part of the
transfer process, which perhaps suggests that Beaumont sought to
impose a requirement for her to provide them documentation at some
point prior to being transferred. ECF No. 17-9, PageID.138 (“Please
have your health care provider complete the attached Medical Inquiry
form to assist us with that process”); id. at PageID.137 (“The request to
have a reduction in your hours from 32 down to part-time as a result of
needing an accommodation for your disability is a new request that we
need documentation for.”).
However, there is also evidence indicating that Shefke was never
told she needed to provide Beaumont with medical documentation prior
to being transferred or prior to being considered for a transfer. ECF No.
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17-18, PageID.237 (Fildew1 Dep. at 55-56) (“Q: So she could still apply
so long as she was – from your perspective, so long as she was keeping
you informed of job openings that she was interested in, it wasn’t as
important to have the form in hand yet . . . ?” “A: Correct. So you’re
always eligible to apply, right, . . .”). For example, when Shefke
informed Beaumont that she had applied to an open position, Beaumont
HR made no mention of requiring medical paperwork to be completed
before Shefke could be interviewed or considered for the position. ECF
No. 18-11, PageID.432 (“I have reached out to the manager over
recruitment at the Beaumont Service Center so they are in the loop that
you[’re] interested in transferring.”); see also ECF No. 18-12,
PageID.436 (“Megan is a FT [full time] Nurse here at Wayne and
looking to go PT [part time] as soon as possible as she is no longer able
to continue fulltime. If she could be scheduled for interviews for
anything she meets the qualifications for that would be helpful.”); ECF
No. 18-12, PageID.435 (“Kevin-can you please review Megan’s app and
send her to the hiring manager if she meets the requirements?”); see
1 Kelly Fildew is a former HR administrator for Beaumont.
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also generally ECF No. 30, PageID.892 (communications from
Beaumont to Shefke).
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h)(2) and LCrR
12.1, a party may file a motion for reconsideration of a non-final order
only if: (A) the court made a mistake, correcting the mistake changes
the outcome of the prior decision, and the mistake was based on the
record and law before the court at the time of its prior decision, (2) an
intervening change in controlling law warrants a different outcome, or
(3) new facts warrant a different outcome and the new facts could not
have been discovered with reasonable diligence before the prior
decision. E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(2). “Motions for reconsideration of non-
final orders are disfavored.” 	Id.
Notably, a motion for reconsideration, much like a motion to alter
or amend a judgment, is thus not for the purpose of “proffer[ing]
a new legal theory or new evidence to support a prior argument when
the legal theory or argument could, with due diligence, have been
discovered and offered during the initial consideration of the issue.”
McConocha v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 930 F. Supp. 1182,
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1184 (N.D. Ohio 1996). Nor is it an appropriate vehicle for raising new
facts or arguments. 	Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v.
Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998) (motions under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) “are aimed at reconsideration, not initial consideration”). “A
motion for reconsideration ‘addresses only factual and legal matters
that the court may have overlooked . . . .’ It is improper on a motion for
reconsideration to ‘ask the court to rethink what [it] had already
thought through—rightly or wrongly.’” 	Carter v. Robinson, 211 F.R.D.
549, 550 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel
Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983). “It is an
exception to the norm for the Court to grant a motion for
reconsideration.” 	Maiberger v. City of Livonia, 724 F. Supp. 2d 759, 780
(E.D. Mich. 2010).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
There is no dispute that there has been no intervening change in
law, nor new facts that have appeared that were not previously
discoverable. 	See ECF No. 28, PageID.868. Beaumont’s argument is
that the court made a mistake on the facts and law; specifically,
“Beaumont had no duty to accommodate Shefke’s request to transfer
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until she provided the requested medical documentation,” and because
Shefke did not provide Beaumont with updated medical documentation
until June 2019, Beaumont had no duty to place her in any of the three
open positions that remain at issue. 	See id. at PageID.868, 870.
