Anderson v Hernandez, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
JEFFERY L. ANDERSON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
v. 	) 	Case No. 1:23-cv-00201-SNLJ
)
JOSEPH T. HERNANDEZ, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jeffery Anderson, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights lawsuit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Scott County Sheriff and Jail Administrator exhibited
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs while he was a pretrial detainee at the
Scott County Jail in Benton, Missouri. This matter is now before the Court on
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity. [Doc. 57]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following screening of plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, he is
proceeding on a claim that defendants Wes Drury and Amy Johnson were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs by delaying the administration of his
psychotropic medication from February 4 to February 19, 2019. [Docs. 1, 9]. After
discovery was completed, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the
affirmative defenses of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and qualified
immunity. [Doc. 57]. A review of the briefing and evidence submitted with the motion
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revealed factual disputes that precluded summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion.
[Doc. 65]. The motion was denied on the issue of exhaustion, and a ruling on the issue of
qualified immunity was deferred. [Id.].
On March 17, 2026, the parties appeared before the Court for an evidentiary
hearing. At that time, defendants withdrew the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. As a result, the Court can now proceed to rule on the motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment shall be granted
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Material facts
are those that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and there is
a genuine dispute where “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When considering a
motion for summary judgment, the court must view “the evidence and the inferences
which reasonably may be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Allard v. Baldwin, 779 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2015).
The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (cleaned up). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving
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party to “present specific evidence, beyond mere denials or allegations that raise a
genuine issue for trial.” Farver v. McCarthy, 931 F.3d 808, 811 (8th Cir. 2019) (cleaned
up). In asserting a factual dispute, the nonmoving party “must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . ; or (B) showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an
adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(1). Similarly, Local Rule 4.01 requires:
Every memorandum in opposition must be accompanied by a document titled
Response to Statement of Material Facts, which must be separately filed using the
filing event “Response to Statement of Material Facts.” The Response must set
forth each relevant fact as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. The
facts in dispute shall be set forth with specific citation(s) to the record, where
available, upon which the opposing party relies. The opposing party also shall
note for all disputed facts the paragraph number from the moving party’s
Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts. All matters set forth in the moving
party’s Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts shall be deemed admitted for
purposes of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing
party.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants filed a statement of facts that complies with Rule 56 and Local Rule
4.01. [Doc. 59]. Plaintiff, however, did not respond to defendants’ statement of facts.
[Doc. 61]. Plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant does not excuse him from complying with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s local rules. Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d
330, 333 (8th Cir. 2001). 	The Court has carefully examined defendants’ evidence1 and
confirmed that their statements of fact have evidentiary support. Because plaintiff failed
1 Defendants supported their statement of uncontroverted material facts with excerpts from
plaintiff’s deposition [Ex. A at Doc. 59-1].
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to respond to defendants’ statement of facts, the following facts are deemed admitted.
Plaintiff did not have personal knowledge regarding what Amy Johnson or Sheriff
Wes Drury did or did not do with respect to the alleged delay of medication.
[Doc. 59 at ¶ 9].
Plaintiff received the disputed medication on or after February 19, 2019. [Id. at
¶ 10].
Plaintiff did not see any doctor who could diagnose him or otherwise give an
opinion with respect to whether there was any detrimental effect to his health
based on his complaint that he did not receive the medications. [Id. at ¶ 11].
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendants solely because of their
supervisory roles as sheriff and jail administrator. [Doc. 59-1, Ex. A at 83:8-18,
126:12-23].
Plaintiff did not communicate with either defendant during the relevant time. [Id.
at 70:18-71:8, 71:9–20; 110:6-15].
Plaintiff is unaware of any personal knowledge or involvement by defendants in
the alleged delay of his medication. [Id. at 80:6–81:10, 83:15-18].
In his response to defendants’ motion, plaintiff states that he asked for help with
his psychiatric issues, but the “people responsible” failed to ensure that he received his
medication. [Doc. 61].
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity. The availability of qualified immunity depends on the
answer to two questions: (1) did the defendant violate a constitutional right, and (2) was
the right clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Dean v. Bearden, 79
F.4th 986, 988 (8th Cir. 2023). “Unless both of these questions are answered
affirmatively, [a defendant] is entitled to qualified immunity.” Burns v. Cole, 18 F.4th
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1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2021). Here, defendants focus on the first question, arguing that
(1) plaintiff cannot establish that they were involved in the alleged delay in administering
his psychotropic medication, and (2) plaintiff has not produced verifiable medical
evidence showing a detrimental effect resulting from the purported delay. [Docs. 57, 58].
A claim under § 1983 requires proof that each defendant “personally violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 543 (8th Cir. 2014); see
also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (“liability under § 1983
requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights”). “[A]
general responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison [or jail] is insufficient to
establish the personal involvement required to support liability” under § 1983. Keeper v.
King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997). Instead, plaintiff must show that “each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.” Jones v. City of St. Louis, 104 F.4th 1043, 1050 (8th Cir.
2024).
“In the section 1983 context, supervisor liability is limited.” Boyd v. Knox, 47
F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995). “[A] supervisor incurs liability for [a constitutional
violation] when the supervisor is personally involved in the violation or when the
supervisor’s corrective inaction constitutes deliberate indifference toward the violation.”
Boyd, 47 F.3d at 968. “The supervisor must know about the conduct and facilitate it,
approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what [he or she] might see.” Id.
Plaintiff testified that he filed this lawsuit against the defendants solely because of
their supervisory roles as sheriff and jail administrator. [Doc. 59-1, Ex. A at 83:8-18,
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126:12-23]. He testified that he did not communicate with either defendant during the
relevant time. [Id. at 70:18-71:8, 71:9–20; 110:6-15]. Further, he testified that he was
unaware of any personal knowledge or involvement by defendants in the alleged delay of
his medication. [Id. at 80:6–81:10, 83:15-18]. As a result, plaintiff cannot establish that
defendants had knowledge of, or participated in, the alleged delay in administering his
psychotropic medication.
Further, defendants argue that plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation
because he has not produced verifiable medical evidence showing the alleged delay in
administration of his psychotropic medication had a detrimental effect on his health. To
succeed on a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a pretrial detainee
“must demonstrate that [he] had an objectively serious medical need that the defendants
knew of and yet deliberately disregarded.” Smith v. Lisenbe, 73 F.4th 596, 600 (8th Cir.
2023) (cleaned up). When a deliberate indifference claim is based on an alleged delay in
medical treatment, the plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to
show there was a detrimental effect caused by the delay.” Cheeks v. Belmar, 80 F.4th
872, 878 (8th Cir. 2023). A failure to establish a detrimental effect precludes a claim of
deliberate indifference. Id.; see also Hancock v. Arnott, 39 F.4th 482, 487 (8th Cir. 2022)
(concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to establish the detrimental effect of the delay
through medical evidence was fatal to his claim); Jackson v. Riebold, 815 F.3d 1114,
1120 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding that the plaintiff could not show deliberate indifference
because he failed to provide verified medical evidence establishing the detrimental effect
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of the delay in treatment).
Plaintiff conceded in his deposition that he did not consult any medical provider
who could diagnose him or offer an opinion on whether missing his psychotropic
medication for a period of fifteen days had any detrimental effect on his health. As a
result, he cannot establish that the alleged delay in administration of his psychotropic
medication had a detrimental effect on his health.
Based on the foregoing, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and their
motion for summary judgment is granted.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ affirmative defense of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is WITHDRAWN.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
the issue of qualified immunity is GRANTED. A separate judgment will be entered.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this Order would not be taken
in good faith.
SO ORDERED this 17th day of March, 2026.
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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