Efremov v. Dunbar et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
SERGEI EFREMOV,
Petitioner,
v.
ANGELA DUNBAR et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-2680
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated
this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF
No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current detention and asks the
Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering
Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the
requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.17.) In an order entered on September 28,
2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of
habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.)
Case 1:26-cv-02680-RJJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/13/26 Page 1
of 6

2
Respondents filed their response on October 1, 2026. (ECF No. 5.) On October 9, 2026, Petitioner
filed a reply. (ECF No. 7.)1
II. Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Russia. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Petitioner entered
the United States at a port of entry on July 4, 2024, after making a CBP One appointment. (2026
I-213, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.73.) ICE initially issued Petitioner a Notice and Order of Expedited
Removal on July 6, 2024. (Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, ECF No. 5-3, PageID.82.)
Thereafter, following a determination of credible fear of persecution by an asylum officer,
Petitioner was issued a Form I-862, Notice to Appear, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility,
which placed Petitioner in standard, non-expedited removal proceedings under § 240 of the INA.2
(See 2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.73; Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.56.) Petitioner was
then paroled into the United States until July 3, 2025, and Petitioner has remained in the United
States since that time. (I-94, ECF No. 5-4.) On or about July 6, 2026, Petitioner was detained by
ICE. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8.)3
1 Petitioner filed a motion to accept the late-filed reply. (Mot., ECF No. 6.) The Court grants
Petitioner’s motion and considers the reply to be filed in the case.
2 The Court notes that, in this case, Respondents do not argue that Petitioner’s detention continues
to be governed by § 1225 because he was originally in expedited removal proceedings before he
was placed in regular, non-expedited removal proceedings. Respondents have raised this argument
in many other cases before the Court, and if they had presented that argument here, for the same
reasons set forth in Betancourth-Martell v. Mullin, No. 1:26-cv-1255, 2026 WL 1532967 (W.D.
Mich. June 1, 2026), the Court would conclude that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs
Petitioner’s detention. See also, e.g., Vettah v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-1735, 2026 WL 1945090, at
*2–3 (W.D. Mich. July 6, 2026); Vega-Duno v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-1570, 2026 WL 1593320,
at *1 & n.2 (W.D. Mich. June 4, 2026); Espinoza Ramirez v. Unknown Party, No. 1:26-cv-1505,
2026 WL 1551778, at *1 & n.3 (W.D. Mich. June 2, 2026); Morales Morales v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-714, 2026 WL 972715, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 2026);
Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026).
3 The materials submitted by the parties do not suggest that Petitioner is subject to a final order of
removal or that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
Case 1:26-cv-02680-RJJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/13/26 Page 2
of 6

3
Respondents have not provided Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge as contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers upon the federal courts the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Merits Discussion
A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Based on the facts presented by the parties, and the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026), the Court concludes that
§ 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs Petitioner’s detention.4
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Lopez-Campos, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained:
Noncitizens who have “passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed
in due process of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
212 (1953); see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). Thus,
noncitizens within the interior of the United States are entitled to the protections of
4 Additionally, for the same reasons set forth in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610,
2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), the Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that
Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225 due to his manner of entry into the United States.
Case 1:26-cv-02680-RJJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/13/26 Page 3
of 6

4
the Due Process Clause, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “It is well
established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in
[removal] proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Consequently, the government may not
deny “notice” or “an opportunity to be heard” to a noncitizen “who has entered the
country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its
population, although alleged to be illegally here.” Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–01.
Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 732. The Sixth Circuit therefore upheld the lower courts’
determinations that the government’s detention of the Lopez-Campos petitioners “without bond
under § 1226(a) was a deprivation of liberty that violated [their] due process rights.” Id. at 734.
Petitioner is likewise detained under § 1226(a) and has been denied an individualized bond
hearing. Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory
detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights. See id.; see also Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651,
at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL
3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025
WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
V. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action. They seek the dismissal of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes
that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Case 1:26-cv-02680-RJJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/13/26 Page 4
of 6

5
Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding habeas relief
will bind at least one Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred
outside the area under the authority of the ICE Detroit Field Office, the Court will retain all of the
remaining Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court will order
Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five
business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties as soon
as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.5 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
5 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
Case 1:26-cv-02680-RJJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/13/26 Page 5
of 6

6
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated:
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
October 13, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Case 1:26-cv-02680-RJJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 10/13/26 Page 6
of 6