A. 	Beaumont’s argument is improper in this posture.
As indicated, motions for reconsideration should not be used for “a
second bite at the apple.” 	United States v. Lamar, No. 19-CR-20515,
2022 WL 327711, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2022); see Sault Ste. Marie
Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998).
It cannot be reasonably argued that Defendant’s original motion for
summary judgment made the argument that “Beaumont had no duty to
accommodate” Shefke until she “provided the requested medical
documentation.” Admittedly, Beamont’s original motion and response
made reference to a factual dispute about the necessity of medical
documentation in the statement and counterstatement of facts. 	See
ECF No. 17, PageID.90-92; ECF No. 20, PageID.636, 638, 642.
But this alleged lack of updated medical documentation and a
requirement to provide such was limited to pointing out those factual
disputes, and were not brought up in Beaumont’s argument at all. 	See
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ECF No. 17, PageID.97-101; ECF No. 20, PageID.648-52. Beaumont’s
argument rested on several other grounds, but did not bring forward
the alleged requirement for medical documentation or the necessity of
such. If this alleged requirement truly foreclosed all the issues in this
case, as Beaumont now asserts, one would expect that the point could
have, and should have, been made front-and-center during the initial
consideration of the issue.
The motion would (and should) therefore be denied on this basis
alone, but the court nonetheless addresses the merits, as the issues will
undoubtedly be relevant to the remaining issues at trial.
B. 	Relevant framework and factual issues
Beaumont argues that, “[u]nder well settled law, Beaumont’s
obligation under the ADA to consider Shefke’s request to transfer was
not triggered until Shefke provided Beaumont with the medical
documentation it requested as part of the interactive process.” ECF No.
28, PageID.860 (citing Kirilenko-Ison v. Board of Ed. of Danville
Independent Schools, 974 F.3d 652, 670 (6th Cir. 2020)). Beaumont’s
reliance on Kirilenko-Ison and related cases for this proposition is
misplaced.
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It is true that, generally speaking, employers have “the right to
ask for documentation from a health care provider articulating the
medical necessity of [an employee’s] accommodation.” 	Kellar v. Yunion,
Inc., No. 25-1136, 2025 LX 464565, at *31 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 2025)
(citing Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 813 (6th Cir.
2020) (explaining that an employee “must” provide proof that an
accommodation is medically necessary “when asked by his employer”);
Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 656 (6th Cir. 2000) (“An
employer need not take the employee’s word for it that the employee
has an illness that may require special accommodation. Instead, the
employer has the ability to confirm or disprove the employee’s
statement.”). But as far as Beaumont argues that within the facts of
this case, Shefke was required by law to forward with updated medical
documentation in order to trigger any of Beaumont’s obligations to work
to transfer her as an accommodation, and that it did not need to take
any action to consider her request to transfer until it received that
documentation, that goes too far. The case law indicates that the
employer, as part of the interactive process, may request documentation
from the employee to verify that they have a disability, but says nothing
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about when that documentation is due as a matter of law. 	See King v.
Steward Trumbull Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 30 F.4th 551, 564 (6th Cir. 2022)
(“Medical documentation is not required” in starting the interactive
process of a request for accommodation). Nor does the case law state
that an employer may take no action on a plaintiff’s request or pause
the interactive process entirely when it is already on notice of an
employee’s disability. On the contrary, in Kirilenko-Ison, the employee
failed to provide any documentation at all to verify her condition; that
case thus stands for the proposition that an employer’s requirement of
providing paperwork is permissible when it is necessary to establish
that an employee’s disability is medically supported in the first place.
See Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 669 (“Kirilenko-Ison concedes that she
did not provide the School Board with any documentation about her
disability diagnosis during the interactive process”). But here,
Beaumont was already aware Shefke had a medically diagnosed
disability, and Shefke had already provided them medical paperwork to
that effect both when receiving a prior reasonable accommodation and
when taking FMLA leave. Fabry disease is a degenerative disorder; its
symptoms worsen over time. A jury could find that imposing a
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requirement to provide Beaumont with updated medical documentation
before they took any action on her request to be transferred to a position
with fewer hours as bad faith where Beaumont (a hospital, no less) had
sufficient relevant information about her disability in their possession
already. 	See King, 30 F.4th at 565 (“The employer must participate in
‘good faith’ and conduct an ‘individualized inquiry’ into possible
accommodations.”) (citing Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1045
(6th Cir. 2014).
Thus there is no general requirement as a matter of law that a
plaintiff who has already provided medical documentation provide
updated medical documentation prior to triggering any obligation on
the part of the employer to continue the interactive process. If
Beaumont wishes to make the factual argument that this specific
interactive process was paused entirely while they waited for updated
paperwork, to be entitled to summary judgment they still have to prove
that such a policy existed at Beaumont, that Beaumont in fact applied
such a policy to Shefke and relied on that rationale to pause the
interactive process, that such a policy was applied in good faith to
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Shefke under the circumstances, and/or that they clearly communicated
that requirement during the interactive process.
In the light most favorable to Shefke, factual disputes remain on
all of those issues. In the light most favorable to her, Beaumont never
told Shefke that the medical form was mandatory to the reassignment
process (i.e., if she did not provide it, she would not get placed, nor
would she be interviewed or considered for an open position as an
accommodation). Instead, Fildew told Shefke the form would “assist” or
“expedite” reassignment in some undescribed way. Beaumont’s
argument that it “was waiting for Shefke to submit the requested
medical documentation, so it could adequately assess her request” for a
transfer is therefore based on materially disputed facts and evidence.
See ECF No. 28, PageID.873. The EEOC also raises factual questions
about whether a policy requiring employees to provide documentation
was generally in place – thus raising the question of why it was
necessary to ask Shefke specifically for a new, updated medical form.
ECF No. 30, PageID.890. As the EEOC points out, Beaumont was
aware that Shefke was taking additional FMLA leave at the time due to
a physical inability to complete the required number of hours, and had
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her prior medical accommodation form on hand. Whether a new
“request form” was actually necessary for Beaumont to make efforts to
transfer her to a part-time role as an accommodation is a question best
left to the jury, who could find that Beaumont “unreasonably stalled”
Shefke’s request in light of the information already in their possession.
See King, 30 F.4th at 566. There is also evidence in the record
indicating Beaumont affirmatively stated that it would consider Shefke
for vacant positions despite not having updated paperwork, and that it
acted as though it did not need a form (including suggesting Shefke be
scheduled for interviews and searching for jobs for her), thus raising
factual issues about their argument that they required her to provide
the paperwork first and relied on that rationale.
Beaumont’s view is that, “[w]hile it is true that Shefke did not
‘need a medical form in hand to apply to open positions,’ she was
required to provide Beaumont with a medical form to the extent she
wanted to be transferred as an accommodation. The ability to apply for
a position and a request to be transferred as an accommodation are two
entirely different things.” ECF No. 28, PageID.871. However, the
evidence does not unequivocally support that argument. Again, the
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court previously identified testimony that reads: “Q: So [Shefke] could
still apply so long as she was – from your perspective, so long as she
was keeping you informed of job openings that she was interested in, it
wasn’t as important to have the form in hand yet . . . ?” “A: Correct. So
you’re always eligible to apply, right, . . .”). ECF No. 17-18, PageID.237
(Fildew Dep. at 55-56); see also ECF No. 18-6, PageID.385-386 (Fildew
Dep. at 53:8-54:7) (additional testimony reiterating this point). The
EEOC identifies multiple communications from Fildew that indicated
Shefke should go ahead and apply to open positions as an
accommodation, and did not mention to her a requirement that she first
had to submit new paperwork. ECF No. 30, PageID.892-93. A
reasonable jury can read this evidence in the light most favorable to
Shefke: that Shefke was always allowed to apply to positions to move
the process along, and that medical documentation was not required to
trigger an “expedited” process of being considered; i.e. she could have
provided medical documentation to Beaumont at some later point while
the interactive process continued in the meantime. While Defendant
says that the court’s reading “understates” the importance of other
evidence (ECF No. 28, PageID.871), what they are describing is simply
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considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Shefke, as the
court must at summary judgment.
C. 	Whether the positions were not “vacant” because they
were filled before Shefke provided documentation
Beaumont also argues that the court erred when it ruled that a
material dispute of fact remained as to a particular Care Coordinator
position (which the court dubbed “CCA” for purposes of trying to keep
track of similarly-named open positions). Beaumont now says “the
candidate selected for this position started working in the position on
May 19, 2019, which was more than two weeks before Shefke submitted
medical documentation supporting her transfer request.” ECF No. 28,
PageID.866 (internal citation omitted, emphasis Defendant’s).
Therefore, so says Defendant, “[t]he position was not vacant at the time
Beaumont received the requisite medical documentation.” 	Id.
Beaumont says essentially the same as to the Quality Improvement RN
position (“QIRN”) and other Care Coordinator position (“CCB”). ECF
No. 28, PageID.867.
This argument, that these positions were not “vacant” at the time
Shefke submitted her updated medical form and therefore Beaumont
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had no duty to place Shefke in those positions, appears nowhere in the
original arguments for summary judgment and is, again, not properly
brought in a motion for reconsideration. But in any event, this
argument fundamentally rests on the factual disputes identified above,
including whether Beaumont clearly communicated to Shefke that it
would not consider her for any open position until the moment she
provided updated documentation, whether such a policy in fact existed,
and whether such a policy was properly applied to Shefke. It also rests
on the disputed factual contention that the lack of updated medical
information was the reason that Beaumont did not consider her for
those positions.
D. 	Initial Care Coordinator position (CCA)
Finally, Beaumont argues in the alternative that, even if the court
denies the rest of its motion, the court erred when it stated that the
only dispute as to liability regarding the CCA position is whether that
position was vacant when Shefke applied (ECF No. 24, PageID.807),
and says that it must be allowed to argue at trial that “Shefke was not
entitled to the Care Coordinator position (30111350) because it was no
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longer vacant by the time she submitted her medical documentation.”
ECF No. 28, PageID.875-76.
The court agrees with the EEOC that this argument misstates the
record. The undisputed evidence, and Defendant’s own argument,
shows that Claxton2 did not reject Shefke’s candidacy for the CCA
position for lack of a medical accommodation form. Instead, he declined
to consider her application because of his belief that the hiring manager
already had two other candidates in mind. 	Wm. Beaumont Hosp., 2025
WL 1831056 at *20; ECF No. 17, PageID.97 (“the position was already
filled”). When the interactive process was triggered but not successfully
resolved, “courts should attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown
and then assign responsibility.” 	Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 485 F.3d
862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs.,
100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996)). Since the evidence shows that the
absence of a medical form had, as a factual matter, nothing to do with
Beaumont’s rejection of Shefke’s application for the first Care
Coordinator vacancy, it is irrelevant to their liability as to that position
because (assuming the position was in fact vacant) responsibility for
2 Kevin Claxton worked in Talent Acquisition for Beaumont.
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cutting short the interactive process as to that vacancy indisputably lies
with Beaumont alone. 	See id.3
V. 	CONCLUSION
Therefore, the court DENIES the motion for reconsideration (ECF
No. 28).
SO ORDERED.
Date: November 19, 2025 	s/F. Kay Behm
F. Kay Behm
United States District Judge
3 Their argument also implicitly rests on a hypothetical – that had they
seriously considered Shefke for the position (such as gotten her an interview and
made an offer), and clearly told her “we can’t hire you for this position until you get
your paperwork in,” that she still would not have provided updated medical
paperwork until June 2019. This attempt to defend from liability by forecasting
what Plaintiff might have done under materially different circumstances is
speculative and unavailing at summary judgment. Cf. Turnes v. Amsouth Bank,
N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994) (“an employer may not satisfy its burden
of production by offering a justification which the employer either did not know or
did not consider at the time the decision was made”).
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